Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "United States. Department of Justice" in: publisher
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Responsibility for Issuing Revised Hatch Act Regulations: Memorandum for James A. Kahl, Deputy Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel [February 2, 1994]
"You have asked whether the Office of Personnel Management ('OPM') or the Office of Special Counsel ('OSC') has the authority to promulgate regulations delimiting the scope and nature of impermissible political activities under the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 ('Hatch Act Amendments'), […] OPM contends that OSC has plenary authority to issue Hatch Act regulations, whereas OPM is empowered to promulgate Hatch Act regulations only on two narrowly-defined subjects. OSC, on the other hand, asserts that it lacks authority to promulgate Hatch Act regulations. It contends that OPM historically has been responsible for issuing general Hatch Act regulations and that no provision in the Hatch Act Amendments has reassigned or diminished OPM's responsibility in this regard. After examining existing precedent, the statutes outlining the responsibilities of OPM and OSC for implementing the Hatch Act, and the text and legislative history of the Hatch Act Amendments, we conclude that OPM possesses the authority to promulgate regulations explicating the Hatch Act as amended."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1994-02-02
-
Reconsideration of Prior Opinion Concerning Land-Grant Colleges: Memorandum for James S. Gilliland, General Counsel, Department of Agriculture [December 23, 1993]
"This responds to your request that this Office reconsider our opinion that West Virginia may designate West Virginia State College (State College) as the beneficiary of appropriated funds under the Second Morrill Act, Act of August 30, 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321-326, 328), and that, upon such designation, State College would become eligible to receive appropriated funds for agricultural research and extension under 7 U.S.C. §§ 3221, 3222, and 3223. After reviewing the matter once more, we hereby withdraw our original opinion in favor of the revised views expressed in this memorandum. As explained below, we adhere to our earlier conclusion that West Virginia may validly designate State College as the beneficiary of appropriated funds under the Second Morrill Act. We reverse, however, our original conclusion that West Virginia's designation of State College as a Second Morrill Act beneficiary made that school eligible for funds appropriated pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §§ 3221, 3222, 3223 and similar statutes. (Following the usage of Agriculture, we shall refer to these statutes collectively as the '1890 derivative statutes.') Rather, we conclude that State College is not eligible for funds under the 1890 derivative statutes."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-12-23
-
Admissibility of Alien Amnesty Application Information in Prosecutions of Third Parties: Memorandum for the Inspector General, Department of Justice [December 22, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our legal opinion on whether the confidentiality provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5) bar Justice Department prosecutors from introducing evidence consisting of information submitted as part of an illegal alien's application for amnesty in a criminal prosecution of a third party. We conclude that (1) the introduction of such evidence is generally barred under the plain language of the statute but (2) it is not barred by the statute in the prosecution of third parties for crimes (e.g., the acceptance of a bribe by a government official for approving a false amnesty application) that facilitate or are closely related to the false amnesty application violations covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(6). It should also be noted that a defendant who is not himself the alien whose amnesty application file is used in violation of the statute would not likely have standing to move for suppression of (c)(5) information. However, Justice Department use of amnesty application information is also subject to a specific regulation promulgated by INS, and that regulation limits use against third parties to the prosecution of persons who have 'created or supplied a false writing or document for use in [an amnesty application].' 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(t)(3), (4) (1993). We believe that language would generally allow use of (c)(5) material to prosecute INS employees who take bribes to approve false amnesty applications, based on the reasoning that such an employee participates in the creation of falsified documents used in an amnesty application."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-12-22
-
Clarification of Prior Opinion Regarding Borrowing by Bank Examiners: Memorandum for the General Counsel, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System [December 20, 1993]
"This responds to your request that we clarify an aspect of an opinion previously issued by this Office respecting 18 U.S.C. § 213, which prohibits a bank examiner from borrowing from any Federal Reserve member bank or other covered entity that he examines, or any person connected therewith. See 'Memorandum Opinion for the Secretary of the Board, Federal Reserve Board', 6 Op. O.L.C. 509 (1982) ('1982 opinion'). Specifically, you have asked us whether footnote 8 from that opinion should be construed to mean that 18 U.S.C. § 213 prohibits bank examiners from receiving loans or credit from affiliates of member banks that they have examined in all cases where such affiliates are under 'common control' with the bank, or where the two entities have a common majority of corporate officers or directors. We conclude that such a construction is not required by the statute, except where the affiliated bank is serving as a conduit or 'front' for the implementation of a loan that is actually being extended due to the direction, instigation, or influence of the member bank or person connected therewith."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-12-20
-
Authority to Pay State and Local Taxes on Property After Entry of an Order of Forfeiture: Memorandum for Cary H. Copeland, Director and Chief Counsel, Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, and James Knapp, Deputy Director, Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Division [December 9, 1993]
"You have requested advice on two matters: a proposed Directive from the Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture ('Directive') that would authorize payment of state and local taxes on some civilly forfeited property for which the court had notice of a state or local tax claim before the court entered an order of forfeiture, and a draft Memorandum from the Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Division, to the Attorney General ('AG Memo') concluding that the Attorney General may pay state and local taxes on criminally forfeited property (and proposing an Attorney General Order to delegate such authority to the Director of the Asset Forfeiture Office). The proposed Directive and the draft AG Memo both raise the question of the Attorney General's discretionary authority to pay taxes, for the period from the offense giving rise to forfeiture to the entry of an order of forfeiture, on property for which a court has already entered an order of forfeiture. […] We now conclude that payment of taxes on civilly forfeited property on the terms set forth in the proposed Directive would not be inconsistent with the civil forfeiture statute and would not exceed the Attorney General's equitable discretion under the civil forfeiture laws. We also conclude that payment of taxes on criminally forfeited property in the circumstances apparently envisioned by the draft AG Memo would not be unlawful under the criminal forfeiture laws or beyond the Attorney General's equitable, discretionary authority under such laws. In addition, we describe revisions to the draft AG Memo necessary to assure accuracy in its description of OLC [Office of Legal Counsel] advice."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-12-09
-
Applicability of Executive Order No. 12674 to Personnel of Regional Fishery Management Councils: Memorandum to Ginger Lew, General Counsel, Department of Commerce [December 9, 1993]
This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion whether Executive Order No. 12674, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1989 Comp.) (Order), and the regulations implementing it apply to officials of the Regional Fishery Management Councils (Councils) established under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (Magnuson Act or FCMA). The officials in question are the Council members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) and the Councils' executive directors and administrative employees. We conclude that, under the unusual statutory scheme of the Magnuson Act, appointed Council members and the other Council personnel under consideration are not Executive Branch 'employees' subject to the Order."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-12-09
-
Constitutionality of Vesting Magistrate Judges with Jurisdiction Over Asset Forfeiture Cases: Memorandum to Stef Cassella, Deputy Director, Policy and Litigation, Asset Forfeiture Office [December 6, 1993]
"You have asked whether Congress may constitutionally enact a statute requiring that asset forfeiture cases involving property valued below a certain level be heard by a United States Magistrate Judge rather than a United States District Judge. The limitations imposed by Article III forbid Congress to assign jurisdiction over such cases to a Magistrate Judge without the assent of the parties. Therefore, we must advise you that the provision you have described would be unconstitutional."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-12-06
-
Whether Missouri Municipalities May Tax the Portion of Federal Salaries Voluntarily Contributed to the Thrift Savings Plan: Memorandum for James S. Gilliland, General Counsel, Department of Agriculture [November 10, 1993]
"You have requested our opinion on the following question: must the National Finance Center ('NFC') of the Department of Agriculture ('USDA') withhold and remit local earnings taxes levied by the municipalities of St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri, upon that portion of federal employees' salaries voluntarily contributed to the Thrift Savings Plan ('TSP')? The Financial Management Service ('FMS') of the Department of the Treasury ('Treasury') has taken the position that NFC should not withhold the Kansas City earnings taxes on TSP contributions of FMS employees because similar payments made by municipal employees are not subject to the earnings tax. As we explain in further detail below, we disagree with this approach because TSP contributions, which are held in trust for the contributors, can be distinguished from the deferred compensation plan payments that are exempt -- by a court ruling -- from earnings taxes. Thus, intergovernmental tax immunity does not preclude the Missouri municipalities from levying an earnings tax on voluntary TSP contributions. The St. Louis and Kansas City earnings taxes should be withheld and remitted."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-11-10
-
Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements: Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President [November 3, 1993]
"This memorandum provides you with an analysis of the legal significance of Presidential signing statements. It is addressed to the questions that have been raised about the usefulness or validity of a such statements. We believe that such statements may on appropriate occasions perform useful and legally significant functions. These functions include (1) explaining to the public, and particularly to constituencies interested in the bill, what the President believes to be the likely effects of its adoption, (2) directing subordinate officers within the Executive Branch how to interpret or administer the enactment, and (3) informing Congress and the public that the Executive believes that a particular provision would be unconstitutional in certain of its applications, or that it is unconstitutional on its face, and that the provision will not be given effect by the Executive Branch to the extent that such enforcement would create an unconstitutional condition. These functions must be carefully distinguished from a much more controversial -- and apparently recent -- use of Presidential signing statements, i.e., to create legislative history to which the courts are expected to give some weight when construing the enactment. In what follows, we outline the rationales for the first three functions, and then consider arguments for and against the fourth function. The Appendix to the memorandum surveys the use of signing statements by earlier Presidents and provides examples of such statements that were intended to have legal significance or effects."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-11-03
-
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform: Memorandum for Attorney General Janet Reno and Associate Attorney General Webster L. Hubbell [October 29, 1993]
"The Health Security Act creates for all citizens the security that health care coverage will always be available to them. It accomplishes this by building on the existing American system for providing health care, which largely operates through employers. Much of the system will be administered by the states, which will have primary responsibility to ensure that regional health alliances are established, to certify accountable health plans, and to provide mechanisms to resolve complaints and disputes. This legislation is well within the long-recognized authority of the federal government. It is fair to say that, just as the substantive contents of the legislation draw on existing models and approaches to health care delivery and financing, the structure, processes and mechanisms the legislation uses to accomplish its substantive objectives draw on already existing and validated techniques that the national government has employed on numerous other occasions. Notwithstanding the well-established legitimacy of the means that the Act employs to achieve a public purpose of paramount importance, some special interests have such financial stake in the current system that they have strong incentives to challenge the Act even on highly implausible grounds, if the consequences of doing so were to alter the ultimate design of the system even slightly in their favor."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-10-29
-
Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS: Memorandum for Gary J. Edles, General Counsel, Administrative Conference of the United States
"This memorandum responds to your request of July 30, 1993, which sought clarification of a portion of our April 29, 1991, letter to the Deputy Counsel to the President. Specifically, you raise two questions concerning the advice we gave on that occasion concerning the scope and application of the Emoluments Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 8. After noting that a significant number of the 101 members of the Administrative Conference (the Conference or ACUS) are lawyers in private practice, professors of law, or other experts in administrative law, you ask whether the Emoluments Clause prevents service on the Conference by private individuals who receive a partnership distribution from his or her firm that may include income received by the firm from a foreign government solely because of the pooling of partnership revenues. Further, you ask whether the Clause prevents service on the Conference by a private individual who receives payment from government-owned or controlled instrumentalities that do not engage in traditional functions -- including, but not limited to, foreign public universities."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-10-28
-
Liability of the United States for State and Local Taxes on Seized and Forfeited Property: Memorandum for Cary H. Copeland, Director and Chief Counsel, Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture [October 18, 1993]
"You have asked us to reconsider our opinion that property seized by and forfeited to the United States is not subject to state or local taxation for the period between the commission of the offense that leads to the order of forfeiture and the entry of the order of forfeiture. See Liability of the United States for State and Local Taxes on Seized and Forfeited Property, 15 Op. O.L.C. [Office of Legal Counsel] 85 (1991) (preliminary print) ('Harrison Memorandum'). In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), we partially reverse our opinion. Because states and localities may not tax federal property (absent express congressional authorization), the time at which ownership of forfeited property passes to the United States and the extent of the ownership interest that passes to the United States determine whether state and local taxes are owed. In many property transactions, the time and the extent of transfer of ownership are unambiguous and independent issues. In cases of transfers of ownership under the federal forfeiture statutes, however, the answer to the question of when ownership is transferred has been a matter of dispute, and of great consequence for the extent of the interest transferred."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-10-18
-
Immigration Consequences of Undocumented Aliens' Arrival in United States Territorial Waters: Memorandum for the Attorney General [October 13, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to requests made by the Office of the Associate Attorney General and the General Counsel's Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for our views on the consequences under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of an undocumented alien's arrival in United States territorial waters. Specifically, we have been asked whether undocumented aliens who have been interdicted within United States territorial waters are entitled to an exclusion hearing under section 236 of the INA. We have also been asked to review the INS's enforcement authority under INA section 287, and to assess the INS's recent interpretive regulation, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,257 (1992), codified at 8 C.F.R. § 287 (1993), insofar as it purports to define the 'external boundaries' of the United States under INA section 287. We understand that resolution of these issues is of some urgency because the United States has been interdicting, within its territorial waters, vessels transporting large numbers of undocumented aliens seeking admission into the United States from various foreign countries. These activities have raised the question whether the United States must provide exclusion proceedings for such aliens. Agencies represented on the Working Group on Ocean Policy and the Law of the Sea, in particular the State Department and the United States Coast Guard, have expressed an interest in the issues. We have therefore invited, and received, the views of the State Department and the Coast Guard."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-10-13
-
Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-Off in Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993 [Redacted]
From the Introduction: "This is a critical retrospective evaluation of the activities of the United States Department of Justice ('Department') and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI') during the fifty-one day stand-off at the Branch Davidians' Mt. Carmel compound near Waco, Texas which ended on April 19, 1993 when fire consumed the compound, killing David Koresh and most of his followers. To make this evaluation, I have reviewed the procedures followed by the Department and the FBI, giving particular attention to the means employed, the alternatives considered and the decisions made in attempting to resolve the stand-off."
United States. Department of Justice
1993-10-08
-
Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas: February 28 to April 19, 1993
"What follows is an attempt to explain what actually happened at the Branch Davidian compound between the arrival of the FBI on February 28, and the aftermath of the fire that occurred on April 19. As of the date of this report, the federal trial of the 12 individuals charged with the responsibility for the incidents in Waco has not yet occurred. Therefore, it can be anticipated that many additional facts will come out at trial which are not contained in this report. Nevertheless, we believe this report to be accurate and based upon solid evidentiary grounds; we expect additional details to be revealed at trial. This report has been prepared with the cooperation of literally hundreds of individuals. Approximately 950 interviews were conducted, and tens of thousands of pages of documents and transcripts were read and analyzed. This underlying documentation will be made available to the public, subject to the protection of information relating to sensitive law enforcement sources and methods, and personal privacy concerns, upon the completion of the pending prosecutions in the Western District of Texas. The report begins with a brief history of the Branch Davidian sect and the teachings of David Koresh. There follows a day-by-day chronology of the relevant events during the 51-day standoff. After this chronology, the report will address in more detail numerous areas of particular interest, such as negotiation strategies, the attitudes of individuals in the compound, the decision-making process within law enforcement, the planning for the April 19 insertion of gas, and the aftermath of the fire."
United States. Department of Justice
1993-10-08
-
Reimbursement for Costs of Attending Certain Banquets: Memorandum for Anthony C. Moscato, Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys [September 23, 1993]
"You have asked for our opinion whether employees in the United States Attorneys' offices may be reimbursed for the cost of attending retirement banquets for state officials. Your inquiry focuses on the Opinion of the Comptroller General in Richard W. Held, B-249249 (Dec. 17, 1992), which concluded that the cost of an FBI official's attending such a banquet is properly reimbursable. We believe that the Comptroller General's holding was correct and would be applicable to an employee of a United States Attorney's Office attending the same kind of event under like circumstances. However, we caution that application of the Held ruling should be carefully limited to closely similar factual circumstances, where the nature of the ceremonial event in question provides good reason to believe that the official or employee's attendance advances the office's authorized functions."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-09-23
-
Suspension of a United States Marshal: Memorandum for Shay Bilchik, Associate Deputy Attorney General [September 23, 1993]
"This memorandum will confirm oral advice, given to the Deputy Attorney General and to the Marshals Service, that the Attorney General has the power to suspend a United States Marshal without pay, with the President's prior approval. She may also designate an Acting United States Marshal during the period of the United States Marshal's suspension. This Office has concluded repeatedly that the Attorney General may suspend a United States Marshal without pay, provided that she has the prior approval of the President. The President's power to appoint a United States Marshal entails the power to remove him. […]The President's removal power includes 'the lesser power to place one upon temporary leave without pay as incidental to the power to appoint and dismiss.'"
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-09-23
-
Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters to the President and Other Officials: Memorandum for the Attorney General [September 21, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our legal opinion on the question of whether, and under what circumstances or conditions, the Attorney General may disclose grand jury material covered by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in briefings presented to the President and other members of the National Security Council (NSC). We conclude that the Attorney General may disclose 6(e) matters to the President or to other NSC members where such disclosure is for the purpose of assisting the Attorney General in her enforcement of federal criminal law. Disclosures satisfying this 'criminal law enforcement purpose' standard may be made without prior court approval or a showing of particularized need, but the names of those who received the information must be supplied to the district court that empaneled the grand jury. […] These court-approved disclosures may be made for the purpose of gaining assistance in civil as well as criminal litigation. We do not believe that any of the 6(e) exemptions would apply to disclosures made to the President or NSC officials for general policymaking purposes, as opposed to obtaining the assistance of those officials for law enforcement purposes."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-09-21
-
Ethics Issues Related to the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986: Memorandum for Stephen D. Potts, Director, Office of Government Ethics [September 12, 1993]
"You have asked us to advise whether we agree with a September 27, 1988 letter from the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) to the Department of Commerce (1988 OGE letter) and to review a draft OGE letter to the Special Counsel for Ethics at the Department of Health and Human Services (draft OGE letter). Both letters address issues involving the relationship between federal conflict-of-interest laws and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1534. We believe that the 1988 OGE letter was correct in concluding that payments to a government employee under FTTA section 7 do not violate 18 U.S.C. § 208 or 18 U.S.C. § 209(a). We also agree with the conclusion of the draft OGE letter that, on the specific facts stated there, section 208 bars an employee from working in his official capacity on an invention for which the employee holds a foreign patent, and for which the employee has contracted for foreign commercialization with the same company that is under contract with the federal government to develop the invention."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-09-13
-
General Services Administration Printing Operations: Memorandum for Emily C. Hewitt, General Counsel, General Services Administration [September 13, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion on certain restrictions that the Joint Committee on Printing ('JCP') has attempted to place on the printing operations of the General Services Administration ('GSA'). In particular, you have asked us whether the JCP has the authority to restrict GSA's printing functions, and whether recent legislation has any effect on GSA's authority to engage in printing. We conclude that the JCP does not have the authority to alter GSA's printing operations, but that section 207 of Public Law 102-392 (codified as a note to 44 U.S.C. § 501) mandates procurement of printing for executive branch agencies by or through the Government Printing Office ('GPO')."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-09-13
-
Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) to the Briefing and Arguing of Cases in which the Department of Justice Represents a Party: Memorandum for Stephen D. Potts, Director, Office of Government Ethics [August 27, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion whether 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) prohibits former high-level Department of Justice officials, within one year after their service in the Department ends, from filing briefs or making oral arguments on behalf of parties other than the United States in cases where the Department represents one of the parties. We conclude that the statute forbids these activities. I. Section 207(c) of title 18 prohibits a senior employee, for one year after termination of service, from knowingly making a communication to or appearance before his former department in connection with a matter on which he seeks official action. […] Notwithstanding these prior positions, a memorandum to our files dated January 14, 1993 ('January 1993 Memorandum') memorialized advice that section 207(c) does not preclude former senior officials from briefing and arguing cases in which the Department is or represents a party. Your recent letter about the January 1993 Memorandum argued that section 207(c) prohibits such advocacy, and that the amendments to section 207, which were passed in 1989, broadened, rather than narrowed, its scope. Letter to Daniel L. Koffsky, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from Stephen D. Potts, Director, Office of Government Ethics (June 4, 1993). The question we now face is whether we should revert to our original interpretation of section 207(c) or should adopt the reasoning of the January 1993 Memorandum."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-08-27
-
Construction of § 406 of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990: Memorandum for Joseph R. Davis, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation [August 23, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion whether § 406 of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA), 104 Stat. 1427, 1467, preserves extraordinary benefits payable under § 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-453, 102 Stat. 1904, 1911 (1988), as amended by the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-193, § 601, 103 Stat. 1701, 1710 (1989) (collectively, § 601), even after expiration of § 601's payment authority. We conclude that § 406 does not preserve the § 601 benefits beyond the expiration of the latter provision."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-08-23
-
Applicability of the Civil Service Provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code to the United States Enrichment Corporation: Memorandum for the General Counsel, United States Enrichment Corporation [June 22, 1993]
"You have requested our opinion on whether the United States Enrichment Corporation ('USEC') is subject to the civil service provisions of title 5 of the United States Code. We have concluded that, under the statute establishing USEC, title IX of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2923 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2297-2297e-7) ('the Act'), USEC is exempt from the civil service provisions of title 5. Before USEC was established, the Department of Energy ('DOE') produced enriched uranium for use as fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Congress decided that the DOE program was inefficient; the problems included increasing international competition, declining global market share, and billions of dollars in unrecovered costs of production. In response to these problems, Congress decided to transfer the DOE program to a government corporation that could eventually be sold to the private sector, in order to ensure that the program would be operated in a more business-like fashion."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-06-22
-
Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 93-1: Immigration Judge Decisions and Immigration Judge Orders
"The objective of this OPPM [Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum] is to establish and/or continue EOIR [Executive Office for Immigration Review] policies and procedures relating to Immigration Judge decisions that will, to the maximum extent possible, provide uniformity and consistency in Immigration Judge proceedings."
United States. Department of Justice. Executive Office for Immigration Review
1993-05-06
-
Authority to Grant Conservation Easements under 40 U.S.C. § 319: Memorandum for the General Counsel Department of Commerce [January 19, 1993]
"You have requested the opinion of the Department of Justice on whether the Secretary of Commerce has authority under 40 U.S.C. § 319 to convey to the City of Boulder, Colorado, a 'conservation easement' in federal property under the control of the Department of Commerce. The grant of this property interest would guarantee 'the perpetual preservation of open space . . . and maximum aesthetic and environmental limitations on future construction' on the site. We understand that your Office has tentatively concluded that the Department of Commerce 'may not possess such authority' and has notified the city attorney for Boulder of that view. Consistent with the tentative opinion of your office, we conclude that § 319 does not provide authority to grant a conservation easement. We believe that § 319 authorizes only the conveyance of property interests that were recognized by courts as valid and customary easements under the common law existing when the statute was enacted. Although the so-called scenic or conservation easement first developed as a land use device prior to enactment of § 319, it was not then recognized as a valid or customary easement in the vast majority of jurisdictions. In the absence of any indication that Congress intended § 319 to include conservation easements, we conclude that the Department of Commerce is not authorized under § 319 to convey such an easement."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-01-19
-
Authority of the Secretary of the Treasury Regarding Postal Service Bond Offering: Memorandum for the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury [January 19, 1993]
"You have requested our opinion concerning the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury under 39 U.S.C. §§ 2003(d) and 2006(a) to purchase bond issues of the Postal Service and to control the disposition of the proceeds thereof. Specifically, we were asked to address the legal issues arising from the proposed bond issue described in Postmaster General Runyon's October 7, 1992, letter to Secretary Brady. Although we understand that Treasury and the Postal Service have reached an agreement, in consequence of which the Postal Service has withdrawn this particular bond issue, we are memorializing our legal conclusions in this memorandum because of the recurring importance of these issues. The Postal Service's plan was to issue bonds in the amount of $3 billion. The Postal Service proposed to transfer the proceeds of the bond issue to a trustee who would then purchase an equivalent amount of government securities, the interest and principal of which would be dedicated to repayment of approximately $2.6 billion of Postal Service debt held by the Federal Financing Bank ('FFB'). Under a ruling of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, this transaction would have allowed the Postal Service to remove the original FFB debt from its books, producing, the Postal Service asserted, cost savings and financial flexibility."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-01-19
-
Authority of the Attorney General to Make Successive Designations of Interim United States Marshals: Memorandum for the Assistant to the Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General [January 19, 1993]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 562, the Attorney General may make two or more successive designations of a person to serve as interim United States marshal in a judicial district where the marshal's office is vacant. You have also asked whether, after the expiration of an initial designation under § 562, the Attorney General may authorize a person to act as marshal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510. We conclude that § 562 permits the Attorney General to make successive interim designations, and that the Attorney General also may authorize a person to act as marshal under §§ 509 and 510."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1993-01-19
-
[Letter from William P. Barr, Attorney General, to the President of the United States Regarding the Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, December 4, 1992]
From the letter: "You have asked for my views as to your authority to commit United States troops to support and secure the humanitarian assistance effort currently underway in Somalia. I am informed that the mission of those troops will be to restore the flow of humanitarian relief to those areas of Somalia most affected by famine and disease, and to facilitate the safe and orderly deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces in Somalia in the near future. I understand that private United States nationals and military personnel are currently involved in relief operations in Somalia. I am further informed that the efforts of the United States and other nations and of private organizations to deliver humanitarian relief to those areas of Somalia are being severely hampered by the breakdown of governmental authority in Somalia and, in particular, by armed bands who steal relief commodities for their own use. I conclude that in your constitutional role as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, you may reasonably and lawfully determine that the protection of those engaged in relief work in Somalia, including member so the United States Armed Forces who have been and will be dispatched to Somalia to assist in that work, justifies the use of United States military personnel in this operation. I further conclude that you have authority to commit foreign nationals in Somalia. You have authority to troops overseas without specific prior Congressional approval 'on missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting American lives or property or American interests.' […] As explained more fully in the enclosed opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, your authority thus extends to the protection of the lives of United States citizens and others in Somalia."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
Barr, William Pelham, 1950-
1992-12-04
-
Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations Revised 11/13/92
"The following Guidelines on the use of undercover activities and operations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are issued under the authority of the Attorney General provided in Title 28, United States Code, Sections 509, 510, and 533. They apply to all investigations conducted by the FBI, except those conducted pursuant to its foreign counterintelligence and foreign intelligence responsibilities. The use of the undercover technique, including proprietary business entities, is essential to the detection, prevention, and prosecution of white collar crimes, public corruption, terrorism, organized crime, offenses involving controlled substances, and other priority areas of investigation. However, these techniques inherently involve an element of deception and may require cooperation with persons whose motivation and conduct are open to question, and so should be carefully considered and monitored."
United States. Department of Justice
1992-11-13
-
Immigration and Naturalization Service Participation in Computer Matching Program with Department of Education: Memorandum Opinion for the Secretary, Data Integrity Board [September 21, 1992]
"You requested our opinion whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service ('INS') has legal authority to participate in a computer matching program with the Department of Education ('Education') involving alien applicants for federal student aid under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965. As explained in more detail below, we conclude that INS does have legal authority to participate in the matching program at issue."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1992-09-21
