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[April 18, 2019 Letter to the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Lindsey Graham and the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Jerrold Nadler]
From the Letter: "I write to provide additional information regarding the Attorney General's April 18, 2019 invitation to certain Members of Congress to review a less-redacted version of Special Counsel Robert Mueller's Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (Report). [...] The Attorney General has determined that it is appropriate to provide the Chairman and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, the members of the 'Gang of Eight,' and one designated staff person per member access via 'in camera' review to certain material redacted in the publicly released report."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legislative Affairs
Boyd, Stephen E.
2019-04-18
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[March 24, 2019 Letter to the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Lindsey Graham, the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Jerrold Nadler, the Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Dianne Feinstein, and the Ranking Member of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Doug Collins]
From the Letter: "As a supplement to the notification provided on Friday, March 22, 2019, I am writing today to advise you of the principal conclusions reached by Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III and to inform you about the status of my initial review of the report he has prepared."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Attorney General
Barr, William Pelham, 1950-
2019-03-24
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[May 7, 2019 Letter to the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Jerrold Nadler]
From the Letter: "As you know, the Attorney General has repeatedly sought to accommodate the interests of the House Committee on the Judiciary in the investigation conducted by Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. On April 18, 2019, the Attorney General voluntarily disclosed to Congress the Special Counsel's report, which was intended to be 'confidential' under the applicable regulations, with as few redactions as possible, consistent with the law and long-established confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch. He also made available to you and other congressional leaders a minimally redacted version of the report that excluded only grand-jury information, which could not lawfully be shared with Congress. In response, you refused even to review the minimally redacted report and the Special Counsel's entire investigative files, which consist of millions of pages of classified and unclassified documents, bearing upon more than two dozen criminal cases and investigations, many of which are ongoing."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legislative Affairs
Boyd, Stephen E.
2019-05-07
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[May 6, 2019 Letter to the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Jerrold Nadler]
From the Letter: "I write you in response to your May 3, 2019 letter to the Attorney General. We appreciate the House Committee on the Judiciary's (Committee) offer to negotiate a reasonable accommodation to the demands made by the April 18, 2019 subpoena, and we emphasize the Department of Justice's (Department) continued willingness to engage in good faith with the Committee on these issues consistent with its obligations under the law. We were disappointed that the Committee took initial steps this morning toward moving forward with the contempt process."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legislative Affairs
Nadler, Jerrold
2019-05-06
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[March 29, 2019 Letter to the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Lindsey Graham and the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Jerrold Nadler]
From the Letter: "I write in response to Chairman Nadler's March 25, 2019 letter and Chairman Graham's March 27, 2019 letter, which addressed the investigation of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III and the 'confidential report' he has submitted to me pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c). As we have discussed, I share your desire to ensure that Congress and the public have the opportunity to read the Special Counsel's report. We are preparing the report for release, making the redactions that are required. The Special Counsel is assisting us in this process."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Attorney General
Barr, William Pelham, 1950-
2019-03-29
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Report of Investigation of Former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey's Disclosure of Sensitive Investigative Information and Handling of Certain Memoranda
From the Introduction: "This report describes the investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) into the creation, storage, and handling of certain memoranda (Memos) written by former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James B. Comey. Between January 6, 2017, and April 11, 2017, while Comey was Director of the FBI, he memorialized seven one-on-one interactions that he had with President-elect and President Donald J. Trump. Throughout this report, these Memos are referred to as Memo 1 through Memo 7, numbered chronologically according to the date each Memo was written. Comey, who had original classification authority as FBI Director, marked a small amount of information in Memo 1 as classified at the time that he wrote it. Comey also believed that Memo 3 contained classified information when he wrote it, but did not mark the document as classified. Comey kept signed originals of Memos 2, 4, 6, and 7 in a personal safe in his home and, following his May 2017 removal as FBI Director, provided his personal attorneys with copies of Memos 2, 4, and 6, and a redacted version of Memo 7; Comey never took copies of Memos 1, 3, and 5 to his home, and never shared these Memos with anyone outside the FBI."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2019-08
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Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Disciplinary System
"This review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) disciplinary system is the fifth in a series of Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviews assessing Department components' disciplinary systems. The FBI's mission is to 'protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats; uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States; and provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.' [...] The FBI has defined the actions that violate its standards of conduct and hinder the performance of the FBI's mission. In addition, the FBI has identified the range of discipline it may impose when an employee deviates from these standards and commits misconduct. The OIG conducted this review to examine the FBI's investigations of allegations of misconduct against FBI employees and to assess whether the FBI imposed consistent, reasonable, and timely discipline for misconduct. In this Executive Digest, we first provide a brief overview of the FBI's disciplinary system, followed by a summary of our results and our recommendations."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-05
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U.S. Department of Justice FY2010 Performance Budget: National Drug Intelligence Center
"In FY 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requests a total of $44,023,000, to provide domestic strategic counterdrug analysis in support of policy makers and resource planners and support to law enforcement authorities and the intelligence community by conducting document and computer exploitation of materials collected in Federal, State, and local law enforcement activity associated with counter-drug, counter-terrorism, and national security investigations and operations. This request includes a base adjustment of $23,000. NDIC supports national policymakers and law enforcement decision makers by providing strategic domestic drug intelligence; facilitating information sharing and liaison between intelligence and law enforcement agencies; providing timely operational support to law enforcement authorities by conducting document and media exploitation of evidence collected during Federal, state, and local law enforcement investigations; and providing training in support of the above efforts. NDIC has been a contributor to our nation's counternarcotics effort, the U.S. DOJ Strategic Plan and the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy. In FY2008 the NDIC intelligence analysis staff produced 39 major recurring intelligence assessments and updated two major topical assessments. In November 2007 NDIC published and disseminated the National Drug Threat Assessment 2008, a comprehensive account of the threat to the United States posed by the trafficking and abuse of illicit and pharmaceutical drugs. Since then NDIC has completed 29 planned drug market analyses for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program and 9 regional drug threat assessments for the DOJ Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program."
United States. Department of Justice. Justice Management Division
2009-04-29
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Review of the Department of Justice's Use of Less-Lethal Weapons
"Department of Justice (Department) Special Agents, Deputy Marshals, and correctional personnel may use less-lethal weapons when circumstances require use of some force, but use of deadly force would not be appropriate. Use of these weapons can also enhance the safety of law enforcement officers and the public during law enforcement operations. However, while less-lethal weapons are less likely to cause serious injury or death than firearms, significant injuries and fatalities can result from their use. […] The OIG conducted this review to determine the types of less-lethal weapons used by the Department's law enforcement components; the extent to which the components are using these weapons; whether training and controls have been implemented to ensure the weapons are used properly; whether Department components have identified the impact of using these weapons on their missions; and whether the Department assesses, deploys, and oversees new and emerging less-lethal weapon technologies. In addition, the OIG examined research related to less-lethal weapons conducted or funded by the Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ). We also reviewed the Civil Rights Division's investigations of less-lethal weapon usage by Department law enforcement components and state and local law enforcement agencies."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-05
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Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (as required by Section 1001(3) of Public Law 107-56) [February 2009]
"Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act), Public Law 107-56, directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) to undertake a series of actions related to claims of civil rights or civil liberties violations allegedly committed by DOJ employees. It also requires the OIG to provide semiannual reports to Congress on the implementation of the OIG's responsibilities under Section 1001. This report -- the fourteenth since enactment of the legislation in October 2001 -- summarizes the OIG's Section 1001-related activities from July 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-02
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Office of Justice Programs Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants Awarded to the City of Providence Police Department, Providence, Rhode Island
"The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants, numbers 2005-DJ-BX-1439, 2006-DJ-BX-0569, 2007-DJ-BX-1096, and 2008-DJ-BX-0442, awarded by the Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to the City of Providence Police Department (Providence) in Providence, Rhode Island. The purpose of the grants was to improve the functioning of Providence's criminal justice system. In addition, we also evaluated Providence's capacity to effectively manage grants provided through the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Providence was in the process of receiving these additional funds from OJP and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) at the time of our audit. These funds included three Recovery Act grants including a Byrne grant, number 2009-SB-B9-0441, a congressionally directed grant, number 2009-CK-WX-0638, and a 2009 COPS Hiring Recovery Program grant. The three Recovery Act grants awarded in 2009 totaled $6,144,946. The objectives of this audit were to: (1) determine whether reimbursements claimed for costs under the grants received were allowable and supported and, (2) whether Providence had the capacity to adequately manage those grants it received through the Recovery Act. In addition, we evaluated program performance and accomplishments for those grant programs where Providence had expended funds.
United States. Department of Justice. Audit Division
2010-03
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Use of Equitable Sharing Revenues by the Minneapolis Police Department, Minneapolis, Minnesota
"The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the use of DOJ equitable sharing revenues by the Minneapolis Police Department (Minneapolis PD). Equitable sharing revenues represent a share of the proceeds from the forfeiture of assets seized in the course of certain criminal investigations. During the period of January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008, the Minneapolis PD was awarded DOJ equitable sharing revenues totaling $366,489 to support law enforcement operations. The Minneapolis PD generally complied with equitable sharing guidelines with respect to accounting for equitable sharing receipts, the use of equitable sharing funds, supplanting, and reporting The results of our work are discussed in greater detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report. The audit objectives, scope, and methodology appear in Appendix I. We discussed the results of our audit with Minneapolis PD officials, and we included their comments in the report, as applicable."
United States. Department of Justice. Audit Division
2010-03
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Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records [January 2010]
"On March 9, 2007, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued its first report on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) use of national security letters (NSL). Issued in response to the requirements in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Patriot Reauthorization Act), the first report described the use and effectiveness of NSLs, including 'any illegal and improper use,' in calendar years 2003 through 2005. On March 13,2008, the OIG issued its second report on NSLs, which assessed the corrective actions the FBI and the Department had taken in response to the OIG's first NSL report. The second report also described NSL usage in calendar year 2006. In this third report, we describe the results of our investigation of the FBI's use of exigent letters and other informal requests, instead of NSLs or other legal process, to obtain the production of non-content telephone records from employees of three communications service providers (Companies A, B, and C). The OIG conducted this investigation to examine in greater detail the extent of the FBI's use of exigent letters and other informal requests for such information, as well as to assess the accountability of FBI employees and supervisors who were responsible for these practices. We examined the conduct of the FBI personnel who signed these letters or made these informal requests, their supervisors, and the FBI's senior leadership."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2010-01
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Prosecuting Computer Crimes
"This manual is a product of the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) of the United States Department of Justice. Just as in Searching and Seizing Computers and Electronic Evidence (2d ed. 2002) and Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes (3d ed. 2006), we emphasize real world practice issues for working prosecutors. This manual examines the federal laws that relate to computer crimes. Our focus is on those crimes that use or target computer networks, which we interchangeably refer to as 'computer crime,' 'cybercrime,' and 'network crime.' Examples of computer crime include computer intrusions, denial of service attacks, viruses, and worms. We make no attempt to cover issues of state law and do not cover every type of crime related to computers, such as child pornography or phishing."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Education
2007-02
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Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (as required by Section 1001(3) of Public Law 107-56) [August 2009]
"Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act), Public Law 107-56, directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) to undertake a series of actions related to claims of civil rights or civil liberties violations allegedly committed by DOJ employees. It also requires the OIG to provide semiannual reports to Congress on the implementation of the OIG's responsibilities under Section 1001. This report-the fifteenth since enactment of the legislation in October 2001-summarizes the OIG's Section 1001-related activities from January 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-08
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FY 2010 Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement Congressional Submission
"The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program directly supports both Priority III (Disrupting the Market Threat of Illegal Drugs) of the President's National Drug Control Strategy and Strategic Goal 2.4 (Reduce the threat, trafficking, use, and related violence of illegal drugs) of the Strategic Plan of the Department of Justice (DOJ). In FY 2010, the OCDETF Program is requesting a total of 3,430 positions, 3,376 FTE, and $537,507,000 for the Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement (ICDE) Appropriation. This request represents a program increase $8,938,000 over the FY 2010 Current Services Level Request to support the Administration's Southwest Border Enforcement Initiative. Electronic copies of the Department of Justice's Congressional Budget Justifications and Capital Asset Plan and Business Case exhibits can be viewed or downloaded from the Internet using the Internet address: http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2010justification/. Twenty-seven years after its creation, the OCDETF Program continues to be the centerpiece of the Justice Department's intra- and inter-agency drug enforcement strategy, pursuing comprehensive, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional investigations of major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations that are responsible for the flood of illegal drugs in the United States, and the violence generated by the drug trade. Consistent with the President's National Drug Control Strategy, which seeks to "break" the drug market by making the drug trade more costly and less profitable, OCDETF simultaneously attacks all elements of the most significant drug organizations affecting the United States."
United States. Department of Justice. Justice Management Division
2009
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Top Management Challenges in the Department of Justice-2008
This memorandum is the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) 2008 list of top management and performance challenges facing the Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ's OIG has prepared similar lists since 1998. "By statute, this list is required to be included in the Department's annual Performance and Accountability Report. As in past years, the challenges are not presented in order of priority-we believe that all are critical issues facing the Department. We hope that this document will assist Department managers in developing strategies to address the top management and performance challenges facing the Department. We look forward to continuing to work with the Department to address these important issues."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
Fine, Glenn A.
2008-11-13
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Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Threat and Suspicious Incident Tracking System
"The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this audit to evaluate the policies and procedures the FBI uses to identify, assess, and track terrorist threats and suspicious incidents. In particular, we examined the FBI's: (1) Guardian Threat Tracking System; (2) Guardian threat assessment processes and operational guidance established by FBI headquarters; and (3) Guardian threat assessment policies and procedures in practice at six FBI field offices we visited. To conduct the review we: (1) reviewed threat management documents by the FBI officials and Guardian users assigned to various headquarters locations; (3) interviewed FBI officials and Guardian users at select field offices; (4) examined the process followed by the FBI in developing, implementing, maintaining, and updating Guardian; (5) tested samples of terrorism-related incidents tracked in Guardian; and (6) tested samples of counterterrorism-related cases in the Automated Case Support (ACS) system. [...] Guardian is an automated system that records, stores, and assigns responsibility for follow up on counterterrorism threats and suspicious incidents. Guardian can be used to distribute immediate threat information to users, and it also provides the capability to analyze threat information for trends and patterns."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-11
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Department of Justice Efforts in Managing Information Technology Security Vulnerabilities
"The Department of Justice (Department), like the rest of the federal government has become increasingly dependent on information technology (IT) systems to accomplish its mission. These systems contain a wide range of data regarding individuals, organizations, and other sensitive information. Any IT system inherently contains vulnerabilities that, if exploited, can expose sensitive information to unauthorized individuals, and in some cases compromise national security. To reduce the risk of compromise of its IT systems and the data they contain, it is essential that the Department minimize the vulnerabilities in its IT systems. Enhancing the security of the information contained within its IT systems is a top priority of the federal government and the Department. [...] The objectives of this audit were to identify the Department's major systemic IT security vulnerabilities and assess the Department's progress in mitigating the identified vulnerabilities, in monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the IT security program, and in improving the overall security of its IT systems. The scope of our audit was limited to a review of the vulnerability management part of the Department's IT security program, which focuses on addressing the greatest threats to IT systems. We did not review and evaluate the adequacy of other elements of the Department's overall IT security efforts, such as training or contingency planning."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-12
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Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' Controls Over Its Weapons, Laptop Computers, and Other Sensitive Property
"This audit of the ATF's controls over its weapons, laptop computers, and other sensitive property is one of a series of follow-up audits that the OIG is conducting to examine DOJ components' controls over their weapons and laptop computers. The objectives of this audit were to assess the adequacy of ATF's actions taken in response to weapons, laptop computers, ammunition, and explosives identified as lost, stolen, or missing, and the effectiveness of ATF's internal controls over weapons, laptop computers, ammunition, and explosives. Our other audits of controls over weapons and laptop computers in DOJ components did not include a review of ammunition and explosives. However, we included ammunition and explosives in this audit because the 2002 Treasury OIG audit identified weaknesses in these areas. Our review covered the 59-month period from October 1, 2002, through August 31, 2007. […] Over the 59-month period we tested, 76 weapons and 418 laptop computers were lost, stolen, or missing from ATF. ATF's rate of weapons loss per month has nearly tripled since Treasury's 2002 audit, and the rate of loss per month for laptop computers was 50 times higher than what the 2002 audit revealed. […] We also found serious deficiencies in ATF's response to these lost, stolen, or missing items. […] Our audit concluded that ATF had adequate controls over the explosives in its possession. We also concluded that ATF had proper physical security over its ammunition. However, we identified continued weaknesses in ATF's ammunition accountability and controls."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-09
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Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters [March 2007]
This is the unclassified version of the report, released in March 2007. "In the Patriot Reauthorization Act, enacted in 2006, Congress directed the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to review 'the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national security letters issued by the Department of Justice.' The Act required the OIG to conduct reviews of the use of national security letters for two separate time periods. This report describes the results of the first OIG review of the FBI's use of national security letters (NSLs), covering calendar years (CY) 2003 through 2005. [...] In this review, the OIG conducted interviews of over 100 FBI employee, including personnel at FBI Headquarters in the Office of the General Counsel (FBI-OGC), Counterterrorism Division, and Counterintelligence Division, and personnel in four field divisions. We also interviewed officials in the Department's Criminal Division and National Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Coordinators. We also attended background briefings regarding national security letters is stored and analyzed. We examined over 31,000 FBI documents from FBI Headquarters operational and support divisions and four field divisions pertaining to national security letters. Among the documents we analyzed were Headquarters guidance memoranda; correspondence; and reports by the FBI's Inspection Division, FBI-OGC, and Office of Professional Responsibility. In addition, we analyzed documents from the Department's Office of Legislative Affairs that included testimony, memoranda, and hearing transcripts regarding the oversight and reauthorization of the Patriot Act, including provisions affecting national security letter authorities and semiannual classified reports to Congress on the FBI's use of national security letter authorities."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2007-03
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Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices
This U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General report reviews the FBI's Terrorist Watchlist nomination practices. "The federal government's consolidated terrorist watchlist was created in March 2004 by merging previously separate watchlists that were once maintained by different agencies throughout the federal government. The watchlist is managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), through its supervision of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The watchlist is used by frontline screening personnel at U.S. points of entry and by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials. The watchlist serves as a critical tool for these screening and law enforcement personnel by notifying the user of possible encounters with known or suspected terrorists and by providing instruction on how to respond to the encounter. Each day the watchlist is updated with new or revised biographical information on known or suspected terrorists gathered by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including the FBI. Within the FBI, submitting the name of a known or suspected terrorist to the consolidated terrorist watchlist is referred to as a watchlist nomination. In general, individuals who are subjects of ongoing FBI counterterrorism investigations are nominated for inclusion on the watchlist, including persons who are being preliminarily investigated to determine whether they have links to terrorism. In certain circumstances, FBI policy also allows for the nomination of an individual for who the FBI does not have an open terrorism investigation."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-05
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Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by Monterey County, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to Monterey County, California. As of October 30, 2008, Monterey County had received SWBPI funding totaling $192,930. [...] The objective of our audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by Monterey County were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. [...] Many drug and other criminal cases occurring along the southwest border are initiated by a federal law enforcement agency or multi jurisdictional task forces, e.g., High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). Many U.S. Attorneys, including the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California, have developed prosecution guidelines which govern the most common violations of federal law. These prosecution guidelines are used by law enforcement agencies to determine whether to file a case in federal, state, or county court. As a result, many federally initiated cases occurring near the southwest border are referred to the state or county for prosecution."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-02
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U.S. Department of Justice Annual Financial Statement: Fiscal Year 2008
"This audit report contains the Annual Financial Statement of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department) for the fiscal year (FY) ended September 30, 2008."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-01
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Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by San Mateo County, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to San Mateo County (San Mateo), California. As of April 17, 2008, San Mateo had received SWBPI funding totaling $1,520,999. […] The objective of our audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by San Mateo were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. We found that all of the cases San Mateo claimed and was reimbursed for were ineligible under the SWBPI guidelines. Specifically, San Mateo received unallowable reimbursements totaling $1,520,999 for 1,076 cases submitted because they were not federally initiated."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-08
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Follow Up Audit on the Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by the City and County of San Francisco, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, previously completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to the City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco), California, and issued a final report in November 2007. The objective of our prior audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by San Francisco were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. [...] San Francisco provided a total of 134 cases that it believed were eligible for maximum SWBPI reimbursements totaling $1,170,000 under the "both" prosecution and pretrial detention reimbursement category. However, San Francisco acknowledged that the OIG would apply the quarterly pro-rata rates to the maximum reimbursement for all cases determined to be eligible. We found that San Francisco was able to provide support for allowable SWBPI reimbursements totaling $522,957. As a result, San Francisco must repay the remaining $2,528,192 in unallowable SWBPI reimbursements as shown in the following table."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-10
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Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by San Benito County, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to San Benito County (San Benito), California. As of April 15, 2008, San Benito had received SWBPI funding totaling $397,984. […] The objective of our audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by San Benito were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. We found that all of the cases San Benito claimed and was reimbursed for were ineligible under the SWBPI guidelines. Specifically, San Benito received unallowable reimbursements totaling $397,984 for 103 cases submitted because they were not federally initiated."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-10
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Interim Review of ATF's Project Gunrunner
"Project Gunrunner is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) national initiative to reduce firearms trafficking to Mexico and associated violence along the Southwest border. In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) and in fiscal year (FY) 2009 appropriations, ATF received $21.9 million in funding to support and expand Project Gunrunner. In May 2009, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) opened an evaluation of Project Gunrunner, which is ongoing. We are issuing this interim report on Project Gunrunner plans as ATF is expanding the project. In our review, we concluded that aspects of ATF's Project Gunrunner expansion plans will enhance its ability to combat firearms trafficking. However, in our view some planned Project Gunrunner activities do not appear to represent the best use of resources to reduce firearms trafficking, and issues with new office locations, staffing structure, personnel with Spanish proficiency, and program measures need to be addressed. […] We also concluded that the staffing model ATF plans to use for the new Gunrunner teams appears adequate, provided ATF defines the reporting and supervisory structure. However, we found that ATF has insufficient numbers of personnel proficient in Spanish on Gunrunner teams. Finally, we concluded that more specific program measures are needed to accurately measure Project Gunrunner's impact on cross-border firearms trafficking. In this interim report we make seven recommendations for ATF to improve its allocation of resources and implementation of Project Gunrunner expansion plans."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-09
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Federal Bureau of Investigation's Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator Program
"The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to: assess how the FBI's WMD Coordinators should plan and perform activities that address prioritized WMD threats and vulnerabilities, evaluate the FBI's integration of WMD Coordinator functions with field division intelligence capabilities and practices, and review FBI efforts to ensure that WMD Coordinators and others that work on the WMD program have the skills and abilities necessary to detect and prevent WMD attacks. […] During this audit, we examined how the FBI supports and manages WMD Coordinators to enable them to address pressing WMD threats and vulnerabilities in their field divisions. We also reviewed how WMD Coordinators interacted with Intelligence Analysts and examined how they used information provided in WMD intelligence reports to enhance their knowledge of threats facing their field division. We further considered whether the FBI has provided adequate training for and oversight of its WMD Coordinator and Intelligence Analyst personnel. In addition, we examined WMD activity reports from each field division and reviewed strategic plans, operational guides, and FBI directives to ascertain WMD Directorate efforts to track and evaluate WMD Coordinator activities. […] In this report we make 13 recommendations relating to the FBI's WMD Coordinator program. These recommendations include implementing procedures to help increase WMD Coordinators' domain awareness, ensuring that WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts are sharing WMD-related information, and providing the necessary training to ensure that WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts have the skills necessary to address domain needs."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-09
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United States National Central Bureau of INTERPOL
This U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General report addresses the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB) of INTERPOL. "Our objectives for this audit were to evaluate the USNCB's efforts to ensure sharing of INTERPOL information among federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; review the USNCB's processes for the exchange of INTERPOL information to ensure that requests for assistance and information were handled in an appropriate, efficient, and timely manner; review the USNCB's controls over INTERPOL case information; and examine the USNCB's organizational role and strategic priorities to ensure that they are in line with DOJ priorities. […] To evaluate the USNCB's processes and controls over the exchange and integration of information, we reviewed the USNCB's policies and procedures for maintaining data within its case management system, and we performed various tests on domestic and foreign law enforcement agency notices and diffusions. We also reviewed records from automated domestic data systems to determine if INTERPOL information was included in the databases in a timely manner and whether the information was accurate, complete, and consistent."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-09
