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CBP and CWMD Need to Improve Monitoring and Maintenance of Radiation Portal Monitor Systems (Redacted)
From the Highlights: "CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] uses RPM [Radiation Portal Monitor] systems as the primary means to scan for radiological and nuclear threats and materials at U.S. ports of entry. We conducted this audit in response to a hotline complaint. Our objective is to determine the extent to which CBP monitors and maintains its RPM systems in accordance with DHS acquisition guidelines, policies, and procedures. [...] We made two recommendations to improve the monitoring and maintenance of CBP's RPM systems."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-04-27
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Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
From the Highlights: "Our objective was to determine whether DHS complied with PIIA [Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019] and Executive Order 13520, 'Reducing Improper Payments' (November 20, 2009), in fiscal year 2021. We also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS' payment integrity reporting. [...] We made two recommendations that, when implemented, should improve DHS' compliance with PIIA."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-06-08
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DHS Office of Inspector General, Testimony of Acting Inspector General John V. Kelly, Hearing Before Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, March 6, 2019
From the testimony of John V. Kelly: "My testimony today will focus on our recent work in the areas of: (1) family separation, (2) unannounced inspections of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities, (3) the Department's efforts to hire and train border patrol agents and immigration officers, and (4) oversight of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster relief work."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2019-03-06
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FEMA's Waiver Authority Under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018
From the Document: "Several challenges limited our ability to fulfill the mandate in Section 1216 of the 'Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018' (DRRA). For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) data system does not capture Individuals and Households Program (IHP) assistance data in a manner that allows us to accurately calculate a percentage of distributions made in error in any 12-month period. In addition, the amount of data required to conduct the audit represents millions of rows of data, as well as underlying supporting documents. These efforts require considerable resources for FEMA to provide, and the Office of Inspector General to review, the IHP information. Facing these limitations, we adopted an alternate approach to estimate FEMA's percentage of distributions made in error. Specifically, we analyzed FEMA's IHP Recoupment Processing Executive Summary for fiscal years 2015 through 2019 and concluded that, for these fiscal years, FEMA's percentage of distributions identified for recoupment was, on average, less than 1 percent -- well below the DRRA's 4 percent threshold."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-05-10
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Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative
From the Document: "In advance of Federal approval for emergency use of the Coronavirus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine, DHS prepared to coordinate employee vaccinations by tasking its components to identify eligible personnel in health care and frontline occupations in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. DHS acted swiftly to identify employees in vaccination priority groups, but provided minimal guidance to components, resulting in inconsistent responses across the Department as to which types of employees were deemed eligible. DHS only partially committed staff resources and delayed establishing a comprehensive, full-time task force to manage the effort. Also, at times, DHS' communications to its employees were inconsistent or unclear, causing confusion among some employees. DHS successfully vaccinated some employees, but missing and erroneous personnel data in DHS systems used to facilitate vaccinations contributed to DHS falling short of reaching its vaccination goals. This report identifies areas of consideration for DHS to better prepare for future emergencies and pandemics. We make one recommendation to improve DHS' ability to identify essential employees, when necessary, in future emergency situations. Also, DHS should consider improving its preparedness by developing incident response protocols that include a plan for establishing and staffing an incident response team. To foster trust among its workforce, DHS should strive to communicate directly and consistently with personnel during future initiatives. Finally, DHS should consider devising and implementing a methodology for conducting oversight of employee data."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-05-10
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Yuma Sector Border Patrol Struggled to Meet TEDS Standards for Single Adult Men but Generally Met TEDS Standards for Other Populations
From the Document: "As part of OIG's [Office of Inspector General's] annual, congressionally mandated oversight of CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] holding facilities, we conducted unannounced inspections of five locations in the general area of Yuma, Arizona, to evaluate CBP's compliance with applicable detention standards. [...] We made one recommendation to Yuma sector Border Patrol to monitor data integrity. We did not make recommendations on TEDS [National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search] compliance because there are relevant outstanding recommendations from a prior review."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-04-14
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ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 Before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights
From the "What We Found": "U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) policy requires coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) testing of migrants before transfer, transport, or release from ICE detention facilities. These policies do not include requirements to test family units or noncitizen unaccompanied children (UC) before transfer from U.S. Customs and Border Protection custody. ERO has a process for escorting UCs, but the process does not include requirements to ensure UCs are tested for COVID-19 before transport to the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement. The Department of Homeland Security Chief Medical Officer recommended UCs receive a COVID-19 test before transport. However, ICE has not implemented this recommendation. We identified numerous instances where ERO could not provide evidence that single adults, family units, and UCs were tested for COVID-19 before transport on domestic commercial flights. It is important for DHS and all its components to detect and slow the spread of COVID-19, and ICE is responsible for transporting migrants domestically to ICE facilities and other locations. Therefore, to reduce the spread of COVID-19, ICE should ensure migrants in its care are COVID-19-negative before they board domestic commercial flights. Without ensuring all migrants are COVID-19-negative and without complete records, ERO could risk exposing other migrants, ERO staff, and the general public to COVID-19 on domestic commercial flights."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-05-18
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Semiannual Report to Congress, October 1, 2021 - March 31, 2022
From the Document: "During this reporting period, DHS OIG [Office of the Inspector General] completed audits, inspections and evaluations, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department's programs and operations. Audits provide essential transparency over DHS-level programs and operations and are concentrated in promoting effective governance and accountability across the DHS, ensuring taxpayer funds are used effectively and efficiently. Inspections and evaluations provide systematic and independent assessments of the design, implementation, and results of DHS operations, programs, and policies to determine their efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. They may include reviews of high-profile or particularly sensitive matters. Investigations address alleged violations of law that impact the DHS's programs, operations, facilities, and personnel. Priority is given to investigations of suspected violations of criminal and civil statutes. Investigators work closely with prosecutors and other law enforcement organizations."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-06-09
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FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions
From the Highlights: "Through grants to states, FEMA uses the HMGP [Hazard Mitigation Grant Program] to purchase properties that are flood damaged or in flood-prone areas, demolish any structures on them, and ensure they are maintained forever as open space. FEMA has acquired more than 32,000 properties for open space since 1989. We conducted this audit to determine whether FEMA is properly using the HMGP for property acquisitions. [...] We made four recommendations to help FEMA strengthen its property acquisition activities."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2022-06-22
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A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the
Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and Homeland Security Investigations
"The U.S. Southwest border with Mexico spans nearly 2,000 miles. The region presents unique challenges to law enforcement, and, because multiple law enforcement agencies engage in investigative activity along the Southwest border, effective cooperation among such agencies is important to ensure that all agencies perform their work without jeopardizing the safety of law enforcement and the public. The U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) are among the largest U.S. federal investigative law enforcement agencies. [...] For this review, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the DHS Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) jointly evaluated cooperation between the FBI and HSI on Southwest border criminal investigations."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2019-07
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Department of Homeland Security: Office of Inspector General: Fiscal Year 2004: Annual Performance Plan
"The Annual Performance Plan is the OIG's 'roadmap' for the inspections and audits it plans to conduct each year to evaluate department programs and operations. In devising the plan, OIG endeavors to assess the department's progress in meeting what we consider to be its major management challenges. This plan describes more projects than may be completed in FY 04, especially since we anticipate that developments and requests from DHS management and Congress during the year will necessitate our undertaking some projects that we cannot anticipate now. Resource issues too may require us to vary the plan in some way as the year progresses. Finally, the plan contemplates that some jobs listed here will start during FY 04 but will carry over into FY 05. In establishing priorities, the OIG placed particular emphasis on legislative mandates, such as the Chief Financial Officer's Act and the Federal Information Security Management Act, DHS' strategic objectives, the President's Management Agenda, the Secretary's priorities, Congressional priorities, and the most serious management challenges facing DHS.'"
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2004
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Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical Emergency Preparedness and Response Database (Redacted)
The DHS Inspector General found that FEMA's Emergency Preparedness and Response database does not have "adequate or effective database security controls for NEMIS [National Emergency Management Information System]."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2005-09
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Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings
"As outlined in a May 21, 2013, memorandum from the participating Inspectors General, the objectives of this review were to determine: [1] The extent of the information available to the U.S. government concerning the relevant individuals and events preceding the Boston Marathon bombings; [2] Whether the sharing of this information was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information sharing, policies, regulations, and U.S. laws; and [3] Whether there are weaknesses in protocols and procedures that impact the ability to detect potential threats to national security. In furtherance of these objectives, the Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) sought to develop a chronology of the events leading up to the bombings based on information that was known to the U.S. government prior to April 15, 2013. We also sought to identify what additional information existed and may have been available to the U.S. government before the bombings. In considering whether information that existed prior to the bombings was 'available' to the U.S. government, the OIGs took into account the limited facts known to U.S. government agencies prior to the bombings and the extent of the government's authority under prevailing legal standards to access that information. As a result, the scope of this review included not only information that was in the possession of the U.S. government prior to the bombings, but also information that existed during that time and that the federal government reasonably could have been expected to have known before the bombings."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General; United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2014-04-10
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Investigation of DHS Employee Corruption Cases: Fiscal Year 2015 Report to Congress
"The Secretary announced the delegation of criminal misconduct investigative authority on September 18, 2014. This authority permits Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to work side by side, as appropriate, with other Federal investigative agencies looking into alleged criminal conduct by CBP employees, which should increase workforce accountability and enable CBP leadership to have greater awareness of conduct and integrity issues. CBP is directed to provide regular updates as it converts internal affairs investigators to criminal investigators as part of this transition. Further, the Deputy Secretary shall continue to oversee joint coordination of integrity oversight, as discussed in the Senate report."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General . . .
2015-11-23
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Interagency Review of Prior Inspector General Recommendations Related to U.S. Export Controls, Volume II
This report of the Offices Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury; and the Central Intelligence Agency; and the United States Postal Service; addresses the issue of U.S. Export Controls. In this volume II are two Appendixes. Appendix H is the Department of Homeland Securities report. Appendix I is a follow up on prior interagency reviews.
United States. Department of State. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Commerce. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General . . .
2008-09-30
