Advanced search    Help

Clear all search criteria

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

• Association of Old Crows Annual Symposium and Convention

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Nashville, TN, Monday, October 28, 2002 to the Association of Old Crows. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The real issue we face, though, is how to weigh the risks of using force, should we have to do so, and that's what I'd like to talk about briefly this afternoon. Those risks are very real. As President Bush has demonstrated over and over again, he takes those risks extremely seriously, as does everyone in his administration. That's why the President has made it clear that he will do everything possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that resolves this issue that resolves this danger to our country and the world, if possible, without the use of force".

  United States. Department of Defense

  Wolfowitz, Paul

  2002-10-28
• Center for the Study of Popular Culture, Restoration Weekend Conference

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Palm Beach, FL on Friday, November 15, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The war on terrorism is not something that's going to be over with one battle or one engagement, or in one country. As President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have said over and over again, we are in for a long war. If we do capture Osama bin Laden or kill him, the war will not be over. My boss reminded people right after September 11th that it's a mistake, in fact, to focus too much on one individual. And indeed, in some sense we should remind ourselves that the war on terrorism is not only about killing and capturing terrorists. As President Bush said in his State of the Union message, a major part of our efforts is building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terrorism, and particularly in the Muslim world.

  United States. Department of Defense

  Wolfowitz, Paul

  2002-11-15
• Government Electronics and Information Technology Association

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Vienna, VA to the Government Electronics and Information Technology Association on Wednesday, October 30, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz discussed operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the technologies and strategies used in those operations.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2002-10-30
• FORTUNE Global Forum

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld gave a speech in Washington, DC on November 11, 2002. Secretary Rumsfeld said "In the global war against terrorism, President Bush has assembled the largest coalition in the history of mankind. Not bad for an administration that's frequently described by the press, and some in Europe, as unilateralist. The scope of this alliance is truly breathtaking in its breadth and its depth. Some 90 nations -- nearly half of the countries on the face of the earth -- are participating in the global war on terrorism. Never before have the interests of civilized nations more clearly overlapped. And never before have the nations of the world so effectively cooperated to defend them".

  United States. Department of Defense

  Rumsfeld, Donald, 1932-

  2002-11-11
• United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1998

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This document explains the Special Operations Forces' (SOF's) posture statement for 1998. The contents include the following: special operations, the relevance of Special Operations Forces, current operations, SOF around the world, U.S. Southern Command and Special Operations Command South, U.S. Atlantic Command and Special Operations Command Atlantic, U.S. European Command and Special Operations Command Europe, U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command Central, U.S. Pacific Command and Special Operations Command Pacific, and Special Operations Command Korea, Emerging Threats and SOF Funding, SOF Organization, SOF Programs and Systems appendices, and a glossary. Special operations forces have been a part of the U.S. military history since the colonial era. In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. These operations have always been carried out by specially trained people with a remarkable inventory of skills. SOF principal missions: counter-proliferation, combating terrorism, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, psychological operations, civil affairs, unconventional warfare, and information operations. Characteristics of special operation forces exemplify the following: mature professional with leadership abilities, specialized skills, equipment, and tactics, regional focus, language skills, political and cultural sensitivity, and small, flexible, joint-force structure.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2002-06-16
• Toward a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing: An Overview of the 1996 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The April 1996 Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense contains the U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement that includes three essential elements: (1) national security interests; (2) U.S. military forces; (3) allied contributions to security. The importance of responsibility sharing with allies of the United States poses an important concern to Congressional leaders. An alliance relationship based upon shared roles, risks, responsibilities and costs allows the United States to align itself in a strategic role with regards to its' allies in Europe, Japan, South Korea, and the Gulf States. This report contains an overview of the strategic context of responsibility sharing and country summaries that include statistics of country responsibility sharing contribution in the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1996-04-01
• Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (1997)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The March 1997 Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense presents the Department of Defense assessment of the relative contributions toward common defense and mutual security made by the NATO nations, key U.S. allies in the Pacific such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Under legislative provisions dating to the Defense Authorization Act of 1981 (P.L. 96-342, Section 1006), the Department of Defense is required to compare the defense burdens borne by the United States and our allies, explain disparities, and describe efforts to eliminate such disparities. The Defense Authorization Act of 1997 (P.L. 104-201, Section 1084) updates the earlier reporting requirement by recognizing that there are multiple and diverse ways in which allies may share the responsibility for mutual security objectives. The report contains three chapters that include the U.S. responsibility sharing policy, key allies (NATO, Pacific, and GCC), and an assessment of country contributions (i.e. the defense spending as a percent of GDP, multinational military activities, cost sharing, and foreign assistance) by each country. The NATO countries listed include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The pacific allies include Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the Gulf Cooperation Council that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1997-03-01
• Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The purpose of this order is to provide Marine Corps policy, planning guidance and assignment of responsibilities in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities during presidential declared or undeclared disasters and domestic emergencies per references (a) through (h) in this document. Included are provisions for domestic emergencies including: (a) Natural disasters including earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms, floods, wildland fires, wind driven waters, tidal waves (tsunami) or other catastrophes; (b) A civil disturbance in which group acts of violence and disorder prejudice public law and order; (c) Attacks on the United States, its territories, or possessions; and (d) Terrorist acts.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1998-10-13
• Managing the Consequences of Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  In the event of a domestic incident on American soil resulting in the release of CBRNE, the local law enforcement, fire and emergency medical personnel who are first to respond may become rapidly overwhelmed by the magnitude and lingering effects. In that instance, a governor may request a Presidential disaster declaration for the state and assistance from the federal government through the LFA. If DoD assistance is requested, the Department of Defense has many unique capabilities, both technical and operational, which could support civil authorities to mitigate and manage the consequences of such an incident. Consequence management brings together the skills and assets of many government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. By enhancing America's preparedness, the likelihood that an event will occur, or the consequences if it does occur, will be reduced. The Department of Defense is committed to providing preparatory assistance and stands ready to contribute its unique capabilities when called upon.

  United States. Department of Defense

  Cohen, William S.

  2001
• Military Commission Instruction: Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission (Draft)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction provides guidance with respect to crimes that may be tried by military commissions established pursuant to references (a) and (b) and defines the elements of those crimes. This instruction is issued pursuant to Section 7(A) of reference (a) Military Commission Order No. 1 (March 21, 2002), and in accordance with references (b) Military Order of November 13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 F.R. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001), (c) Section 113(d) of Title 10 of the United States Code, and (d) Section 140(b) of Title 10 of the United States Code. The following crimes outlined in this document and elements thereof are intended for use by military commissions established pursuant to references (a) and (b), the jurisdiction of which extends to offenses or offenders that by statute or the law of armed conflict may be tried by military commission as limited by reference (b). These crimes and elements derive from the law of armed conflict, a body of law that is sometimes referred to as the law of war. They constitute violations of the law of armed conflict or offenses that, consistent with that body of law, are triable by military commission. This document does not preclude trial for crimes that occurred prior to its effective date.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2003-02
• Military Commission Instruction No. 5: Qualification of Civilian Defense Counsel

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction establishes policies and procedures for the creation and management of the pool of qualified Civilian Defense Counsel authorized in Section 4(C)(3)(b) of reference (a) Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), in accordance with reference (b) Military Order of November 13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 F.R. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001).

  United States. Department of Defense

  2003-04-30
• Military Commission Instruction No. 7: Sentencing

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This instruction promulgates policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for matters related to sentencing of persons with regard to whom a finding of guilty is entered for an offense referred for trial by a military commission appointed pursuant to references (a) Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), and (b) Military Order of November 13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 F.R. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001). Reference (a) permits a military commission wide latitude in sentencing. Any lawful punishment or condition of punishment is authorized, including death, so long as prerequisites detailed in reference (a) are met. Detention associated with an individual's status as an enemy combatant shall not be considered to fulfill any term of imprisonment imposed by a military commission. The sentence determination should be made while bearing in mind that there are several principal reasons for a sentence given to those who violate the law. Such reasons include: punishment of the wrongdoer; protection of society from the wrongdoer; deterrence of the wrongdoer and those who know of his crimes and sentence form committing the same or similar offenses; and rehabilitation of the wrongdoer. In determining an appropriate sentence, the weight to be accorded any or all of these reasons rests solely within the discretion of commission members. All sentences should, however, be grounded in a recognition that military commissions are a function of the President's war-fighting role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and of the broad deterrent impact associated with a sentence's effect on adherence to the laws and customs of war in general.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2003-04-30
• Toward a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing: An Overview of the 1995 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The April 1995 report, "Toward a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing," provides an overview of the United States and Allied contributions in coping with the complex realities and opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War. The concept of "Responsibility Sharing" provides a clearer sense of present and future realities than the older idea called "Burden Sharing." The reports are written to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Defense and belong to the series entitled Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense, which include: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 reports. The thrust of the reports deal with responsibility sharing and is based on the fact that allied nations contribute to their security, and to our own, in a variety of ways. For example, in Europe, through initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace, the U.S. is working with its' Allies to build a new security architecture that will enhance peace and stability throughout the transatlantic region. The country summaries provide a statistical account of the respective country contributions regarding responsibility sharing in the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2002-04-01
• Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: Address to the Troops and All Department of Defense Personnel [September 12, 2001]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated: "Great crises are marked by their memorable moments. At the height of peril to his own nation, Winston Churchill spoke of 'their finest hour.' Yesterday, America and the cause of human freedom came under attack. And the first great crisis of America's 21st century was suddenly upon us. And we saw the memorable moments. Who will ever forget the display of national unity on the steps of the Capitol Building? People will long remember seeing and hearing members of Congress spontaneously breaking out into 'God Bless America.' What a wonderful thing for the world to see. What pride we can take in that moment. So too, President Bush's address to the nation will live in memory. He spoke for all of us when he showed his compassion and concern but also noted a 'quiet unyielding anger' among the American people. He offered a clear-sighted view of what needs to be done to prepare for the future. As one of those working with him on his national security team I can report that, throughout this crisis, the President has been as commanding and impressive in person as he has been in his public addresses."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001-09-12
• Department of Defense Directive 5134.08: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB))

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This Directive, consistent with sections 142 138(b)(10) and 138d of title 10, United States Code (Reference (a)), reissues DoD [Department of Defense] Directive (DoDD) 5134.8 (Reference (b)) in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5134.01 (Reference (c)) to update the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the ATSD(NCB) ASD(NCB), under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L))."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2011-05-12
• DoD Joint Service Chemical/Biological Defense Program Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book FY 2002 Amended Budget Submission Procurement Defense-Wide

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The DoD Chemical/Biological Defense (CBD) Program provides development and procurement of systems to enhance the ability of U.S. forces to deter and defend against chemical and biological (CB) agents during regional contingencies. The probability of U.S. forces encountering CB agents during worldwide conflicts remains high. An effective defense will reduce the probability of a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attack and enable U.S. forces to survive, continue operations, and win. This program supports U.S. counterproliferation policy. The program continues to implement congressional direction to improve joint CB defense capabilities and reflects an integrated DoD jointly developed program. This year's program continues funding to support counterproliferation initiatives within the passive defense area. This funding enhances and accelerates high-payoff technologies for advanced CB defense systems. This budget submission also includes increased funding for research, development, and acquisition of CB defense systems/equipment and vaccines. Moreover, the Department continues to procure new CB defense equipment for our forces, due in large measure to the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommendation to increase planned spending on counterproliferation by $1 billion over the FY 1999-2003 program period, of which $732 million was allocated to the DoD CBD program. The thrust of the CBD program is to deter the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with an integrated systems approach to force protection on the battlespace. The DoD CBD program invests in technologies to provide improved capabilities that have minimal adverse impact on our warfighting potential. Joint and Service unique programs support the framework of the three tenets of CB defense: Contamination Avoidance (detection) and NBC Battle Management (reconnaissance and warning of battlespace contamination to enable units to maneuver around them), Force Protection (individual, collective, and medical support), and Decontamination.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001-06
• Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program: FY00-02 Overview

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The mission of the CBDP is to provide world-class chemical and biological defense capabilities to allow the military forces in battlespace environments contaminated with chemical or biological warfare agents. Under the oversight of a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, the individual Services, working within the framework of a Joint Service Agreement, have planned and supported a robust, coordinated program. This overview document provides highlights of our major efforts within the program, providing a summary of FY00 accomplishments and goals for FY01 and beyond. A separate, more detailed DoD Annual Report to Congress on the Chemical and Biological Defense Program is provided to the Congress.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement 2000

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  More recent history has caused the United States to maintain specialized forces capable of performing extremely difficult, complex, and politically sensitive missions on short notice, in peace and war, anywhere in the world. In 1987, Congress mandated the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) with the responsibility to prepare and maintain combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). The characteristics of SOF personnel are shaped by the requirements of their missions and include foreign language capabilities; regional orientation; specialized equipment, training, and tactics; flexible force structure; and an understanding of the political context of their mission. Today's SOF are the product of an evolutionary process. The lessons learned from past operations and events, as well as the requirements of current missions and operations, have brought about a unique force with distinctive characteristics, capabilities, and limitations.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2000
• Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress: Executive Summary (1999)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The CPRC focused its annual activity and program review on identifying key R&D and acquisition program accomplishments and milestones illuminating planned near-, mid-, and longterm capability improvements. The CPRC has determined that a prudent, time-phased response to the challenges posed by NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats is in place and solidly under way. Although it will take several years to achieve the goals and objectives of the numerous programs responding to these challenges, the CPRC can report that progress continues to be made in many ACE priority areas. This progress continues to strengthen U.S. capabilities for countering proliferation and NBC terrorism and includes: i) the rapid fielding of essential capabilities; ii) coordinating and focusing interorganizational R&D and acquisition activities; iii) expanding international cooperative activities; and iv) improving the integration, management, and oversight of activities and programs related to countering proliferation and NBC terrorism."

  United States. Department of Defense

  1999
• Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress: Executive Summary (1998)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The CPRC focused its annual activity and program review on identifying key R&D and acquisition program accomplishments and milestones illuminating planned near-, mid-, and longterm capability improvements. The CPRC has found that a prudent, time-phased response to the challenges posed by NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats is in place and solidly under way. Although it will take several years to achieve the goals and objectives of the numerous programs responding to these challenges, the CPRC can report that progress continues to be made in many ACE priority areas. This progress continues to strengthen U.S. capabilities for countering proliferation and NBC terrorism and includes: i) the rapid fielding of essential capabilities; ii) coordinating and focusing interorganizational R&D and acquisition activities; iii) expanding international cooperative activities; and iv) improving the integration, management, and oversight of activities and programs related to countering proliferation and NBC terrorism.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1998
• Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress: Executive Summary (1997)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The counterproliferation ACEs for 1997 are listed in Table 1. They reflect the newly developed and prioritized CINC counterproliferation required capabilities, results of recent counterproliferation-related studies and analyses conducted in support of the budget development processes of the CPRC-represented organizations, and the growing government-wide concern about the potential for NBC terrorist threats. The ACEs reflect evolving needs and shortfalls that change as threats evolve and become better understood and as research and development (R&D)and acquisition programs mature, enabling new operational capabilities. Updated and current ACEs will serve to improve the focus of future programmatic and managerial efforts to counter NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats. This year, each CPRC-represented organization individually prioritized the ACEs in accordance with their own departmental mission needs to more accurately reflect each organization's response to countering proliferation. This paper outlines key activities undertaken and accomplished by DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence to enhance the interdepartmental response to countering NBC/M proliferation and terrorist threats since the May 1996 CPRC report was submitted."

  United States. Department of Defense

  1997
• Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress: Executive Summary (1996)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The CPRC reviewed the progress in meeting the goals and objectives of this plan last year and recommended additional initiatives to improve the interdepartmental response to countering WMD proliferation threats. These recommendations included establishing a prioritized list of counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs). The ACEs define those priority areas where additional capabilities are required to meet the challenges posed by WMD proliferation threats. They prioritize the counterproliferation-related responses to interdepartmental policy needs and, in particular, reflect the operational requirements of the Unified Commands for countering proliferation. In fact, the counterproliferation ACEs combine the CPRC-endorsed NPRC "Areas for Progress" and the counterproliferation warfighting priorities of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified Commands. The ACEs, listed in Table 1, serve to guide the CPRC's program review process and are used as the basis to assess progress in meeting the counterproliferation and related nonproliferation mission needs of the CPRC-represented Departments. Because several new initiatives have been undertaken since the CPRC/NPRC review process began, the time is right to evaluate the progress that has been made in enhancing the ability of the U.S. to respond to and counter WMD proliferation threats. Accordingly, the CPRC focused its review activities this year on examining key accomplishments in each ACE priority area. Although it will take several years to implement the full set of CPRC/NPRC recommendations, the CPRC can report that progress has been made over the past two years in many ACE priority areas. This progress has led to a strengthening of U.S. capabilities for countering proliferation. This strengthening includes the rapid fielding of essential capabilities, focused interdepartmental R&D activities, and improved integration, management, and oversight of programs related to countering proliferation."

  United States. Department of Defense

  1996
• Department of Defense Instruction 2200.01: Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP), September 15, 2010

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction reissues DoD Instruction 2200.01. It establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for combating trafficking in person and implements National Security Presidential Directive 22.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-09-15
• Department of Defense Directive: DoD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "a. In accordance with section 113 of title 10, United States Code (Reference (a)) and consistent with Presidential Policy Directive No. 1 (Reference (b)), establishes DoD policy and assigns DoD responsibilities for countering financing used to engage in terrorism, illicit trafficking networks, and related activities that support an adversary's ability to negatively affect U.S. interests. b. Incorporates and cancels Directive-Type Memorandum 08-034 (Reference (c))."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-08-19
• Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-006 - 'DoD Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 12 (HSPD-12)'

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "HSPD-12 [Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 12] mandates a Government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractor employees under the terms of applicable contracts. HSPD-12 further directs Federal Departments and Agencies to migrate to a single identification standard for Federal employees and contractor employees under the terms of applicable contracts, for physical access to all Federally controlled facilities and logical access to Federally controlled information systems. 'National security systems,' as defined by section 3542 (b)(2) of title 44, United States Code (Reference (a)), and 'Special-Risk Security Provisions,' as defined by Federal Information Processing Standard 201-1 (FIPS 201-1) (Reference (b)), are exempted from this policy. The Common Access Card (CAC) is the DoD [Department of Defense] Federal credential, and as such, effective immediately and consistent with applicable law, the CAC will be accepted by all DoD Components as the official DoD/Federal identification credential that can be used for logical and physical access once access privileges are granted. These credentials do not automatically grant access to either Federally controlled facilities or information systems."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-08-10
• Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the U.S. Military Service Academies: Academic Program Year 2009-2010, Report to the Congressional Defense Committees of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Section 532 of Public Law Number 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requires an assessment at the Military Service Academies (MSA) during each Academic Program Year (APY). This assessment is to determine the effectiveness of the policies, training, and procedures of the Academy with respect to sexual harassment and violence involving Academy personnel. In APYs beginning in odd-numbered years (e.g., APY 09-10), the annual assessment is comprised of an Academy self-assessment and an anonymous survey of cadets and midshipmen. This survey, the bi-annual Defense Manpower Data Center's (DMDC) 2010 Service Academy Gender Relations (SAGR) Survey covers topics such as incidence of unwanted sexual contact and harassment, reporting and training, and characteristics of the unwanted sexual and gender-related behaviors. The Department of Defense (DoD) consolidates and summarizes the reports from each Academy and the results from the 2010 SAGR Survey. This summary serves as the Department's Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies covering APY June 1, 2009 through May 31, 2010. Appendix A is the aggregate sexual assault data and consolidated data matrices. TABs A through C of this report are the self-assessments from the United States Military Academy (USMA), the United States Naval Academy (USNA), and the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), respectively. The 2010 SAGR Survey is available at http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/research."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-12
• Department of Defense Final Report to Congress on Access to National Airspace for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This final report, generated in response to direction contained in Section 935(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, Public Law 111-84, provides information describing Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Transportation (DoT) efforts to jointly develop a plan for providing expanded access to national airspace for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) of the DoD. This report expands on the information provided in the April 2010 Interim Report and has been coordinated between DoD, DoT and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-10
• Department of Defense Instruction 8581.01: Information Assurance (IA) Policy for Space Systems Used by the Department of Defense

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This Instruction: A) Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 8581.1 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) in accordance with the guidance in DoDI 5025.01 (Reference (b)) and the authority in DoDD 5144.1 (Reference (c)). B) Implements requirements of National Security Directive 42 (Reference (d)) by establishing IA policy and assigning responsibilities for all space systems used by the Department of Defense in accordance with Committee on National Security Systems Policy No. 12 (Reference (e)). C) Supplements IA policy and requirements contained in DoDD 8500.01E (Reference (f)) and DoDI 8500.2 (Reference (g))."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2010-06-08
• DoD Instruction 5525.15: Law Enforcement (LE) Standards and Training in the DoD, December 22, 2016

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This Instruction reissues and cancels the April 27, 2012 publication of "Law Enforcement (LE) Standards and Training in DoD". "In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5124.02 and DoD Instruction 5105.18, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for: [1] DoD military and civilian LE standards and training. [2] The DoD Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission. [3] Certification and physical fitness standards for DoD military police (MP), civilian police (CP), and security guards (SGs). [4] Certification for investigative analysts (IAs)."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2016-12-22
• DoD Directive 2060.02: DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy, January 27, 2017

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and formalizes relationships among the DoD Components for countering WMD (CWMD) in accordance with Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code and the DoD Strategy for CWMD."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2017-01-27