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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Unexploded Ordnance
"The Defense Science Board Task Force on Unexploded Ordnance, UXO, met from September 2002 to May 2003. The Task Force's charter contained two principal questions: (1) can advanced technology help reduce the very high cost of UXO cleanup at former and current test and training sites and (2) can advanced technology help minimize the environmental impact of future live-fire munitions training? The Task Force's answer to both these questions is a qualified "yes". This report describes the UXO cleanup problem and makes recommendations to save tens of billions of dollars in future cleanup costs."
United States. Defense Science Board
2003-12
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Defense Science Board Task Force on The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities
The Task Force was charged to examine the use of red teams in the Department of Defense and recommend ways that such teams could be of greater value to the department. The term "red team" refers to not only "playing" adversaries or competitors, but also serving as devil's advocates, offering alternative interpretations (team B) and otherwise challenging established thinking within an enterprise. The report argues that red teaming is especially important now for the DoD. Current adversaries are tougher targets for intelligence than was the United State's major cold war foe. Red teaming deepens understanding of options available to adaptive adversaries and both complements and informs intelligence collection and analysis. Aggressive red teams are needed to challenge emerging operational concepts in order to discover weaknesses before real adversaries do. In addition, in the wake of recent military operations, use of red teams can temper the complacency that often follows success. The authors elaborate on the meaning of red teaming and discuss the attributes of effective red teams. A summary of some current red team activities in DoD is provided as well as a discussion of a special case of the use of red teams where the red team addresses issues fundamental to the existence of the enterprise and not just particular plans or programs. The report concludes with a discussion of several recommendations on the use of red teams.
United States. Defense Science Board
2003-09
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Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing
"This report concludes that sea basing will be a critical future joint military capability for the United States. It will help to assure access to areas where U.S. military forces may be denied access to support facilities. To develop such a complex, enduring and far reaching capability as sea basing, the Task Force believes it is essential to undertake a spiral development effort - one that accounts for evolution from current capabilities to tomorrow's needs. In addition, the development process must incorporate experimentation to identify and correct development concerns and to train sea basing leaders for the future."
United States. Defense Science Board
2003-08
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Enabling Joint Force Capabilities
U.S. national security leaders face a complex, dynamic set of demands in protecting the interests of the United States and its allies. Three key trends shape the nature and capability of the military forces required to meet these demands: 1. The limited ability to predict when, where, and under what conditions we will need to commit U.S. military forces, the need for forces that enjoy dominant superiority over potential adversaries, and the rapid development and global availability of information technology. Taken together, these trends underscore the need for enhanced joint capabilities. The task force identifies specific characteristics and examples of organizations that could be capable of accepting responsibility and accountability for delivering the capability with needed responsiveness, reviews and understands the current state of assigned responsibilities and accountability for joint capabilities to quickly bring combat forces together and focus them on joint objectives across a wide spectrum of possible contingencies, and recommends further steps to strengthen the joint structure ability to quickly respond with effective joint force operations with integrated Service-and Agency-provided force capabilities.
United States. Defense Science Board
2003-08
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force
"[The task force conducted] a comprehensive study of the ends and means of precision compellence, or the nuanced use of force, in concert with coalition partners, to achieve political, economic and moral change in countries affecting US interests. Real-world events have since underscored the need for such a study; indeed, the U.S. military applied key elements of a measured, nuanced approach in both the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. [The task force] notes this evolution in operations and a parallel evolution in the thinking of the combatant commands and services. Because of this evolution, it is no longer as necessary as it once was to sell the fundamental objectives of what we term here the discriminate use of force (DUF). These emerging capabilities exist within a political context that requires the use of discriminate force. Moreover, destructive power alone is not sufficient to reach many U.S. goals, and it must be properly applied. [...] DUF is about more than the limited use of force. [...] The intent is to apply force discriminately in order to achieve the desired and avoid the undesired. [...] The task force's concept of the discriminate use of force harmonizes with some contemporary thinking about effects-based operations (EBO). [...] The task force's recommendations focus on how the Department of Defense (DoD) can (1) implement DUF or EBO more consistently, and (2) achieve the needed institutional and organizational changes, particularly in career structures."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force
2003-07
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Defense Science Board Task Force: Training for Future Conflicts
The report has a training goal: instruct and convince the acquisition and personnel communities to recognize instinctively that military proficiency is as dependent on the warriors who operate weapon systems as it is on the weapon system technology, and a superb way to waste personnel or system acquisition money is to ignore training, or to tacitly allow training to pay the bills for acquisition or personnel system flaws in those more measurable arenas. The task force work described in this report is aimed at determining how our forces must prepare for conflicts in the future, 10 to 20 years from now. The task force examined what a future conflict might be. Then the task force considered what future training for future wars might require. The special forces units employed were superbly trained for the Afghan campaign. However, the integration of all of our forces into that war leaves us with training lessons, especially for preparation for "no-plan" contingencies. The rest of our forces need to train in the continuous ways that our special units often can. In this report we suggest some technological and bureaucratic changes that might lead in that direction. Nevertheless, the unimplemented structural changes to the defense and intelligence systems that we recommended in our previous report are still needed if our forces are to be given a chance to learn before they get to the war how to fight, jointly, in the new combinations that will be required to succeed in planned or unexpected future conflicts.
United States. Defense Science Board
2003-06
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Defense Science Board Task Force on Future of the Aircraft Carrier
The mission of sea-based air has shifted from countering Cold War, blue water threats to supporting land forces dependent on air-delivered weapons, logistics and ISR for their survival and offensive punch. The Navy's role has shifted to the littoral, where the large deck carrier is potentially at risk from enemy weapons of increasing sophistication. Yet aircraft carrier design has not substantially advanced during the past forty years. Despite major advances in ship design, shipboard technology, aircraft concepts and cost reduction schemes, major shifts in Navy missions, personnel shortages and the rise of joint CONOPS, the new Nimitz class carrier of today is essentially the same ship it was forty years ago. Today's new platform must incorporate the best thinking about future CONOPS, threats, weapons systems and reduced cost if it is to remain effective in the unpredictable, rapidly changing world of the twenty- first century. The Navy should seek the best future sea-based air system to guard against the collapse that doomed capital ships of the past The Navy must aggressively seek new ideas for vehicles that support sea-based air power. Transforming today's carrier force into the most effective, most affordable sea-based air system possible is mandatory for the Navy. This report examines the future of the aircraft carrier. The Task Force considered the aircraft carrier's role, status, technology and environment. It strongly recommends that the Navy aggressively pursue new sea-based air system concepts as it replaces its aging carrier fleet.
United States. Defense Science Board
2002-10
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Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology
"Technology has been and must continue to be a key enabler of military advantage, both in conflict and in situations where conflict is close at hand. Over the years, the Department of Defense (DoD) science and technology (S&T) program has discovered, invented, harnessed, and demonstrated such enabling technologies. The Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study task force was asked to examine three aspects of the DoD science and technology program: How the Department's S&T investment should be spent; the level of investment in science and technology; and how the military can realize the most value from this investment."
United States. Defense Science Board
2002-05
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Defense Science Board Task Force on High Energy Laser Weapons Systems Applications
"Appropriately developed and applied, high-energy laser systems can become key contributors to the 21st-century arsenal. Success for directed energy requires hard and expensive work to mature the technologies, develop operational systems, and apply the capabilities operationally. In the relatively near term, the new capabilities afforded by the use of highpower lasers could improve numerous aspects of warfare from initial detection and identification of targets to battle damage assessment after their attack."
United States. Defense Science Board
2001-06
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future DoD Airborne HF Radar Needs/Resources
The Defense Science Board Task Force was formed to address questions related to the development of X-band, active, electronically steered arrays (AESAs) for airborne platforms. Areas focused on were advanced radar capabilities for ground targets and air targets. The Task Force found that the state of the art in airborne X-band AESAs has moved impressively in the last decade due to several prototyping efforts and the JSF Dem Val technology push. Factors of 3 to 5 or more in weight and cost reductions can be supported along with innovations in mechanical design to simplify manufacturability and maintenance. Transmit/receive modules are approaching commodity status, albeit with limited component suppliers. For a given size and weight, AESA technology provides a factor of 10-30 times more net radar capability than competing approaches due to power increases, lower losses, and increased flexibility. Also, AESA designs provide inherently superior countermeasure resistance, enhanced range resolution (for target identification), and more flexibility to support nontraditional radar modes such as jamming and ESM. In addition, AESA technology supports high reliability/low maintenance designs with the promise of attractive life cycle costs. These advantages are so compelling that it is unlikely that any new U.S. fighter radar will be procured in the future without AESA technology. It is the assessment of the Task Force that the technology of X-band AESAs is mature and ready for insertion, with little risk, into the existing ground surveillance radars on JSTARS (i.e., RTIP), the U-2 (i.e., ASARS Improvement Program), and Global Hawk. The Task Force strongly supports the development of an X-band AESA for the Global Hawk in the near term.
United States. Defense Science Board
2001-04
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Options for Acquisition of the Advanced Targeting Pod & Advanced Targeting FLIR Pod (ATP/ATFLIR)
"The Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) requested that the DSB form a brief study of ongoing Navy and Air Force programs aimed at developing advanced laser guided weapon targeting pods for their tactical aircraft. This request for a DSB Task Force was occasioned by Congressional interest in the possibilities of a Joint development and production program for these pods. Current targeting pods are inadequate because improved enemy low altitude air defenses have forced tactical aircraft to operate at significantly higher altitudes. As a result, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have declared that obtaining an advanced targeting pod for the current Navy, Marine, and Air Force tactical air fleets is an extremely urgent matter."
United States. Defense Science Board
2001-02
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More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden
The task force reviewed approximately 100 current and future technology solutions and sought to understand DoD's fuel requirements and its end-to-end fuel delivery processes. The task force then turned its attention to understanding DoD's policy on energy efficiency and the processes for requiring and acquiring more efficient platforms and systems. The task force also investigated the environmental impacts of fossil fuel use, including global climate change. The task force made the following significant Findings during the course of its work. Although significant warfighting, logistics and cost benefits occur when weapons systems are made more fuel-efficient, these benefits are not valued or emphasized in the DoD requirements and acquisition processes
United States. Defense Science Board
2001-01
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Defense Science Board Task Force on Logistics Transformation Phase II
The 1998 Logistics Transformation study emphasized the critical, indeed fundamental, importance of logistics to the success of U.S. military operations. It noted that an artificial dichotomy exists between operations and logistics and that this dichotomy threatens to undermine DoD's planned revolution in military affairs (RMA). It also noted that a properly reformed logistics system would reduce a CINC's operational footprint, cost less money, and effectively support U.S. military strategy. The Phase II study reviewed the issues raised two years earlier, calling attention to both the durable nature of the problem and the vital need to transform the system
United States. Defense Science Board
2001-01
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Defense Science Board Letter Report on DoD Science and Technology Program
"This report is in response to the Congressional Language in Section 212 of the FY 2000 Defense Appropriation Report. That Section requests the views of the Defense Science Board on the adequacy of the Department's FY 2001 Science and Technology Program budget requests. Since a Defense Science Board Task Force studied the Department's Science and Technology Program in 1998 under the Chairmanship of Walter Morrow, it was decided by the OSD and DSB leadership that a summary should be prepared based on the report of the 1998 Study of the Department's Science and Technology Program."
United States. Defense Science Board
Morrow, Walter E.
2000-08
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Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security
Globalization-the integration of the political, economic and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated peoples-is not a discernible event or challenge, is not new, but it is accelerating. More importantly, globalization is largely irresistible. Thus, globalization is not a policy option, but a fact to which policymakers must adapt. Globalization has accelerated as a result of many positive factors, the most notable of which include: the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; the spread of capitalism and free trade; more rapid and global capital flows and more liberal financial markets; the liberalization of communications; international academic and scientific collaboration; and faster and more efficient forms of transportation. At the core of accelerated global integration-at once its principal cause and consequence-is the information revolution, which is knocking down once-formidable barriers of physical distance, blurring national boundaries and creating cross-border communities of all types.
United States. Defense Science Board
Hicks, Donald A.
1999-12
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Defense Science Board 1998 Summer Study Task Force on Joint Operation Superiority in the 21st Century, Volume 1: Integrating Capabilities Underwriting Joint Vision 2010 and Beyond
This 1998 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study continues a series of DSB studies that have examined key challenges facing America's military in the coming decade. Taken together, these studies address a wide range of threats and challenges facing the United States. Such threats include familiar conventional threats as well as less traditional threats. This report examines capabilities and technologies to underwrite the operational concepts and goals of Joint Vision 2010 and beyond. Its central theme is that the cornerstone of a highly effective, next- generation force is early and continuous combat effectiveness with dominant force. Such a capability is necessary for combat success with the fewest casualties, at the lowest cost, and in the shortest time. This report describes a set of critical operational challenges and offers the Department recommendations associated with achieving this capability. This Summer Study and the companion 1998 study, Logistics Transformation, have added emphasis to the close connection between effective, next-generation military operations and focused logistics. To have early and continuous combat effectiveness with dominant force, it is essential to have more agile and deployable forces and to be more responsive in theater. It also calls for a different logistics system --one with increased speed, reliability, and precision -- that minimizes stockpiles in the field relying on highly responsive lift.
United States. Defense Science Board
1998-10
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Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume III: Supporting Reports
In the study, the Task Force concludes that the Department should treat transnational threats as a major Department of Defense mission. Transnational actors have three advantages: I) they can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; 2) we cannot easily deter them because they have no homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral. Further, warning may be short and attribution may be slow or ambiguous. Since the United States is now the dominant military force in the world, potential adversaries will be driven to asymmetric strategies to meet their objectives. As such, transnational threats represent an important national security problem. Notably, the Department of Defense has the capacity to mitigate these threats with its extensive capabilities, training and experience. In the attached report, the Task Force suggests a multi-faceted strategy for the DoD to address this increasingly important class of threats. This strategy involves the development of an end-to-end systems concept, investment in critical technology areas, and the leveraging of similarities between civil protection and force protection. The Task Force concludes that the Department also needs to increase its emphasis on responding to this threat by more clearly assigning responsibilities and by providing mechanisms for measuring its readiness to respond. We hope this Summer Study provides insights on how to mitigate transnational threats to the Nation. It stops short, however, of providing a plan. We strongly encourage the Department to take on the task of developing an implementation plan that identifies the appropriate allocation of resources and areas for emphasis.
United States. Defense Science Board
Hermann, Robert; Welch, Larry
1998-02
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Defense Science Board Force Protection Panel Report to DSB
"Khobar Towers, like Beirut more than a decade before, had a sobering effect on the US military, the event highlighted the difficulty of protecting forces and the potentially devastating consequences of an attack. To reduce risks, force protection must become a way of life for every member of the US Armed Forces, whether stationed in the United States or abroad. It must become part of the culture or state of mind in every day operations and a central component of mission planning and execution. What is it that has changed about this mission? Some argue that while the tactics and tools of force protection have changed very little, there has been a significant change in the nature of the threat. Today's forces face a new and more complex threat: the transnational threat. Transnational adversaries appear to be growing more sophisticated and appear to be increasingly interested in inflicting mass casualties and extensive destruction. Further, the inability of these adversaries to threaten the United States with traditional military force drives them to the use of other weapons - high explosives, chemical and biological agents, and potentially even nuclear devices. Moreover, the United States is no longer a sanctuary and is vulnerable on its own soil. This trend has implications both for force protection and protection of civilians at home."
United States. Defense Science Board
1997-12
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Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume I: Final Report
"In response to joint tasking from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 1997 DSB Summer Study Task Force addressed the Department's Responses to Transnational Threats. In the study, the Task Force concludes that the Department should treat transnational threats as a major Department of Defense mission. Transnational actors have three advantages: 1) they can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; 2) we cannot easily deter them because they have no homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral. Further, warning may be short and attribution may be slow or ambiguous. Since the United States is now the dominant military force in the world, potential adversaries will be driven to asymmetric strategies to meet their objectives. As such, transnational threats represent an important national security problem."
United States. Defense Science Board
1997-10
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Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume II: Force Protection Report
Transnational actors have three advantages: 1) they can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; 2) we cannot easily deter them because they have no homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral. Further, warning may be short and attribution may be slow or ambiguous. Since the United States is now the dominant military force in the world, potential adversaries will be driven to asymmetric strategies to meet their objectives. As such, transnational threats represent an important national security problem. Notably, the Department of Defense has the capacity to mitigate these threats with its extensive capabilities, training and experience. In the attached report, the Task Force suggests a multi-faceted strategy for the DoD to address this increasingly important class of threats. This strategy involves the development of an end-to-end systems concept, investment in critical technology areas, and the leveraging of similarities between civil protection and force protection. The Task Force concludes that the Department also needs to increase its emphasis on responding to this threat by more clearly assigning responsibilities and by providing mechanisms for measuring its readiness to respond.
United States. Defense Science Board
Hermann, Robert; Welch, Larry
1997-10
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Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority: Volume 2, Part 1, Supporting Materials
"This document provides the supporting material for Volume 1. It does not contain recommendations and findings, nor does it represent the consensus opinion of the Task Force. Volume 1 is a result of finding new ways to make rapidly deployable forces much more effective than they are today. The report indicates that substantial, possibly revolutionary, improvements in the effectiveness of rapidly deployable forces are feasible. The concepts in the report can be refined, tested and evolved into fielded capabilities over the next two decades. The essence of this new expeditionary force is an ability to mass fire than forces. It relies on an ensemble of remote weapons effective against all types of targets; an extensive suite of sensors, information processors and information warfare capabilities to provide situation understanding dominance; a ground force comprised of light agile combat cells that offer few targets for the enemy; a precision logistics capacity that provides the right stuff at the right place at the right time; and a robust information infrastructure that ties this distributed force together."
United States. Defense Science Board
1996-10
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Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield
"The Task Force addressed four aspects of information architecture for the battlefield: the use of information in warfare; the use of information warfare, both offensive and defensive; the business practices of the DoD in acquiring and using battlefield information systems; and the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems. This report emphasizes the importance of the warfighter as the principal customer for battlefield information systems. In today's complex world, the warfighter requires flexible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted to accomplish different missions. Further, the Task Force is quite concerned that DoD information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare. However, the Task Force also found that the information systems of potential adversaries are also quite vulnerable. The Task Force believes that management structure changes can provide an effective approach to integration of disparate systems. The group reinforces that notion that DoD can greatly enhance the effectiveness of limited DoD resources by leveraging available commercial products and technology."
United States. Defense Science Board
1994-10
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects
"This task force was established to review information regarding the possible exposure of personnel to chemical and biological weapons agents and other hazardous material during the Gulf War and its aftermath."
United States. Defense Science Board
1994-06
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness
This document contains the final report of the DSB Task Force on Readiness. The report focuses on the Department's readiness management and oversight processes, especially key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness problem and on other matters affecting individual and collective readiness. The Task Force did not look in detail into acquisition, technology, or industrial base issues related to readiness; the adequacy of forces to carry out the Bottom-Up Review; or nuclear forces strategy and requirements. The Task Force concluded that although there are some downward indicators, the general readiness posture of today's conventional and unconventional forces is acceptable in most measurable areas. However, the Task Force reported that is observed enough concerns that they were convinced that unless the Department of Defense and the Congress focus on readiness, the armed forces could slip into a 'hollow' status. For analytical purposes, the Task Force divided readiness into three levels: unit, joint (and combined) force, and national. The Task Force found that there currently exists a well-defined reporting system to evaluate the current readiness of combat and support units. It found the Department's systems for predicting future unit readiness significantly less mature and less comprehensive. The Task Force determined that the Department has neither a clear definition of joint readiness nor of a system to measure it. At the highest level, national readiness is important to ensure that our forces have sufficient readiness to carry out our National Military Strategy. The Task Force deferred judgment on this level of readiness
United States. Defense Science Board
1994-06
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Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Aircraft Bottom Up Review
"The DoD team that conducted the Bottom Up Review (BUR) took on a very substantial task. The BUR team was appropriately composed of all relevant OSD offices and the services. This Defense Science Board Task Force conducted an independent assessment of their effort. The limited time available required the BUR team to focus chiefly on a comparison of tactical aircraft as stand alone air warfare assets. The process included six main avenues of analysis: costing, affordability, industrial base and threat assessments, a PA&E qualitative assessment, and an Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) cost-effectiveness comparison model."
United States. Defense Science Board
1993-04-14
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Historical Perspectives: A Review of Studies of the Department of Defense Science and Technology Program
This report summarizes substantive recommendations and resulting actions of 16 prior studies. A short summary of each report reviewed is included. Summaries of the recommendations of the various reports are grouped by management areas. Assessments of the resulting actions are provided. Several recommendations have led to actions taken to address the particular situation in question. Significant steps have been taken: 1) to provide proper balance between technology base performers, and 2) to implement greater interaction between DoD and universities. Advanced Technology Demonstrations were established in 1975 and grew to $1.7B (excluding SDI) in 1987. Formal peer review processes were established. The Federal Technology Transfer Act became law in 1986. Two-year budget cycles are being implemented in the 1988-89 budget cycle. Several recommendations remain open to further action. The technology base organization and management structure and contracting practices need streamlining. Recommendations to select the 'best qualified' lab director (military or civilian), to provide programmatic stability, and give more authority and responsibility to lab directors need additional attention. Recommendations to create a separate personnel system for scientists and engineering to designate lead laboratories with specific missions and to pursue joint Services planning need further work.
United States. Defense Science Board
Cattoi, R. L.
1987-07
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Conflict Environment Task Force (Implications of Third World Urban Involvement
"The Defense Science Board Conflict Environment Task Force was formed at the request of General John W. Vessey, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1985. It was charged [...] to examine problems of support for control and management of large urban areas, especially in the Third World, but not issues of military seizure and defense. [...] We were posed four questions. What are the control and management implications of existing, albeit possibly damaged, elements of the urban infrastructure--physical, economic and social? What are current DoD capabilities in the areas of intelligence, engineering, civil affairs and psychological operations? How good is the fit between U.S. operational concepts, capabilities and Third World urban realities? What changes are needed in those concepts and capabilities? [...] History tells us that the most likely situations U.S. forces will face abroad are those we now label (perhaps euphemistically) as low intensity conflicts and used to call 'small wars' or 'military expeditions short of war.' These interventions usually take place in the Third World, which is substantially urbanized and increasingly so. Avoiding passage through, use of, or presence in Third World cities may amount to avoiding intervention. [...] Much of what will happen in the urban area lies well outside the control of U.S., forces or the U.S. Government. That makes it all the more important to foster realistic anticipation of what is likely to happen in the urban area and contribute to influence at the margin open to the U.S."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
1986-05
