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Defense Science Board Task Force on Directed Energy Weapons
"Directed energy offers promise as a transformational 'game changer' in military operations, able to augment and improve operation capabilities in many areas. Yet despite this potential, years of investment have not resulted in any operations systems with high energy laser capability. The lack of progress is a result of many factors from unexpected technological challenges to a lack of understanding of the costs and benefits of such systems. Ultimately, as a result of these circumstances, interest in such systems has declined over the years. This task force was asked to review all directed energy programs in the Department and other organizations as well as supporting technology advancements and their applications. This report contains the results of that review and provides a window into the progress toward weaponization of these systems. While the task force heard descriptions of dozens of technically feasible and operationally relevant directed energy programs and activities, the report focuses on a smaller number of the most promising applications. Applications with potential to provide superior capabilities include long-range strategic missions such as space control and force protection, and tactical missions such as ground-based defense against rockets, artillery, and mortars and defense against man portable air defense systems. For some applications, directed energy has the potential to compete favorably with kinetic solutions; for others, no adequate kinetic approach currently exists. The task force believes that the range of potential applications is sufficient to warrant significantly increased attention to the scope and direction of efforts to assess, develop, and field appropriate laser, microwave, and millimeter wave weapons."
United States. Defense Science Board
2007-12
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Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority: Volume 2, Part 1, Supporting Materials
"This document provides the supporting material for Volume 1. It does not contain recommendations and findings, nor does it represent the consensus opinion of the Task Force. Volume 1 is a result of finding new ways to make rapidly deployable forces much more effective than they are today. The report indicates that substantial, possibly revolutionary, improvements in the effectiveness of rapidly deployable forces are feasible. The concepts in the report can be refined, tested and evolved into fielded capabilities over the next two decades. The essence of this new expeditionary force is an ability to mass fire than forces. It relies on an ensemble of remote weapons effective against all types of targets; an extensive suite of sensors, information processors and information warfare capabilities to provide situation understanding dominance; a ground force comprised of light agile combat cells that offer few targets for the enemy; a precision logistics capacity that provides the right stuff at the right place at the right time; and a robust information infrastructure that ties this distributed force together."
United States. Defense Science Board
1996-10
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Task Force on Cyber Deterrence
"The United States gains tremendous economic, social, and military advantages from cyberspace. However, our pursuit of these advantages has created extensive dependencies on highly vulnerable information technologies and industrial control systems. As a result, U.S. national security is at unacceptable and growing risk. Over the past several years, the United States has been subjected to cyber attacks and costly cyber intrusions by various actors, including the four most cyber-capable adversary states identified by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2016."
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-02
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Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030
"The final report of the Defense Science Board 2012 Summer Study on Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030 is attached. In accordance with its charter, the study reviewed emerging technologies that will enable the next generation of dominant military capabilities anticipated to be in development or fielded by 2030. The review was guided by the January 2012 military strategy guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This report recommends specific investments for the Department focused on high leverage technologies that were judged as not adequately pursued today. In the process of developing these investment recommendations, the study also identified four investment categories that complement the traditional approach of seeking increasingly technically-sophisticated, complex, and therefore expensive systems. These are recommended as a taxonomy for thinking about the Department's technology investment portfolio. The investment categories are described in this report, and are listed here: Coping with parity, Achieving superiority through cost-imposing strategies, Achieving superiority through enhancing force effectiveness, Anticipating surprise. For each investment category, the report highlights several technology areas that were seen as under-attended, meaning they are lacking investment, effort, or focus commensurate with their potential importance to the Department. This was measured by a review of current activities inside and outside the Department of Defense rather than a thorough, detailed survey of the entire national investment portfolio. Consequently, the results of this process should not be viewed as a comprehensive list of technology investments for the Department. Rather, it is a set of priority investments that can complement, and in some cases replace, currently programmed initiatives."
United States. Defense Science Board
2013-10
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Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems
From the executive summary: "The goal of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems was to determine whether iterative software development practices evolved in the commercial world are applicable to the development and sustainment of software for the Department of Defense (DoD). [...] The DoD can leverage today's commercial development best practices to its advantage, including on its weapons systems. Doing so will enable the DoD to move from a capabilities-based acquisition model to a threat-based acquisition model. Making this transition is necessary if the United States is to maintain its technological superiority and counter rapidly growing adversary capabilities. Our adversaries are acquiring capabilities not previously anticipated and are doing so at a pace that now challenges U.S. technological superiority. The DoD needs to return to a modernized version of threat-based assessments. The United States must have the ability to quickly respond to adversary advancements and update our systems accordingly. Rapid and continuous software development will be essential to achieving this outcome."
United States. Defense Science Board
2018-02
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Summer Study on Capabilities for Constrained Military Operations
"In accordance with its charter, the Study focused on regional conflicts that remain below the threshold of full-scale warfare, called constrained military operations. This study is unique in not only describing the character and implications of so called gray zone conflicts but also offering a comprehensive agenda of actionable recommendations for the U.S. to address such conflicts. The good news is that The DoD can prevail with inexpensive capabilities that have low technology risk and on a short timeline. The Study analyzed planning and assessment processes; information, intelligence, and cyber capabilities; physical capabilities; and interagency capabilities where The DoD provides a supporting role. While the Study reviewed technologies, capabilities, operating concepts, and processes to provide responses to constrained military operations, they also reviewed the need for a strategic framework to provide guidance for any future actions. The Study took a three-pronged approach to countering potential adversaries' strategies for waging long-term campaigns for constrained military operations and Gray Zone conflicts: [1] Create a long-term strategic framework and threat-oriented campaigns. [2] Exploit the new and evolving information landscape. [3]Continue to add to the available set of tools applicable to operations addressing less than full-scale conventional warfare."
United States. Defense Science Board
2016-12-21
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Task Force on Deterring, Preventing, and Responding to the Threat or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Executive Summary
"The Task Force divided its findings into three specific areas - Early Warning, Chemical and Biological Threats, and Nuclear Threats. First, the Task Force found that timely warning of proliferation significantly expands options for deterrence.Augmenting traditional intelligence sources with open sources shows promise for early proliferation detection. Second, chemical and biological threats have historically been addressed through protection or response; the Task Force recommends these threats can and should be addressed more broadly in a deterrence context. Defense-in-depth, from warning through attribution and requisite retaliation, is feasible,and more importantly, critical to addressing emerging threats. Finally, nuclear deterrence requires relearning much of what has been forgotten with regards to the principles, but applying them with new tools and unprecedented integration. That integration should leverage conventional, nuclear, and non-kinetic capabilities coupled with messaging and demonstrated operational flexibility to strengthen deterrence and assurance, better manage escalation risks, and widen the options available to leadership."
United States. Defense Science Board
2018-05
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DSB Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic Capability: Executive Summary
"The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic Capability was established to assess how cyber capabilities are being used by U.S. competitors and adversaries to achieve strategic effects, and provide recommendations for how the United States can develop and employ a strategic cyber capability of our own. While the United States retains significant advantages in most military domains, the United States has fallen behind its competitors in the cyber domain, both conceptually and operationally. The threat that adversary nations and nonstate actors pose is not a hypothetical one - the United States has witnessed the effectiveness of strategic cyber operations, both against other countries and against the United States itself, on multiple occasions. Given the degree to which U.S. civilian and military infrastructure depend on cyber-enabled technologies, U.S. risks in the cyber domain present a serious and growing challenge to the Nation's ability to defend itself at home and advance its interests abroad. The DSB report on Cyber as a Strategic Capability concludes that U.S. strategic competitors and other states possess effective strategic cyber capabilities and doctrine. These may, in certain scenarios, stress U.S. ability to deter adversary cyber aggression. The study, therefore, examines the laws, governance structures, and culture that impair the United States from fully possessing strategic cyber capabilities. The United States must act quickly to enable strategic cyber as an option in the spectrum of effects. Doing so will help ensure the United States maintainsits current global posture and the U.S. homeland is protected against adversary blackmail and aggression."
United States. Defense Science Board
2018-06
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Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems
"Unmanned systems are proving to have a significant impact on warfare worldwide. The true value of these systems is not to provide a direct human replacement, but rather to extend and complement human capability in a number of ways. These systems extend human reach by providing potentially unlimited persistent capabilities without degradation due to fatigue or lack of attention. Unmanned systems offer the warfighter more options and flexibility to access hazardous environments, work at small scales, or react at speeds and scales beyond human capability. With proper design of bounded autonomous capabilities, unmanned systems can also reduce the high cognitive load currently placed on operators/supervisors. Moreover, increased autonomy can enable humans to delegate those tasks that are more effectively done by computer, including synchronizing activities between multiple unmanned systems, software agents and warfighters--thus freeing humans to focus on more complex decision making."
United States. Defense Science Board
2012-07
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Interim Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on SARS Quarantine
"The Task Force established by the Defense Science Board (DSB) to assess Department of Defense quarantining guidance for dealing with a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic met on three occasions during 2003-2004 to review the status of current and planned Department of Defense (DoD) policies and procedures related to SARS outbreak response. The Task Force received a number of briefings describing SARS and other disease outbreak response and quarantine operations, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention SARS guidelines, lessons learned, DoD global surveillance systems, and military/civilian public health interfaces. We operated at a deliberate pace as both, the course of the outbreak and the maturing institutional responses, were rapidly moving targets."
United States. Defense Science Board
2004-12
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Report of the Joint Defense Science Board Intelligence Science Board Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence
This "is the final report of the Defense Science Board and Intelligence Science Board Joint Task Force on Integrating Sensor Collected Intelligence. As directed, we reviewed the mix and balance of sensors across the spectrum with the goal of identifying gaps and shortfalls and determining the improvements needed in the full cycle from tasking to collection to posting for all and subsequent dissemination of the information gathered by intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. The task force noted the robust plans for acquisition and deployment of airborne ISR with particular emphasis on unmanned platforms. We also observed the more fragile state of satellite-based ISR due to the effects of well-documented execution problems with key overhead sensor acquisition programs and the changing world events that increased demands beyond the capacity of the current and planned capabilities. The report identifies the gaps that could develop as a result of this situation. Many of the most challenging intelligence targets-including detecting WMD and its precursor agents, tracking people and characterizing deeply-buried targets-require that the relevant sensors be in close proximity to the target. The task force discussed the requirements of close-in ISR including unique platforms to deliver the sensor to the target area, specialized sensors to detect the faint signals of interest and tailored exfiltration techniques to get the data back from the sensors. The task force recommended that research and development efforts continue to address the most difficult signatures and the close-in ISR requirements."
United States. Defense Science Board; Intelligence Science Board
2008-11
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force
"[The task force conducted] a comprehensive study of the ends and means of precision compellence, or the nuanced use of force, in concert with coalition partners, to achieve political, economic and moral change in countries affecting US interests. Real-world events have since underscored the need for such a study; indeed, the U.S. military applied key elements of a measured, nuanced approach in both the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. [The task force] notes this evolution in operations and a parallel evolution in the thinking of the combatant commands and services. Because of this evolution, it is no longer as necessary as it once was to sell the fundamental objectives of what we term here the discriminate use of force (DUF). These emerging capabilities exist within a political context that requires the use of discriminate force. Moreover, destructive power alone is not sufficient to reach many U.S. goals, and it must be properly applied. [...] DUF is about more than the limited use of force. [...] The intent is to apply force discriminately in order to achieve the desired and avoid the undesired. [...] The task force's concept of the discriminate use of force harmonizes with some contemporary thinking about effects-based operations (EBO). [...] The task force's recommendations focus on how the Department of Defense (DoD) can (1) implement DUF or EBO more consistently, and (2) achieve the needed institutional and organizational changes, particularly in career structures."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force
2003-07
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities (Report Summary)
"The Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities was asked by the Secretary of Defense to consider the issues associated with the current nuclear stockpile, nuclear production complex, management of the nuclear enterprise, and examine plans to transform the nuclear enterprise to provide a capability to respond to 21st Century security needs. The Task Force concluded that there is agreement that the overriding priority for the US nuclear weapons enterprises is to provide and sustain a reliable, safe, secure and credible set of nuclear weapons needed to maintain the nuclear deterrent. However, there is no national consensus on the nature of that need. Currently approved programs are focused on extending the life of existing weapons indefinitely with a production complex that is not configured, managed, or funded to meet minimum immediate stockpile sustainment needs. However, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RWW) program, if it progresses to production, provides for a path to a sustainable nuclear stockpile. Finally, the current nuclear organization, management, and programs do not provide for a nuclear weapons enterprise capable of meeting the nation's minimum needs. The Task Force believes that the recommendations and considerations contained in this report will get the US on the right track toward achieving a reliable, safe, secure and credible nuclear weapons stockpile and overall nuclear enterprise for the 21st Century. The Task Force urges the senior leaders of this nation to understand the urgent need to act on the report's findings and recommendations."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities
2006-12
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Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons
This report is "an independent assessment of the systemic causes of the August 30 unauthorized movement of nuclear warheads from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Based on the information and insights gained from investigating and assessing these systemic causes, the report includes 16 recommendations to strengthen nuclear weapons surety."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety
2008-02
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Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, Executive Summary
"The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic Capability was established to assess how cyber capabilities are being used by U.S. competitors and adversaries to achieve strategic effects, and provide recommendations for how the United States can develop and employ a strategic cyber capability of our own. While the United States retains significant advantages in most military domains, the United States has fallen behind its competitors in the cyber domain, both conceptually and operationally. The threat that adversary nations and non-state actors pose is not a hypothetical one - the United States has witnessed the effectiveness of strategic cyber operations, both against other countries and against the United States itself, on multiple occasions. Given the degree to which U.S. civilian and military infrastructure depend on cyber-enabled technologies, U.S. risks in the cyber domain present a serious and growing challenge to the Nation's ability to defend itself at home and advance its interests abroad. The DSB report on Cyber as a Strategic Capability concludes that U.S. strategic competitors and other states possess effective strategic cyber capabilities and doctrine. These may, in certain scenarios, stress U.S. ability to deter adversary cyber aggression. The study, therefore, examines the laws, governance structures, and culture that impair the United States from fully possessing strategic cyber capabilities. The United States must act quickly to enable strategic cyber as an option in the spectrum of effects. Doing so will help ensure the United States maintains its current global posture and the U.S. homeland is protected against adversary blackmail and aggression."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Department of Defense
2018-06
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance Report Summary
"The Task Force investigated the lessons learned from the Patriot system performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and assessed if these lessons could be incorporated into the continuing development of Patriot and its follow-on system, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The Task Force concluded that the lessons can be incorporated into Patriot-MEADS. Two of the main shortfalls seen in OIF performance transcend just the Patriot system; they involve combat identification and situational awareness."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Patriot System Performance
2005-01
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics
This report addresses human dynamics as an essential aspect of planning for success in military and national security operations and underlines the importance of human dynamics awareness in strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. This report postulates that "substantial improvements by the [Department of Defense] DoD are needed in understanding human dynamics. In particular, DoD must take a longer-term view and build upon increased capability achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan." The task force envisages opportunities with both near-term and long term payoffs. Specific recommendations are grouped by the following topics: coordination and leadership; interagency and civil interactions; education, training, and career development; human dynamics advisers; science and technology investments, and data, tools, and products.
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics
2009-03
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Task Force on Survivable Logistics: Executive Summary
"The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Survivable Logistics was established to evaluate the current state of the U.S. military's Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt), to assess high-end threats to the JLEnt from strategic competitors such as Russia and China, and to provide recommendations for securing and sustaining the JLEnt in an increasingly contested global security environment. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not fought an adversary capable of the catastrophic disruption of military supply chains and deployment of personnel and materiel. As a result, the JLEnt has suffered neglect and chronic underfunding relative to other DoD priorities. Simultaneously, the ability of strategic competitors to threaten the JLEnt has increased as they invest in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities and gray zone tactics. Upon completion of the study, the Task Force found that survivable logistics are essential for continued U.S. power projection and readiness against strategic competitors. However, DoD logistics capabilities require renewed attention to ensure they will be able to achieve mission success in a contested environment. Without a demonstrably resilient and survivable logistics capability, U.S. deterrence will suffer and the ability of the U.S. military to operate globally will be at stake."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Department of Defense
2018-11
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Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff
"As requested in the Terms of Reference (TOR) the Task Force was asked to evaluate a complete range of time-critical conventional strike options within several realistic scenarios. The Task Force tried to explore and illuminate various attributes associated with the different means of accomplishing a time-critical conventional strike from strategic standoff capability. The TOR pinpointed four parameters of interest to focus on: target set, accuracy, basing, and kill mechanism. In addition, the Task Force was asked to assess each alternative strike capability using four principal measures of effectiveness and issue specific recommendations for preferred approaches based on specific dominate requirements. The final report addresses each tasking in the Terms of Reference and offers findings and recommendations derived from a scenario-based analysis. The findings and recommendations include both strike options as well as key enablers that must be effective if a time critical strike from strategic standoff is to be successful. Recommendations are provided in the areas of ISR; planning and exercising; munitions; hardened underground facility defeat; SOF; dynamic fire control; air-breathing delivery vehicles; integration and exercising of combined operations C3I."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff
2009-03
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Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise: Volume I: Main Report
"This report offers important considerations for the Department of Defense in response to future threats to our nation's security. This study concerns itself with the matter of capability surprise, which can arise from many sources--scientific breakthrough, rapid fielding, operational innovation. It considers two fundamental kinds of surprises: 1) those specific few, that because of their unique characteristics and impact, the national should be anticipating--referred to as 'known surprises'; and 2) those that arise unexpectedly out of a myriad of other possibilities, seemingly without warning--the 'surprising surprises.' The premise of the study is that surprise cannot be eliminated, but it can--and must--be managed."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
2009-09
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software
"Software has become the central ingredient of the information age, increasing productivity, facilitating the storage and transfer of information, and enabling functionality in almost every realm of human endeavor. However, as it improves the Department of Defense's (DoD) capability, it increases DoDs dependency. Each year the Department of Defense depends more on software for it administration and for the planning and execution of its missions. This growing dependency is a source of weakness exacerbated by the mounting size, complexity and interconnectedness of its software programs. It is only a matter of time before an adversary exploits this weakness at a critical moment in history. The software industry has become increasingly and irrevocably global. Much of the code is now written outside the United States (U.S.), some in countries that may have interests inimical to those of the United States. The combination of DoDs profound and growing dependence upon software and the expanding opportunity for adversaries to introduce malicious code into this software has led to a growing risk to the Nation's defense."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software
2007-09
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism
"Use of the reserve components in support of overseas contingencies has increased significantly since September 11, 2001 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the number of reserve component members on active duty has declined over the past few years, from a peak in May 2003, the current level still remains far higher than in decades past. This level of effort is expected to continue as long as the reserves are used as part of the rotational force supporting these ongoing operations. These circumstances have evoked considerable concern over whether such use can be sustained by the service members called to duty and, equally important, whether such use might affect the viability of the all-volunteer force over the long run. Thus, the Defense Science Board, under direction by Congress, examined the issue of length and frequency of the deployment of members of the National Guard and reserves in the global war on terrorism."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism
2007-09
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21st Century Military Operations in a Complex Electromagnetic Environment
"The principal finding of the study is particularly sobering: At a time when the United
States relies on information superiority on the battlefield for future military success, this
capability is jeopardized by serious deficiencies in U.S. electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
The study made several specific recommendations aimed at mitigating some of the
most serious deficiencies in current systems. Also included are overarching recommendations
addressing needs that are key to operating in a complex electromagnetic environment-
dynamically managing use of the spectrum, achieving near real-time system adaptation, and
shifting more to offense; and creating 21st century EW governance."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
2015-07
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DSB Summer Study Report on Strategic Surprise
"The final report of the Defense Science Board 2014 Summer Study on Strategic Surprise is
attached. In accordance with its charter, the study reviewed how information about a potential
adversary may lead to changing current Department priorities and what the possible actions and
hedges against those changing priorities may be. The study considered what actions, if not
taken by the Department, might lead to potential regrets in 2024. They study also reviewed
possible actions and hedges against changing priorities.
The study focused on potential regrets in eight areas and provides recommendations to avoid
strategic surprise in those eight domains."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
2015-07
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply
"The report makes recommendations that help ensure the long term, leading edge U.S. performance of microchip design, development, and manufacturing. The report also focuses on the future U.S. ability to ensure long term trusted and secure supplies of microelectronic components to the DOD and to the U.S. government."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply
2005-02
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology
"The importance of information technology (IT) to U.S. military capability is widespread. It enables nearly all of the nation's military combat capability and has become a necessary element of our most critical warfare systems. Yet, there is growing concern within Congress and among Department of Defense leadership that the nation's military advantage may be eroding. At the request of Congress, this task force undertook a review of Department of Defense (DOD) policies and procedures for the acquisition of information technology. The broad scope of the study touched on acquisition and oversight policies and procedures, roles and responsibilities for acquisition officials department-wide, and reporting requirements and testing as they relate to IT acquisition. The primary conclusion of the task force is that the conventional DOD acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to fit the needs of the many IT systems that require continuous changes and upgrades. Thus the task force believes that there is a need for a unique acquisition system for information technology. The task force offers the following recommendations to change the Department's approach to information technology acquisition."
United States. Defense Science Board. Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures
2009-03
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Conflict Environment Task Force (Implications of Third World Urban Involvement
"The Defense Science Board Conflict Environment Task Force was formed at the request of General John W. Vessey, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1985. It was charged [...] to examine problems of support for control and management of large urban areas, especially in the Third World, but not issues of military seizure and defense. [...] We were posed four questions. What are the control and management implications of existing, albeit possibly damaged, elements of the urban infrastructure--physical, economic and social? What are current DoD capabilities in the areas of intelligence, engineering, civil affairs and psychological operations? How good is the fit between U.S. operational concepts, capabilities and Third World urban realities? What changes are needed in those concepts and capabilities? [...] History tells us that the most likely situations U.S. forces will face abroad are those we now label (perhaps euphemistically) as low intensity conflicts and used to call 'small wars' or 'military expeditions short of war.' These interventions usually take place in the Third World, which is substantially urbanized and increasingly so. Avoiding passage through, use of, or presence in Third World cities may amount to avoiding intervention. [...] Much of what will happen in the urban area lies well outside the control of U.S., forces or the U.S. Government. That makes it all the more important to foster realistic anticipation of what is likely to happen in the urban area and contribute to influence at the margin open to the U.S."
United States. Defense Science Board; United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
1986-05
