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Report of the Defense Science Board 2010 Summer Study on Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces
"The world continues to change rapidly. Today's military forces face an increased level of operational uncertainty and must be ready to adapt rapidly. The lengthy preparation cycles and associated enterprise culture and processes that evolved over the past decades are a liability within the Department of Defense (DOD). Solutions must be developed in days, weeks, or months -not decades. This Defense Science Board (DSB) 2010 summer study was charged to help DOD make Adaptability a core value- apart of the culture of the enterprise, both it processes and people. The DSB has identified what it believes are the key elements of strategy to promote adaptability within the Department of Defense: 1) Align enterprise functions to support mission outcomes. […] 2) Reduce uncertainty through better global awareness. […] 3) Prepare for degraded operations. 4) Enhance adaptability of the enterprise workforce. 5) Change the culture."
United States. Defense Science Board
2011-01
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Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administration
"This report summarizes the main findings and recommendations of reports published by the Defense Science Board for the Secretary of Defense during the last dozen years. The purpose of this effort is to aid the incoming Administration to make a fast start in addressing pressing national security issues and opportunities. While the topics that have been addressed span a wide range, seven major themes dominated the Board's considerations."
United States. Defense Science Board
2016-12
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DSB Task Force Report on Next-Generation Unmanned Undersea Systems
"Rapidly advancing adversary capabilities, particularly those that employ anti-access and area- denial (A2/AD) strategies, pose a significant and increasing threat to U.S. operational and warfighting effectiveness in the air, in space, on land, and on the ocean's surface. The threat in the undersea domain is also increasing, but here the U.S. has a greater opportunity to retain an advantageous position to offset the burgeoning warfighting challenges it faces in other domains. This will require investment in new areas, adoption of commercial technologies to be used within a system of systems to support today's mission requirements, development of new concepts of operations (CONOPS), and acceptance of greater detection and loss risk to individual units mitigated by larger numbers of lower cost assets. In October 2014, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) requested that the Defense Science Board (DSB) review existing military and civil undersea systems and technologies and propose near- and mid-term unmanned undersea systems concepts that provide significant capability gains. Furthermore, the DSB was asked to consider methods for deploying initial capabilities with plans for capability evolution and to recommend approaches that facilitate rapid experimentation and operational demonstration. […] This report presents the key findings and recommendations of the task force deliberations. Four specific unmanned undersea system concepts that have the potential to create important new undersea capabilities and present potential adversaries with significant challenges are recommended along with the associated development and experimental programs for their validation. In addition to creating new capabilities, these system concepts illustrate important design principles that work around many of the long-standing technological issues that have limited unmanned undersea systems performance."
United States. Defense Science Board
2016-10-19
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Defense Strategies for Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats
This report has been made to assess the risks of current and future ballistic and cruise missile threats to US assets. This task force put forth short and long-term responses to the discovered risk assessment to create an actionable plan going forward to secure US assets.
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-01
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Defense Science Board Task Force Report On Cyber Defense Management
"In October 2014, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) requested that the Defense Science Board (DSB) investigate ways to improve the Department of Defense's overall management processes for providing cyber security in its systems and networks. The Board assembled a Task Force composed of national leaders in information technology (IT) and cyber security. The Task Force met from January 2015 through November 2015 to deliberate on cyber security for the Department of Defense (DoD). [...] The highly publicized government and commercial cyber breaches have driven a dramatic increase in general awareness and concern for cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the potential for damage from losing personal information stored within a system. This awareness has resulted in increased demand for more secure products and services. Recently, cyber security insurance rates have experienced an increase averaging more than 30 percent from the previous year. This may reduce 'papering over' the security problem."
United States. Defense Science Board
2016-09-01
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Task Force on Military Satellite Communication and Tactical Networking: Executive Summary
"The study will review the current US military satellite communication and tactical networking capabilities, identify shortfalls within existing and planned capability development, and then propose mid- and long-term system and technology improvements needed to allow effective complex operations against advanced threats. Specifically, the study will investigate military satellite communications systems and address questions such as: what is achievable for assured communications within current modernization and development programs; what is the potential of new technology what are the new satellite architectural concepts that will offer greater robustness for wideband communications with greater resistance to kinetic, electronic, and cyber attacks."
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-03
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Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy
"At the request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a study on the applicability of autonomy to Department of Defense (DoD) missions. The study concluded that there are both substantial operational benefits and potential perils associated with the use of autonomy. Autonomy delivers significant military value, including opportunities to reduce the number of warfighters in harm's way, increase the quality and speed of decisions in time-critical operations, and enable new missions that would otherwise be impossible. Autonomy is by no means new to the DoD. Fielded capabilities demonstrate ongoing progress in embedding autonomous functionality into systems, and many development programs already underway include an increasingly sophisticated use of autonomy. Autonomy also delivers significant value across a diverse array of global markets. Both enabling technologies and commercial applications are advancing rapidly in response to market opportunities. Autonomy is becoming a ubiquitous enabling capability for products spanning a spectrum from expert advisory systems to autonomous vehicles. Commercial market forces are accelerating progress, providing opportunities for DoD to leverage the investments of others, while also providing substantial capabilities to potential adversaries. This study concluded that DoD must accelerate its exploitation of autonomy--both to realize the potential military value and to remain ahead of adversaries who also will exploit its operational benefits."
United States. Defense Science Board
2016-06
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DSB Task Force Report on Cyber Supply Chain
"Modern weapons systems have depended on microelectronics since the inception of integrated circuits over fifty years ago. Today, most electronics contain programmable components of ever increasing complexity. At the same time, the Department of Defense (DoD) has become a far less influential buyer in a vast, globalized supplier base. Consequently, assuring that defense electronics are free from vulnerabilities is a daunting task. Because system configurations typically remain unchanged for very long periods of time, compromising microelectronics can create persistent vulnerabilities. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in microelectronics and embedded software can cause mission failure in modern weapons systems. Such exploitations are especially pernicious because they can be difficult to distinguish from electrical or mechanical failures and because effects can run the gamut from system degradation to system failure to system subversion. Cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may be inserted or discovered throughout the lifecycle of a system. Of particular concern are the weapons the nation depends upon today; almost all were developed, acquired, and fielded without formal protection plans."
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-02
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Task Force on Defense Strategies for Ensuring the Resilience of National Space Capabilities: Executive Summary
"Since 2000, when the Defense Science Board concluded space superiority was absolutely essential in achieving global awareness, information dominance on the battlefield, deterrence of potential conflict and superiority combat effectiveness of our forces, and threats to space superiority have grown significantly. [...] From April 2015 through September 2016, the Task Force received more than 40 briefings from practitioners and senior officials throughout DoD, the intelligence community (IC), the commercial sector, academia, the national laboratories, and the policy community."
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-03
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Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Strategies for Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats
"The study reviewed current and future ballistic and cruise missile threats and assessed the implications of those threats to the survivability of U.S. forward based critical assets. The study found that the survivability of those assets could be very problematic given recent increases in potential adversary ballistic and cruise missile inventories and capabilities, in combination with a continued U.S. trend to make its regional offense capabilities increasingly dependent on fewer and fewer forward based assets. The final report recommends a three-pronged strategy to mitigate this problem based on a combination of passive defense enhancements, active defense enhancements, and some offensive capabilities not easily targetable by regional cruise and ballistic missiles. Implementing that strategy entails an ongoing annual investment of about $2.5 billion."
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-01
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DSB Task Force on Cyber Supply Chain
"Modern weapons systems have depended on microelectronics since the inception of integrated circuits over fifty years ago. Today, most electronics contain programmable components of ever increasing complexity. At the same time, the Department of Defense (DoD) has become a far less influential buyer in a vast, globalized supplier base. Consequently, assuring that defense electronics are free from vulnerabilities is a daunting task. Because system configurations typically remain unchanged for very long periods of time, compromising microelectronics can create persistent vulnerabilities. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in microelectronics and embedded software can cause mission failure in modern weapons systems. Such exploitations are especially pernicious because they can be difficult to distinguish from electrical or mechanical failures and because effects can run the gamut from system degradation to system failure to system subversion. Cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may be inserted or discovered throughout the lifecycle of a system. Of particular concern are the weapons the nation depends upon today; almost all were developed, acquired, and fielded without formal protection plans."
United States. Defense Science Board
2017-02
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Creating an Assured Joint DOD and Interagency Interoperable Net-Centric Enterprise
In this report, "the Task Force was asked to assess the requirements for military operations in a net-centric environment, the use of a single autonomous agency as one mechanism to achieving interoperability, a standards-only approach allowing independent development and the development of a virtual test, integration and certification capability to assure interoperability. In doing so the Task Force was cognizant of the multiple organizations (Military Departments, domestic support operations, coalition partners and non-traditional partners) involved in DOD operations. The final report addresses the Terms of Reference tasking and provides findings and recommendations that recognize our shift from 'network enabled to network dependent' and the criticality in creating an interoperable net-centric environment that is necessary for national security. The report proposes a 500-day action plan which first establishes the governance system and the subsequent actions toward implementation of the Task Force recommendations."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-03
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Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland
"This report on unconventional operational concepts and the homeland was prepared as part of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests. The summer study recognized that asymmetric tools of war in the hands of potential adversaries may well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad int he face of significant devastation in the homeland-dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief operations and combat abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted." The report is divided into four chapters addressing homeland defense, DOD roles and responsibilities, assurance of deployment and supply, and building one national homeland defense team that encompasses all levels of government and the private sector. Appendices contain relevant legislation and directives for DOD in homeland security and defense and selected excerpts from the "Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-03
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Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology
"At the request of Congress, the Defense Science Board (DSB) undertook a review of Department of Defense policies and procedures for the acquisition of information technology. The findings and recommendations presented in this report are the result of a study that was broad in scope, as established in legislative guidance--covering acquisition and oversight policies and procedures, roles and responsibilities for acquisition officials department-wide, and reporting requirements and testing as they relate to IT acquisition. More specifically, the terms of reference directed that the matters addressed by the task force include the following: 1) DOD policies and procedures for acquiring information technology, 2) roles and responsibilities in implementing policies and procedures, 3) application of acquisition policies and procedures to IT that is integral to critical weapons or weapon system, 4) legal requirements (U.S. Code) as they relate to the acquisition of IT, 5) DOD policies and procedures to facilitate the use of commercial information technology, 6) suitability of DOD acquisition regulations, 7) adequacy and transparency of metrics, 8) effectiveness of existing statutory and regulatory reporting requirements, 9) adequacy of operational and development test resources, and 10) appropriate policies and procedures for technology assessment, development, and operational testing."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-03
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Report of the Defense Science Board Advisory Group on Defense Intelligence: Operations Research Applications for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
This is the final report of the Defense Science Board Advisory Group on Intelligence Task Force on Operations Research Applications for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). "The Task Force was asked to examine the use of operations research (OR) methods to support ISR decision making within the Department of Defense (DoD). [...] The Task Force reviewed the application of OR-which it views as decision support analysis based on information collected and analyzed using the scientific method-throughout the DoD and the Services focusing primarily on the resources available to conduct OR, as opposed to reviewing specific programs. The Task Force examined the commitment of decision makers to the use of OR and the extent to which these resources reflected the application of standard OR processes and practices and the manner in which the results appeared to be employed. The Task Force also looked at several private-sector OR application models and at recent and historical uses of OR in support of national security requirements."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-01
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Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume I: Final Report
"In response to joint tasking from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 1997 DSB Summer Study Task Force addressed the Department's Responses to Transnational Threats. In the study, the Task Force concludes that the Department should treat transnational threats as a major Department of Defense mission. Transnational actors have three advantages: 1) they can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; 2) we cannot easily deter them because they have no homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral. Further, warning may be short and attribution may be slow or ambiguous. Since the United States is now the dominant military force in the world, potential adversaries will be driven to asymmetric strategies to meet their objectives. As such, transnational threats represent an important national security problem."
United States. Defense Science Board
1997-10
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills
"The Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills was chartered to assess all aspects of nuclear deterrent skills--military, federal, and contractor--and to recommend methods and strategies to maintain a right-sized, properly trained, and experienced work force to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent through 2020. [...]. Today, deterrence of major power nuclear threats and the prospects of global war have receded in national priority while nuclear proliferation terrorism and defense have become urgent concerns. Today's nuclear security enterprise devotes the energy and attention to proliferation and terrorism issues that once were reserved for nuclear offensive forces. It is in that context that this task force reviewed nuclear deterrence expertise."
United States. Defense Science Board
2008-09
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Biological Safety and Security Program
"This report examines the biological safety, security, and personnel reliability programs of DoD's biological labs, and compares these labs with other similar operations in academia, industry and the federal government. The report offers recommendations for improvements in the DoD program based on this comparison. The task force found that safety and security of the DoD facilities that they assessed are as good or better than those in comparably sized facilities in other government, industry and academic sectors and that DoD regulations exceed those imposed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While the program remains sound, the task force does provide recommendations to further improve on computer systems security, lab activity monitoring, inspection compliance and biological select agent and toxin transportation. These recommendations are detailed in the report and serve to further enhance current biological safety and security operations, while minimizing the impact on missions of the DoD laboratories."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-05
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Defense Science Board Report on Advanced Computing
"The Task Force was asked to evaluate NNSA's strategic plan for Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) and its adequacy to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), whose mission is to ensure the safety, performance and reliability of our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The Task Force was also asked to evaluate the role of ASC in maintaining US leadership in advanced computing and assess the impact of using ASC's capabilities for broader national security and other issues. The Task Force concluded that, since the cessation of nuclear testing, ASC has taken on the principal integrating role in assuring the long term safety and reliability of the stockpile. It is also an essential tool in addressing specific stockpile issues. Furthermore, ASC has played a leadership role in re-establishing US leadership in high performance computing. The use of ASC and ASC-derived technology for other national security, scientific, and commercial applications has also increased dramatically, and high performance computing is viewed as an extremely valuable and cost-effective approach to many of the user's important problems. However, it is not likely that ASC will meet the compelling goals stated in its roadmaps and planning documents at the currently projected levels of funding. Furthermore, the high end of the US computing industry may be negatively impacted with implications for the much broader range of potential users in the DOD, other federal agencies, and the commercial world. Accordingly, the Task Force strongly recommends sizing the budget of ASC to meet its nuclear weapons objectives and retain US leadership in advanced computing."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-03
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Understanding Human Dynamics
This report from the Defense Science Board discusses human dynamics. "This report looks at understanding human dynamics as an essential aspect of planning and necessary for success across the full spectrum of military and national security operations. The report focuses on the following areas: importance of human dynamics in future US military operations; coordination and leadership; interagency and civil interactions; education, training, and career development; human dynamics advisors; science and technology investments; and data, tools and products."
United States. Defense Science Board
2009-03
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Defense Imperatives for the New Administration
"It has been more than two generations since the presidency transitioned with American troops engaged in significant combat operations-a deployment begun in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Beyond the current military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation faces other equally important national security challenges. These include nuclear proliferation, the potential for other regional conflicts into which we could be drawn, and the spread of militarily relevant technology even beyond nation-states. The incoming leadership must be prepared to deal with the most pressing issues facing the Department of Defense today. The pressing issues described herein are daunting and may seem all-inclusive, but they are only a fraction of the defense challenges facing the new administration. This report describes just those issues that the next Secretary of Defense should place at the top of the agenda-issues that will require the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, and, if left unresolved, could lead to future military failure. This report offers recommendations drawn from report prepared by the Defense Science Board, an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense, which address topics at the confluence of technology, policy, and management."
United States. Defense Science Board
2008-08
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Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume II: Force Protection Report
Transnational actors have three advantages: 1) they can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; 2) we cannot easily deter them because they have no homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral. Further, warning may be short and attribution may be slow or ambiguous. Since the United States is now the dominant military force in the world, potential adversaries will be driven to asymmetric strategies to meet their objectives. As such, transnational threats represent an important national security problem. Notably, the Department of Defense has the capacity to mitigate these threats with its extensive capabilities, training and experience. In the attached report, the Task Force suggests a multi-faceted strategy for the DoD to address this increasingly important class of threats. This strategy involves the development of an end-to-end systems concept, investment in critical technology areas, and the leveraging of similarities between civil protection and force protection. The Task Force concludes that the Department also needs to increase its emphasis on responding to this threat by more clearly assigning responsibilities and by providing mechanisms for measuring its readiness to respond.
United States. Defense Science Board
Hermann, Robert; Welch, Larry
1997-10
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Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study: Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests: Volume II: Main Report
This study "concerns itself with challenges the U.S. military might face in the future, emphasizing areas where the nation is less well prepared. Future adversaries are more likely to attack the nation with asymmetric tools of war, employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Thus, challenges from nuclear weapons, from cyber warfare, in and from space, to force deployment and resupply, and on U.S. soil, may well dominate in the decades ahead. Addressing U.S. vulnerabilities in these and other areas is the focus of the study's effort, leading to actions for the Department that can improve the nation's posture against future threats."
United States. Defense Science Board
2008-12
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Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study: Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests: Volume I: Executive Summary
This is the executive summary for the main report. This study "concerns itself with challenges the U.S. military might face in the future, emphasizing areas where the nation is less well prepared. Future adversaries are more likely to attack the nation with asymmetric tools of war, employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Thus, challenges from nuclear weapons, from cyber warfare, in and from space, to force deployment and resupply, and on U.S. soil, may well dominate in the decades ahead. Addressing U.S. vulnerabilities in these and other areas is the focus of the study's effort, leading to actions for the Department that can improve the nation's posture against future threats."
United States. Defense Science Board
2008-12
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Report of the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety on Nuclear Weapons Inspections for the Strategic Nuclear Forces
This is the "final report of the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety entitled 'Nuclear Weapons Inspections for the Strategic Nuclear Forces.' This task force was asked by the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters to evaluate the effectiveness of nuclear surety inspection procedures and processes, to include assessments of Service surety and readiness inspections and of Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). This review is especially critical at a time of increased focus on the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear forces. The task force members assessed the processes and procedures of Service and DTRA programs, to include specific guidance, directives, and instructions. The task force members have set forth recommendations in the areas of the adequacy of guidance for nuclear operations and inspections, inspection team qualifications, and relationships between different categories of nuclear inspections."
United States. Defense Science Board
2008-12
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects
"This task force was established to review information regarding the possible exposure of personnel to chemical and biological weapons agents and other hazardous material during the Gulf War and its aftermath."
United States. Defense Science Board
1994-06
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Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield
"The Task Force addressed four aspects of information architecture for the battlefield: the use of information in warfare; the use of information warfare, both offensive and defensive; the business practices of the DoD in acquiring and using battlefield information systems; and the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems. This report emphasizes the importance of the warfighter as the principal customer for battlefield information systems. In today's complex world, the warfighter requires flexible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted to accomplish different missions. Further, the Task Force is quite concerned that DoD information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare. However, the Task Force also found that the information systems of potential adversaries are also quite vulnerable. The Task Force believes that management structure changes can provide an effective approach to integration of disparate systems. The group reinforces that notion that DoD can greatly enhance the effectiveness of limited DoD resources by leveraging available commercial products and technology."
United States. Defense Science Board
1994-10
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Defense Science Board Force Protection Panel Report to DSB
"Khobar Towers, like Beirut more than a decade before, had a sobering effect on the US military, the event highlighted the difficulty of protecting forces and the potentially devastating consequences of an attack. To reduce risks, force protection must become a way of life for every member of the US Armed Forces, whether stationed in the United States or abroad. It must become part of the culture or state of mind in every day operations and a central component of mission planning and execution. What is it that has changed about this mission? Some argue that while the tactics and tools of force protection have changed very little, there has been a significant change in the nature of the threat. Today's forces face a new and more complex threat: the transnational threat. Transnational adversaries appear to be growing more sophisticated and appear to be increasingly interested in inflicting mass casualties and extensive destruction. Further, the inability of these adversaries to threaten the United States with traditional military force drives them to the use of other weapons - high explosives, chemical and biological agents, and potentially even nuclear devices. Moreover, the United States is no longer a sanctuary and is vulnerable on its own soil. This trend has implications both for force protection and protection of civilians at home."
United States. Defense Science Board
1997-12
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Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Aircraft Bottom Up Review
"The DoD team that conducted the Bottom Up Review (BUR) took on a very substantial task. The BUR team was appropriately composed of all relevant OSD offices and the services. This Defense Science Board Task Force conducted an independent assessment of their effort. The limited time available required the BUR team to focus chiefly on a comparison of tactical aircraft as stand alone air warfare assets. The process included six main avenues of analysis: costing, affordability, industrial base and threat assessments, a PA&E qualitative assessment, and an Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) cost-effectiveness comparison model."
United States. Defense Science Board
1993-04-14
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Task Force Report: Predicting Violent Behavior
"This report conveys the findings and recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force (TF) on Predicting Violent Behavior. This study was chartered and co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). This DSB study is one of several reviews that resulted from the killings that took place on November 5, 2009 at the Fort Hood, Texas Soldier Readiness Center, and is submitted in response to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of May 21, 2011."
United States. Defense Science Board
2012-08
