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Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
The report begins with background on the event, "on December 25, 2009, a 23 year-old Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (hereafter Abdulmutallab) attempted to detonate a concealed nonmetallic device containing the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane was descending into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport." […]. In the report the committee offers their findings, conclusions and recommendations, "the Committee found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by Abdulmutallab. Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill its missions. Following 9/11, Congress created the NCTC and charged it with serving as 'the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism . ... ' In practice, however, the Committee found that no one agency saw itself as being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats. In addition, technology across the IC is not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts, which contributed to the failure of the IC to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2010-05-18
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Statement for the Record Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Robert Cardillo, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
This is an open hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. From the statement for the record of NGA (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) Director Robert Cardillo: "NGA and our geospatial-intelligence (GEOINT) partners help decision makers, military commanders, and first responders understand what's happening at any given place and time, and anticipate what may happen next. I believe our motto says it all, 'Know the earth, show the way, and understand the world.' Individually and collectively, I can attest that we are fully committed to our Intelligence Community (IC) and Department of Defense (DOD) responsibilities and broader obligation to the nation's security. NGA and our GEOINT partners across the national security community are critical to the IC's commitment to minimize surprise and enable decision advantage. We are routinely able to respond more dynamically than other traditional intelligence disciplines, as we have worldwide reach, increasingly persistent collection and systematic analytic access. With the explosion in publicly available information and non-traditional sources, the IC no longer has a monopoly on access or insight, but the IC is routinely asked to corroborate what is being reported and to put it into the context of what we know about the evolving issue, to include the motives of the participants and the potential threats to our interests. [...] NGA and our NSG [National System for Geospatial-Intelligence] partners, including the combatant commands and the service agencies, are integral players in operations to degrade and disrupt the ability of terrorist organizations. Every day, our analysts support our government's antiterrorism activities around the world."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2016-09-27
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Initial Scope of Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's Activities before and after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the United States
This 2 page document outlines the purpose of the Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's activities before and after the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
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Recommendations of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
"Based on the work of the Joint Inquiry, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002, this document contains 19 recommendations for implementation by the Intelligence Community. Some of these recommendations include: amending the National Security Act of 1947 to create the position of Director of National Intelligence who would orchestrate the interaction between intelligence agencies so that they operate as a 'coherent whole;' accelerating the Security Council's examination and revamping intelligence priorities; creating the position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism on the National Intelligence Council; designing measures to ensure accountability is implemented throughout the Community; establishing a national watchlist center that will be responsible for coordinating and integrating all terrorist related watchlist systems; and aggressively addressing the possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2002-12-10
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Department of Defense Program Known as 'Able Danger', Letter Dated December 22, 2006
"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff has completed its review of the Department of Defense (DOD) program known as "Able Danger" and we wanted to apprise you of the findings. […] 'Able Danger' was the unclassified name for an effort that began in October 1999. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, directed the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to develop a campaign plan against transnational terrorism with an initial focus on the al Qa'ida terrorist network, its command and control infrastructure, leadership, and decision-making process. The USSOCOM fulfilled its mission to draft a campaign plan and delivered this final product to the Joint Staff in January 2001, at which point the Able Danger effort was concluded."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
Roberts, Pat; Rockefeller, John D.
2006-12-22
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress together with Additional Views
This report describes the general history of the Intelligence Community's use of INC information and the genesis of how the handling of INC information transitioned from the CIA to the Department of State and , eventually, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The report focuses on information provided to the Intelligence Community by the INC, in particular, whether and how the Intelligence Community used that information, the inclusion of that information in Intelligence Community analysis, and whether the information played a role in the Intelligence Community's judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2006-09-08
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They compare with Prewar Assessments together with Additional Views
The purpose of this report is to examine prewar intelligence assessments to determine whether they were accurate, regardless of whether they were reasonable or substantiated by intelligence report available at the time. The report is divided into two main topics, Iraq's WMD capabilities and Iraq's links to terrorism. Concerning the WMD capabilities, the report compares the assessments of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report of July 2004 with post-war findings. Similarly, the report also looks at the SSCI report on Saddam Hussein's relationship with Al-Qa'ida including but not limited to training, harboring contacts with terrorist members. The report includes additional views from individual senators.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2006
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Recognizing North Korea as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States: Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy
This report is in response to requests for subcommittee reports that illustrate the wide variety of serious threats that face our nation in the post-9/11 world and describe the methods by which policymakers can help the Intelligence Community address these threats. This report provides an unclassified assessment, based on open source materials, of the threat posed by North Korea to its neighbors in Northeast Asia to the United States. It also discusses the need for better intelligence on North Korea and some areas where this intelligence should be improved.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2006-09-28
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Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information, Together with Additional and Minority Views
"This report's scope, as agreed to unanimously by the Committee on February 12, 2004, is to assess 'whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.' In order to complete this task, the Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation's decision to go to war. Specifically, the Committee chose to review five major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of Iraq. […] These speeches are the best representations of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the international community. They are also fairly comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover similar statements made at similar times. The Committee believes that these speeches would have been subject to careful review inside the White House and most were also reviewed by the intelligence community. […] This report does not include statements made prior to summer 2002 or statements made by officials of the United States Government beyond the top levels of the Executive Branch." Additional and minority views are also presented at the end of this report.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2008-06
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Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Together With Additional and Minority Views
This report investigates intelligence activities conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy leading up to the invasion of Iraq. In particular, the report focuses on a December 2001 meeting in Rome with members of the Iranian security service. "The December 2001 Rome meeting involved discussions with alleged current and former members of the Iranian security service and a foreign government entity which included the foreign government intelligence service. While the information obtained was related to Iran instead of Iraq, senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were involved in the decision-making process on how to undertake the meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In light of the fact that the DoD IG did not evaluate the propriety of conducting these meetings, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV directed that the Committee's review of the December 2001 and June 2003 meetings be completed as part of its pre-war intelligence on Iraq inquiry. This report completes the Committee's inquiry into the Rome meeting and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities. The Committee's review is based on interviews with current and former Intelligence Community and DoD officials, briefings, and documentation provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DoD, and State Department. The DoD Office of the Inspector General provided the Committee with additional information collected as part of its February 2007 review of the activities of the OUSD(P)."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2008-06
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq Together with Additional Views
"On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously agreed to expand its inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. Among the additional areas the Committee agreed to investigate was 'prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq.' This is the Committee's report on that aspect of its inquiry. This report describes the Committee's methodology for reviewing prewar assessments about postwar Iraq, provides brief background on the production of two principal prewar assessments published in January 2003, summarizes other intelligence assessments from 2002-2003, and provides the Committee's conclusions about the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments about postwar Iraq."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2007-05
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United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [website]
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence "was created by the Senate in 1976 to 'oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government,' to 'submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs,' and to 'provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.'"
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
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Joint Inquiry Briefing by Staff on U.S. Government Counterterrorism Organizations (Before September 11, 2001) and on the Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response: 1986-2001
This document covers the testimony of Richard C. Clarke, Coordinator of Counterterrorism for the National Security Council from 1993 to October 2001 before the Joint Senate and House Intelligence Committees on June 11, 2002. The originally classified testimony before the closed Congressional session was declassified on November 17, 2004.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2002-06-11
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Chairman and Vice Chairman Letter Regarding Able Danger Review
"'Able Danger' was the unclassified name for an effort that began in October 1999. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, directed the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to develop a campaign plan against transnational terrorism with an initial focus on the al Qa'ida terrorist network, its command and control infrastructure, leadership, and decision-making process. The USSOCOM fulfilled its mission to draft a campaign plan and delivered this final product to the Joint Staff in January 2001, at which point the Able Danger effort was concluded."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2006-12-22
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Terrorist Arrests and Plots Stopped in the United States 2009-2012
This document describes a variety of terrorist attacks and plots stopped in the United States during the period of 2009-2012.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2012?
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program: Minority Views, Additional Minority Views
This document contains Minority Views and Additional Minority Views of an unclassified report that was released on December 9, 2014, by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence titled, "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program." This document includes Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn. From the Executive Summary: "In March 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ('SSCI' or 'Committee') decided, by a vote of 14-1, to initiate a Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, (the Study). On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder decided to re-open the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program ('the Program' or 'the Detention and Interrogation Program'). Shortly thereafter, the minority withdrew from active participation in the Study when it determined that the Attorney General's decision would preclude a comprehensive review of the Program, since many of the relevant witnesses would likely decline to be interviewed by the Committee. […] We begin with an examination of the procedural irregularities that negatively impacted the Study's problematic claims and conclusions. First, the Committee's decision not to interview key witnesses led to significant analytical and factual errors in the original and subsequent updated versions of the Study. Second, over the objection of the minority, the Committee did not provide a copy of the draft Study to the Intelligence Community for initial fact-checking prior to the vote to adopt the Study at the end of the 112th Congress. Third, Committee members and staff were not given sufficient time to review the Study prior to the scheduled vote on December 13, 2012. Fourth, the Committee largely ignored the CIA's response to the Study on June 27, 2013, which identified a number of factual and analytical errors in the Study."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2014-12-09?
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program
This is an unclassified report that was released on December 9, 2014, by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The purpose of this report is to review the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. The report includes a Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein, a Findings and Conclusions section, and an Executive Summary. From the Foreword: "On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the President for declassification and subsequent public release. This action marked the culmination of a monumental effort that officially began with the Committee's decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had its roots in an investigation into the CIA's destruction of videotapes of CIA detainee interrogations that began in December 2007. The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified but is now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the hopes that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the management of other covert action programs. […] Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy to forget the context in which the program began - not that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for the future. […] This Committee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides a significant amount of new information, based on CIA and other documents, to what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations,' as well as non-governmental organizations and the press."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2014-12-09?
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program: Additional Views
This document contains Additional Views of an unclassified report that was released on December 9, 2014, by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence titled, "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program." This document includes Additional Views of Senators Rockefeller, Wyden, Udall, Heinrich, King, and Collins. From the Senator Rockefeller's Additional Views: "The Senate Intelligence Committee's entire Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is the most in-depth and substantive oversight initiative that the Committee has ever undertaken, and it presents extremely valuable insights into crucial oversight questions and problems that need to be addressed at the CIA. Moreover, this Study exemplifies why this Committee was created in the first place - following the findings of the Church Committee nearly 40 years ago - and I commend Chairman Feinstein for shepherding this landmark initiative to this point. It is my hope and expectation that beyond the initial release of the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions, the entire 6,800 page Study will eventually be made public with the appropriate redactions. Those public findings will be critical to fully learning the necessary lessons from this dark episode in our nation's history, and to ensuring that this never happens again. It has been a long, hard fight to get to this point. Especially in the early years of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, it was a struggle for the Committee to get the most basic information - or any information at all - about the program. The Committee's Study of the Detention and Interrogation Program is not just the story of the brutal and ill-conceived program itself. This Study is also the story of the breakdown in our system of governance that allowed the country to deviate, in such a significant way, from our core principles. One of the profound ways that breakdown happened was through the active subversion of meaningful congressional oversight - a theme mirrored in the Bush Administration's warrantless wiretapping program during the same period."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2014-12-09?
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [Unclassified Findings on Russian Interference with Elections]
"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) is conducting a bipartisan investigation into a wide range of Russian activities relating to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. While elements of the investigation are ongoing, the Committee is releasing initial, unclassified findings on a rolling basis as distinct pieces of the investigation conclude. The Committee has concluded an in-depth review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) produced by CIA, NSA [National Security Agency], and FBI in January of 2017 on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections; declassified version released January 6, 2017) and have initial findings to share with the American people."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2018-07-03
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Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
In June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his violations of human rights including the actual use of weapons of mass destruction against his own people, as a part of the Committee's continuing oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States." The first overall conclusion was that "most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence. This report examines: the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own people; the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community; whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policymakers in the executive branch and Congress; whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee's review.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2004-07-07
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September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community: Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Long before the September 11 attacks, I made no secret of my feelings of disappointment in the U.S. Intelligence Community for its performance in a string of smaller-scale intelligence failures during the last decade. Since September 11 I have similarly hid from no one my belief that the Intelligence Community does not have the decisive and innovative leadership it needs to reform itself and to adapt to the formidable challenges of the 21st Century. In the following pages, I offer my suggestions about where our Intelligence Community should go from here. These views represent the distilled wisdom of my eight years on the SSCI, of innumerable hearings, briefings, and visits to sensitive sites and facilities, and of thousands of man-hours of diligent work by intelligence oversight professionals on the SSCI staff over several years. Most of all, these Additional Views represent the conclusions I have reached as a result of the work of our Joint Inquiry Staff and the many private and public committee hearings we have had into the intelligence failures that led up to September 11. I hope that the American public servants who inherit responsibility for these matters during the 108th Congress and the second half of President Bush's first term will carefully consider my arguments herein. Thousands of Americans have already been killed by the enemy in the war declared against us by international terrorists, and though we have enjoyed some signal successes since our counteroffensive began in late September 2001, our Intelligence Community remains poorly prepared for the range of challenges it will confront in the years ahead.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2002-12-10
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Findings of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the September 11attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2002-12-10
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Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: Additional Views of Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Carl Levin and Senator Richard Durbin
This document presents the views of John D. Rockefeller IV, Carl Levin, and Richard Durbin on the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the U.S. prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. "Phase one of the Committee's report on U.S. pre-war intelligence on Iraq details how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Intelligence Community as a whole often failed to produce accurate intelligence analysis on alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorist organizations. Regrettably, the report paints an incomplete picture of what occurred during this period of time. The Committee set out to examine ten areas of investigation relating to pre-war intelligence on Iraq and we completed only five in this report. The scope of our investigation was divided in a way so as to prevent a complete examination of all the matters within the Committee's jurisdiction at one time."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2004
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Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: Additional Views of Senator Richard Durbin
This document is Senator Richard Durbin's view on the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the U.S. prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. He concludes that the report appropriately identifies problem areas in the Intelligence Community's analysis and reporting relating to prewar intelligence on Iraq. "I voted in favor of this report because I believe that it makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of prewar intelligence related to Iraq. However, this report should be considered incomplete as the Committee's inquiry is far from finished."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
Durbin, Richard J. (Richard Joseph), 1944-
2004
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DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing: The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context
George Tenet addresses a wide variety of issues related to the worldwide terrorist threat, including Al-Qaeda; the situtation in Iraq; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the challenges these threats pose for U.S. interests.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
Tenet, George J., 1953-
2004-02-24
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Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft: Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate
This document recommends: "The legal requirement for a Presidential Determination prior to providing U.S. assistance to a foreign government engaged in a program of interdicting drug trafficking planes should be changed to an annual Presidential Certification process with more thorough reporting requirements. Also, U.S. support to the Peruvian counter-drug air interdiction program should not be resumed unless and until the President has made a Certification as described in Recommendation I, and the U.S. and Peruvian Governments have addressed the specific shortcomings highlighted by the April 20 tragedy and subsequent reviews. On the morning of April 20, 2001, a Peruvian Air Force A-37 fighter engaged in counter-drug operations over northeastern Peru fired on and disabled a suspected drug trafficking aircraft. The single engine float plane actually was owned and operated by the Association of Baptists for World Evangelism and was carrying missionaries returning to their homes in Iquitos, Peru. One of the missionaries, Veronica Bowers, and her infant daughter Charity were killed by the gunfire."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2001-10
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Remarks as delivered by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence: Worldwide Threat Assessment to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Wednesday, January 29, 2014
This is the testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence. On January 29, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held an open hearing on Current and Projected National Security threats against the United States. These open hearings occur yearly, and quite a few areas of threat are on the rise, including cyber, counterintelligence, counterspace, and Transnational Organized Crime. They concluded that global threats in the cyber realm are a growing trend, and our increased reliance on cyberspace and digital networks as a nation will create growing risks to our use of digital infrastructure. Exploiting and disrupting our online activities will likely increase, the Select Committee concluded; biggest threats will come from Russia and China.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2014-01-29
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SSCI Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012
"The purpose of this report is to review the September 11-12, 2012, terrorist attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya. This review by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter 'SSCI' or 'the Committee') focuses primarily on the analysis by and actions of the Intelligence Community (IC) leading up to, during, and immediately following the attacks. The report also addresses, as appropriate, other issues about the attacks as they relate to the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (State or State Department). It is important to acknowledge at the outset that diplomacy and intelligence collection are inherently risky, and that all risk cannot be eliminated. Diplomatic and intelligence personnel work in high-risk locations all over the world to collect information necessary to prevent future attacks against the United States and our allies. Between 1998 (the year of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) and 2012, 273 significant attacks were carried out against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. The need to place personnel in high-risk locations carries significant vulnerabilities for the United States. The Committee intends for this report to help increase security and reduce the risks to our personnel serving overseas and to better explain what happened before, during, and after the attacks."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2014-01-15
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USA FREEDOM Act (H.R. 3361), Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, June 5, 2014
This testimony compilation is from the June 5, 2014 hearing on the USA FREEDOM Act held before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Dianne Feinstein: "Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) today held a public committee hearing on the House-passed FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] reform bill, the USA FREEDOM Act. Following is her opening statement, as delivered: 'Today we meet to receive testimony and discuss the legislation passed by the House of Representatives on May 22 to reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. That legislation, which is called the USA FREEDOM Act, was approved last month by the two committees of jurisdiction in the House: the House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After amendments on the House floor, the bill was passed by a vote of 303-121, that's about 3 to 1 and it sends a very loud signal, I think, to this house. It was a very large majority voting for it and votes came from both sides of the aisle. The bill makes major changes to existing intelligence programs conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or what we call FISA." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James M. Cole, Richard H. Ledgett, Mark F. Guiliano, Robert S. Litt, Stephanie O'Sullivan, Harley Geiger, Dean Garfield, Michael Woods, and Stewart Baker.
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2014-06-05
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S. Rept. 110-76: Report on Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq together with Additional and Minority Views, May 31, 2007
This U.S. Senate Report from the Select Committee on Intelligence reports on Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq. This report has been redacted and as such has some sections blacked out. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously agreed to expand its inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. Among the additional areas the Committee agreed to investigate was "prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq.'" This is the Committee's report on that aspect of its inquiry. This report describes the Committee's methodology for reviewing prewar assessments about postwar Iraq, provides brief background on the production of two principal prewar assessments published in January 2003, summarizes other intelligence assessments from 2002-2003, and provides the Committee's conclusions about the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments about postwar Iraq. The Committee reviewed written intelligence assessments concerning conditions in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein that were published between April 19, 1999 (shortly after enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998) and March 19, 2003, the beginning of US combat operations in Iraq. For purposes of this report, the Committee considered the postwar period to begin with the removal of Saddam from power in April 2003. Documents provided to the Committee by the Intelligence Community from this period represented a variety of intelligence assessments. They ranged from short articles included in the daily publications produced by Intelligence Community agencies for senior executives, to hard-copy slides from briefing presentations made by Department of Defense analysts, to fully coordinated, interagency intelligence assessments that were widely disseminated throughout the federal government. The Intelligence Community provided the Committee with all-source assessments."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2007-05-31
