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Lessons in Restructuring Defense Industry: The French Experience
This background paper first describes the structure and management of the French defense-industrial base and then reviews a variety of strategies the French Government and industry are pursuing to rationalize the base, while preserving key technological assets and strengthening the competitive position of French defense contractors in world markets. France has faced the problem of overcapacity since the late 1980s and is already implementing some of the policy options for the United States in the 1990s discussed in the OTA report Redesigning Defense. These strategies include consolidation, diversification into the civil sector, shifting emphasis from procurement to R&D, integrating civil and military production, and international collaboration. While not all French efforts have been successful, and some actions taken by the French Government would not be appropriate to the U.S. economic or political context, the French experience provides interesting and useful lessons for the United States in planning its own restructuring efforts.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1992-06
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Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards
This assessment, prepared under the direction of the OTA Energy Program, was requested by Senators Abraham Ribicoff, John Glenn, and Charles Percy of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. The purpose was to provide a comprehensive analysis of technological factors and potential options to assist Congress in evaluating national and foreign policy relevent to nuclear proliferation. The study concludes that the complex and difficult problem of proliferation is controllable only by hard and controversial choices by many nations over which the U.S. has only limited influence. Within these limits, however, there are many options for reducing the probability of proliferation. The desirability of these options depends not only on their effectiveness and feasibility, but also on perceptions of the importance of non-proliferation relative to other national choices.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1977-06
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Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?
Combat is confusing, complex, and deadly. Friendly fire casualties can probably never be eliminated, but several measures can reduce them. Application of new and existing technology can make identification of friendly forces on the battlefield more reliable; improved communication can reduce confusion on the battlefield; and better training can help military personnel make crucial, rapid decisions under the extreme stress of combat. Congress faces several decisions related to reducing friendly fire. These include: the choice of best technical approaches to pursue; the allocation of resources between systems that are devoted exclusively to reducing friendly fire and other systems-for example, better navigation and communication devices--that may reduce friendly fire in indirect and less visible ways; the best mix of near-term deployments and longer term research and development; and the need for cooperation and coordination among the military Services and with allies.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1993-06
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Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat Simulation
Synthetic-environment technology is dual-use. Research funded by the Department of Defense (DoD) seeded the field. Now there is a large commercial market, and DoD is actively exploiting the dynamism and efficiency of that market. Advances in synthetic environment technologies such as computer image generation are reducing the costs of cockpit simulators and facilitating other applications. This paper describes technical challenges and discusses issues of validation, standardization, scalability, flexibility, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and infrastructure.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1994-09
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Improving the Prospects for Future International Peace Operations: Workshop Proceedings
In June 1995, OTA convened a workshop that brought together some of the world's leading practitioners, academic experts, experienced diplomats, and leading technologists in order to examine the role that technology could play in improving the prospects for international peace operations. The chief conclusions are that the main problems with past peace operations have been political in nature. The participants suggested a number of means to deal with these issues, which are reported here, with the understanding that they reflect not OTA conclusions, but a consensus among these individuals. Further, most participants agreed that, although political and policy issues play a primary role in determining the performance of peace operations, the proper application of technologies, both new and old, can add significantly to the prospects of success for an operation, should one be initiated. Technological contributions can be made in the areas of sensors (especially for monitoring in the more traditional types of peacekeeping operations), intelligence gathering, communications, data fusion, countersniping technologies, mine clearance, and crowd control. Some technologies are well in hand, and others are being rapidly developed and may be available in a very few years. The use of several options among the less-than-lethal weapon categories may be quite effective, but will require some consideration of policy issues to determine a) compatibility with current or future international treaties and b) the vulnerability of U.S. forces to such weapons, if used against them.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1995-09
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Contributions of DOE Weapons Labs and NIST to Semiconductor Technology
This Report examines how NIST and DOE weapons laboratories could contribute to advances in semiconductor technology aimed specifically at civilian applications. Semiconductor technology was chosen as an example of a technology focus for a civilian technology initiative, primarily because the industry had already developed a set of comprehensive technology roadmaps and the federal labs had substantial expertise in the area.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1993-09
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Defense Conversion: Redirecting R&D
Defense conversion means finding productive civilian uses for the resources and people formerly devoted to the Nation's defense. Channeling the savings from reduced defense R&D to civilian R&D is, of course, only one option for using the peace dividend. There are many others, including deficit reduction, This Report examines opportunities to advance civilian technologies and improve U.S. industrial competitiveness internationally by redirecting research and development from defense to dual-use or civilian purposes. The Report has two parts. Part One analyzes how R&D institutions currently pursuing defense missions could be more responsive and useful to civilian technology development. Part Two of the Report examines how proposals for new national missions might replace defense in contributing to the country's repository of technology, high-value-added jobs, and gross domestic product.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1993-05
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Distributed Interactive Simulation of Combat
Distributed interactive simulation (DIS) is the linking of aircraft, tank, and other military simulators in diverse locations so that the crew of one simulator can "see," operate with, "shoot" at, or be "destroyed" by the other vehicles being simulated. Command structures can also be simulated. This allows forces to practice and train in situations too costly or risky to practice with real weapons. This background paper is the third publication of the Office of Technology Assessment's (OTA's) evaluation of combat modeling and simulation technologies.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1995-09
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Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry
This background paper explores the multifaceted challenge of integrating a private, primarily civil industry into the global arms-control regime established by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The interaction between industry and arms control raises new and challenging issues, such as reconciling the intrusive verification provisions of the treaty with the privacy protections of the U.S. Constitution, and addressing the concern that CWC-mandated declarations and inspections of chemical plants could provide opportunities for industrial espionage. Implementation of the Convention will entail an unavoidable tradeoff between the need to gather enough information to verify treaty compliance and the risk that intrusive inspections could jeopardize valuable trade secrets. The background paper concludes, however, that advance preparation by industry can mitigate such concerns.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1993-08
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Effects of Nuclear War
This study examines the full range of effects that nuclear war would have on civilians including the direct effects from blast and radiation, as well as indirect effects resulting from economic, social, and political disruption. Particular attention is devoted to the ways in which the impact of a nuclear war would extend over time. Two of the study's principal findings are that conditions would continue to get worse for some time after a nuclear war ended, and that the effects of nuclear war that cannot be calculated in advance are at least as important as those which analysts attempt to quantify. This report provides essential background for a range of issues relating to strategic weapons and foreign policy. It translates what is generally known about the effects of nuclear weapons into the best available estimates about the impact on society if such weapons were used. It calls attention to the very wide range of impacts that nuclear weapons would have on a complex industrial society, and to the extent of uncertainty regarding these impacts.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1979-05
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SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software
It puts Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) technologies in context by reporting the kinds of ballistic missile defense (BMD) system architectures that the SDI organization has considered for "phased deployment." It reviews the status of the various SDI technologies and system components. It analyzes the feasibility of producing dependable software of the complexity that advanced BMD systems would require. Finally, it summarizes what is now known-and unknown-about the probable survivability of such systems against concerted enemy attacks of various kinds. The study found that major uncertainties remain concerning the probable cost, effectiveness, and survivability of the kinds of BMD system (which rely on kinetic rather than directed-energy weapons) that might be deployable in the "phase-one' proposed for the mid to late 1990s. In addition, OTA believes several more years of SDI research would be needed to determine whether it is feasible to construct the kinds of directed-energy weapons contemplated as follow-ons to SDIO's "phase one" BMD system. The survivability of both short-term and longer-term BMD systems would depend heavily on the outcome of a continuing competition in weapons and countermeasures between the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, developing dependable software for advanced BMD will be a formidable challenge because of the difficulty of testing that software realistically.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1988-05
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MX Missile Basing
OTA identified a wide variety of possible basing modes and evaluated them in terms of: technical risk; degree of survivability; endurance; contribution to weapon effectiveness; effectiveness of command, control, and communications; arms control impacts; institutional considerations; impacts on the deployment region; costs; schedule; and impact on stability The concluding section of chapter 1 compares the leading options in terms of a variety of criteria used, and it is apparent that a final choice depends in large measure on the relative weight assigned to these criteria. Five basing modes were found that appear feasible and offer reasonable prospects of survivability, but none of them is without serious risks, high cost, important uncertainties, or significant drawbacks. No basing mode appears Iikely to offer survivability for the MX much before the end of the current decade
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1981
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Defense Technology Base: Introduction and Overview
Keeping ahead of the Soviet Union technologically is a central element of U.S. national security strategy, and the Nation spends a large amount of money in order to do so. In recent years, however, there have been troubling indications that the U.S. technological lead is slipping, and that it is increasingly difficult to maintain a meaningful edge. These concerns-expressed both by the Administration and within Congress- prompted the Senate Committee on Armed Services to request that the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) undertake a major assessment on "Maintaining the Defense Technology Base. ' This special report is the first product of that assessment. It provides an overview of the subject, including specific concerns about the health of the defense technology base and the related issues before Congress. Subsequent reports will probe aspects of this immense problem in greater detail.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1988-03
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Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties
Like an earthquake, the force of an underground nuclear explosion creates seismic waves that travel through the Earth. A satisfactory seismic network to monitor such tests must be able to both detect and identify seismic signals in the presence of "noise," for example, from natural earthquakes. In the case of monitoring a treaty that limits testing below a certain size explosion, the seismic network must also be able to estimate the size with acceptable accuracy. All of this must be done with an assured capability to defeat adequately any credible attempt to evade or spoof the monitoring network. This report addresses the issues of detection, identification, yield estimation, and evasion to arrive at answers to the two critical questions: (1) Down to what size explosion can underground testing be seismically monitored with high confidence? (2)How accurately can the yields of underground explosions be measured? In doing so, we assessed the contribution that could be made if seismic stations were located in the country whose tests are to be monitored, and other cooperative provisions that a treaty might include.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1988-05
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New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
The adoption of the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept has raised a number of serious, complicated, and interrelated issues for the United States and the other members of NATO. The range of issues is broad-encompassing political, military, and technological questions-although no single issue is dramatic enough to garner headlines in any but the most specialized press. The report briefly reviews what FOFA is and how it fits into NATO strategy, but is primarily concerned with the outstanding technical issues, how our Allies view FOFA, how the Soviets might respond to it, and how the various technical developments might be brought together into "packages" of systems to support specific operational concepts.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1987-06
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Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space
This background paper describes and assesses current concepts for directed-energy ballistic missile defense in space. Its purpose is to provide members of Congress, their staffs, and the public with a readable introduction to the so-called "Star Wars" technologies that some suggest might form the basis of a future nationwide defense against Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles. Since these technologies are a relatively new focus for U.S. missile defense efforts, little information about them has been readily available outside the expert community.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1984-04
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Technologies for NATO's Follow-On Forces Attack Concept
This report is an unclassified version of OTA's Special Report, "Technologies for NATO's Followon Forces Attack Concept." It contains primarily the executive summary of the classified report, as well as the chapter on delivery systems and munitions, with classified material removed. The detailed discussions of other areas--particularly surveillance systems and the threat--were omitted because little more than what appears in the summary could be said in an unclassified report.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1986-07
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Physical Vulnerability of Electric Systems to Natural Disasters and Sabotage
"Electric utilities normally plan for the possibility of one, or occasionally two, independent failures of major equipment without their customers suffering any significant outage. If the system can be better protected, or made sufficiently resilient to withstand greater levels of damage, then the risk of a major, long-term blackout will be reduced. However, any such measures will cost money. Utilities are taking some steps, but apparently, generally consider the risk to be too low to warrant large expenditures […]. However, the consequences of a major, long-term blackout are so great that there is a clear national interest involved. Steps that may not be worthwhile for individual utilities could make sense from the national perspective. The purpose of this report is to explore the options for reducing vulnerability and place them in context. It first reviews the threat from both natural disasters and sabotage to determine what damage might occur. However, an analysis of the probability of any of these threats materializing is beyond the-scope of this study. Chapter 3 reviews the impact of major blackouts that have occurred, in order to help understand the costs of an even greater one that might be experienced eventually. Chapter 4 estimates the effect on the system when various critical components are damaged, and how the system can be restored. Chapters 5 and 6 describe present and potential efforts to reduce vulnerability. Finally, chapter 7 suggests how Congress could act, depending on how seriously the problem is viewed."
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1990-06
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Verification Technologies: Measures for Monitoring Compliance With the START Treaty
This report describes the role of monitoring in the arms control verification process. It surveys the types of on-site inspection and their costs, risks, and benefits. It also examines the INF Treaty experience for lessons relevant to START. Our general discussions of the monitoring process and on-site inspections are relevant to other types of arms control as well as to START. The report outlines the monitoring tasks specific to START and suggests the cooperative and unilateral measures available for a START monitoring regime. It does not attempt to predict which of the possible cooperative measures will finally be negotiated in the START Treaty.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1990-12
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Evaluating Defense Department Research
Congress must vote funding for-- and sometimes choose among--an extremely complex assortment of highly technical proposals for supporting the defense technology base. Any type of systematic approach that could make this task more tractable, rational, and transparent would be attractive. One approach that seems, at first examination, to hold much promise is some sort of "decision-support system" or, as it is sometimes called, "risk analysis" often used by commercial research groups. Closer examination reveals that such approaches are too limited in scope to apply across the whole range of projects that Congress must consider, although the approach can still be applied to specific cases. One limitation of using a decision-support system is that the method requires a quantitative measure of "benefit," which is very difficult to produce when dealing with questions of national security. This is not to say that members of Congress do not have clear ideas of national security objectives, just that these ideas typically are not readily quantifiable.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1990-07
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Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology
At the request of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Government Operations, OTA undertook an assessment of international collaboration in defense technology. This Special Report is the frost product of that assessment. It provides an overview of the subject and analyzes the impact that changes in the environment of defense technology and reduced East-West tensions will exert on defense industrial cooperation and
associated alliance relations.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1990-05
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After the Cold War: Living With Lower Defense Spending
This is the first report of OTA's assessment of Technology and Defense Conversion, requested by several congressional committees and members of the Technology Assessment Board to examine effects of the defense build-down on the civilian side of the economy. This report focuses on ways to handle the dislocation of workers and communities that is, to some degree, inevitable in the defense cutback. It opens a discussion of how defense technologies might be converted to commercial applications. The second and final report of the assessment will continue that discussion and will concentrate on opportunities to channel human and technological resources into building a stronger civilian economy.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1992-02
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Global Arms Trade: Commerce in Advanced Military Technology and Weapons
Congress faces two very important and interconnected issues: 1) controlling the
proliferation of modern weapons and defense technology and 2) the health of the U.S. defense industries. This report, the final evaluation by the Office of Technology Assessment, on international collaboration in defense technology, explores the form and dynamics of the international defense industry, the intricacies of technology transfer and equipment sales, and the implications for U.S. policy.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-06
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Verification Technologies: Cooperative Aerial Surveillance in International Agreements
This report examines the potential and limitations of cooperative aerial surveillance as a means of supporting the goals of a variety of international agreements. It surveys the types of aircraft and sensors that might be used. It reviews the status of and issues raised by the Open Skies Treaty negotiations as an extended example of an aerial surveillance regime. The report concludes with a quantitative analysis of one possible use of cooperative overflights: the search for potential arms control violations.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-07
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Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort
This report investigates the status of research on technological means used to protect ourselves against terrorist threats. It deals with the Federal research and development effort in countering terrorism, and with the state of attempts to use technology to aid in detecting and preventing attempts to introduce explosives aboard aircraft.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-07
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Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base
The objectives of the report are to provide a framework for the debate over the size and character of the future defense technology and industrial base (DTIB), and to assist Congress in selecting criteria for making the difficult policy and budget choices that will be required to facilitate the transition. The industrial base characteristics proposed in this report differ significantly from those of the current base. Probably the most fundamental difference is the separation of the R&D process from the expectation of major production runs. To maintain both technological development and manufacturing skills in a period of reduced defense budgets, OTA describes a process of continuous competitive prototyping that tests new concepts, incorporates new technology into fielded systems, but results in the manufacture and deployment of new systems only when required. These steps, and others examined in the Report, carry risks to both the R&D and manufacturing elements of the base. However, the new fiscal and security realities facing the Nation force difficult tradeoffs that include such risks. It is also clear that managing this change will require improved and better-integrated management in the future.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-07
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Adjusting to a New Security Environment: The Defense Technology and Industrial Base Challenge
The size, form, and purpose of the United States anneal forces are all being examined along with questions of how much defense the Nation needs and how much it can afford. While no clear answers have yet emerged, there is a consensus that-despite Operation Desert Storm-as long as positive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations continue, U.S. defense procurement during the coming decade will be much less than in the preceding one. As a result, the defense technology and industrial base that develops and produces our military systems is currently in flux, changing in both size and form. OTA has been asked by several congressional committees and individual Members of Congress to conduct an assessment of what form the future defense technology and industrial base might take; what form it ought to take; what government policies can do to draw these two together; and how the sweeping changes expected in the base can be managed to minimize adverse economic effects and ensure sufficient future technology and industrial capability to meet the Nation's needs. To set the context for this assessment, this background paper outlines the complex defense technology and industrial base challenges that confront the Nation in adjusting to a new security environment. It examines the role of the defense technology and industrial base in maintaining America's security, and the major factors affecting the country's evolving security posture.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-02
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Verification Technologies: Managing Research and Development for Cooperative Arms Control Monitoring Measures
Cooperative monitoring measures, including on-site inspections, are now a regular feature of international arms control agreements. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the prospective Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty, and the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention all contain such measures. This new element of arms control verification is likely to be a part of any future arms control arrangements in which the United States becomes involved. How well prepared are we for this new era? This report examines the management of the research and development process from which the new technologies are emerging and identifies a range of organizational options that might help improve the balance of research emphasis.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-05
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American Military Power: Future Needs, Future Choices
This background paper, part of OTA's ongoing assessment of the future defense technology and industrial base, outlines some of the issues of importance for making choices about the future nature and role of U.S. armed forces, and suggests how these choices will affect defense base requirements. The final report of the assessment, to be delivered in the spring of 1992, will address specific policy options arising from the strategic choices and tactical decisions discussed here. In preparing this background paper, OTA sought information and advice from a broad spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations whose contributions are gratefully acknowledged. As with all OTA studies, the content of the background paper is the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment and does not necessarily represent the views of our advisers and reviewers.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1991-10
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Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control
This report discusses implications of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) technology. The report examines U.S. options for countering Soviet military satellite capabilities and explores both unilateral and cooperative measures for limiting the anti-satellite weapons threat (ASAT). The report also examines the pros and cons of several illustrative "arms control regimes" for space weapons, ranging from lesser to greater limitations than now exist. It suggest that some combinations of unilateral and cooperative measures might provide more military security than either type alone.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1985-09
