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Oversight of the US Intelligence Community's Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and their delivery means poses a grave threat to global security. It is a pressing national security issue for which the US Intelligence Community has significant responsibilities and can make vital contributions. The purpose of this directive is to provide for leadership, oversight, and guidance to the US Intelligence Community in carrying out its responsibilities for combating proliferation, including support to nonproliferation and counter proliferation, and to provide an overall framework for US Intelligence Community contributions to the formulation and implementation of US policies for combating proliferation. This directive also sets forth the authorities and responsibilities of the Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation and the mission of the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC). This directive is not intended to abrogate or derogate the authorities and responsibilities of organizations in the US Intelligence Community contained in statute, Executive order, Presidential Directive, National Security
Council Intelligence Directive, or other lawful authority.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1999-05-07
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Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence
This directive establishes a system of DCI Directives (DCIDs) and subsidiary issuances, provides a summary of DCI authorities and responsibilities, assigns responsibility for the execution of certain DCI authorities and responsibilities and provides for a process for the creation and coordination of DCI directives and subsidiary issuances. The goal of this system of directives is to enable the Director of Central Intelligence to provide timely, coordinated and clear guidance and direction to the Intelligence Community. The
process established is based on the authorities and responsibilities of the DCI as head of the US Intelligence Community, as assigned by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Executive Orders 12333, 12951, 12958, and other statutes, Presidential directives, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs).
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1998-11-19
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Intelligence Community Policy and Planning Committees
Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and
Executive Order 12333, the Intelligence Community Principals
Committee and the Intelligence Community Deputies Committee are
established. This directive details what activities these communities preform.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1997-07-28
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Information Handling Committee
The Committee will advise the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on the establishment of common objectives for Intelligence Community information handling and coordinate the achievement of these objectives through improvement and integration of Intelligence Community information handling systems. Information handling includes the functions of receipt of information
from collection sources, dissemination, transformation, indexing, categorization, storage, retrieval and presentation, automatic data
processing, telecommunications, and teleprocessing related thereto.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1982-05-04
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Community Management Staff
This directive establishes a Community Management Staff to assist the DCI in fulfilling his Intelligence Community coordination and management responsibilities.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1995-06-12
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Community Nonproliferation Committee
The Community Nonproliferation Committee will complement the Nonproliferation Center's goals by providing a forum for policy, enforcement and intelligence officials to consider plans, opportunities, developments, and related activities in the fields of weapons proliferation and technology transfer.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1993-04-12
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2003
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. This report provides country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. Countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern are not discussed. Countries covered in this report include Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Sudan. Countries reported as key suppliers include Russia, North Korea, and China. The report also includes information on the role western European countries play in the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training, and a brief discussion regarding emerging state and non-state suppliers.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2003-11
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July - 30 December 2002
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. This report provides country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2002.
Countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern are not discussed. Countries covered in this report include Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Sudan. Countries reported as key suppliers include Russia, North Korea, and China. The report also includes information on the role western European countries play in the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training, and a brief discussion regarding emerging state and non-state suppliers.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2003-11
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. This report provides country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2002.
Countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern are not discussed. Countries covered in this report include Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Egypt. Countries reported as key suppliers include Russia, North Korea, and China. The report also includes information on the role western European countries play in the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training, and a brief discussion of trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2001-02
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Darker Bioweapons Future
The Academy of Sciences concluded that advances in biotechnology, coupled with the difficulty in detecting nefarious biological activity, have the potential to create a much more dangerous biological warfare (BW) threat. Growing understanding of the complex biochemical pathways that underlie life processes has the potential to enable a class of new, more virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical pathways and elicit specific effects, claimed panel members. Biologists have synthesized a key smallpox viral protein and shown its effectiveness in blocking critical aspects of the human immune response.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2003-11-03
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Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis: Occasional Papers [website]
The Kent Center Occasional Papers available here contribute to the ongoing development of that body of knowledge, offering an opportunity for intelligence professionals and interested colleagues-in an unofficial and unfettered vehicle-to debate and advance the theory and practice of intelligence analysis.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
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Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?
"We live in what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has called "a world defined by surprise and uncertainty." In this timely and thoughtful paper, first circulated in draft at a workshop sponsored by the DI's Global Futures Partnership in May 2002, Kent Center Research Scholar Jack Davis reminds us that warning is an analytic discipline and that strategic warning, in particular, is a unique analytic challenge that demands continued
reassessment and improvement. Indeed, DI guidance on Best Warning Practices'
stresses the Directorate's longstanding conviction that 'every analyst is a warning analyst' and that 'sound analytic tradecraft is the best assurance of good warning analysis'."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Davis, Jack
2003-01
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Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
"Of the many individuals who paved a pathway for the development of intelligence
analysis as a profession, Kent stands out--both for his own contributions to analytic doctrine and practice, and for inspiring three generations of analysts to build on his efforts to meet changing times. Kent's tools for leadership once again were tough standards, color and wit, and enthusiasm for drawing lessons from intelligence challenges. If intelligence analysis as a profession has a Founder, the honor belongs to Sherman Kent. This essay: (1) sketches Kent's pre-CIA background, (2) tries to capture his colorful personality, (3) catalogues his contributions to the profession, (4) sets out his main
analytic doctrines, and, finally, (5) outlines some of the unresolved challenges he left for later generations."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Davis, Jack
2002
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When Everything Is Intelligence- Nothing Is Intelligence
"This essay, was delivered as a keynote speech on 23 May 2002 at the Kent Center Conference on "Understanding and Teaching Intelligence Analysis: A Discipline for the 21st Century." In it, Professor Wilhelm Agrell of the University of Lund, Sweden reflects on the evolution of the practice of intelligence analysis into a modern profession. Highlighting what intelligence analysis is and, importantly, is not, he questions the recent fascination with applying "the concept or perhaps the illusion of intelligence analysis" too broadly, such as to "information processing activities that are not really
intelligence in the professional sense of the word." Professor Agrell sounds a cautionary note that is timely at a historical juncture when intelligence analysis is receiving unusual public attention. By stressing the importance of linking theory and practice, he provides useful guidance for those establishing academic training programs in intelligence analysis and echoes the mission of the Kent Center and these Occasional Papers in promoting the development of intelligence analysis as a professional discipline."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Agrell, Wilhelm
2002-10
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Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence
"This memorandum on tensions in analyst-policymaker relations is occasioned by recent media accounts of DOD-Intelligence Community differences over the extent of Iraqi-al Qa'ida ties. Similar patterns of tension have existed over the decades. The following conclusions could have been crafted about Vietnam War issues in the 1960s, Soviet strategic intentions in the 1970s, or Central American insurgencies in the 1980s."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Davis, Jack
2003
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Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations
"In a series of post-retirement lectures in training courses for CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency analysts, Kent addressed two recurring challenges in analyst-policymaker relations--providing warning and analyzing intentions--that he argued needed fresh examination by each new generation of practitioners. Kent titled these lectures "Aspects of the Relationship between Intelligence Producers and Consumers." While he admitted, in his final recorded thoughts on the issues, that his generation had found no failsafe formulas to ensure effective ties, he did point to the general paths that he believed needed to be taken."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Davis, Jack
2003
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Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions
The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this biannual report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY97 Intelligence Authorization Act. At the DCI's request, the Nonproliferation Center (NPC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1997-06
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Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Statement for the Record
This report outlines the threats to the United States and its interests now and into the next century. We still call this the post-Cold War world. Among the opportunities and challenges of our time, there is not yet one dominant enough to define the era on its own terms and give it a name. Looking beyond our borders, we see much that is uncertain: --The stability of many regions of the world is threatened by ethnic turmoil and humanitarian crises. -- Two great powers, Russia and China, are in the process of metamorphosis and their final shape is still very much in question. --Free nations of the world are threatened by rogue nations - - Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, that have built up significant military forces and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. --The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs and crime. --And the interdependence of the world economy has made us more vulnerable to economic shocks beyond our borders. The strategic threat to our continent is reduced, but the potential for surprise is greater than it was in the days when we could focus our energies on the well-recognized instruments of Soviet power. No one challenge today is yet as formidable as the threat from the former Soviet Union. If nurtured by neglect on our part, these new challenges could expand to threaten the growth of democracy and free markets. All the tools of national security -- diplomacy, the military, and intelligence -- must remain sharp. It is the task of the Intelligence Community to provide policymakers and military commanders with early warning of emerging problems -- warning that can allow us to avoid crisis or military conflict. We must continuously monitor and assess the threats so that our leaders can manage these wisely.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Deutch, John M., 1938-
1996-02-22
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Weapons Proliferation Threat
Few international dangers confronting the United States have more serious and far-reaching implications for national security and worldwide stability than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The legendary Chinese master of military strategy, Sun Tzu, is reported to have said that the best method of preserving security is to avoid direct battle and instead attack the enemy's plans and strategies. That, in essence, is a fundamental principle of the nonproliferation policy of the United States. If we can determine and understand the plans and intentions of would-be proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and then frustrate those plans before they reach fruition, we will have preserved the security of our nation without having to confront the devastating power of the weapons themselves. The proliferation of WMD is a global problem that cuts across geographic, political, and technological lines. It involves some of the largest and smallest, richest and poorest countries led by some of the most reactionary and unstable regimes Many potential proliferators are convinced that they need to develop WMD and associated delivery systems to protect their national security.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1995-05-01
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Chemical/Biological/Radiological Incident Handbook (October 1998)
This handbook is intended to supply information to first responders for use in making a preliminary assessment of a situation when a possible chemical, biological agent or radiological material is suspected. When evaluating and taking action against a possible chemical, biological, or radiological incident, your personal safety is of primary concern.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1998-10
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2001 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community [website]
The Director of Central Intelligence's FY2001 Annual Report of the Intelligence Community provides insight into the activities and accomplishments of the Intelligence Community (IC). The mission of the Intelligence Community is to provide policymakers, military commanders, and law enforcement officials with timely, accurate intelligence on a wide range of national security issues. Within this context, sources and methods must be protected. Therefore, this report acknowledges only a few of the total contributions made by the men and women of the Intelligence Community.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2002-02
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Devotion to Duty: Responding to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11th
"This is the story of how the men and women of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] responded to the attacks of September 11th. To the extent it can be told in an unclassified account, it offers a sense of the teamwork, creativity, and commitment displayed by Agency officers in the days and weeks after the tragedy. Love of country and dedication to mission sustained them in their vital work. Most CIA officers belong to one of four Directorates. Each mobilized its unique skills and resources in the wake of the assault on the United States: The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyzes information from both open and classified sources to produce timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. DI analysts help the President and other policymakers reach informed decisions by offering insights on virtually every foreign challenge facing our nation. The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) applies innovative technical solutions to the most critical intelligence problems. DS&T officers design equipment and provide expertise in support of espionage, covert action, and counterintelligence operations. The National Clandestine Service (NCS) is responsible for collecting human intelligence, conducting covert action, and working with foreign liaison services. The Counter-terrorism Center (CTC), an NCS component, in cooperation with other US Government agencies and with foreign partners, acts to target terrorist leaders and cells, disrupt their plots, sever their financial and logistical links, and deny them safe haven. Operations officers and analysts serve side-by-side to fulfill CTC's mission. The Directorate of Support (DS) builds and operates facilities all over the world, ensures secure and reliable communications, and runs supply chains that acquire and ship a wide range of critical, clandestine equipment to the most remote corners of the globe."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2010-12
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. Report includes country-specific information on acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress. Countries reported that acquired WMD include Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, India, Pakistan. Countries reported as key suppliers include Russia, North Korea, and China.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2002
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Scientific Information Report: Biology and Medicine
"This is a serialized report consisting of unevaluated information prepared as abstracts, summaries, and translations from recent publications of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. It is issued in six series. Of these, four, Biology and Medicine, Electronics and Engineering, Chemistry and Metallurgy, and Physics and Mathematics, are issued monthly. The fifth series, Chinese Science, is issued twice monthly and the sixth series, Organization and Administration of Soviet Science, is issued every 6 weeks. Individual items are unclassified unless otherwise indicated."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1962-10-12
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Director Tenet's Statement to CIA Workforce about Terrorist Attacks [September 12, 2001]
"Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet spoke to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] workforce this afternoon about yesterday's terrorist attacks. Here are excerpts of his remarks: Good afternoon. Yesterday, the entire American people--joined by men and women around the globe--recoiled in horror at the barbaric acts against our country. In my hometown of New York, at the Pentagon, and in the skies over Pennsylvania, the bloody hand of evil struck again and again, stealing thousands of innocent lives. As the devastating toll of terror comes into focus, we are sure to find among those who were lost friends, colleagues, and others we hold dear. Our thoughts and prayers are with all the victims, with those searching and caring for them, and with those who mourn them. I urge all of you to take the time to think of brothers and sisters that we, as Americans, have lost and to pray for those who survive them. The images of fire and destruction are forever etched in our minds. And in our hearts, amid the numbing shock, there has been profound grief and renewed resolve. As President Bush said last night, the search for the sponsors of these unspeakable acts has already begun. Our Agency is among the leaders of that search. The fight against those who use the weapon of terror to menace and murder is necessarily hard. The shield of fanaticism --wielded by those ready to forfeit their lives to achieve their twisted dreams--is not easily pierced."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2001-09-12
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Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
This volume pulls together and republishes, with some editing, updating, and additions, articles written during 1978-86 for internal use within the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. Four of the articles also appeared in the Intelligence Community journal "Studies in Intelligence" during that time frame. The information is relatively timeless and still relevant to the never-ending quest for better analysis. The message that comes through in the author's presentation is that information and expertise are a necessary but not sufficient means of making intelligence analysis the special product that it needs to be. A comparable effort has to be devoted to the science of analysis. This effort has to start with a clear understanding of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the primary analytic mechanism--the human mind--and the way it processes information. Given the centrality of analytic science for the intelligence mission, a key question that this book poses is: Compared with other areas of our business, have we committed a commensurate effort to the study of analytic science as a professional requirement? How do the effort and resource commitments in this area compare to, for example, the effort and commitment to the development of analysts' writing skills?
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Heuer, Richards J.
1999
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Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis
"This primer highlights structured analytic techniques-some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2009-03
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Rethinking 'Alternative Analysis' to Address Transnational Threats
"This document details how to understand and address the unique analytical challenges posed by complex and fast-moving transnational threats such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, and organized crime. Distilled from a longer piece also co-authored by Warren Fishbein of the Kent Center's Global Futures Partnership and Gregory Treverton of the RAND Corporation, this paper proposes some practical ideas for adapting the organizational culture and processes in which analysis of these issues is done to improve understanding and warning."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Kent, Sherman
2004-10
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Central Intelligence Agency Strategic Intent 2007-2011; One Agency, One Community
This Strategic Intent is the five year roadmap (2007 - 2011) for the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the document, the Strategic Intent will fulfill the requirements of the President's National Security Strategy and the National Intelligence Strategy from the Director of National Intelligence. It states the vision, the mission statement, core values, and the goals of integrating intelligence capabilities, fulfilling a leadership role in the intelligence community, strengthening core capabilities, investing in people, and creating a 21st Century Infrastructure.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2007-01-01
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Intelligence in the Civil War
"This document highlights how the north and south gathered and used their information, the important missions, and the personalities. Though much has been written about the Civil War itself, little has been written about the spy war that went on within. The chronicling of Civil War intelligence activities challenges historians because of the lack of records, the lack of access to records, and the questionable truth of other records. Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederacy's Secretary of State, burned all the intelligence records he could find as federal troops entered Richmond. Union intelligence records were kept sealed in the National Archives until 1953. A few individuals involved in intelligence gathering burned their personal papers while others chose to publish their memoirs, though greatly embellishing their exploits. Even today, the identities of many spies remain secret. Henry Thomas Harrison, for example, was a Confederate spy whose intelligence set in motion the events that produced the battle of Gettysburg. But neither his first name nor details of his long career as a spy were known until 1986, when historian James O. Hall published an article about him."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2004