Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "USAF Institute for National Security Studies" in: publisher
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Five Minutes Past Midnight: Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials
While weapons of mass destruction have been recognized as a "major threat to our security," with nuclear weapons being the most potentially devastating, it is less understood that growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are also a "clear and present danger" to international security. Much of this material is uncontrolled and unsecured in the former Soviet Union (FSU). The proliferation risks of fissile materials are great and there are no short term solutions. Of immediate concern is the breakdown of societal controls in the FSU and the huge amount of unsecured and uncontrolled fissile materials. There is no national material control and accounting in Russia. No one knows exactly how much fissile materials they have, and at most sites not only do they not know how much they have, they do not know if any is missing. A bankrupt atomic energy industry, unpaid employees and little or no security has created a climate in which more an more fissile materials will likely be sold in black markets or diverted to clandestine nuclear weapons programs or transnational terrorist groups. Growing stockpiles of plutonium are another major proliferation risk. Despite the seemingly hopeless magnitude of the problem, a number of non-proliferation efforts have been taken to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. The US will have to take the lead--because no one else can--to meet this challenge through the entire range of political and economic tools discussed.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Lambert, Stephen P.
1995-01
-
Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat
This paper proposes an unusual and more sanguine view of the problem of nuclear proliferation. Dr Kincade points out that the pace of nuclear weapons testing and deployment has slowed in recent decades, while there has concurrently been an increase in the availability of nuclear knowledge. While non-proliferation efforts by the supplier states may explain part of this success, he postulates that domestic political decisions by potential proliferators play an equal or greater role. Deciding whether or not to weaponize and deploy a nuclear capability is certainly not the first step for a state wishing to achieve nuclear status, but it may be the most important. Here a number of domestic factors come into play that have little to do with international constraints or concerns about prestige: economics, internal politics, government learning, generational change, and so on. Kincade's findings are counterintuitive in the proliferation literature, and, if true, suggest that the problem cannot be dealt with solely using traditional means. Dr Kincade's thesis merits careful consideration by those involved in the proliferation debate as well as those in the policy making community.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Kincade, William H.
1995-12
-
Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian Military and Security Force
The proliferation of weapons of all types, especially weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has emerged as a primary international security challenge in the post-Cold War era. This paper examines the critical issue of weapons proliferation in a unique way by focusing on how criminality in the former Soviet Union (FSU) exacerbates this problem. Undoubtedly, this dimension of the weapons proliferation problem does not receive enough attention, is not well understood, and presents extremely difficult policy-making challenges. As the author points out, many very worrisome proliferation ingredients are already present in the FSU, including huge stockpiles of conventional arms and WMD; widespread corruption, turmoil, and uncertainty in military and security establishments; and the potential for huge profits from state and nonstate markets. Adding organized crime to this volatile mix creates an explosive recipe and marks the FSU as the primary source of weapons proliferation for years to come. Overall, this study reaches four main conclusions. First, Russian military and security organizations are the primary sources for the flourishing illegal weapons trade within and outside of the FSU. Second, military criminality is playing an integral role in facilitating the illegal weapons trade. Third, weapons proliferation is fostered by extensive ties between criminal Russian military organizations and criminal elements within the Russian civil sector. Finally, the aforementioned factors raise substantial doubts about the avowed security of the Russian nuclear and CW stockpiles. These conclusions have enormous implications for American and Western policy makers as they attempt to craft mechanisms like the CTR to deal effectively with the threat of weapons proliferation from the FSU.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Turbiville, Graham Hall
1996-06
-
Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of Civil-Military Relations in the United States
"Melancholy Reunion" picks up where "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012" left off. The year is now 2017, and two years have elapsed since the countercoup that returned the U.S. government to civilian control. The United States has suffered not only defeats in the High-Tech War of 2007 and the Second Gulf War of 2010, but also a military coup in 2012. That coup, engineered by a highly politicized officer corps that blamed these bloody losses on "incompetent" civilian leaders, was initially welcomed by a public exasperated with elected government. Only a few years of repressive military rule had passed, however, before the countercoup in 2015. The chastened electorate placed the thoroughly disgraced armed forces under draconian civilian control. The speaker in this essay addresses the twentieth reunion of the Air University classes of 1997, a rather melancholy event under the circumstances. He examines civil-military relations issues emerging in the 1996-1997 time frame that, with the benefit of twenty-first century hindsight, foretold the coming catastrophes.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
1996-10
-
North Korea's Nuclear Program: Clinton Administration's Response
This paper highlights a potential source of unrest and instability in Northeast Asia. It addresses the suspected North Korean nuclear weapons program and the policies that the Bush and Clinton administrations employed to meet this perceived threat. In particular, the paper focuses on the counterproliferation policy efforts of the Clinton administration over the past two years, leading to the arguable success of the October 1994 US-North Korean agreements. Col Berry then analyzes the counterproliferation policy and draws conclusions as to whether it can serve as a model for similar efforts to stem proliferators in other regions of the world.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Reynolds, Rosalind R.
1995-03
-
Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References
The purpose of this paper is to promote an understanding of and research into a new category of weapons, designated "nonlethal" by the military services. These weapons are also classified as "less-than-lethal" or "less-lethal" by law enforcement agencies. National security experts consider these weapons increasingly important in the post-Cold War era. This type of weapon has been used throughout history, but was given new emphasis during the Vietnam War era. Law enforcement agencies and Army national guard units relying upon traditional forms of politico-military force were ineffective in countering US domestic civil unrest. As similar types of conflict, now many magnitudes greater, seem to dominate international politics since the end of the Cold War, this type of weapon takes on increasing importance. The Department of Defense defines these weapons as follows: Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: a. they have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel, b. they affect objects differently within their area of influence [229:1-2]. Our intent is to create an initial term and reference listing that will help support joint-force and dual-use initiatives focused on identifying the potential drawbacks of integrating nonlethal weapons into our military services and law enforcement agencies. Because of the limited objective of this paper, it consists solely of two sections: a list of terms that describes nonlethal weapons along with the concepts both surrounding and inhibiting their use and a comprehensive listing of references to facilitate further research. The category of nonlethal weapons that offers the capability for information warfare has not been included in this paper because of its association with that distinct form of conflict.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Bunker, Robert J.
1997-07
-
Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia
This paper, while it reports the
results of research undertaken across the year prior to the events of
September 11 and their aftermath, presents an analysis that is both
timely and relevant given those events. The two authors--each of whom is individually the winner of a previous INSS outstanding research award--develop and test a systematic, targeted, and useful methodology for examining the non-state political violence and its practitioner that the United States now faces. Their analysis also is grounded in Central Asia, a new but increasingly important region to United States military interest and presence. The paper stands well on either of those legs--a systematic methodology for violent non-state actors or a detailed and security oriented examination of an emerging critical region. Taken together, the two legs mark it as a singularly significant work, one well worthy of serious study. It is the contention of this paper that the new warlords of the
developing world pose a pressing security challenge for which regional governments and western powers, including the United States (US), are not adequately prepared. The post-heroic objectives and asymmetric methods embraced by VNSAs shatter the
assumptions of the "Clausewitzian Trinity" on which the modern nation-state roots its conception of conflict. The new VNSAs are
already challenging our understanding of how traditional constructs of deterrence, coercion and warfighting apply. Developing viable policies and responses to these threats demands a rigorous examination of the linkages between the spawning of VNSAs and
transnational security issues at the sub-national level. We further assert that non-traditional security issues, such as resource scarcity and demographics pressures, are gaining relevance as explanatory factors in the transformation from passive individual deprivation to violent collective action.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Thomas, Troy S.; Kiser, Stephen D.
2002-05
-
Sharing the Knowledge: Government Sector Partnerships to Enhance Information Security
The U.S. military has become increasingly dependent upon the nation's information and communications infrastructures. Concurrently, threats to and vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are expanding, in large part due to structural factors not likely to disappear in the future. To prevail against the increasing threat, the military--and, more broadly, the government--needs to adopt a risk reduction and management program. A crucial element of this risk management program is information sharing with the private sector. However, substantial barriers threaten to block information exchanges between the government and private sector. These barriers include concerns over release of sensitive material under Freedom of Information Act requests, antitrust actions, protection of business confidential and other private material, possible liability due to shared information, disclosure of classified information, and burdens entailed with cooperating with law enforcement agencies. There is good cause to believe that the government and private sector can overcome these barriers, guided by lessons learned from numerous successful government-private sector information-sharing mechanisms. This analysis concludes with actions the government should undertake to develop an information-sharing mechanism with the private sector. Key among them are actively engaging the private sector from the onset, determining information requirements, and fostering a partnership based on trust.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Rinaldi, Steven M.
2000-05
-
Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for U.S. Security Interests
This paper analyzes the history of Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation. The "special" Moscow-New Delhi relationship during the Cold War, it concludes, was based upon Indian needs, American ambivalence, and Soviet opportunism. In the post-Cold War era this relationship has persisted due to continued American ambivalence, short-term Indian military needs, and Russian economic needs. This bond, therefore, may be fractured by an eventual improvement in Indian military self-reliance or a deepening in Indo-American military cooperation. India's strategic culture, rooted in Indian history, geography and political culture, has created an Indian strategic mindset impervious to American nonproliferation efforts. The paper finds, moreover, that there are no short-term "silver bullets" to cure the current Indo-American rift, which flows from causes in addition to India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. While short-term measures can be taken to improve the bilateral relationship, the historical rift that has emerged between the two states cannot be easily mended. The United States, therefore, must strive to ensure that Indian nuclear expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe and limited manner.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Conley, Jerome M.
2000-02
-
Interpreting Shadows: Arms Control and Defense Planning in a Rapidly Changing Multi-Polar World
The focus of arms control is changing. It now deals with issues affecting all nations and not just the super powers. The policy options available to counter proliferation span responsibilities in different American agencies. A cohesive arms control effort will require greater interagency cooperation, because it will involve both inherently political and military issues. In reviewing current policy options some key findings emerge. First, the United States needs to develop closer relationships with countries that will have an impact on key regions. Key considerations in building these relationships are that the country has a similar government, an open economy, a professional military, and adequate infrastructure to support joint military exercises. Second, deterrence is still required, but nuclear deterrence by the United States is no longer credible and can be counterproductive to non-proliferation. The result is that conventional deterrence as the primary method of deterrence needs to be developed and demonstrated. Additionally, because of their quick deployment and long-range precision-strike capabilities, the role of the Air Force will probably increase in scenarios with regional powers possessing weapons of mass destruction. Third, economic sanctions are ineffective and hurt the population and not the leaders they are targeted against. There may be situations where multilateral sanctions would be appropriate; however, the United States should discontinue implementing unilateral economic sanctions. Fourth, export controls have been used to limit proliferation and support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, more can be done to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons through unilateral and multilateral export controls. Fifth, military assistance, when provided, needs to focus more on infrastructure development and deal less with weapon system sales. Building a nation's infrastructure has the dual purpose of aiding their economy and facilitating joint military exercises. Finally, confidence-building measures need to be pursued with more than lip service, because for confidence-building measures to succeed takes as much work as other options discussed.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
King, David R.
1999-06
-
Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience
The primary focus of the paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful development and subsequent rollback of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the important milestones in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa's nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from this effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own "identity crisis." Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long-term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation--and receive guarantees of its security--rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared "total onslaught" by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West. Several recommendations are offered for critical review of the above issues to include the need for greater international dialogue and constructive engagement with threshold nations such as India and Pakistan. Nonproliferation regimes can be used to promote mutual verification, transparency, and the resolution of mutual security concerns. More than anything, policymakers must be prepared to assist threshold nuclear states in resolving their core regional security concerns if they wish to encourage states to pursue nuclear rollback.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Horton, Roy E.
1999-08
-
Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction
The purpose of Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction is to integrate the key insights of previous Air Force vision statements with the findings of the 1998 Long-Range Air Power Panel and address one of the most demanding practical issues that will impact America's next first battle. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) changes the context and conduct of future warfare. For starters, America's military strategy, operations concepts, and doctrine for the early 21st century should be based on the very real possibility that the armed forces will be pitted against adversaries armed with biological and chemical weapons and the ballistic and cruise missiles needed to deliver them accurately across great distances. The single most distinguishing feature of counterforce operations against WMD, as compared with existing missions of battlefield area interdiction, offensive counterair, and deep interdiction, lies in the targets themselves: chemical and biological weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles. These targets may already be earmarked for attack under an existing mission area but counterforce operations against WMD should be considered a specialized subset of these other missions and whose neutralization or destruction is of immense importance to the success of the overall campaign. Many of the WMD targets should be destroyed early in a conflict to prevent their use against friendly populations and forces. Locating these targets can be difficult, including, for example, the specific site of WMD facilities within the confines of a larger fixed target. Some targets may be relocatable; they may be vulnerable to attack for a short period of time (hours) at the outset of conflict. Mobile targets, such as missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), present an especially difficult bombing task due to an enemy's use of ruses, decoys, rapid shoot-and-scoot operations, and other tactics. Another consideration is the depth of the target from political borders. Generally speaking, the deeper the target location, the more onerous is the counterforce strike operation. Finally, linking sensors-to-shooters can help significantly in striking the WMD target within the enemy's decision-making cycle.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Chandler, Robert W.
1998-09
-
Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations: New Answers and New Issues in the Arena of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy and Posture Entering the Twenty-First Century
"This publication represents the INSS vision. It emphasizes both the product of research, the papers produced, and the process of national security education and expertise development. Each of the authors presented here is a 'military-academic,' more traditionally a 'soldier-scholar,' and most are associated with the faculties of either the United States Air Force Academy or of its parent United States Military Academy. The results of their research are distributed by INSS to reach an audience that includes the military policy community. But of equal importance, these same results find their way into the classroom, educating the next generation of military leaders. The messages of these researchers and their enthusiasm for their subjects also reach the military faculties, particularly the junior faculty that many of these authors mentor in both career and academic pursuits. In short, these papers and authors combine the product and the process goals of INSS, thus magnifying the significance of their research efforts. Therefore, INSS presents the following four papers on post-Cold War deterrence and strategic defense, nuclear strategy, and regional considerations both for their content (product) and in furtherance of education and inquiry (process) in this critical arena of high-end national security policy."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.
2001-02
-
Searching for National Security in an NBC World: Four Papers on Changing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats and US Government Policy in the Post-Cold War International Security Environment
"The four papers that follow are not a set, but a sampling of research being undertaken about the future role of nuclear weapons. No one of them is complete in addressing one or more of the questions--in fact these papers were written to address related but separate research questions. Either together or alone, neither are they necessarily definitive on each selected topic, but instead they represent developmental efforts by researchers still growing expertise in these fields. And both in spite of and because of researcher evolution and learning, they take on the added importance of being written by military and military-related civilians associated with the three Department of Defense service academies--faculty and staff members at institutions devoted to the undergraduate education and career preparation of future generations of practitioners of United States national security at all stages of the military spectrum."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.
2000-07
-
Northeast Asia Regional Security and the United States Military: Context, Presence, and Roles
The combined set of papers covers a broad and relevant swath of territory, both geographic and conceptual. The first paper, by Jay Parker, addresses the regional security context with special
emphasis on that strategic landscape as viewed from the perspective
of Japanese security and the United States roles both in Japanese
security and within the broader region. Sue Bryant then fits the
Korean peninsula into that regional security context, adding special
emphasis on the Korean road toward unification and on the continuing United States military presence in Korea--both for peninsular and regional security reasons. Finally, Russ Howard and Al Wilner add China to the mix and also add the third level of analysis--their focus is on post September 11, 2001 issues and
opportunities, and the specific military-to-military dimension of
United States overall military presence and policy. Together, then,
the papers cover the region as well as policy recommendations from
macro United States security and military policy, to force presence,
to the significant roles of individual service members.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Bryant, Susan F.; Howard, Russell D. (Russell D'Vere), 1946-; Parker, Jay M. . . .
2002-11
-
View from the East: Arab Perceptions of United States Presence and Policy
The papers included address in detail some of the implications of those perceptions for US military presence and policy in the region. Brent Talbot focuses his analysis on the key segment of the region's population that stands between the totally dispossessed and deprived radical base and some entrenched,
corrupt regimes. This Arab majority, he argues, can reshape the
region's states into culturally compatible and accountable (if not
purely democratic by western standards) revisionist Arab and
Islamic political and economic states that are much more
compatible with United States values and presence. This is a
significant message in terms of the longer-term strategic postscript
to the current US-Iraq conflict. Mike Meyer focuses his analysis at
the more operational level of US military personnel on the ground
in the region, but comes to complementary conclusions as to United States public diplomacy and presence. He argues that American
military personnel and programs must purposefully shape the
relationships--and through them perceptions and attitudes--with
the emerging military and political leaders in this region of
transition. This approach also provides a key element to the statebuilding exercise that will likely soon present itself. Together the two papers suggest a wisdom of experience--academic and practical--that is essential to the high-stakes endgame that lies before us.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Talbot, Brent J.; Meyer, Michael B.
2003-02
-
'Squaring the Circle': Cooperative Security and Military Operations
This is considered to be an important paper for at least three reasons. First, it provides a pointed overview of conventional arms controls. So much of the
focus in arms control literature is exclusively on strategic agreements that this important arena is overlooked. Second, this paper addresses the interaction effects of multiple arms control agreements. These second order consequences--often unforeseen and potentially negative--raise a warning flag for future multilateral and theater arms control and cooperative security efforts. Third, and closely related, the paper highlights the potential for the
"offensive" use of arms control provisions by the full range of state parties to arms control agreements. Agreements are negotiated with a particular target state or group of states in mind and toward the bounding or control of specific behaviors and capabilities. Seldom do we really consider the second and subsequent order potential in compliance and verification monitoring that are highlighted here. Such indirect consequences clearly must be anticipated today and factored into a whole range of national security planning.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
2002-07
-
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology
This paper is a capstone document on two levels. First, it is a linked follow-on to Steve Lambert's (with Dave Miller) Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control (INSS Occasional Paper 12, April 1997). That paper was derived from their Naval Postgraduate School thesis, and it was selected for the award of the INSS Linhard Outstanding Researcher Award. Second, this current paper also caps a remarkable series of closely related research by the team of John Cappello, Gwen Hall, and Steve Lambert. They previously wrote A Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model (INSS Occasional Paper 20, July 1998--also a Linhard Award winner); "US Counter-proliferation Strategy for a New Century" (in Searching for National Security in an NBC World, INSS July 2000); and "Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic Force Posture" (in Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations, February 2001; a version was also published under that same title in National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 2001). This paper brings both tracks full circle back to "tactical" nuclear weapons. While this topic is addressed in much more exhausting detail in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds. Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities (INSS, July 2001), this paper offers a concise summary of many of the difficult issues presented in addressing this category of weapons within nuclear policy and posture, and particularly within the arms control arena. Its four direct findings are worthy of full consideration and debate as we rethink the place and role of tactical nuclear weapons.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Lambert, Stephen P.; Cappello, John T.; Hall, Gwendolyn M.
2002-08
-
Uganda: Perfection of Post-Conflict Stability or Ticking Time Bomb?
"This paper uses interviews with Ugandan local citizens, government officials, aid workers, non government organization managers, and U.S. officials to re-evaluate the current degree of stability in Northern Uganda. It provides an alternative framing to the historical narrative, which forces new considerations for understanding the causes of conflict, drivers of the cessation of violence, and explanations for why the present situation in Uganda remains precarious. The findings show that complex social, political, and economic factors cause the region to remain highly susceptible to conflict almost 10 years after the displacement of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), threatening not just Ugandan citizens but also East African stability and U.S. national security interests."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Pearson, Kristin M.; Pedersen, Alex S.
2016
-
Changing Balance of Power in the Asia-pacific Region and Optimum Us Defense Strategy and Us Air Force Strategic Posture
"This paper provides: an assessment of where US interests conflict with China's, particularly in the East and South China Seas and Taiwan; an evaluation of China's maritime expansion and anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy; an assessment of pressures that are stressing US alliances and partnerships, particularly with Japan and Taiwan; an evaluation of the US rebalance and the prospects for multilateralism and interoperability; an examination of the prospects for conflict and convergence from 2020-2040; an analysis of US access, force presence, and basing issues in the Asia-Pacific region; and an assessment of optimum US defense strategy and US Air Force strategic posture for projecting power despite various challenges."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Burgess, Stephen Franklin
2016
-
Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical Operations Concepts and Cases
"In this Occasional Paper, Jim Smith lays out a conceptual basis and a series of templates for guiding analysis of culture and violent non-state actors. These templates focus on analysis of WMD acquisition and use, and on culturally driven operational campaigns. While the two follow on case studies did not specifically apply those templates, they proceeded from the same conceptual foundation, and they are certainly compatible with the intent of Smith's guidelines. Mark Long applies cultural analysis of radical Islam and al-Qaida in discussing the many factors and influences involved in the core al-Qaida group's WMD decisions. His work graphically demonstrates the complexity of such decisions for that core group, and suggests that what many may find as counter-intuitive caution plays a major role here. And Tom Johnson, in examining a tribal insurgent psychological campaign in Afghanistan, demonstrates that traditional beliefs, myths and stories, and behavioral influences can be manipulated for significant effect in countering our efforts to gain stability and legitimacy for the Afghan government. Together these papers underscore the central role of culture in analyzing and understanding non-state adversaries."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.; Johnson, Thomas H.; Long, Jerry Mark
2008-02
-
Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement
This study from the USAF Institute for National Security Studies poses the following research questions to determine if a global Salafi Jihad insurgency is underway. "Is a diverse confederation of armed groups, linked together by a common ideology (or narrative) and strengthened by new power enhancers, conducting a global insurgency against the United States and its allies? Is this global insurgency being carried out by a radical Salafi Jihad movement (and its al Qaeda vanguard) and does it have as its goals a) to foster regime change locally in apostate Muslim states and b) international system transformation globally? Is the strategy adopted by the Salafi Jihad movement a hybrid or an adaptation of the insurgency strategy that revolutionary movements employed against states during the latter half of the 20th century? If so, what does it have in common with them and how does it differ? To answer these core research questions, a series of corollary issues will first be examined as a prelude to conceptualizing a set of requirements or model of a hypothetical global insurgency. These requirements will then be tested against existing open source information on the actions, activities, and operations of the Salafi Jihad movement and its al-Qaeda vanguard. The objective will be to determine whether preliminary evidence supports the proposition that those actions, activities, and operations, when seen through the lens of the proposed requirements, can be described, at minimum, as a global insurgency in its incipient stage of development. While these findings can only serve as preliminary indicators, the study will provide the basis for further analysis."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Shultz, Richard H., 1947-
2008-04
-
Out of Balance: Will Conventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence?
In light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, some scholars argue that the use of extended-range weapons does not provide deterrence and invites unnecessary risks. In this article, the author contends that deploying only a small number of ICBMs will not erode US deterrence and that proposing a non-nuclear alternative of conventional ICBMs might boost, rather than erode, Russian confidence that a US nuclear strike is highly unlikely. Major topics addressed include The Fog of Deterrence, The Soviet Legacy, and The Context Today. Author concludes that by providing the United States with a nonnuclear option for prompt response at intercontinental ranges, these weapons would even increases Russian confidence that a nuclear strike by the United States against a target anywhere is the most improbable.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Butterworth, Robert Lyle
2001
-
Shades of Sentinel? National Missile Defense, Then and Now
Due to emerging long-range missile threats, US officials are seeking changes in the ABM Treaty. However, this proposal is similar to that of the 1967 Sentinel Plan, and dangers that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara warned against years ago could apply to current plans. Might we be making the same mistake we made 33 years ago in deploying a costly and unnecessary limited national missile-defense system? Major topics addressed in article include The Decision to Deploy Sentinel, The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, and Sentinel Redux? Author concludes that there should be a clearer understanding about the ICBM threat.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Costanzo, Charles Edward
2001
-
Military Commissions, Past and Future
The detention of suspected terrorists has raised questions about how they will be held accountable for their alleged crimes. President George W. Bush authorized the use of military commissions to try non-U.S. citizens involved in terrorist activities. Authors examine the role of military commisions in the U.S. Army's history. Major topics of article include "The Mexican-American War to Reconstruction," "The Indian wars to World War II," "World War II," "Contemporary Litigation," and "The Uniform Code of Military Justice."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Prescott, Jody; Eldridge, Joanne
2003-03-04
-
Partnering for Hemispheric Security: A Combined Regional Operations Center in Brazil
Brazil is crucial to maintaining the security and stability of South America, a continent vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Colonel Krause presents a provocative proposal for building a stronger alliance with Brazil through a combined regional operations center. Such a center could yield productive partnerships with both Brazil and other nations in the region, as well as facilitate multinational security cooperation in the heart of South America.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Krause, Merrick E.
2002
-
Maintaining Friendly Skies: Rediscovering Theater Aerospace Defense
As Pearl Harbor did in 1941, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks brought home the catastrophic consequences of an insufficient homeland aerospace defense. This is not a new issue. The history of the Cold War is replete with attempts to build effective aerospace defenses for the United States and Soviet Homelands as well as for the theater armed forces of both superpowers. Grau and Kipp chronicle this history and recommend steps for improving US theater and homeland aerospace defenses. The article contains ten key conclusions from the United States and Soviet Union theater-air-defense-systems experience applicable to future missile defense.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Kipp, Jacob W.; Grau, Lester W.
2002
-
Attack Operations: First Layer of an Integrated Missile Defense
United States forces have a long history of conducting attack operations. The proliferation of theater and long-range ballistic missiles suggests that the concept should be adapted to support missile-defense operations. To do so, we must include missile-defense capabilities in air and space expeditionary force packages, mature technology and doctrine to accommodate such capabilities, and connect Air Force capabilities to joint doctrine and employment concepts. Author argues that, although current structures contain pieces of the puzzle, we must fully integrate those pieces within an overall theater missile-defense architecture that includes offensive capabilities.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Krause, Merrick E.
2003
-
Reflections on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and National Missile Defense
The United States announced its withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2002. Major Ruse's examination of how the treaty restricted the development of our national missile defense system helps us understand what the withdrawal means for the future. The Treaty had been adopted during the Cold War, to avert a possible nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race. Logic held that if each nation remained defenseless to a nuclear attack and if nuclear retaliation to a first strike were guaranteed, then neither nation would have any motivation to consider launching a nuclear strike. The treaty codified MAD, which prevailed until the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Against this brief background of the ABM Treaty, one needs to explore why it became such a hot issue after three decades. The answer lies within a framework of political and technological developments as well as a revised security environment. The Cold War is over, and the US must develop new legal, strategic, political, and technological means appropriate for today's global security environment. An NMD system does not yet exist, butt hopefully its inevitable deployment will spark fresh thinking about the strategic shape of our future world and contribute to a secure environment for future generations.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Ruse, Mark A.
2002
-
Air and Space Nation is in Peril
The United States air forces protect economic security. This is especially true because military strategy has evolved so dramatically over the past decade. The basic factors that shaped our geopolitical environment during the Cold War have changed. It is essential that the US maintain strong public support for its actions. This in turn means we must be extremely careful about both inflicting and sustaining casualties. If such sterilized warfare is our goal, then certain types of strategies, tactics, and weapons are more desirable than others. Precision or nonlethal weapons delivered by air platforms - ideally either unmanned, unseen, or flying beyond the range of enemy fire - are the instruments of choice. It would be foolish for our leaders to think that air and space power could be effective in any crisis, but it has now become their weapon of first resort. Over the past few years, we have heard references to a crisis in the American air and space industry. Despite America's dominant position, concerns need to be addressed. First and foremost, we need to conduct a broad-based examination of all aspects of the air and space nation. The US must have a comprehensive plan to develop, improve, and coordinate the commercial and military aspects of our policy.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948-
2003
