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U.S. NRC Fact Sheet: Plutonium
This United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) factsheet describes plutonium, its source, pathways into the body, radiological considerations, toxicity, and production and disposition.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Public Affairs
2003-10
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U.S. NRC Fact Sheet: NRC Review of Paper on Reducing Hazards from Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel
This United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) factsheet discusses the NRC review of a paper by Robert Alvarez titled:"Reviewing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States," published on April 12, 2003. The NRC concludes that the paper fails to make the case for its central recommendation.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Public Affairs
2003-08
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Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to their Tracking, Tagging and Disposition. Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy
"The events of September 11, 2001, heightened the nations concerns regarding the use of radioactive materials for a malevolent act. In June 2002, the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) met to address these concerns and discuss the nations ability to adequately protect inventories of nuclear materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD). An attack involving an RDD has been of particular concern because of the widespread use of radioactive materials in the United States and abroad by industry, hospitals, and academic institutions. At the June meeting, the Secretary of Energy and the NRC Chairman agreed to convene an Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices (hereafter WG) to address these concerns. In the first meeting, the WG identified the following four focus areas for examination: (1) the relative hazards of radioactive materials; (2) the options for establishing a national source tracking system; (3) the potential for the use of technological methods for tagging and monitoring sources while in use, storage and transit; and (4) actions for facilitating the securing and final disposition of unsecured, excess, and unwanted sources."
United States. Department of Energy; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2003-05-07
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Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs
A "dirty bomb" or radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a conventional explosive or bomb containing radioactive material. The conventional bomb is used as a means to spread radioactive contamination. It is not a nuclear bomb and does not involve a nuclear explosion. Any type of radioactive material could be used in a dirty bomb, but in general these devices would be unlikely to cause serious health effects beyond those caused by the detonation of conventional explosives.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2003-05
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Fact Sheet: Dirty Bombs
"In order to better inform the public on what a dirty bomb is and what terrorists might intend to try to accomplish in setting off such a weapon, the following information is provided. Given the scores of exercises"federal, state and local"being staged to assure that all emergency response organizations are properly equipped, trained and exercised to respond to terrorist chemical, biological or radiological attack, we believe members of the public, as well as news organizations, will value some concise, straightforward information. Basically, the principal type of dirty bomb, or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), combines a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, with radioactive material. In most instances, the conventional explosive itself would have more immediate lethality than the radioactive material. At the levels created by most probable sources, not enough radiation would be present in a dirty bomb to kill people or cause severe illness. For example, most radioactive material employed in hospitals for diagnosis or treatment of cancer is sufficiently benign that about 100,000 patients a day are released with this material in their bodies. However, certain other radioactive materials, dispersed in the air, could contaminate up to several city blocks, creating fear and possibly panic and requiring potentially costly cleanup. Prompt, accurate, non-emotional public information might prevent the panic sought by terrorists."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2003-03
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission: CLI-02-25: In the Matter of Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.
This order considers in some detail the legal question whether NEPA requires an inquiry into the threat of terrorism at nuclear facilities. At the outset, however, we stress our determination, in the wake of the horrific September 11th terrorist attacks, to strengthen security at facilities we regulate. We currently are engaged in a comprehensive review of our security regulations and programs, acting under our AEA-rooted duty to protect "public health and safety" and the "common defense and security." We are reexamining, and in many cases have already improved, security and safeguards matters such as guard force size, physical barriers, access control, detection systems, alarm stations, response strategies, security exercises, clearance requirements and background investigations for key employees, and fitness-for-duty requirements. More broadly, we are rethinking the NRC's threat assessment framework and design basis threat. We also are reviewing our own infrastructure, resources, and communications. Our comprehensive review may also yield permanent rule or policy changes that will apply to the proposed PFS facility and to other NRC-regulated facilities. The review process is ongoing and cumulative. It already has resulted in a number of security-related actions to address terrorism threats at both active and defunct nuclear facilities.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2002-12-18
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Letters to The Honorable Tom Ridge, from Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 5, 2002 & March 31, 2003
These two letters outline the steps the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has taken to evaluate and enhance security at NRC-licensed facilities since September 11, 2001. The letters highlight some of the significant accomplishments of the NRC, and their licensees. The letters also describe certain ongoing initiatives.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2003
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NRC Information Notice 2002-28: Appointment of Radiation Safety Officers and Authorized Users under 10 CFR Part 35
The purpose of this U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) information notice (IN) is "to inform licensees of the importance of ensuring that Radiation Safety Officers (RSOs) and Authorized Users (AUs) are appointed with the individuals' knowledge and consent. This IN is also being issued to inform licensees of the new requirement affecting the appointment of RSOs under the revised 10 CFR [Code of Federal Regulations] Part 35, 'Medical Use of Byproduct Material.' It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to ensure compliance with the new NRC requirement. However, no specific action nor written response is required."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
2002-09-27
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Statement Submitted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Invesitgations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, Concerning Nuclear Power Plant Security(2)
This statement discusses the current status of actions that NRC and its licensees have taken in response to the terrorist acts that occurred on September 11 and outline the work that lies ahead. The belief is that the NRC's response to the September attacks has been appropriate and thoughtful, and that the NRC's current programs continue to provide a very high level of security. Before September 11, 2001, nuclear power plants were among the best defended and most hardened facilities of the Nation's critical infrastructure. In the aftermath of the attacks, security was strengthened considerably. On September 11, the NRC activated its Emergency Operations Center in Rockville, Maryland and all four Regions activated their Incident Response Centers. They immediately advised the licensees of all nuclear power plants, non-power reactors, nuclear fuel facilities, gaseous diffusion plants, and decommissioning reactors to go to the highest level of security as defined by a 1998 safeguards information notice and they promptly did. Their licensees have remained at the highest level of security as described in the 1998 notice since that time. They have maintained a steady flow of information with their licensees through over 30 updates to the original threat advisory, regular communications between the NRC Regional Administrators and licensees, audits of licensee activities, and numerous interactions with various stakeholders. In February they issued Orders to each operating power reactor licensee specifying actions each must take to continue the high level of security to protect the plants, and thereby public health.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2002-04-11
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Security Gap: A Hard Look at the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security
Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Rep. Markey initiated a series of letters to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding our nation's preparedness for similar attacks on civilian nuclear targets. The possibility of a terrorist attack on a civilian nuclear power plant is not new. In fact it is anticipated in requirements, referred to as the "Design Basis Threat," that all plant operators must meet when they build a civilian nuclear power-plant in the United States. President Bush has remarked on the discovery of Al Qaeda documents showing the plans of civilian nuclear targets, and Al Qaeda operatives have given testimony asserting their interest in targeting nuclear materials and civilian nuclear power-plants. Although Rep. Markey's concerns regarding the terrorist threat to civilian nuclear power-plants have been expressed in correspondence with the NRC over many years, the basis of the current analysis can be found in the letters sent by Rep. Markey to the NRC following 9-11, as well as the NRC's responses forward to Rep. Markey on March 4, 2002. The NRC requested that some responses to these questions be kept confidential for security reasons. They have done so while compiling this analysis.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2002-03-25
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Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (Final Report)
This document provides citations to replace the outdated citations referred to in Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/, FEMA-REP-1.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2002-03
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Nuclear Security in the Post-September 11 Environment
Since September 11th there have been no specific credible threats of a terrorist attack on nuclear power plants. Of course, there is information that al Qaeda considers nuclear facilities as potential terrorist targets. In light of the high general threat environment, we and our licensees have maintained our highest security posture. The physical protection at nuclear power plants is very strong. I know that there has been a lot of discussion concerning the adequacy of security in light of the sensitivity of these facilities. But let me assure you that nuclear plants are not "soft" targets. For decades, security against sabotage has been an important part of the NRC's regulatory activities and our licensees' responsibilities. The plants are among the most formidable structures in existence and they are guarded by well trained and well armed security forces. The security at nuclear plants is and has always been far more substantial than that at other civilian facilities. I want to assure you that the NRC is responding to the terrorist threat in a comprehensive fashion. September 11 has served to alert America to the need for re-examination of past practices. As a result, the NRC is undertaking a top-to-bottom review of our security program to ensure that we have the right protections in place for the long term.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2002-01-17
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One Year After: Reflections on Nuclear Security: Dr. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at the INFOCAST Conference 'The Nuclear Renaissance: Maximizing the Value of Nuclear Assets,' Washington, DC, September 11, 2002
Given the riveting effect that the attacks have had on the Nation, it is appropriate on this anniversary to spend a few moments to reflect on the implications of those horrendous events. In the aftermath of the attacks, the security surrounding the Nation's critical infrastructure, including the Nation's commercial nuclear power plants, has become a central concern. I have been particularly gratified to have played a part in the collaborative work that has occurred among the Federal government, State and local officials, and licensees and industry working groups to ensure that the already robust protection of these facilities was further enhanced. All levels of government, as well as NRC licensees, have made significant contributions to bolster defenses against the increased threat of a terrorist attack. I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to them. The events of September 11 have also had a broader impact. We all look at the world in a different way. Society is wary of potential terrorist activities and is concerned about the facilities that they might be interested in attacking. This heightened alertness is manifested in the increased reporting by members of the public of possible suspicious activities in the vicinity of nuclear plants. It is also clear that the threat of terrorism will be an abiding issue for the long term. As a result, there is a demand for action by government to preserve the security of its citizens.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2002
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Letter to Ms. Mar Lampert, Massachusetts Citizens for Safe Energy, Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee, from Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 22, 2002
This letter is a response on behalf of the NRC to an earlier letter from Ms. Lampert, in which she expressed concerns regarding the security of nuclear power plants in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2002
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Statement Submitted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, Concerning Nuclear Power Plant Security(1)
Shortly after the second airplane crash into the World Trade Center on September 11, the NRC activated its Emergency Operations Center and the Regions activated their Incident Response Centers. They immediately issued a notice to advise all nuclear power plants, non-power reactors, nuclear fuel facilities, gaseous diffusion plants, and decommissioning reactors to go to the highest level of security and they promptly did. Their licensees have remained at the highest level of security alert since that time. The NRC has maintained a steady flow of information with all licensees through some 20 updates to the original threat advisory, regular communications between the Regional Administrators and licensees, audits of licensee activities, and numerous interactions with various stakeholders. The NRC's Executive Team meets on a regular basis to discuss their interactions with other government agencies, any changes in the current threat environment, and any additional actions that should be considered. Commissioners are engaged in the process; they receive frequent briefings and provide the chairman with the benefit of their views. The NRC emphasizes that there has been no credible threat against NRC-licensed facilities since September 11. However, they have maintained 24-hour per day operation of NRC's Emergency Operations Center. This effort has principally involved their safeguards team. This group receives a substantial and steady flow of information from the intelligence community, law enforcement, and licensees that requires prompt evaluation to determine whether to advise licensees about any changes in the threat environment in general or for a particular plant.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2001-12-05
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Letter to J. Morris Brown, United States Enrichment Corporation, Regarding Issuance of Orders for Compensatory Safeguards Measures, from Martin J. Virgilio, Directory, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, July 17, 2002
This letter goes over enclosed orders issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the United States Enrichment Corporation, that modify the current certificates of compliance for enrichment facilities to require compliance with the specified interim safeguards and security measures.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2002
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Letter to The Honorable Edward J. Markey, United States House of Representatives, from Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 4, 2002
This letter is a response on behalf of the NRC to earlier letters from Congressman Markey, regarding actions taken by the NRC and the nuclear industry in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2002
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NRC Urges Increased Security [September 11, 2001]
"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], purely as a precaution, has recommended that all nuclear power plants, non-power reactors, nuclear fuel facilities and gaseous diffusion plants go to the highest level of security. Details of the heightened security are classified. While there has been no credible general or specific threats to any of these facilities, the recommendation was considered prudent, given the acts of terrorism in New York City and, in Washington, D.C. NRC news releases are available through a free listserv subscription at the following Web address: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html. The NRC Home Page at www.nrc.gov also offers a Subscribe to News link in the News & Information menu. E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC's Web Site."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Public Affairs
2001-09-11
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Risk Methods Insights Gained from Fire Incidents
"This report presents the findings of an effort to gain new fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology insights from fire incidents in nuclear power plants. The study is based on the review of a specific set of 25 fire incidents including fires at both U.S. and foreign reactors. The sequence of actions and events observed in each fire incident is reconstructed based on the available information. This chain of events is then examined and compared to typical assumptions and practices of fire PRA. The review focuses on two types of actions and events. First are events that illustrate interesting insights regarding factors that fall within the scope of current fire PRA methods. Second are events observed in actual fire incidents that fall outside the scope of current fire PRA methods. Fire PRA insights are then drawn based on these observations. The review concludes that the overall structure of a typical fire PRA can appropriately capture the dominant factors involved in a fire incident. However, several areas of potential methodological improvement are identified. A few factors are also identified that fall outside the scope of current fire PRAs including the occurrence of multiple initial fires or secondary fires, multiple simultaneous initiating events, and some aspects of the smoke control and human response assessment."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
2001-09-01?
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Manual of Respiratory Protection against Airborne Radioactive Material
"This Manual provides information to assist respirator users and program staff in establishing a respiratory protection program that is in compliance with NRC [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Committee] regulations. It may also be of use to managers, supervisors, engineers and workers who may need to understand respirators, their uses, and their limitations. Chapter 1 provides a brief history of respirator regulations and discusses the applicability of OSHA's respiratory protection rules at an NRC-licensed facility. Chapter 2 covers evaluations to determine whether or not the use of respirators results in doses that are as low as reasonably achievable, and factoring hazards other than radiological hazards into decision making. Chapter 3 addresses respiratory protection procedures and programs, while Chapter 4 gives extensive information on respirators and related equipment including care, use and storage of this equipment. Chapter 5 offers advice on user-related issues such as medical evaluation, training and fit testing. Finally, Chapter 6 supplies information about personnel safety issues that may be related to respiratory protection, and addresses both radiological and non-radiological topics. A list of references and resources is included at the end of each chapter, which also provides e-mail addresses for various sources of information."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2001
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Nuclear Energy Security Issues in the Post-September 11 World: Physical Security, Safety, Reliability of Supply: Remarks of Chairman Richard A. Meserve, United States Regulatory Commission, before th Sociedad Nuclear Espanola (Spanish Nuclear Society), Valencia, Spain, 26 October 2001
Just last year, King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia visited Washington. The date was February 23 -- the anniversary of the day, now 20 years ago, when the King courageously and selflessly rescued Spanish democracy. As I am sure you know, he won the enduring gratitude and admiration not only of his own countrymen and women, but of people all over the world who cherish liberty. On the eve of the King's arrival in Washington, ETA terrorists ruthlessly murdered a member of the Basque regional parliament in the presence of his own son. They also murdered one of his escorts. Speaking in Washington the next day, the King denounced the crime, and he uttered a profound warning. He said "terrorism is a scourge that affects each and every one of us and, to fight against it, democratic societies must join efforts and necessarily strengthen the indispensable international cooperation." At the time, most people in my country probably did not fully appreciate just how urgent that message was. We surely do today. The King also commented that the terrorists, in murdering an elected parliament member, were really attacking the democratic process that chose him. Again, his remarks were prophetic. The September 11 terrorists, in ruthlessly attacking ordinary men and women, were really waging war on freedom itself, on the whole idea of a democratic, egalitarian, open society.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2001
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Nuclear Security Issues in the Post-September 11 Environment: Dr. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Atlanta, Gerogia, November 8, 2001
The protection of licensed facilities against sabotage is by no means a new issue for the NRC or its licensees, as you well know. For decades, security against sabotage has been an important part of the NRC's regulatory activities and our licensee's responsibilities, applying defense in depth as the guiding principle. This begins at the design stage, with facilities that are capable of withstanding many of the challenges that either safety events or safeguards events, such as armed assaults, might bring to bear. Nuclear facilities are among the most robustly built structures in existence. Secondly, we require careful background checks to minimize the risk of insider assistance and have access controls, delay barriers, and intrusion detection systems to detect and deter potential attackers. Thirdly, we require that licensees be able to respond with force to a group of armed attackers using protective strategies involving layers of defense. This system of multiple protections has long been in place. But that is not sufficient reason for assuming that "business as usual" is an acceptable response to the events of September 11. What occurred on that date was an attack by suicidal terrorists bent on maximizing damage in the course of their own self-destruction. September 11 has served as a wake-up call to America about the threat of terrorist attacks. I am sure that all of you in the nuclear industry are particularly aware of the heightened public sensitivity to the possible vulnerability of nuclear plants in this changed environment.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2001
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What the National Energy Strategy Means for the Nuclear Power Industry: Remarks of Dr. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the Energy Investor Policy & Regulation Conference, New York City, December 4, 2001
In the aftermath of the attacks, many immediately asked about the consequences if a large airliner, fully loaded with jet fuel, had crashed into a nuclear power plant. We had to say candidly that we were not sure. We know that reactor containments are extremely robust, that nuclear plants benefit from redundant safety equipment, that operators are trained to respond to unusual events and that carefully designed emergency plans are in place. Nuclear power plants are certainly far more capable to respond to an aircraft attack than other civilian infrastructure. But the NRC had never previously had reasons to perform a detailed engineering analysis of the consequences of a deliberate attack by a large airliner. We are performing those analyses today. Certainly the various steps to improve air security generally should serve to reduce any current risk. Since long before September 11th, the NRC has required the operators of nuclear power plants to have in place a strong defense to other types of possible terrorist attacks. Although the details are understandably classified, this typically involves a fenced perimeter, intrusion detection devices, access barriers, heavily armed and carefully trained guard forces, and a comprehensive defensive strategy. This program is subject to comprehensive NRC regulatory requirements and detailed inspection, including periodic force-on-force exercises. Nuclear power plants have long had defensive capabilities that far exceed those of other civilian infrastructure.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2001
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Letter to The Honorable Harry Reid, United States Senate, from Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 28, 2001
This letter highlights the extensive focus on the security of the nuclear facilities the NRC regulates. The NRC has worked around the clock to ensure security at those facilities, which launched a top-to-bottom review of their security requirements. Enclosed is a list of fundamental difficulties in regards to the enactment of The Nuclear Security Act of 2001.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Meserve, Richard A.
2001
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Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)
The MARSSIM provides information on planning, conducting, evaluating, and documenting building surface and surface soil final status radiological surveys for demonstrating compliance with dose or risk-based regulations or standards. The MARSSIM is a multi-agency consensus document that was developed collaboratively by four Federal agencies having authority and
control over radioactive materials: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The MARSSIM's objective is to describe a consistent approach for planning, performing, and
assessing building surface and surface soil final status surveys to meet established dose or risk-based
release criteria, while at the same time encouraging an effective use of resources. The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) provides a nationally consistent consensus approach to conducting radiation surveys and investigations at potentially contaminated sites. This approach should be both scientifically rigorous and flexible enough to be applied to a diversity of site cleanup conditions. MARSSIM's title includes the term "survey" because it provides information on planning and conducting surveys, and includes
the term "site investigation" because the process outlined in the manual allows one to begin by investigating any site (i.e., by gathering data or information) that may involve radioactive contamination.
United States. Department of Defense; United States. Environmental Protection Agency; United States. Department of Energy . . .
2000-08
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NRC Collection of Abbreviations
"This collection of abbreviations in common use in the nuclear industry and regulatory community was compiled from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and nuclear industry sources. It was published to assist agency authors, readers, and stakeholders in identifying abbreviations for the numerous organizational, scientific, and engineering terms that appear in NRC printed and electronic information. The compilation is descriptive rather than prescriptive. No one abbreviation is recommended to the exclusion of another because the same abbreviation may with equal validity apply to two or more terms."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1998-07
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Proposed Federal Policy Regarding Use of Potassium Iodide After a Severe Accident at A Nuclear Power Plant
"As part of the Federal effort to reevaluate the Federal policy on KI [potassium iodide] based on a request by a petitioner, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) adopted recommendations that would result in a revised Federal policy statement. NRC staff has participated in the FRPCC activities and has worked closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in this area. There are three options that can be taken with regard to the FRPCC recommendations: (1) recommend no change in the existing Federal policy, (2) recommend the adoption of the FRPCC recommendations, with the added recognition of recent developments regarding medicinal stockpiles for nuclear, biological, and chemical events, or (3) recommend modifications to the FRPCC recommendations."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Callan, L. Joseph
1997-06-16
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Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants: Criteria for Emergency Planning in an Early Site Permit
"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have added Supplement 2 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, to provide guidance for the development, review, and approval of radiological emergency information and plans submitted with an early site permit application under Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 52."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
Kantor, F.; Fox, E. F., Jr.; Wingert, V. . . .
1996-04
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Protection against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants: Vehicle Barrier System Selection Guide: Volume 2, Revision 1
"This manual provides a simplified procedure for selecting land vehicle barriers that will stop the design basis vehicle bomb threat adopted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Proper selection and construction of vehicle barriers should prevent intrusion of the design basis vehicle. In addition, vital safety related equipment should survive a design basis vehicle bomb attack when vehicle barriers are properly selected, sited, and constructed. This manual addresses passive vehicle barriers, active vehicle barriers, and site design features that can be used to reduce vehicle impact safety."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nebuda, D.T.
1994-12
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Protection against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants: Vehicle Barrier System Siting Guidance for Blast Protection: Volume 1, Revision 1
"This manual provides for determining the minimum safe standoff distance between vital safety related equipment and the design basis vehicle bomb threat adopted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Vital safety related equipment should survive the design basis vehicle bomb attack when the minimum safe standoff distance is provided. Guidance is provided for exposed vital safety related equipment and for equipment housed within vital area barriers."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nebuda, D.T.
1994-12
