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Dereliction of Operational Expertise: How Self-Efficacy Shapes Decisionmaking
From the Thesis Abstract: "In 1995, LtGen(R) Paul Van Riper pitted bankers against US Marine Corps generals in two contests - a stock exchange simulation and a wargame. The venture capitalists won both exercises, beating standing operational leaders that represented decades of deployment and experience. LtGen(R) Van Riper believed that the money managers success stemmed from resiliency and confidence in ambiguous situations. Learning from this failure, the US Army may be able to increase operational leader effectiveness by fostering self-efficacy - confidence - in relation to observed ability."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Tucker, Aaron J.
2019-05-23
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Artificial Intelligence and Operational Art: The Element of Grip
From the Thesis Abstract: "The United States lacks a deliberate theory of artificial intelligence (AI) warfare. This contributes to the lack of discussion of the implications of AI at the operational level of war. AI is typically defined using a technological lens devoid of implications for operational art. The proposed new element of operational art 'grip,' explains the fundamental relationship between AI and humans across two spectrums: autonomy and role-exchange. Grip sets the foundation for a theory of AI warfare that proposes a hypothesis for actions, in addition to revealing the necessity for altering mission command theory. The development of AirLand Battle and the resulting formal emergence of the operational level of war (and operational art) is a historically similar case of how key assumptions influence battlefield visualization. Removing the assumption of 'human in the loop' AI warfare reveals a new element of operational art is required to arrange forces in time, space, purpose, in addition the Army mission command theory needs to adjust to enable a commander to move between forms of grip."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Pritchard, Michael D.
2019-05-23
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Importance of Educational and Mental Health Support in Youth DDR Operations
From the Thesis Abstract: "Warfare takes a toll on everyone who experiences it. This toll is especially heavy for children who live through a conflict. Experiencing traumatic events in war increases the chances of child survivors suffering from a variety of psychological disorders. War also disrupts the social network around children which further slows childhood development. The Islamic State (IS) deliberately recruited, educated, and radicalized thousands of children during their reign of control in portions of Iraq and Syria. Reintegrating the children traumatized and radicalized by IS requires well thought out and resourced youth Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) operations. Not properly reintegrating children traumatized by IS or other conflicts prolongs the time necessary for consolidating gains and undermines national and regional stability. Youth DDR operations in Sierra Leone in 2002 and the Niger River Delta in 2004 and 2009 offer good and bad examples for planning and conducting youth DDR operations in postconflict Iraq and Syria and beyond. [...] Providing post-conflict mental health and educational support to children by the US military reduces drivers of conflict, supports consolidation of gains, and develops a more lasting peace."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Morelli, Steven
2019-05-23
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Operation Blue Bat, 1958: Framing Activities in Crisis Response
From the Thesis Abstract: "In 1958, the US military forecasted decisive battles in Europe against a near peer competitor as the most likely instance of future conflict. To fit this vision, US forces fielded advanced weapons, created new organizational structures, and adjusted forward basing locations. Instead of conducting large scale combat, however, President Eisenhower ordered the US military to conduct forcible entry and partnered stability operations in Lebanon to quell political chaos. Known as Operation Blue Bat, the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958 represents an example of military leaders needing to rapidly discern US policy, frame the operational environment, and adjust the operational approach to nest military objectives with political aims at an acceptable level of risk. As the United States enters another era of great power competition, military planners must be cognizant that emergent crises without distinguishable national policy will continue to occur. Operation Blue Bat elucidates the operational challenges of military options to address those events."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Jaquith, Brian A.
2019-05-23
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Future Roles of Army Aviation in Large Scale Combat Operations
From the Thesis Abstract: "The US Army is experiencing a cultural shift away from years of low intensity, counterinsurgency operations toward large scale combat operations with a near-peer or peer threat. The shift includes a major change from brigade-centric operations to divisions and corps serving as the primary warfighting headquarters. Headquarters must now not only provide resources, but simultaneously direct the conflict in multiple domains, including space and cyber-space. US Army Aviation can be a significant force multiplier, but only when used effectively. Army Aviation continues to gain ground through lessons learned from the readiness training centers on how best to reach deep in multi-domain operations. Army Aviation faces many obstacles to continue to be a force multiplier. [...] For Army Aviation to be ready to fight today, they must continue to improve the legacy fleet. However, the more Army Aviation spends on updating the legacy fleet, the less it is investing in the future airframes. Additionally, the current fleet has limited potential for further modifications. The key question is whether such modifications to the legacy fleet will be enough to combat the challenges faced in the complex and lethal battlefield of large scale combat operations against a near-peer or peer threat. This monograph addresses those questions surrounding the shift from counter-insurgency to large scale combat operations for Army Aviation."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Dougher, Kenneth R., II
2019-05-23
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Wicked Game: Planning for Nonlinear Warfare
From the Thesis Abstract: "As the United States realigns its military ways and means to deter and defeat the nation's near-peer adversaries in large-scale combat operations, the United States must not overlook its adversary's capability to employ nonlinear warfare to achieve political objectives. Both China and Russia are attempting to expand their regional and global influence while countering US global influence. This occurs primarily through the information and cyber domains. The employment of cyber and information technologies provides Russia and China with an asymmetric advantage over the West. Both nations acknowledge the value of the cyber and information domains, which is reflected in emerging Chinese and Russian nonlinear warfare doctrine. The Russian incursion into Ukraine and Chinese activities within the South China Sea provide recent examples of their nonlinear doctrine in action. To assist in meeting these challenges, the US military should consider adapting its operational art framework to assist planners in developing campaign plans that are distinctively suited for defeating nonlinear threats. A planning framework for countering nonlinear threats requires an operational art framework for comprehending these ill-structured problems. Designing campaigns to counter nonlinear warfare - specifically within the cyber and information domains - requires planners to use a 'grammar' unique to this type of conflict."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Sweitzer, Christopher S.
2019-05-23
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35th Infantry Division's Mobilization, Training, and Integration in World War II: A Lesson in Deploying National Guard Divisions for Large-Scale Combat Operations
From the Thesis Abstract: "The realities of World War II compelled the US Army to activate the National Guard en masse. Federalizing the National Guard proved critical prior to potentially utilizing expeditionary military forces. At the time, the National Guard acted as the largest component of the Army and contained not only troop strength, but also provided command and control capabilities organic in its division headquarters. National Guard units became vital to quickly mobilize forces for national defense and eventually the execution of the largest expeditionary war the United States has ever seen. The 35th Infantry Division became one of these divisions first mobilized in 1940. The process of mobilizing, training, and integrating National Guard divisions into the Regular Army has not occurred in-scale, since World War II. This monograph strives to identify successes and shortfalls of activating the 35th Infantry Division during World War II for overseas service."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wilson, Shelby P.
2019-05-23
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Artificial Intelligence -- Conquering a Relative Disadvantage
"From the Thesis Abstract: The US military is in a position it has not experienced since the end of the Cold War, one of having to play catch up with its peer adversaries. While the United States focused on counterinsurgency operations, its adversaries watched, learned, and developed capabilities which put the military in a position of relative disadvantage. Russia, in particular, demonstrated a reconnaissance-strike capability during the Russo-Ukraine war which the US military could not match. As the United States endeavors to close these gaps, the question becomes in what new technologies should it invest? Artificial Intelligence is an emerging technology with limitless military applications. Where can the US military leverage this technology to re-establish overmatch against its peer competitors is the question this research paper seeks to answer. Human-AI [artificial intelligence] teaming in the form of autonomous drones linked to strategic and operational level fires enabled by AI assisted deconfliction measures is one area the US military will close a demonstrated capability gap and regain overmatch without sacrificing acceptable risk levels."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Stansbury, Douglas W.
2019-05-23
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Duke in the Peninsula: Arthur Wellesy and the Application of Operational Art During the Peninsular War 1809-1813
From the Thesis Abstract: "From April 1809 through June 1813 the Duke of Wellington, commander of the Anglo-Portuguese army, created a well-disciplined military organization, defended Portugal from two French invasions, and successfully ended French control of Spain. During the campaign, Wellington led a diverse coalition of forces from Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain with varying degree of skill, discipline, and morale against a powerful French army that had successfully subdued many other parts of Europe. Wellington's nineteenth-century campaign provides tremendous insight into the operational level of war, employing military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risk that linked tactical actions to strategic outcomes including protecting Portugal, ending Bonapartist control in Spain, and ending Napoleon's regime in France. [...] Wellington's campaign demonstrates the effective application of operational art to achieve desired results even against an aggressive and stronger enemy. His ability to correctly determine the proper course of action through visualizing and understanding the operational environment aided in his skillful handling of the army during those four years. Viewing this nineteenth century campaign through the modern elements of operational art provide valuable lessons for operational artists today."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Blackburn, Anthony R.
2019-05-23
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Phantom Corps' Counterattack: A Study of Doctrine, Language, & Operational Art
From the Thesis Abstract: "Doctrine influences how the US Army fights, by guiding actions of individuals and units during the uncertainty of combat, and various other martial affairs in preparedness for the nature of war. The US Army fought World War II applying the doctrine of two key publications 'Field Service Regulations', 'Field Manual 100-5, Operations' (1941 & 1944), 'and 100-15 Larger Units' (1942). The conceptual framework created by these doctrines entailed strategy and tactics. Later in the Cold War, the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine's conceptual framework partitioned war into three levels: the strategic, operational, and tactical. Operational art emerges into the US Army lexicon as a tool for creating a shared understanding in applying the new conceptual framework of the operational level of war. Commanders and their staffs apply operational art to bridge the strategic purpose with tactical actions. Today, 'Field Manual 3-0, Operations' demonstrates that doctrine continues to evolve to reduce uncertainty and is increasingly relying on the operational art lessons from the past, specifically in large-scale combat. Applying today's conceptual framework to the US Army's largest battle's counterattacking corps provides a new analysis on doctrine, language, operational art, and the relief of Bastogne, Belgium."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ward, Brandon M.
2019-05-23
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Partner Operations in North Burma: Assessing By, With, and Through
From the Thesis Abstract: "To be an effective operational approach, 'by, with, and through' (BWT) must address the entire spectrum of conflict to successfully employ and maximize the capacity and unique capabilities of surrogate forces. Partner operations are not the only means to shape the theater or address contingency operations. With the return of great power competition, current adversaries possess the ability to contest the US military in multiple domains through layers of strategic and operational stand-off. The use of surrogate forces provides unique capabilities and the means to provide access and depth while also preserving strategic flexibility, building legitimacy, and extending operational reach. However, to succeed, partner operations and the use of surrogate forces require the careful alignment of interests; unity of command balanced with the need to preserve partner agency; the careful employment of surrogate forces within their capabilities; the necessary resources and enabler support to sustain operations; and unity of effort toward a common objective. Most importantly, however, partnerships are maintained and continued through personal relationships, leadership, and mutual trust."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Haith, Michael C.
2019-05-23
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Hunting Steel Beasts: A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Tank Units in World War II
From the Thesis Abstract: "In order to fight and win in large-scale combat operations, the Army must think of and employ corps and divisions as fighting formations instead of simply headquarters organizations. Over the course of the Global War on Terror, the Army focused on employing the modular Brigade Combat Team as the tactical echelon of choice in warfighting. Over the past few decades, the Anti-Tank units in particular disappeared almost completely from the US Army's organization. The study is significant because there is potentially a lack of dedicated organic anti-tank capability in US Army divisions and corps. Given the threats that the US Army could do battle with in the future in large scale combat operations, there exists certain biases that suggest that American technological advantages can close operational and tactical gaps with our adversaries. Anti-Tank units are legacy formations that employed low-tech options to destroy armor. This capability seems to get overlooked in the modern high-tech Multi-Domain concept battle of the future."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Timmreck, Albert J.
2019-05-23
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Exploitation Tactics: a Doctrine for the 21st Century
"Globalization has changed many security, economic, political, and social conditions that shape world behavior; which in turn has produced a new paradigm for warfare that is fundamentally different from the industrial aged warfare paradigm that the world was accustomed to in the 20th century. This paper recommends that current U.S. doctrine be modified to focus on 'exploitation tactics' as a better way to support 21st Century Combat Operations. The paper uses a case study of the 2-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team to demonstrate how to restructure a modular brigade size organization to increase its effectiveness on a 21st Century battlefield. This restructuring includes Brigade, Battalion, and Company Fusion/Exploitation Cells, Company and Platoons S2s, and toolkits that provide the technical means to support this exploitation strategy. Central to the restructuring effort is to create the ability for commanders at the platoon and company level to see and understand the battlefield so they can act decisively and maneuver intelligence throughout the depth and breadth of the Joint Force. This restructuring effort takes advantage of the work that has been done to better understand how to solve adaptive problems by agents of change in the Army, DoD [Department of Defense], and academic community and lessons learned with Theater Fusion Cells and the F3EA [find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze] process in Iraq and Afghanistan."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Hartman, William J.
2008-05-15
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Thoughts, Words and Actions - Disunity in the British and American Struggle Against Global Terrorism?
"Currently Britain and America are engaged in an unprecedented struggle against global terrorism. This new, complex and challenging threat is proving difficult to overcome and the struggle against it, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, is not going well. One of the major reasons for this issue is that disunity of effort in the struggle exists between the two countries. This disunity stems from the lack of a common concept and definition of terrorism both in and between the two countries. This has led to differences in approach when dealing with the threat. Essentially the UK views terrorism as a criminal matter where the US deals with terrorism as an act of war. Therefore the UK and US ends, means and ways are different with detrimental effects. The implications of this disunity cab be seen from the strategic to the tactical levels and felt both domestically and globally. They include wasted resources and growing opposition to the different means of combating terrorism which have led to a longer struggle and an increasing threat of terrorism. For this disunity to be reduced, greater discourse, ideally leading to common consensus on a concept and definition needs to be conducted. Whether this is achieved or not other actions can also help reduce the friction. These include greater emphasis and utilization of countries' strengths and better synchronization between the UK and US. Global terrorism is predicted to be a long term threat. For the UK and US to have greater success in dealing with it there needs to be improvement in their unity of effort."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Croft, Neal S.
2007-05-09
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Air Base Defense in the Twenty-First Century
"Through its history, the United States Air Force has struggled with the most efficient and effective way to provide for its own air base ground defense. This monograph submits a solution intended to end the debate. In an effort to provide the most comprehensive answer possible, the method used to develop this monograph contains two key aspects. The first of these aspects is a historical study of the Air Force's air base ground defense dilemma. Included is a look at the US Army Air Forces' attempts to solve the problem in World War II. The initial history is followed by a study of the US Air Force's continuing efforts to solve the dilemma starting with a study of air base defense issues in Korea and continuing through the current Global War on Terrorism. The second key aspect is a historical case study of two Air Forces that faced similar issues. The first of these is the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force and the second is the German Luftwaffe of World War II. Each employed different methodologies and subsequently achieved different results. The results of the analysis contained in this monograph provide a clear answer. To finally solve the air base ground defense problem, the US Air Force will have to accept risk with regards to resource constraints in order to mitigate risk to expeditionary operations. Failure to embrace the capability necessary to engage and defeat threats to deployed airmen and resources in the future will have a direct impact on the US Air Force's ability to sustain global reach and global power in the Twenty-First Century."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Christensen, Glen E.
2007-04-12
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Opium -- The Fuel of Instability in Afghanistan: Why the Military Must be Involved in the Solution, and Recommendations for Action
"This paper seeks to answer the question, 'What role should the militaries of the US and their NATO allies play in the counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan?' This monograph shows the United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military support of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics programs should have a critical supporting role in a comprehensive counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan, and that military support can lead to the reduction of opium-heroin trafficking, reducing the influence of the forces that oppose the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. To demonstrate why Afghanistan's opium economy is a serious concern to the US, the first section of this monograph describes how forces that work against the legitimate central government in Kabul profit from these illicit funds. The second section describes the current situation in Afghanistan as it relates to the narcotics issue. The final section contains recommendations for US and NATO military involvement in the counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Duncan, Thomas A., II
2007-04-18
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Systemic Operational Design: Bringing Efficacy to the Operational Level of War
"The premise of this monograph is that the Elements of Operational Design are incapable of linking the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives and that Systemic Operational Design is a viable alternative. This monograph introduces the reader to Systemic Operational Design by providing an application of it to the Global War on Terrorism [GWOT]. The narrative generated by this application serves as a vehicle to explore the depths of Systemic Operational Design and enables a comparison to the Elements of Operational Design. Qualitative analysis of key points made in the narrative answers the monograph's research questions: First, given the failure of the Elements of Operational Design to produce a strategic victory in the GWOT, are they still relevant in the age of globalization? Second, is Mass a valid principle of war on the Twenty-first Century battlefield? Last, should terrorism be classified as an act of war or as a crime?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bernard, Barrett M.
2007-02-27
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Resurrecting NSC-68 for the Global War on Terror
"Although the threat to today's U.S. national interests is a form of terrorism being waged by Radical Islam there are distinct similarities to the threat of communism posed after World War II. For the defeat of communism, one single document formed the foundation for the long term strategy to prosecute the Cold War. Today's threat posed by Radical Islam has proved to be ideological and existential much like the communist threat, however, the strategies being developed within the U.S. Government for defeating the threat do not appear as effective as those during the cold war. The hypothesis this monograph proposes is that the organization of the National Security Council and the processes it used for advising the President on foreign policy are no longer working due to the bureaucratic growth in the U.S. Government. A proliferation of strategies by separate departments and agencies spurred by a 'lead agency' approach of the current administration will prevent the U.S. from maintaining a long war focus on the threat facing our vital interests."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cabrey, Richard M.
2007-05-14
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Covert Action Lead -- Central Intelligence Agency or Special Forces
"Since the end of the 'Cold War' in 1989, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has had a reduction in its ability to perform its tenet missions: Foreign Intelligence Collection, Covert Action, and Counter Intelligence. This is primarily due to two reasons: insufficient resources (budget and manpower) to meet its current requirements and a shift in focus from Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to other forms of intelligence gathering. With the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism has seemingly surfaced as a top threat to the global community--especially the United States (U.S.). An effective method of infiltrating a terrorist network and neutralizing its capability is through HUMINT via Covert Action. Historically, the CIA has called upon the Department of Defense (DoD) to help with and augment Covert Action in the form of detailing. DoD, compared to the CIA, is resourced significantly greater in terms of budget and manpower. With respect to its training, skill sets and maturity, United States Army Special Forces are the most capable component of DoD to execute detailing for Covert Action. As the fear of terrorism continues to hold its place as an elevated threat to the U.S., combined with the decline in the CIA's ability to perform Covert Action, is it now time for Special Forces to assume the lead role in Covert Action?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bramble, Vincent Paul
2007-05-09
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COIN goes 'GLOCAL': Traditional COIN with a Global Perspective: Does the Current US Strategy Reflect COIN Theory, Doctrine and Principles?
"The post-9/11 security environment is extremely complex. There has been much discussion regarding the threat, nature of the conflict and the strategy to address this environment. It is the hypothesis of this monograph that the current conflict is most accurately characterized as a global counterinsurgency (COIN) against the Westphalia nation-state system by an Islamist terror network and the overarching jihadist movement and as such, the ends, ways and means of US national strategies must be congruent with COIN theory, doctrine and principles. In examining the ends, ways and means of the current national strategies, this monograph compares these strategies to COIN theory, doctrine and the principles and imperatives derived from historical and contemporary COIN experiences. The research leverages the classical COIN theory writings of O'Neill, Thompson, and Galula. It also references contemporary authors such as Kilcullen, Hoffman and Cassidy. Additionally, this monograph references the recently released COIN doctrine throughout."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Erickson, Scott J.
2007-05-17
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Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Hopeless Case for U.S. Policy in the Middle East?
"The Israeli-Palestinian issue remains one of the most significant and difficult dilemmas facing the international community. The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has directly and indirectly spawned several regional wars in the past five decades, threatened Western access to critical oil resources in the Middle East, provided a justification for increased militarization throughout the region, and caused a high number of civilian deaths as result of terrorism. To end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not simply a question concerning Israel's security and finding a just solution for the Palestinians, it is vital for the interests of the U.S. in the region. Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects, however, are not hopeful. Many peace plans have been advocated to reach a settlement and the U.S., under every president from Truman to George W. Bush, has undertaken efforts on its own. […] The U.S. should take the lead in a renewed diplomatic initiative of the international community to facilitate a sustainable settlement. Only through direct and firm U.S. commitment to a renewed peace process can the current cycle of violence be broken and a sustainable settlement be reached. A new strategy should involve the Arab nations, has to be based on international consensus on the end state for both conflict parties up front, and should establish firm milestones on the 'road to peace'. A successful long-term approach has to consider all issues preventing a peaceful coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians. Besides defining borders and addressing issues, like security for the region, refugee return and compensation, the framework has to answer the question on how to build a survivable sovereign Palestinian state and to define the future status of Jerusalem."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Schmaglowski, Dieter
2007-05-24
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Crossing the Last Three Feet: Organizational Integration of State Department Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations Overseas
"The influence effort is one of the key parts of success in the Global War on Terrorism. The US government must do everything possible to be effective in winning the war of ideas. This monograph will explore the efficacy of assigning a US military psychological operations officer to work in the Public Diplomacy section of select embassies to facilitate the Global War on Terrorism. It will address the responsibilities and capabilities of the Department of State in executing influence for the US government overseas and show how the addition of this officer will offset the resource shortfalls of State Public Diplomacy. In addition to highlighting the benefits to State, it will also show the benefits to the Department of Defense. Lastly, it will present considerations for implementation of this proposal including recommendations for grade and seniority of the officer, specific unit of assignment, and pre-assignment training and education."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Russell, Dale M.
2007-03-20
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Narco-Crime in Mexico: Indication of State Failure or Symptoms of an Emerging Democracy?
"The increasing volume and manner of violent deaths in Mexico nearly doubled in 2009 to just over seven thousand. Mexico appears capable of devolving into a failed state status where an insurgency threat could potentially thrive. These indices depict Mexico as potentially very near collapse. This monograph examines the contradiction among experts of Mexico and Latin America to determine whether the increased cross-border criminal violence reflects 'an unintended side effect of democratization and economic globalization,' or a signal for the eventual failure of Mexico as a nation-state. The monograph determines that Mexico will not fail. The violence along the US-Mexico border and within Mexico reflects a reaction by criminal organizations to the aggressive counter-narcotic policies enacted by President Calderón. President Calderón, having run for election as an anti-corruption conservative candidate, continues to pursue an aggressive policy as representative of the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections after nearly 7 decades of single-party rule. Despite significant economic challenges and a deteriorating security situation in localized areas, the empirical evidence indicates that Mexico as a nation-state demonstrates clear national durability."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Nava, Juan P.
2010-05-21
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Combating Deviants: The Saudi Arabian Approach to Countering Extremism and Terrorism
"The government of the Kingdom feels it has done a great deal to counter the effects of Islamic deviants since 9/11 and are adopting many methods in countering extremism and terrorism on the Arabian Peninsula. However, detractors against the Kingdom say this is not the case and that the Saudi government has not done enough to counter these threats. It is for this reason that the purpose of this monograph is to examine the methods and strategies executed by the Kingdom in countering these threats. The question this research will answer is: What policies, practices and strategies employed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are successful in countering the current Islamic extremist/terrorist threat? To answer this question this research will utilize literature written on and in the Kingdom by scholars and authorities in Middle Eastern affairs. This research will develop background on the historical, cultural and religious methods utilized by the Kingdom in dealing with the current extremist/terrorist threats and how these methods have succeeded in thwarting their definition of extremist/terrorist activity."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Gonzalez, Michael G.
2009-04-09
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Exploiting Terrorist Vulnerabilities: A Law Enforcement Approach to Fighting Terrorist Organizations
"This monograph explores some of the vulnerabilities that are present within terrorist organizations that the United States can exploit in order to deter, dismantle, dissuade, and defeat terrorist organizations. Moreover, the vulnerabilities are reviewed from a law enforcement perspective and not solely from a kinetic military stance. In addition, the monograph explores ways in which terrorist organizations have been defeated in the past, so the United States can utilize these understandings in order to develop a better approach to fighting terrorist organizations. The monograph closes with three recommendations that the United States should consider to improve its effectiveness in fighting terrorist organizations. A greater emphasis on the cognitive war (war of ideas), synchronization (interagency cooperation), and greater adaptability would assist the United States in fighting both terrorist organizations and the atmospheres that breed terrorist organizations and insurgencies."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Day, Danny, Jr.
2009-05-06
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Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant Command
"Interagency coordination organizations at the combatant command level contribute significantly to irregular warfare (IW) planning and execution but need reform to become more effective. The challenges presented to the United States by IW are substantial and persistent. National level interagency reform is necessary to manage IW threats, but is impeded by numerous considerations. Interagency improvement at the Combatant Command level is more practical and offers immediate benefit to national strategy. Combatant Commanders are charged with applying IW doctrine in order to accomplish United States policy in their areas of responsibility. As configured, the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) serving the Combatant Commanders require improvement in organization, resourcing and training. Study of three specific interagency organizations provides potential areas of improved performance and efficiency. The USPACOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counterterrorism (JIACG/CT) from 2001 through 2005, the USSOUTHCOM's reconfigured Interagency Coordination Group (IACG) within its Partnering Directorate, and the USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF) offer examples of JIACGs coping with the issues of IW. Each organization possesses strengths and weaknesses but all need additional emphasis and support. Congressional legislation should establish minimum levels of budgetary and personnel support from the whole of government to the JIACGs. Congressional legislation should also stipulate specific training requirements for interagency members who serve in JIACGs. Finally, Combatant Commanders should introduce an IW Directorate within their staff to assist JIACGs and all directorates with the conduct of IW."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Doyle, David S.
2009-04-14
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Justice: A Problem for Military Ethics during Irregular War
"This monograph directly addresses the problem posed when considering the question 'Who says what right is?' or 'Justice according to whom?' The relative nature of the term 'justice' creates a problem for military ethics, particularly when soldiers try to determine what actions are morally acceptable while engaging in irregular warfare. This problem prompted a distinct way of thinking about 'justice' to form over the course of history, called the Just War Tradition. However, instead of encouraging ethical reflection, Just War Tradition has today caused military ethics to drift toward legalism. What can stop this slide into strict formalism, where law eclipses ethics? The research conducted for this monograph has led the author to believe that the answer lies in a philosophical current called personalism, which has synthesized the Aristotelian and Kantian positions. Simply stated, personalism promotes empathetic reflection prior to acting. Personalism does this by emphasizing the equal dignity of human beings, an idea that is particularly salient to irregular war. During irregular war, military actions are intended to win over the civilian population. The value, therefore, of adopting a personalist ethic is not only moral, but also pragmatic, guiding irregular warfare closer to success."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bauer, John W.
2008-05-22
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From Beirut to Port Arthur: Field Artillery Doctrine and Practice in Low Intensity Conflict
"Field Manual (FM) 6-20, Fire Support in the AirLand Battle, the Army's capstone manual for fire support, states: 'The fire support system must be flexible enough to respond to a number of battlefield situations ranging from the nonlinear characteristics of the high- and mid-intensity conflicts to the special demands of low-intensity conflict.' Given the likelihood of U.S. forces' involvement in the latter, it is critical that the fire support system, and in particular, the field artillery, be able to respond appropriately. That response is governed in large measure by field artillery doctrine. The purpose of this monograph is to assess the viability of that doctrine to contribute to mission success in varied LIC [Low Intensity Conflict] environments. Because doctrine emanates from the principles that comprise a given body of theory, the monograph begins with a capsulation of the classical underpinnings of field artillery theory. Linkages between classical theory and the employment of artillery in the LIC environment are then drawn. Armed with this theoretical foundation, we examine how the artillery has performed historically in each of the four LIC operational categories of combatting [sic] terrorism, peacekeeping operations, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and peacetime contingency operations. [...] Finally, recommendations are offered to address any deficiencies noted. The study concludes that there are legitimate roles for the field artillery in all four of the operational categories that comprise the low intensity conflict spectrum. By refocusing and retooling field artillery doctrine to encompass the fire support requirements peculiar to the low intensity conflict environment, the field artillery will be better prepared to fulfill its charge within the context of military operations in LIC."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Gregory, William A.
1990-11-21
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Impact of C4ISR/Digitization and Joint Force Ability to Conduct the Global War on Terror
"The end of the Cold War marked the end of an era in United States national security. The bipolar global balance of power, which defined our nation's defensive strategy for more than 30 years, was replaced with the uncertainty of failed nation-states, rogue authoritarian regimes, and international terrorist organizations. Operations in the late twentieth century and early twenty first cnetury [sic] have been characterized by a dramatic increase in the use of C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] systems, transformation initiatives, and network centric warfare concepts. Joint and Coalition forces showed how effective these systems, initiatives, and concepts can be during major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A theory of technological synergy is used to describe changes in effectiveness through implementation of technology and organizational change. Multiple systems from space, to aircraft and UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle], to ground systems are required to empower the Joint Force. Through the successful implementation of these systems, a global C4ISR structure can be described as the primary enabler that empowers Joint Forces to successfully conduct the Global War on Terror."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Dacus, Andrew P.
2006-05-25
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Maximum Use of Civilian Communications Capabilities for National Security
From the introductory Staff Study section of this analytical study: "The civilian communications industry in the United States, with a plant value of over 7 billion dollars, employing over 1/2 million skilled communications men, and rapidly expanding, is capable of furnishing sufficient skilled and experienced personnel in wartime to meet practically the entire Armed Forces and industrial requirements. […] Signal Corps experience in both recent Wars has demonstrated and proven the value and benefits of military utilization of civilian industrial trained and experienced technicians as implemented through the 'Affiliation' principle. […] Current programs leading toward a utilization of this civilian skilled manpower reservoir, principally through the 'Affiliation Program', can ultimately utilize only a minor fraction of the segment of this group of personnel which would be available to the Armed Forces in wartime. Current program limitations and implementing experiences indicate a definite need for a more comprehensive program of civilian skilled personnel utilization. […] Since there exists in the Signal Corps a positive wartime requirement for trained and skilled civilian communications personnel; since there exists within the civilian communications industry a sufficient force of this category of personnel to meet practically all wartime manpower requirements; and since current programs provide for only a minor utilization of this civilian capability; - the urgency of the problem warrants consideration of a plan designed to achieve maximum utilization of this capability."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Heltzel, William E.
1947-11-19
