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'Plan Colombia': Assessing U.S. Colombia Counterinsurgency and Counterdrug Strategies
From the thesis abstract: "Colombia remains one of the most troubled countries in South America. The continued export of drugs coupled with a significant insurgent threat and increased violence against civilians, signals a crisis capable of disrupting the entire region. […]. The purpose of this monograph is to examine current U.S. and Colombian counter-drug strategies. Will the U.S. contribution in financial and military aid to 'Plan Colombia' ensure success? Is 'Plan Colombia' an appropriate strategy for ending Colombia's insurgency and reducing or eradicating the export of drugs to Europe and North America, or does the plan require modification to achieve the desired end-state? Will greater engagement in the internal affairs of Colombia drag the U.S. into a regional conflict similar to Vietnam? The monograph concludes that the implementation of Plan Colombia will begin the process of conflict resolution. Over time, military and financial aid from the U.S., European and Colombia's regional partners will bring to an end the civil war that started more than fifty-years ago. The strategic focus of Plan Colombia is imbedded [sic] in the ability to recognize existing linkages between the drug trade, the insurgency, and the paramilitaries. The success of Plan Colombia is dependent on recognizing the relationship between illegal drug trafficking and systemic violence, the role of the peace process, development of institutional strength, and the role played by the U.S. and the international community in providing support to conflict resolution."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Warren, Paul S.
2001-05-15
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Fighting with Fires: Decentralize Control to Increase Responsiveness
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph on military theory examines the subject of fire support effectiveness and responsiveness. In 1987 the fire support effectiveness rate as measured by the Army's Combat Training Centers was 60%. Despite the Army's effort to improve its ability to fight with fires, the effectiveness rate as of February, 2000, had declined to 12%. This factual evidence complements the perceptions of senior Army leaders who criticize the fire support community for failing to provide the supported maneuver formation with responsiveness fire support. The examination of theory explains how the Army's centralized control of fires to facilitate massing of fires, coupled with a poorly developed digital fire control system are the root causes of failure. Theory is further used to predict the role of fires in the future and shows that centralized control works directly against the Army's focus on high tempo, decisive maneuver operations. This document aims to change the Army view's on how it controls and fights with indirect fires at the brigade level and below. In essence, a shift from centralized control to decentralized control would improve both effectiveness and responsiveness while also setting into motion establishment of a foundation from which to support 21st Century Warfare."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Johnson, Robert C., LTC
2001-05-15
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Operational Planning Issues for the Peaceful Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
"This monograph examines if the US Army in Korea is trained, equipped, and staffed to move directly into the last phase of a campaign plan, post-hostilities. As the new millennium dawns over the Korean Peninsula, literally the world's hopes and expectations for peace are at an all time high. This monograph will study current North and South Korean relationships, in order to glean information the U.S. Army planner will need in the event of moving directly into post-hostilities. Additionally four well know scenarios for North Korean collapse and eventual reunification are studied. Within each scenario, the Army planner has to discern how to optimize the plan and allow for the innumerable branches or sequels that will be required. In order to provide further background information to facilitate planning and assumptions, the interests of the four major powers are discussed. The common theme among the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia is to seek stability and prevent no one power from establishing a hegemonic influence or domination over northeast Asia. This will allow all the powers involved to freely focus on economic investment and trade in the region. The monograph concludes by using a fictitious scenario of DPRK collapse and developing strategic and operational end states that will need to be accomplished in order to meet the 2000 National Security Strategy for northeast Asia."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Stahl, Albert C.
2001-05-15
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United States War on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End
"The monograph addresses trend analysis of drug control programs since 1993 and explores emerging indicators on drug war policy from the new Bush Administration. […]. Using principles of economic theory, the cocaine supply market would not exist were it not for the demand. It would appear that profits from the U.S. demand outweigh the risks associated with illegal production. If this researcher could come to this conclusion with vast amounts of public accessed data, why has the preponderance of fiscal resources gone to supply reduction rather than demand reduction? The research question is of interest to a student of operational art. For his understanding that policy formulation for national drug control is primarily an extension of political will. The military planner must understand the reality that the tactics of elections is driving the strategic formulation of policy. The get-tough approach represented by source country interdiction is easier politically to present to a nation that has grown accustomed to politically-correct rhetoric. Exploring the cognitive tension between the continued execution of a failing drug control strategy and the continued political success gained from the electorate is of value in understanding the role of national will. The monograph concludes that electoral politics was the reason why the preponderance of federal fiscal dollars went to supply programs rather than demand reduction programs. The United States drug policy has been driven by the need to appear tough on drugs, regardless of results."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Peavie, Barrett K.
2001-05-01
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New Kind of War: Adaptive Threat Doctrine and Information Operations
"The United States military remains the dominant post-modern state combatant. Military actions in Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Desert Storm victory validated the theory that information-based technologies are decisive factors in modern military operations. Threats recognize that peer competitors of the U.S. do not exist and are several decades away from developing similar military technologies. Consequently, threat-based strategies seek alternative or asymmetrical methods of warfare designed to exploit U.S. weaknesses and disrupt or paralyze the decision-making apparatus. Information operations provide opportunities to avoid direct contact with superior conventional forces and threat capabilities enhanced where qualitative gaps with opposing forces exist. The theoretical framework for the study is a model of information warfare that draws a distinction between 'cyberwar' and 'netwar,' two components of information warfare that are structurally different. Using a hybrid of this model, the effectiveness of threat strategy using 'netwar' to disrupt the decision-making process and create paralysis at the strategic and operational level can be determined. Understanding how the threat is adapting to knowledge- based warfare and U.S. military information dominance is vital to U.S. national interests. What methods are state and non-state actors using to counter U.S. technological superiority? Can adaptive threat applications be developed that cause strategic and operational paralysis? If so, then are they successful in achieving threat end-states and are they designed to use information operations to gain a relative advantage? Can it be shown that future threats to the security of the United States can develop new ways, specifically 'netwar' strategies, to attack and exploit U.S. military weaknesses?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Warren, Paul S.
2001-02
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Arming the Skies: The Right Time Has Not Arrived
"This monograph examines the benefits and drawbacks of an aggressive US space weaponization program. The US possesses a lead in space capabilities that places it in a position to field space weapons first and guarantee the security of national space assets for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the dependence of US military forces on space enablers poses a vulnerability that an adversary will likely attempt to exploit in any future conflict. Advocates of weaponizing space view the failure to weaponize space first would represent an abdication of responsibility by US government officials. The risks associated with weaponizing space include the possibility of an increase in nuclear tensions and a diminishment of US national power in terms of diplomatic, information and economic influence."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Taylor, Kirk D.
2000-12-15
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Doctrinal Lessons from Non-State Actors
"The mode of warfare is changing. State on state conflict is no longer the primary approach to war. A phenomenon known as Gray Area War is on the rise. Gray Area War is defined as a conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity and the method is combining elements of traditional war fighting with organized crime. This method of warfare is eclipsing state on state conflict. The world is changing at an alarming pace. Alvin and Heidi Toffler outline the cause of these changes and attribute them to the Third Wave. The Third Wave is built upon the information revolution and globalization. The shrinking world is causing fractures and divisions in many states throughout the world. Not only are states in decline, but so is the mode of warfare that states traditionally wage. Though state on state conflict is [sic] decline, warfare will continue."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Forte, Robert A.
2001
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Support to Urban Operations
From the monograph abstract: "This monograph addresses the research question: are there unique ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] capabilities to support urban military operations? The desire to explore this research question is based on the conditions: (1) shift in demographics and economics to urban areas into 2030; (2) increase of U.S. military operations on the urban landscape since the 1990s; (3) potential use of urban areas by determined foes as an asymmetric approach; and (4) availability of literature questioning if there are adequate ISR capabilities to support urban military operations. The methodology for the research consists of a thorough literature review on the characteristics of an urban environment, especially the effects that it has on threat and friendly forces operations; ISR capabilities currently in the Army as well as part of ongoing research and development programs; and case studies of Grozny, Chechnya and Hue, Vietnam. Analysis of available literature was sufficient for making generalizations of the unique ISR capabilities required to support military operations on the urban terrain compared to the conventional, open battlefield. There is a need for innovative ISR capabilities on the modern urban battlefield. The challenge of operating on urban terrain is multi-dimensional. In contrast to open terrain, the urban landscape has limited open maneuver and observation areas with line of sight concerns because of the density of man-made structures and population, subterranean areas, and possibly natural terrain features. ISR capabilities in urban areas should include both human and technical assets, representing all the intelligence disciplines. As ISR systems are designed, there should be emphasis on as many collectors as possible to be unmanned; miniature, unobservable (stealthy); capable of transmitting what they see, hear, smell and/or sense through walls, windows, tunnels, and electrical conduits; and are part of a network centric architecture. The ongoing Army initiative to transform from a legacy force into an objective force offers an ideal window of opportunity to design and procure the ISR capabilities essential to support urban military operations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bush, Bichson
2000-11-16
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Information Superiority: Seeking Command of the Cyber-Sea
"This thesis examines the initial effort to formulate principles for information-based operations. Although it is impossible to explore each aspect of this transformation, it is worthwhile to examine current efforts by the US military to develop a doctrinal foundation for Information Operations (IO). It explores the ongoing struggle to capture within the confines of Joint military doctrine those critical features of this new age driven by information. The world community is increasingly dependent on reliable information traffic. Information has become a commodity and source of power unto itself. Alvin Toffler describes this period as the transformation of societies from 'second-wave' (industrial/mechanical) to 'third-wave' (information-based) means. The growing dependence of the US military on these infrastructures reveals potentially vulnerable elements of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). This monograph examines the need for a comprehensive IO doctrine. It yields a critical analysis of existing doctrine, illuminates several flaws within the current construct, and concludes with a suggested model for IO development."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Kardos, Thomas J.
2000-05-23
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Nature of Future Intelligence Organizations
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph identifies the essential characteristics and capabilities of intelligence organization structures for an army force that is global, rapidly deployable and capable of executing fall spectrum military operations in joint and combined environments. It identifies these characteristics and capabilities by tracing the evolution of military intelligence organization structures over the past decade. It examines lessons learned from deployments to Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti as well as observations from Division Advanced Warfighting Experiments (DAWE) to determine causes of recurring problems related to intelligence organizational design. This monograph proposes a traditional, matrix and virtual models as potential intelligence organization structures. It analyzes each model's strengths and wea[kn]esses, identifies essential characteristics, and assesses applicability of each relative to future environmental influences specific to offense, defense, stability and support operations. These environmental influences are stability, complexity and diversity. They are important considerations because they often necessitate changes in organizational design."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Pacher, Leo R.
2000-05-15
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Ancient Chinese Precedents in 'China's National Defense'
From the thesis abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategy embodied in China's 1998 White Paper titled China's National Defense and compare it with the strategic concepts contained in a number of military classics from ancient China. The assumption is that since China's political and military leaders state openly that their strategy is based on traditional Chinese strategic concepts, a study of ancient classics on strategy may provide a deeper understanding of the strategy embodied in China's National Defense. Such an understanding will be of value to United States military strategists as they deal with the China of today and tomorrow. The results of this study did find ancient precedents in the strategy outlined by China's National Defense. The most prevalent strategic precedents include the concepts of: gaining popular support for the national government, pursuing economic development to satisfy the population, developing a strong military to deter/defeat internal and external threats, and preferring the use of peaceful means to solve conflicts rather than using military force."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Geddis, Robert B.
1999-06-04
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Creating a DoD Strategic Information Support Center
From the thesis abstract: "The US Armed Forces needs a new organization capable of remaining competitive in an ever-expanding global information environment, adapting to reach both illiterate and technologically-savvy audiences of the 21st Century, developing information strategies to shape the global information environment, and responding to positive and negative information within the global information environment. The U.S military must shed its Cold War-organization, policy, doctrine, and equipment and prepare for the 21st Century. If the military fails to adapt, some other non-military organization may take its place. The new organization may have the expertise, but not the loyalty or deployability that a Department of Defense Strategic Information Support Center (D-SISC, pronounced DEE-SIK) could have. Interagency coordination regarding information activities conducted by the military and other government organizations is episodic at best. Currently, there is no standing organization at the military strategic level to conduct interagency coordination and deconfliction between military and other governmental information activities. In an environment of shrinking budgets, increased operational tempo, and continued downsizing, the US Armed Forces must change to meet the needs of the 21st Century and Joint Vision 2010. Recent history demonstrates that the side with the ability to rapidly present its policy, strategy, and position to a variety of audiences in a coherent manner achieves an information advantage. A single organization, such as the DoD Strategic Information Support Center, from which military information activities can be coordinated, integrated, deconflicted, and synchronized is a step in the right direction."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Gallogly-Staver, Erin J.
1999-05-27
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When Does a 'Hacker' Become an 'Attacker?'
From the thesis abstract: "The ability to defend the United States cyber sovereign territory is a must for the country to continue to enjoy relative freedom. The actual defense of this is far more difficult than the traditional defense of land, sea or air space. The Internet offers an environment of exponential growth in both technology and users. Couple this with an infantile and developing governing system and the Internet is both a conduit for use and a vehicle for attack. The history of cyber attack is key in determining the ability to defend and the mode in which to do it. By tracing the capabilities of adversaries, both internal and external, we can attempt to delineate the point where the electronic intrusion becomes alarming to the nation. Combine this understanding with a thorough knowledge of current methodologies and tools used for cyber attack and one has a good jump on 'knowing one's enemy.' Constraining, yet legitimizing, the effort of governments to fight the unbounded attack of cyber warriors are laws and agreements which attempt to lay ground rules for cyber utilization. Careful construction of these rules joined with vigilant international agreements can facilitate apprehension and thwarting of would-be attackers worldwide. Laws which are drafted without thought to the defense of information systems can be equally as damaging to the government that adopts them. This monograph concludes with the current efforts underway by the United States government and the Department of Defense in particular, Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 posture the United States for success in combating cyber aggression. The follow through by the legislative, judiciary branches and various departments will determine the success of this country in securing its national information infrastructure."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Are, David C.
1998-12-16
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Relationship among Tasks, Centers of Gravity, and Decisive Points
"At the operational and strategic levels, military planners use the concepts of centers of gravity and decisive points to assist them in determining the best ways for accomplishing assigned tasks. By identifying the enemy's center of gravity, the planner determines the enemy assets that must be defeated to gain victory. On the other hand, by identifying the friendly center of gravity, the planner has determined the friendly assets that must be protected to retain freedom of action to attack the enemy's center of gravity. Since it may not be possible to directly attack enemy centers of gravity, friendly forces attack formations, positions, or support structures that lead directly to the center of gravity. These are referred to as decisive points....This monograph discusses the military theory of centers of gravity and its relationship to assigned tasks and decisive points. United States' joint and individual service doctrines and historical examples frame the discussion of theory. This monograph seeks to clarify the relationship among assigned tasks, centers of gravity, and decisive points to assist commanders and planners in determining how to best accomplish assigned tasks."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Springman, Jeffrey A.
1998-05-21
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Building a Basis for Information Warfare Rules of Engagement
From the thesis abstract: "The U.S. armed forces face a global information threat which could launch an attack without warning. This surprise attack could damage the U.S. armed forces ability to mobilize, deploy and control forces worldwide. The attack will use the global information infrastructure to target the information based processes the U.S. armed forces utilize to dominate the entire spectrum of conflict. To protect information based processes, U.S. armed forces joint operational planners are building plans to defeat and possibly attack information based threats. This monograph discusses how the U.S. armed forces should regulate the defensive and offensive responses to information attack with Rules of Engagement. After defining several terms, this monograph illustrates the gravity of the threat the U.S. armed forces face in the information spectrum. The proliferation of computers and networking is creating a huge underclass of IW warriors bent on destroying, manipulating, and stealing information. While past IW threats were curious 'hackers,' the modem IW [Information Warfare] environment is encompassed by over 18 countries currently pursing active IW attack and defense programs. Dealing with a threat requires operational planners recognize that information is rapidly becoming the center of gravity for military operations. This monograph proposes IW planners build IW ROE [Information Warfare Rules of Engagement] that extends maximum protection to information by protecting key information systems and infrastructure. Additionally, IW ROE should also allow the U.S. armed forces to autonomously implement retaliatory or pre-emptive self defensive actions to counter any information based threat."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Uchida, Ted T.
1997-12-18
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Building a Tactical Intelligence Model for the Information-Based Force
From the thesis abstract: "Force development trends since the end of the Cold War have dictated a smaller, more lethal force that is capable of rapidly responding to a multitude of contingencies from a CONUS [Contiguous United States] base-force projection. The tremendous growth in information and precision technologies has established the technological conditions for this force development-information based. These requirements call into question the adequacy of current organizational structures and their ability to allow for the optimization of these capabilities to meet the needs of a force projection, information based Army. This paper examines the division level military intelligence [MI] model in particular. The division continues to be the major tactical formation with the capability to tailor for specific missions. Military intelligence by definition, provides at least half of the information equation that the commander uses to make decisions. The monograph will begin by charting the historical development of the current tactical MI organizational model based on the requirements for military intelligence contained in historical documentation and doctrinal developments since World War II."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Felts, Thomas H.
1997-12-18
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Digitized Chaos: Is Our Military Decision Making Process Ready for the Information Age?
From the monograph's abstract: "The integration of new technologies has always been important to the military. The longbow, rifled muskets, and armored fighting vehicles are all examples of technological innovations that found their way into the military. However, history has proven that new technology alone seldom has dramatic effects on battlefield effectiveness. Changes in doctrine, organization, and training must accompany the new technology in order to exploit its full capabilities. Today the Army is looking at ways to integrate information age, or digital technologies into our fighting force. In particular, the area of battle command is seen as holding great promise for digitization. Unfortunately, the Army is implementing its new battle command technology without considering changes to its planning and decision making doctrine. This monograph addresses the compatibility of the Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) with information age technology. The analysis focuses on decision making theory, current digitization concepts and projects, and performance feedback from the field. The overall conclusions of this analysis are that the Army should upgrade certain portions of its decision making process to make it more compatible with digital information systems and contemporary decision making theory."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Charlton, John W.
1997-12-18
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Interagency Cooperation: FEMA and DoD in Domestic Support Operations
From the abstract: "Hurricane Andrew was the worst natural disaster in American history. Its sustained winds in excess of 145 miles per hour razed entire neighborhoods. Debris was scattered dangerously throughout the area, restricting access and hindering assistance efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], the organization tasked with coordinating relief efforts in the wake of such disasters, tried for the first time to implement the Federal Response Plan (FRP), a document that had only been approved four months before Andrew made landfall. As the lead agency, FEMA coordinated the efforts of 26 governmental agencies and the American Red Cross. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has a role in disaster relief operations. Today, publications such as the Army's Field Manual 100-19, 'Domestic Support Operations', provides doctrinal principles for domestic support. But in 1993, DOD had little, if any, doctrine written on disaster relief. When FEMA's initial relief efforts fell well short of residents' and the administration's expectations, DOD assumed a much greater role. Some authors proposed placing DOD in charge of the national disaster assistance program DOD's executive agent is the Secretary of the Army. This paper studies the interagency cooperation between DOD and FEMA, focusing specifically on the evolution of doctrine and procedures for responding to natural disasters. While both FEMA and DOD have improved in their ability to respond to disasters, some obstacles remain. Funding pre-disaster activities and the inability to use Reserve forces are the two most significant remaining shortcomings. Additionallv, FEMA's failure to quickly integrate the lessons learned from previous disasters impacted negatively on response and relief operations after Hurricane Andrew."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Fischer, Carl E.
1997-05-22
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Water and Conflict in the Middle East
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph assesses the potential for conflict in the Middle East as a result of water scarcity. It is guided by the Homer-Dixon model linking the contributions of environmental scarcity to violent conflict. The monograph begins with a general overview of the water scarcity issue In the Middle East. It then examines the analytical framework developed by Homer-Dixon to gain an understanding of the contributions of decreasing quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, and unequal resource access to the development of environmental scarcity. The framework is further used to establish the linkage between between [sic] environmental scarcity and the outbreak of violent conflict. With an understanding of the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict developed, the monograph investigates the three major Middle East water scarcity regions of the Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates: and Nile river basins. Investigation of these three basin regions focuses on the factors of water quality and quantity, population growth, and water access. Additionally, history of water related conflict in each basin is also reviewed. The monograph concludes with an assessment that the Jordan river basin is the region most likely to experience violent conflict in the future as a result of water scarcity."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Woolwine, Stephen M.
1997-05-22
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System for Humanitarian Intervention?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph investigates the reasons for the lack of coordination and combined effort between political leadership, military engagement and humanitarian activity during a humanitarian intervention. […] The monograph first describes the changed nature of conflicts with the end of the Cold War and defines intra state conflicts, which result in failed states, as happened in Somalia, as the most likely type of conflict for the foreseeable future. After a brief description of the nature of humanitarian intervention as a new type of peace operation in a post-Cold War environment and the anatomy of a failed state the focus is on analyzing the political-, military-, and humanitarian key actor's criteria for action and success in humanitarian interventions. The monograph discusses the reasons for failure in humanitarian interventions like Somalia as a combination of the key actor's still Cold War dominated event-or situation-oriented view instead of a process-oriented view necessary to create a 'New World Order' and not adjusted criteria for action and success in a new crises environment. The basis for the lack of political, military and humanitarian cooperation is the missing combined systematic approach for conflict resolution. The study concludes in defining three basic principles -the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a process, the necessary shift from a force-oriented to a time-oriented approach, and the application of a dynamic combined strategy -for a system to successfully combine the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of a humanitarian intervention."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Halbauer, Volker
1997-05-22
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Information Operations - A New Tool for Peacekeeping
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph discusses the application of information operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of peace missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace imposition. Using a variety of models and an examination of the components of information operations this monograph demonstrates the applicability of these operations to peace missions. Examples from recent history provide a backdrop for evaluating previous applications and investigating other potential uses of information operations to support peace missions. […] The monograph first examines the status of international relations as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of information technology. The impact of these two earthshaking events have forever changed the face the world. As the nations of the world seek a new geometry of relationships without the Soviet Union the level of violence continues to rise. Without the unifying ideologies of the Cold War, many nations are seeking identity through ethnicity. This factor in conjunction with a freedom to act completely in promotion of national interests without the specter of a global nuclear war has led to a very unstable world. […] Information operations allow cost effective solutions to violence by reducing the resources required to keep the peace. Peace missions can use information operations to reduce forces necessary to make peace, bypass belligerent leaders to inform populations about alternatives to violent solutions, and control the ability of belligerents to continue conflict. The maturation of the information age provides an opportunity to establish a 'Pax Informationus' and retain sufficient national resources to address domestic problems."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Phillips, Gary E.
1997-05-22
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National Guard Combat Divisions: State Militia or Federal Muscle Force Structure Mix
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines the current force structure of the Bottom-Up Review and its ability to meet the requirements as outlined in the National Military Strategy. The goals and objectives of the national U.S. strategy are examined in the context of the two MRC [Major Regional Contingencies] scenario as described in the National Military Strategy. Cold War logic has had a significant impact on the framers of the National Military Strategy and the Bottom-Up Review force reflects this influence. The two MRC scenario 'sizing function' has left the U.S. military with a smaller, more lethal, but probably irrelevant force in the post-Cold War environment."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Rousseau, Thomas L.
1997-05-22
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Are Current Psychological Operations Procedures Adequate in Information Warfare?
"This monograph discusses the ability of Psychological Operations forces to conduct information operations. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U S Army has struggled to adapt to an increasingly volatile series of missions. Many believe the likely conventional or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) threat will involve Information Warfare (IW) as part of the conflict. As a consequence, the army has begun to develop capabilities that allow it to fight more effectively in an information intensive environment. While some aspects of information warfare are conducted domestically, many are executed on foreign soil and involve extensive interaction with other governments, their population, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Each of these entities constitutes a potential target audience for psychological operations while executing information warfare. The importance of information warfare grows proportionally as the level of technological sophistication increases around the world. The U S Army is compelled to rely upon psychological operations forces to fill vital support roles in the conduct of information warfare. In this monograph, psychological operations capabilities will be measured using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study and to a lesser extent, recent OOTW operations. Based on the successes and failures found in these examinations, the monograph will draw conclusions as to the abilities of the psychological operations force to conduct information warfare."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Duff, Murray J.
1997-04-18
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Musicians of Mars in the Deep Attack: Noise or Harmony?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph presents a new concept of division deep battle characterized by decentralized planning and execution by task organized, combined arms brigades instead of the current Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) method. The study first argues that current division deep battle doctrine does not support the Army's doctrinal tenets of agility or initiative. The absence of these tenets significantly reduces the likelihood of success in the deep battle. The doctrine fails these tenets by ignoring the fundamentals of combined arms operations, by over-centralizing execution and planning in the DOCC, and by not establishing unity of command. This monograph next examines similarities and contradictions in Army deep, close, and rear battle doctrine. Both close and rear battle doctrine emphasize decentralized execution of combat operations by task organized, combined arms units. On the other hand, deep battle doctrine relies on centralized execution using pure, non task organized, units. […] The study concludes that the best concept for division deep battle is a decentralized approach using task organized brigades. The division should task organize a brigade with all the necessary assets for successful completion of the deep attack. The division should provide a mission, intent, and desired end-state and decentralize further planning and execution to the deep task force commander. This concept brings agility and initiative back into the division deep battle."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Miller, James L.
1996-12-20
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Can the United States Be Involved in Simultaneous 'Contemporary Peacekeeping' Operations and Maintain the Flexibility to Respond to Two, Nearly-Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs)
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines the impact of the United States likely future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations on its ability to successfully implement its national security and national military strategy. There are several potential shortfalls associated with this peacetime component of United States strategy when also considering the United States requirement to fight and win two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs [Major Regional Conflicts]. Possible shortfalls include force structure and force preparedness limitations and delays and logistics shortcomings in the areas of infrastructure, vital logistics components and strategic mobility assets. Although the potential problem areas are not new, how they influence the United States ability to execute its national military strategy has grown in magnitude as a result of a changed security environment. This change has required that contemporary peacekeeping forces be built from assets of major powers such as the United States--assets that will be needed in the initial stages of both MRCs. Therefore, as contemporary peacekeeping operations operationally fulfill the United States national military strategy, they may, in other ways, hinder the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Buchs, Todd A.
1996-05-23
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Force XXI: What Are the Risks of Building a High Tech, Narrowly Focused Army?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines the doctrinal and acquisition focus of Force XXI in light of the projected future strategic environment. Despite its conceptual overtones, Force XXI is currently physically manifested in both a doctrinal publication and in the Army's modernization plans. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, contains the Army's initial effort at defining the probable nature of the future strategic environment and the technological acceleration that is anticipated. It outlines the Army's concept for conducting war in the future, and provides a conceptual framework for the types of weapons and systems the Army will need to counter the diverse nature of future threats. Although cognizant of the requirements for modernization to meet threats throughout the spectrum of conflict, Force XXI is aimed at a very narrow portion of the upper end of that spectrum. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, while providing a comprehensive summary of the dangers emerging in the last part of this century, fails to adequately address how the Army will deal with the entire spectrum of conflict. The baffle dynamics explained in the text are centered on traditional, conventional warfare. OOTW [Operations Other Than War] is initially addressed, but its presence is marginalized in favor of discussion of conventional baffle. A review of programmed expenditures illustrates the Army's almost total dedication to the high end of the spectrum; the traditional form of combat that some critics assert is the least likely to occur in the near future. The concentration of resources on this very narrow slice of the spectrum of conflict does not come without a corresponding cost. Assessing that cost is the crux of the Army leadership's modernization dilemma. Judging where along the spectrum of conflict to accept risk is an infinitely difficult process."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Jones, Brian D.
1996-05-23
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Environmental Scarcity as a Cause of Violent Conflict
"Gulf War images of oil soaked birds and burning oil wells continue to generate academic research on the environment as both a victim and a weapon of war. The resulting literature has sensitized policy makers and military leaders to the environmental costs of conflict and military preparedness. Regrettably, this narrow focus obscures a potentially more ominous role for the environment as a cause of conflict. Within the complex web of causality, the increasing scarcity of renewable resources such as fresh water, forests, and arable land portends to be the leading cause of conflict in the 21st century. This monograph proves that environmental scarcity is a cause of violent conflict. Using the Modified Conflict Causality Model and six case studies, the monograph shows that scarcity generates adverse social effects which, in turn, cause violent conflict. After proving causality, the monograph looks at three implications. First, recent Operations Other Than War in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti treated the symptoms of scarcity without solving the underlying environmental problems. Consequently, conflicts in those countries are likely to recur, rendering the long-term outcomes of the operations as failures. Second, conflicts arising from environmental scarcity will occur more frequently in the future, threatening U. S. national security interests. Third, doctrine reveals that the Army is unprepared intellectually to contend with scarcity as a cause of violent conflict."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
David, William E.
1996-04
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Protecting the Force in Operations Other than War
From the thesis abstract: "Army warfighting doctrine clearly delineates the definition, scope, and components of protection for application on the battlefield; however, the Army's Operations Other Than War (OOTW) doctrine does not provide similar clarity for the concept in OOTW missions. Protection, as defined by FM 100-5, Operations, conserves the commander's combat power, but none of the OOTW manuals give the same definition of protection. In examining Army doctrine, this monograph highlights the significant differences which appear in the key OOTW doctrinal manuals: FM 100-20 (Draft), Operations Other Than War, FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, and FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Humanitarian Operations. Comparing these manuals to FM 100-5 shows the disparities which exist in the doctrine. In operations other than war, the commander's requirement to protect his force has received little attention in doctrine. The history of the United States Multinational Force in Lebanon, September 1982 to February 1984, reveals several essential concepts necessary to protect the force in OOTW. Examining the bombing of the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) building in Beirut, Lebanon on the 23d of October, 1983 provides evidence to further modify existing -Army doctrine. The commander must weigh competing requirements to secure his force while simultaneously exercising restraint in the use of weapons. Regardless of the mission, a commander must take precautions to protect his force. Especially during active hostilities, the need for security outweighs concerns about perception."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Stewart, Michael D.
1995-12-14
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Assessment of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph assesses the process of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for humanitarian assistance operations. Three case studies of operations conducted overseas for which humanitarian assistance was the primary focus serve as the basis for the assessment. The case studies illustrate how the IPB process is an inadequate tool for analyzing the complex environments in which humanitarian assistance operations take place. This monograph concludes with some recommendations for intelligence preparation based on Peter M. Senge's writings on general systems thinking. The body of the monograph presents background on humanitarian assistance operations, IPB, and the case studies. It draws on the U.S. National Security Strategy and the Joint Publications series to define the U.S. military role in humanitarian assistance operations. Background on the IPB process comes from 1994 version of Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. This section identifies the implicit and explicit assumptions of the process. The monograph then discusses the case studies in terms of the assumptions. […] Finally, a consideration of theory draws on Senge's discussion of mental models and dynamic complexity. Overcoming the limitations that the IPB process creates involves breaking the present mental model and learning to deal with dynamic complexity. Taking advice from Senge's approach, the monograph recommends changing the IPB doctrine. It calls for a new process based on a different set of assumptions and not reliant on templates, but adapted to uncertainty, change, and the importance of interrelationships."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Snider, Lauri J.
1995-12
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USAF and Technological Asymmetry: A Critique of Current Air Power Theory and Doctrine
"This monograph examines the question of whether the United States Air Force (USAF) is too reliant upon technological asymmetry. It examines four possible paths to over-reliance and then surveys Air Force doctrine and air power theory. The study then assesses that doctrine and theory in light of potential over-reliance on technological asymmetry. The analysis shows that the USAF is over-reliant on technological asymmetry. The current air power theory and doctrine of strategic attack requires technology to replace some aspects of human decision making, technology to replace strategy (to a degree), the elimination of fog and friction, and certainty regarding enemy reactions in order to be effective. These assumptions, which are the foundation of the theory, require careful and rigorous examination - which the Air Force has not yet accomplished. Over-reliance on technological asymmetry raises fundamental concerns, and USAF thinkers must address these concerns in order to make the theory and doctrine truly viable."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wilhelm, Karen S.
1995-05-19
