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Preparing for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat within the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)
"This monograph investigates the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threat the US will face on the battlefield and in the homeland in what is now called the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). The monograph begins by examining the CBRN evolution and its impact to include recent conflicts. The monograph focuses on three areas. First, has the CBRN threat been adequately identified within the COE? This threat includes the possible agents and employment scenarios used against US Forces. Second, is the current force design within the US Army and US Army Chemical Corps properly structured to deal with the threat? Finally, based on the first two issues, what are the appropriate solutions? The monograph frames the US Armys current and future capabilities to operate in a CBRN environment. Army doctrine states US forces must operate in a CBRN environment with minimum degradation. The monograph provides a comparison of US Army capability against the COE CBRN threat construct. This comparison identifies the critical gap that currently exists between requirements and capabilities. Finally, the examination concludes that the US Army is not adequately postured to meet the CBRN COE threat. The monograph recommends the establishment of a multi-purpose CBRN organization at the Corps and Division level and a realignment of CBRN personnel and organizations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Farrior, Cedrick A.
2004-05-26
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Some Principles of Human Intelligence and Their Application
"Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines, has through the course of the 20th century been less emphasized by the U.S. Army relative to the technical disciplines of signals intelligence and imagery intelligence. HUMINT should remain a key component of an intelligence system, as it can cue and be cued by the other disciplines and combine with them to be more effective than any of them would be by itself. Also, the Army is involved in low- and mid-intensity campaigns around the world and Army doctrine for these types of operations identifies the importance of HUMINT in their conduct. Army leadership has expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of Army HUMINT and stated that it needs improvement. To make such an improvement, principles of HUMINT are necessary so that the HUMINT system and its components, including the individual HUMINT collectors, may be properly designed or trained. Such principles may be derived from writings of theorists and practitioners of HUMINT."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Sayre, Robert, Jr.
2004-05-26
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Department of Defense Pre-positioning Programs: A Springboard for Deployments
"The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), asymmetrical warfare, and globalization spell uncertainty, and strategic responsiveness can be the key to winning this nation's wars. The U.S. defense strategy requires pre-positioning posture to enable faster force closure and to be more flexible; more expeditionary; more survivable against anti-access threats; more joint and supportive of emerging joint warfighting concepts; and consistent with new DoD basing initiatives. Since the mid-1970's, the DoD has relied on military pre-positioning programs as a means to project combat power. The equipment content of these programs and the Services' pre-positioning concepts are reflective of a Cold War strategy: a European-focused theater, engagement and forward basing, and conventional warfare against a predictable adversary. Post 9-11 events reflect a change from a predictable enemy to an unpredictable enemy, thus dictating the need for DoD to re-look at how it employs its pre-positioning concepts. Predominantly, the pre-positioning concepts are service specific and lack joint integration, joint doctrine, and joint training. Joint pre-positioning begins with developing common operational and logistics systems. Beginning with command and control (C2), DoD must identify a C2 structure capable of integrating the capabilities of all the services. From determining and developing common user parts, to asset visibility, to over all theater distribution, DoD must resource ways to integrate service pre-positioning concepts into a joint integrated program that is 'plug and play."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Woodhurst, Melinda S.
2004-05-26
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Future Role of Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism: Divining the Strategy
"The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, actively thrust the U.S. government into a war against terrorism, principally against the form of terrorism most closely associated with radical Islam, born in the Middle East region. President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in an effort to kill or capture the perpetrators of the latest terror attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., with the ultimate goal of eradicating terrorism against the U.S. as a feasible option for groups or nation-states that wish harm upon America. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM set out to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and enable the growth of a free and representative Iraqi government. However, the administration's strategy aims to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq after a secure environment is attained and self-sustaining Iraqi rule is established, thus leaving the fledgling government to its own devices. An effective strategy to ensure a productive role for Iraq in the war on terror hinges upon the continued presence of U.S. military forces in that country."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Donovan, Matthew P.
2004-05-26
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Expanding the United States Army for 21st Century Roles and Missions: Foreign Legion or Foreign Augmentation?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph considers expanding the U.S. Army using non-citizens to man new units. Both the French Foreign Legion and British Brigade of Gurkhas provide useful examples of the types of forces needed by the United States to preserve American hegemony and win the GWOT [Global War on Terrorism]. This monograph presents models for an American foreign legion and indigenous units using the DTLOMS [Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Material, and Soldier] force development framework. While both concepts presented in this work would provide the U.S. Army with sorely needed additional manpower, the foreign legion model is the most feasible. In addition, the United States Army should actively recruit skilled non-citizens overseas through the promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service. Neither an American foreign legion based on the French model nor units of indigenous forces based on the British Gurkha model should be formed at this time. Two rationales led to this conclusion. First, the increasing militarization of American foreign affairs has had several unfortunate consequences, and this trend would be furthered by the creation of the units presented in this monograph. Second, the creation of an American foreign legion or battalions of foreign troops would continue to allow the youngest generations of Americans to forgo one of the primary obligations of citizenship - compulsory military service, thus indirectly exacerbating the 'Civil-Military Gap' and further eroding the trust and understanding between civilian and military leaders, possibly with dire consequences."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cyrulik, John M.
2004-05-26
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Blurred Strategy: Collaborating Civil-Military Interagency Doctrine for Post Conflict Operations
From the thesis abstract: "The premise for this study evolved during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). It stems from a perception that the combat plan for the Coalition force invasion worked brilliantly but noticeably absent was a detailed plan for transitioning to peace. This study conducts a thorough review of the current joint military doctrine and the interagency policy and guidance relevant to post-conflict operations, complex contingency and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It includes a case study of the formal USG [United States government] civil-military interagency planning effort for OIF's post-conflict operations. It creatively employs a gap analysis research strategy in concert with a case study methodology, the research addresses its primary research question: Is joint military doctrine sufficiently robust to be adopted by the USG civil-military planning community as the framework for developing a single integrated doctrine for planning complex contingency and post-conflict operations?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Chanez, Jaime S.
2004-05-26
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Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions
"Operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 revealed an aspect of military operations that is creating new conditions for operational commanders of land forces in combat theaters. Other United States government agencies are engaged in the same area of operations during decisive operations. Doctrine and practice currently delay meaningful integration of these other government agencies until the transition phase of joint operations. The "War on Terror" has most dramatically highlighted this as the lines between the roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies and others have become blurred and just as often intertwined. This condition reflects the intentional application of the elements of national power. It results from deliberate direction and coordination at the strategic level of national leadership. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional combatant command headquarters may be sufficient at times when other government agencies have the lead role. This monograph asks whether a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role. The monograph presents case study analysis of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti. Each historical case describes the planning, execution, and interagency integration with military operations. Each case is examined according to the criteria of ends, ways, means, and risk to provide insights to answer the research question. Several topics are presented to provide background and frame the problem."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Royse, James C.
2004-05-23
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Rapid, Decisive or Effective? The Applicability of Rapid Decision Operations in the Enforcement of the Bush Doctrine
"The monograph first defines the Bush Doctrine, using various Presidential speeches and the National Security Strategy. The Doctrine can be simplified as a commitment to preemptive war against terrorists groups, weak states that facilitate terrorist groups, and rogue states that sponsor terrorist groups. The central chapter of the monograph then defines Rapid Decisive Operations, highlighting its commitment to using asymmetrical effects in a rapid tempo to produce 'cybershock,' or the inability to react to American operations and demands. The fourth chapter then uses these four features of Rapid Decisive Operations and examines their utility against each of the three groups mentioned in the Bush Doctrine. The final chapters draws conclusions, and while Rapid Decisive Operations is not judged to be utterly without merit, the concept is found to lack applicability in the areas of warfare most likely to face the United States in coming decades. The monograph concludes by recommending that Joint Forces Command reexamine the assumptions underlying Rapid Decisive Operations and consider designing a new Joint Warfighting Concept from properly validated assumptions."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ollivant, Douglas A.
2004-04-21
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Intelligence Collection: Supporting Full Spectrum Dominance and Network Centric Warfare?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines whether the Army's information collection efforts are supporting the goal of full spectrum dominance and whether these are in harmony with the concepts of network centric warfare. Full spectrum dominance and network centric warfare are central themes in Department of Defense and Army transformation literature and both require information collection and an understanding of the role of cognition empowered by networking for success. More specifically, it examines whether Army collection efforts are focusing too heavily on collection for combat operations and leaving it unable to fully exploit the access to adversary systems during stability operations. This study found that the institutional Army is not fully supporting the goal of full spectrum dominance or network centric warfare but is still myopically investing heavily in efforts to defeat the adversary's conventional capabilities with standoff collection technology and is not creating the organizational, systems and technical architectures necessary to leverage the power of a fully networked force."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Moses, Bruce D.
2004-03-26
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Training Intelligence Analysts to Meet the Challenges of the Contemporary Operating Environment
From the thesis's abstract: "This thesis examines the methods that the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) uses to train the Army's intelligence analysts. Rapidly changing world conditions require that the Army train its intelligence analysts to correctly identify the right tactical problem when critically analyzing the varied threats and environments that its forces will encounter while conducting a wide range of operations. This study reviews the doctrinal basis for conducting analysis and then compares how the USAIC translates that doctrine into training for its analysts. Using observations from the Army's Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training Program and from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the study seeks to determine the adequacy of analyst performance across the Army's formations as a means of measuring the effectiveness of the USAIC training. Tracing substandard analyst performance back to the USAIC training reveals several conclusions. While the overall program of instruction seems adequate, the USAIC does not dedicate sufficient training focused solely on analysis. The USAIC has not updated its training to incorporate critical aspects of the emerging Contemporary Operational Environment, despite acknowledging the rapidly changing world conditions. Finally, USAIC training plans do not indicate any type of formal critical reasoning and creative thinking training."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Land, Eric A.
2004
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Encouraging Risk and Embracing Uncertainty, the Need to Change U.S. Army Culture
From the student paper asbtract: "This monograph examines the culture of risk and uncertainty tolerance within the US Army officer culture. The author defines culture as the collective experiences, training and education among officers. The central research question is does the US Army develop leaders to make risk decisions in an environment of uncertainty? The methodology includes an analysis of three historical case studies of risk and uncertainty across the spectrum of conflict. [...] A model for risk tolerance is developed that relates the amount of uncertainty to risk in each case and for Army officer culture as a whole. The tolerance to risk changes with the amount of uncertainty the culture is able to control. [...] Control of risk and uncertainty may in fact run counter to the very nature of conflict and war yet the US Army officer culture appears to be increasingly based on controlling through technology large amounts of uncertainty and hence risk. This control can only come through a centralization of decision-making and standardization, almost mechanization of subordinates and their actions. This tendency toward centralized risk 'management' is actually engrained via the way the officer corps trains its leaders. [...] experiences the success of doing so. This monograph recommends a shift in cultural mindset through a refined education process rather than implementing changes to training scenarios and curriculums. The US Army officer culture must begin to accept the need to educate, train and then form the experiences that support a judgment based risk tolerant culture."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ault, Robert T.
2003-05-22
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What Happens When the Supply Chain Breaks? Implications for the Army Supply Chain Under Attack
"This monograph answers the question: How should the Army adapt to sudden supply network change? Unexpected catastrophic have significant implications for the strategic-level support provided by the national economic base to the U.S. Army. In a system of tightly linked supply chains consisting of consumers, retailers, suppliers, and manufacturers, a sudden change in their ability to communicate data or distribute product can have a significant effect on the entire organization. Many of the companies who responded well to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had systems and procedures and plans in place that gave them the visibility and agility they needed to shift resources. Because they anticipated disruptions, they designed their organizations so that they could respond. They used the best available technology to help them see supply net exceptions as they were happening allowing them to sense and interpret, and then decide and act on that information. They also protected critical infrastructure, processes, people, and information. They created redundancy by either physically separating resources to mitigate threats and/or they had procedures in place to quickly accommodate or adapt to events by shifting resources where they were needed."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
DeBusk, Steven S.
2003-05-22
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How Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence Sharing Challenges Between Conventional and Special Operations Forces?
This monograph examines why intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is more important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhance conventional forces capabilities and facilitate greater intelligence sharing with special operations forces. This study addresses how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces can overcome intelligence sharing challenges through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability. First, this paper analyzes the current operational environment that dictates the requirement for conventional and special operations forces to transform to achieve success during military operations. Furthermore, this paper examines the current doctrinal framework that guides intelligence sharing and dissemination within the U.S. Army and identifies different approaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S. Army doctrine, conventional doctrine, and specific special operations doctrine. Additionally, this paper reviews various theories that support the increased need and importance of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, and further identifies proposed methods to solve many of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encounter in intelligence sharing. This study also examines historical conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the most recent war in Afghanistan to illustrate how sharing intelligence directly impacts military operations. Lastly, this monograph provides possible recommendations and solutions addressing methods to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, through enhanced equipment, training, and interoperability.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bredenkamp, Michele
2003-05-22
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Operation Enduring Freedom as an Enabling Campaign in the War on Terrorism
"The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon left the American public in a state of anguish and anger. With the debris still smoldering in the streets of New York, Bush stated that the United States and all those who want global peace will stand united to 'win the war against terrorism.' Less than a month later, Bush announced the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the first military action in the broad 'campaign against terrorism.' James W. Reed wrote 'should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning' focusing on campaign planning and design. In the article, Reed describes the relationship between terminal and enabling campaigns. The terminal campaign 'seeks war termination as an endstate.' James W. Reed defines an enabling campaign as achieving 'some intermediate strategic objectives short of termination.' With this in mind, is Operation Enduring Freedom an effective enabling campaign to create conditions for the defeat of terrorism in the Central Command area of responsibility? The methodology for determining the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom is in two pieces. First, is the campaign adequate, feasible, and acceptable? This three part criteria is how joint doctrine evaluates effectiveness. Second, do the operational objectives nest within the strategic endstate? According to Reed, enabling campaigns help create the conditions for a terminal campaign. Therefore, a linkage between the operational objectives and the terminal campaign that achieves the strategic endstate is imperative. The Italian Campaign offers a historical case study of an enabling campaign. By comparing the Italian Campaign with Operation Enduring Freedom, the strengths and weakness of each generate lessons applicable to the future of the war on terrorism."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Clement, John G.
2003-05-22
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Is U.S. Army Rear Area and Base Security Doctrine Sound for Sustaining Operations on the Noncontiguous Nonlinear Battlefield?
"Army FM 3-0, Operations replaced the term rear operations with sustaining operations, introduced fundamental changes to the operational framework, and suggested leaders use adaptive combinations of contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations with linear and nonlinear operations in the execution of full spectrum operations. This conceptual shift of sustaining operations on a noncontiguous nonlinear battlefield requires fundamental changes in rear area and base security doctrine. This monograph reviews Joint and Army doctrine; assesses the threats to sustainment operations base on the COE and Army transformation; and explores historical case studies of Russian operations in Afghanistan. The monograph recommends several changes to doctrine definitions, concepts, and capabilities. Recommendations include improving threat level and rear area definitions, introducing preemption and operational level force protection concepts, and enabling support organizations with organic, flexible force protection and preemptive capabilities."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Coston, Anthony M.
2003-05-22
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Coercive Airpower in the Global War on Terror: Testing Validity of Courses of Action
"The issue of validity for coercive COAs requires planners to take into account a vastly changed political landscape since 9/11. Perhaps a toughened military doctrine is required to fight GWOT, where pragmatic considerations sometimes may have to give way to hard-line principles. One of the keys to success for air planners will be to avoid atrophy of thought. A certain rigidity can harden into extreme dogmatism, a condition that could reduce the potential success of airpower in GWOT. Anecdotes abound concerning the proper application of airpower, but unfounded confidence, arrogance that ignores political and military realities, combined with rhetoric that divides rather than unites, can create an ethos that is more detrimental than it is helpful. US airpower enjoys numerically and qualitatively superior advantages over the rest of the world, and continued mastery of basic airpower principles will continue to contribute to that advantage. Nonetheless, we have to remember the basics. Coercion is but one strategy air planners can implement, and the results of this monograph should at least provide a starting point for planning. However, original thought combined with hybrid strategies appears to be the way of the future for airpower application in GWOT."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cody, James R.
2003-05-22
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Covering the Seams: Unifying Effort to Defeat Transnational Terrorism
"In the post-Cold War decade of the 1990 s the United States struggled to find a strategy suitable for the emerging security environment. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 clarified the perception of the heretofore obscure and confusing security environment. The attacks brought into focus the true picture of the threat to United States citizens and interests at home and abroad presented by transnational terrorism. In the ensuing months after the attacks, the Nation has undertook actions across all aspects of national power to defeat the global threat of transnational terrorism. The Nation has formulated a strategy for combating terrorism that places the U.S. Military in a significant role. Perhaps the most significant role for the military in this effort will be globally operationalizing the application of military power to achieve the strategic objective to defeat transnational terrorism. The challenge for the United States application of military power lies in leveraging a regionally based operational command and control structure against a globally distributed threat. This monograph proposes that the existing organization, delineated responsibilities, and commensurate procedures of the operational military system of the United States, must adapt to meet the necessities of the world environment and defeat the threat of transnational terrorism. To better understand the operational challenges confronted in the Global War on Terror, a commensurate level analysis of the adversaries is necessary. The operational analysis uses the doctrinal elements of operational design to guide the examination of the adversaries. Furthermore, the analysis uses the third element of operational design as a measure of effectiveness for the command and control structure of the operational military in addressing the global threat of transnational terrorism."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Gallahue, Kimo C.
2003-05-22
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International Terrorism
"September 11, 2001, was a day that future historians will call a hinge of history. On that day, a lethal blow was struck in the heart of freedom. From that day on, international terrorism could no longer be considered a tactical threat with no real global implications. There is no question that terrorist incidents will continue to plague the international community well into the foreseeable future. One primary reason for this is the inherent difficulty involved in preventing a terrorist attack before it occurs. Another is the often fanatical nature of individuals who carry out the often suicidal assaults. These factors are often the primary reason that the only action that can be taken in response to terrorism is after-the-fact. Herein, too, lies a significant and controversial problem; which responses are appropriate? The purpose of this monograph is to examine the origin structure and goals of the international terrorism and terrorist action and identify steps the U.S. can take to stop the threat of terrorism coming from the Middle East. The focus of this monograph is, therefore, on the U.S. available policy options which range to combat international terrorism from diplomacy, international cooperation, intelligence capabilities, economic sanctions to the use of the military forces, against Middle East States on the terrorist list (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan). The author concludes that the war against terrorism can be won, not merely contained."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Alfarajat, Ahmad D.
2003-05-22
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Strategic PSYOP: Coordinating Worldwide Psychological Operations - Is There a National Requirement for a Strategic Psychological Operations Organization?
From the thesis abstract: "Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is a cornerstone of the United States' Information Operations and is a combat multiplier. As defined by Joint Doctrine, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. A Strategic PSYOP organization is necessary to breach the gap between diplomatic and political statements and actions and those statements and actions by military organizations. To be effective, PSYOP must operate in, with and amongst the national leadership and governmental organizations. Current operations in the Global War on Terror focus on the need to coordinate, integrate and conduct Psychological Operations at the strategic level."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Acevedo, David
2003-04-13
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False Security: Amending UN Chapter VII
"Threats to peace, violations of security and challenges to world order, which led to the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 will continue. States and state-like entities will continue to approach the UN with their grievances. The credibility and global relevance of the UN hinges on its ability to uphold and enforce its Charter. The UN Security Council invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter through the use of sanctions and / or subsequent military action when there is a threat to peace and security. Chapter VII resolutions, however, do not always meet their objectives. If Chapter VII reform results in a clearer mission statement with realistic ends, ways, means and parameters in which to operate, the UN will be more reliable and effective in providing global security. The relationship between the UN and the rest of the world is based on perceptions of capability. The United States's [sic] perception of the UN is driven by the reality that in all cases of Chapter VII sanctions where the sanction evolved into military enforcement, the US was involved. This often resulted in a perception that the UN was unable to carry out Chapter VII operations. Though primarily due to the UN's membership not providing the UN with the ways and means to live up to its Chapter VII responsibilities, a shift in thinking could improve the UN's credibility. Member nations can transform the UN into one that promotes its strengths and eradicates its weaknesses."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Mate, Melinda M.
2003
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U.S. Military Intervention in Colombia: Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations
"This monograph focuses on the strategic and operational considerations for US military intervention in fighting the complex conflict in Colombia as a potential base-planning document, while also analyzing the necessity of greater unified military action-to include its possibility for success, in order to solve Colombia's narco-terrorist, insurgent threat. The purpose of analysis is to provide a strategic and operational context of the narco-paramilitary-insurgent problem in Colombia, by utilizing operational design to understand the complexities of the primary threats and provide a conceptual framework for future planning. The conclusion is that the scope of the conflict is beyond Colombia's capacity to cope with based upon the strategic aims and operational capabilities of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug trade. Further, the Colombian government is failing because two critical elements necessary for democratic rule still do not exist, stability and security. Colombian strategy must change by developing political objectives and a military strategy aimed at restoring stability and security through an integrated effort by Colombia, its neighbors, and the United States."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Hernandez, Bryan P.
2003
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Moving an Expeditionary Force: Three Case Studies in Afghanistan
"This monograph explores theory, history, and doctrine in order to determine if past expeditions into Afghanistan offer logistics lessons to 21st Century U.S. Army expeditions. The monograph also proposes how the U.S. Army can best deploy and supply its expeditionary forces in the future. These case studies, the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), and Operation Enduring Freedom of the U.S. War on Terrorism (2001-Present), explore events leading to the war, deployment of forces, use and protection of lines of communication (LOC), use and supply of logistics bases, and methods of movement and sustainment throughout operations. Case study analysis incorporates criteria from current Army doctrine. Though none of the case study logistical approaches are fully viable for future U.S. Army expeditions, they offer options that the U.S. Army does not currently possess, but could. Recommendations for moving expeditionary forces of the future are twofold: first, the U.S. Army can harvest the strengths of past expeditions in Afghanistan for future use; and second, the Army can make changes in theory, doctrine, organizations, and materiel in order to improve deployment and movement practices. Deploying the U.S. Army to battle and supplying it there should be the job of the U.S. Army. This monograph concludes that to be successful in this arena, the U.S. Army will have to recognize the significance of logistics, especially transportation, and make it the top priority for military development in the 21st Century."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Granger, Martha G.
2003
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Agent of Change or a Colonel Who Just Complained: A Case Study of Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor and His Book, 'Breaking the Phalanx, a New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century'
"The monograph proposes that Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor represents an Agent of Change for the United States Army. In 1997 Colonel Macgregor published the book, 'Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century' (BTP). This book questioned the Army's continued adherence to a Cold War paradigm and proposed that a new operational concept supported by organization, doctrine and cultural changes could revolutionize the military's capabilities. Colonel Macgregor proposed concepts for improving the Army's integration into the joint community and modifying the Army's organizational and cultural. Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor believed emerging information technologies combined with significant changes in the national security environment promised a revolutionary advancement of the Army Army's capabilities if synchronized with corresponding changes in doctrine, organization, and culture. The proposals in BTP remain controversial. As with the cliche one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, one man's agent of change is often viewed by others as simply a disenfranchised complainer. Hence the monograph monograph's title Douglas Macgregor an Agent of Change or a Colonel Who Just Complained? The monograph next provides an analysis of the environment confronting the United States Army during the time period of 1991-2003."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Stempniak, Daniel S.
2003
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Unconditional Surrender: A Modern Paradox
"This study determines whether or not unconditional surrender leads to a more lasting peace. The answer is paradoxical"yes, unconditional surrender can achieve the desired effects; however, it is no longer a suitable policy in the twenty-first century, due to the threat of nuclear escalation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Using the methodology of historical and descriptive comparison, the findings reveal the following: persistence of bellicose means and will have a direct impact on the duration of the ensuing peace; and victory results in a more lasting peace when the enemys will is removed. Considerable attention should also be given to post war settlement efforts with regard to financial aid and reconstruction. The Marshall Plan is a prime example. The findings also discover the existence of a perceived cultural bias in the West towards warfighting. This bias is described as the Western lens, which places inordinate significance on the aspects of time and decisiveness that can produce false expectations. Although demanding unconditional surrender, carte blanche, is not likely in the foreseeable future, there are methods governments can use to ensure certain conditions for war termination are met unconditionally. As long as these conditions remove an adversarys belligerent intentions, then the possibility exists for an enduring peace to ensue."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Shoffner, Thomas A.
2003
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In Order to Win, Learn How to Fight: The US Army in Urban Operations
From the thesis abstract: "The urgent requirement for US Army preparedness in conducting urban operations (UO) is very real. As global urbanization continues to increase, the contemporary threat environment makes operations in cities impossible to avoid. [...] This paper asks the question, 'Is the US Army adequately preparing for contemporary and future urban operations?' To determine the answer to this question, the monograph 1) examines the urban threat, 2) analyzes the Army's current and evolving urban operations doctrine, 3) analyzes its urban training and training infrastructure, and 4) determines how effectively equipped the force is for operations in the urban environment. This monograph determines that while there has been a significant improvement in the Army's urban operations doctrine, the Army still remains under-prepared for urban operations, because it is still not training UO as a joint and combined arms team across the full spectrum of operations. This is in large part due to continued shortfalls in training infrastructure and a lack of UO specific equipment in units. While there are existing plans and funds to correct some of these deficiencies over the next decade, the Army cannot afford to wait. Thus the monograph concludes that in the near term, the Army must maximize UO training at every level capable in order to validate doctrine, learn how to fight, and develop needed equipment for urban operations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Forbes, Christopher S.
2002-05-23
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Assumption Based Campaign Planning
"The purpose of the [Army's Strategic Campaign Plan] ASCP was to permit the Army to quickly begin planning and to provide direction for the Army to meet its obligations under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The Army needed to quickly transition from a peace time to a war time status and be prepared to rapidly respond to directions from the highest levels of the nation, the Joint Staff, and the warfighting CINCs. The ASCP in its final form established the basis for the rapid transition from peace to war. This monograph discusses the challenges of planning at the strategic level of war, the techniques used to address those challenges, and the lessons learned experienced by the SAMS Fellows. This study covers the challenges the Army planning team faced and addresses: assembling the planning team; determining the campaign plan design; using assumption based planning and the Wedemeyer method; developing the plan using the elements of operational design; wargaming; and writing the actual ASCP. The paper also covers the lessons learned during the process of writing the ASCP from a planner's perspective. These lessons learned include insights on assumption based planning, the roles of a planner, and some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Mosher, Alan M.; Waters, Brian F; Johnson, Robert C., LTC
2002-05-14
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Operational Framework for Homeland Security: A Primary Mission for the National Guard
"The premise of this monograph is that homeland security must be a primary mission for the National Guard. It describes the development of homeland security strategy over the past decade and the requirements supporting the National Guard's homeland security mission. Next, it examines the nation's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th and explores the operational level requirements and the military tasks essential to support the President's strategic concept for homeland security."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Coffin, William J.
2002-05-14
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Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies
"How will U.S. national security policy be affected by terrorist exploitation of the Internet and related information technologies? Information operations are nothing new; they have been used in military operations throughout the history of conflict. Arguably, however, the combination of breakneck speed of technological advances in information management systems and evolving threats the U.S. national security are redefining forever the nature of warfare. Some proponents have seen the great promise of information operations as the capability to mitigate, if not eliminate, the fog and friction of war by 'seeing all'. Consequently, current information operations doctrine seems to be focused squarely on the advantages of using leading edge technologies to obtain real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, thus creating a 'common operating picture' of a more or less traditional battlefield. However, as the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington illustrate, we will likely continue to face significant threats from elusive, unconventional enemies operating in the shadows of a nontraditional 'battlefield'. Moreover, because of the proliferation of cheap, dual-use information technology, these enemies may possess now, or acquire in the future, the technical expertise and hardware to further their own political agendas, harass and frustrate U.S. attempts to conduct information operations (perhaps even to the extent of negating U.S. information superiority altogether), or directly attack the U.S. infrastructure or population. Information technology has thus given terrorists their own ability to 'see all' on their own traditional battlefield: the populations and civilian infrastructure of the nations they wish to influence or destroy."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Tibbetts, Patrick S.
2002-05-12
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Forcible Displacement of Palestinians to Jordan: A National Security Crisis
From the thesis abstract: "After several rages of war, ongoing and consistent state violence against the Palestinian mainstream and way of life, the diasporas of Palestinian refugees, across the Arab world and especially into the Hasemite Kingdom of Jordan have become an issue of grave concern. The Palestinian refugee issue is a derivative of the expulsion of millions of Palestinians after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, and after the 1967 Six-Day War, (which resulted in Israel occupying the West Bank and Gaza Strip). As long as their land is still illegally occupied territory, the Palestinian refugee issue will be of great concern. Most of the new wave of refugees would likely try to settle into Jordan, since over 1.5 million Palestinians already settled there. After narrowing the scope to Jordan, one can see the economic and political impact that a new wave of Palestinian refugees would have on Jordan's national security. After going through various effects on national security, ranging from exhausting of resources (supply not enough to meet demand) to increased levels of frustration of refugees in Jordan that could lead to civil chaos and uprisings, a resolution can be developed from two options. These options are assessed on lasting solution, capability of implementing, and the political cost for Jordan's image as a moderate state. First, and highly preferred, is the political option, in which Jordan poses as the maintainer of regional stability, playing a key role in diplomacy and adherence to UN Resolutions. The second option, and last resort, would be a purely military option, which would entail the military closure of Jordanian borders to a new wave of refugees. Military leaders would be briefing the political leaders of potential effects and consequences of a military option, as well as the increased readiness of the Jordanian Army to prevent any elements that could provoke an internal crisis."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Al khazleh, Mahmoud F.
2002-05-08
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Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces
"The emphasis on special operations and specifically unconventional warfare (UW) has grown significantly since the end of the Gulf War. The contemporary operational environment (COE) in which the U.S. military operates today is dictating this emphasis. The COE is the complex global environment that exists today. It encompasses the effects of globalism, changes in the global power structure, the proliferation of technology and weapons of mass destruction, and the entire spectrum of threats that exist--from traditional nation-state actors to emerging non-state actors. The core purpose of Army Special Forces (SF) has been, and will continue to be UW. The ability to operate in this dynamic, ambiguous environment through, with, and by indigenous and surrogate forces often makes SF an ideal economy of force for operations in the COE. This study looks at the SF organization to determine what changes are indicated from the COE for it to continue to provide a viable, effective UW capability. The study first analyzes the historical origins and evolution of the SF organization from World War II through the Gulf War. From this analysis, the study identifies areas in which the SF organization needs to change in response to the COE."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ott, Paul A.
2002
