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USAF and Technological Asymmetry: A Critique of Current Air Power Theory and Doctrine
"This monograph examines the question of whether the United States Air Force (USAF) is too reliant upon technological asymmetry. It examines four possible paths to over-reliance and then surveys Air Force doctrine and air power theory. The study then assesses that doctrine and theory in light of potential over-reliance on technological asymmetry. The analysis shows that the USAF is over-reliant on technological asymmetry. The current air power theory and doctrine of strategic attack requires technology to replace some aspects of human decision making, technology to replace strategy (to a degree), the elimination of fog and friction, and certainty regarding enemy reactions in order to be effective. These assumptions, which are the foundation of the theory, require careful and rigorous examination - which the Air Force has not yet accomplished. Over-reliance on technological asymmetry raises fundamental concerns, and USAF thinkers must address these concerns in order to make the theory and doctrine truly viable."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wilhelm, Karen S.
1995-05-19
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Covering the Seams: Unifying Effort to Defeat Transnational Terrorism
"In the post-Cold War decade of the 1990 s the United States struggled to find a strategy suitable for the emerging security environment. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 clarified the perception of the heretofore obscure and confusing security environment. The attacks brought into focus the true picture of the threat to United States citizens and interests at home and abroad presented by transnational terrorism. In the ensuing months after the attacks, the Nation has undertook actions across all aspects of national power to defeat the global threat of transnational terrorism. The Nation has formulated a strategy for combating terrorism that places the U.S. Military in a significant role. Perhaps the most significant role for the military in this effort will be globally operationalizing the application of military power to achieve the strategic objective to defeat transnational terrorism. The challenge for the United States application of military power lies in leveraging a regionally based operational command and control structure against a globally distributed threat. This monograph proposes that the existing organization, delineated responsibilities, and commensurate procedures of the operational military system of the United States, must adapt to meet the necessities of the world environment and defeat the threat of transnational terrorism. To better understand the operational challenges confronted in the Global War on Terror, a commensurate level analysis of the adversaries is necessary. The operational analysis uses the doctrinal elements of operational design to guide the examination of the adversaries. Furthermore, the analysis uses the third element of operational design as a measure of effectiveness for the command and control structure of the operational military in addressing the global threat of transnational terrorism."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Gallahue, Kimo C.
2003-05-22
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International Terrorism
"September 11, 2001, was a day that future historians will call a hinge of history. On that day, a lethal blow was struck in the heart of freedom. From that day on, international terrorism could no longer be considered a tactical threat with no real global implications. There is no question that terrorist incidents will continue to plague the international community well into the foreseeable future. One primary reason for this is the inherent difficulty involved in preventing a terrorist attack before it occurs. Another is the often fanatical nature of individuals who carry out the often suicidal assaults. These factors are often the primary reason that the only action that can be taken in response to terrorism is after-the-fact. Herein, too, lies a significant and controversial problem; which responses are appropriate? The purpose of this monograph is to examine the origin structure and goals of the international terrorism and terrorist action and identify steps the U.S. can take to stop the threat of terrorism coming from the Middle East. The focus of this monograph is, therefore, on the U.S. available policy options which range to combat international terrorism from diplomacy, international cooperation, intelligence capabilities, economic sanctions to the use of the military forces, against Middle East States on the terrorist list (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan). The author concludes that the war against terrorism can be won, not merely contained."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Alfarajat, Ahmad D.
2003-05-22
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New Kind of War: Adaptive Threat Doctrine and Information Operations
"The United States military remains the dominant post-modern state combatant. Military actions in Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Desert Storm victory validated the theory that information-based technologies are decisive factors in modern military operations. Threats recognize that peer competitors of the U.S. do not exist and are several decades away from developing similar military technologies. Consequently, threat-based strategies seek alternative or asymmetrical methods of warfare designed to exploit U.S. weaknesses and disrupt or paralyze the decision-making apparatus. Information operations provide opportunities to avoid direct contact with superior conventional forces and threat capabilities enhanced where qualitative gaps with opposing forces exist. The theoretical framework for the study is a model of information warfare that draws a distinction between 'cyberwar' and 'netwar,' two components of information warfare that are structurally different. Using a hybrid of this model, the effectiveness of threat strategy using 'netwar' to disrupt the decision-making process and create paralysis at the strategic and operational level can be determined. Understanding how the threat is adapting to knowledge- based warfare and U.S. military information dominance is vital to U.S. national interests. What methods are state and non-state actors using to counter U.S. technological superiority? Can adaptive threat applications be developed that cause strategic and operational paralysis? If so, then are they successful in achieving threat end-states and are they designed to use information operations to gain a relative advantage? Can it be shown that future threats to the security of the United States can develop new ways, specifically 'netwar' strategies, to attack and exploit U.S. military weaknesses?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Warren, Paul S.
2001-02
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Future Role of Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism: Divining the Strategy
"The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, actively thrust the U.S. government into a war against terrorism, principally against the form of terrorism most closely associated with radical Islam, born in the Middle East region. President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in an effort to kill or capture the perpetrators of the latest terror attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., with the ultimate goal of eradicating terrorism against the U.S. as a feasible option for groups or nation-states that wish harm upon America. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM set out to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and enable the growth of a free and representative Iraqi government. However, the administration's strategy aims to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq after a secure environment is attained and self-sustaining Iraqi rule is established, thus leaving the fledgling government to its own devices. An effective strategy to ensure a productive role for Iraq in the war on terror hinges upon the continued presence of U.S. military forces in that country."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Donovan, Matthew P.
2004-05-26
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MARSOC: A Way Ahead
"The Global War on Terror and the Department of Defense have thrust change upon the Marine Corps and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Because the Secretary of Defense mandated that the Marine Corps would create a component in USSOCOM, the window for revolutionary change is open. USSOCOM needs a force with the capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)). When the United States Marine Corps joins USSOCOM, it should not create a force that duplicates what already exists within that organization and is anathema to the Marine's organizational culture. If the Marine Corps must provide a component to USSOCOM then it should provide a capability that is distinctly, 'Marine.' The Marine Corps should offer, and USSOCOM should accept placement of all MEU (SOC)'s under the combatant command authority of USSOCOM. In the current war, the MEU (SOC) is the ideal force to provide the power, resilience, and ensure the unity of command for the special operations commander of all forces involved in a special operation. Additionally the Marine Corps Special Operations Command [MARSOC] should have the typical service responsibilities of training and equipping forces, but it should also have an operational responsibility of forming the core of a Joint Task Force for service in 'small wars.' These changes can create more capability for USSOCOM and place the Marine Corps in the forefront of the Global War on Terror."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Simmons, Todd P.
2006-05-25
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Can the United States Defeat Radical Islam?
"On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadist organizations declared war on the United States. Since that day, the U.S. government has initiated a series of policies, legislation and actions to confront the new threat. Seven years into the war, there is growing criticism of the structure and approach the U.S. has adopted to defeat Al-Qaeda and the Salifist jihad organizations that support it. This monograph explores the basis of this criticism and determines whether or not the United States has the institutional structure, human resources and polices required to project the full complement of diplomatic, military, intelligence resources required to defeat Al-Qaeda and the global Salafist jihad that it represents. The monograph tracks changes in U.S. legislation, organizational structure, and actions mounted to contain and defeat Al-Qaeda since the 9/11 attacks. It presents non-classified evidence regarding the effectiveness of these changes to identify, interdict and neutralize Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups and records how Al-Qaeda has responded. The monograph concludes with a set of recommended strategic and global adjustments to the U.S. global war on terrorism required to defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist network. The monograph opens with an evaluation of Al-Qaeda's origins and cause, its recruiting base and methods, its cellular structure and operating procedures, and its financial assets including the sources of its funding, how funds are moved and managed, and how these funds are used to support the global Salafist jihad that Al-Qaeda embodies. This is followed by an analysis of the U.S. government structure and capabilities available to meet the challenged posed by Al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attacks. The monograph then turns to examine both the short and long-term responses of the U.S. government to the attacks"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Hanratty, Martin E
2008-05-22
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Global Counterinsurgency: A Way Out of the Global War on Terrorism Quagmire?
"With the attacks of September 11th, by a transnational, global, terrorist network, the full danger of this new security threat was revealed. The initial response of the United States Government to this threat resulted in the birth of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Since its birth the GWOT has taken center stage as the default Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy of the United States. In the execution of this strategic construct the United States has deployed its military instrument of power to two regional conflicts--Afghanistan and Iraq--and numerous other low level, special operations throughout the globe. After more than six years of implementation, this monograph examines the effectiveness of GWOT and its current relevancy as a strategic concept. The monograph addresses the background and origins of GWOT to include the arguments for and against its usefulness and its strengths and weaknesses as a strategic construct. The monograph specifically examines the current security environment in which the GWOT is being applied and finds it to be insufficient. The monograph proposes that the security environment is more accurately defined as a global insurgency conducted by a transnational terror network with global reach. Further, the best way to address this security environment is to replace the construct of GWOT with a global counterinsurgency (COIN) strategic framework. In doing so, the monograph replaces the primacy of 'terror or terrorism' as the overarching threat with a clear identification of the enemy--al Qaeda and associated groups and movements. The research delves into the strategic goals and operational objectives of al Qaeda and assess its effectiveness as a global insurgency using the criteria established by contemporary and historical insurgency theorists…"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Lee, Michael J.
2008-05-22
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Path to a Culturally Relevant National Security Strategy
"This monograph will argue that understanding and addressing the nature of the threat's identity is paramount to the United States' ability to win the GWOT (Global War on Terror). In an attempt to remain ahead of its enemies in the prosecution of the GWOT, the United States has proceeded with an extensive review of its National Security Strategy and an historic transformation of its Government, thereby improving its ability to protect the US' interests both at home and abroad and increasing its capacity for coordinated action. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism contains an analysis of the threat and lays out a strategy for winning the war on terror. It qualifies the threat as one fuelled by an ideology of oppression, violence, and hate with an ultimate goal of establishing a single, pan-Islamic, totalitarian regime. The GWOT is therefore characterized as a war against the radical Islamist ideology. This assumes that the threat's ideology is a militant one existing on the fringes of the true nature of Islam. Furthermore, the strategy disregards the role that Islam has in shaping and informing the threat. This theory ignores the central function that religion has in determining identity and the strength it has in protecting identity. The limited understanding of the nature of the threat hampers the current US National Security Strategy's ability to address some of the root causes of the war. The question is therefore 'how identity theory can inform the creation of a National Security Strategy?' A constructivist approach in which people's understanding of their interests depends on the ideas they hold highlights the applicability of group identity to International Relations. This approach contends that international relations need not be conflictual, but rather that relations depend on the nature of the interaction among states but more importantly in the context of this paper."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Frappier, John
2010-05-28
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Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: Winning the War on Terror with Information Engagement
"Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has developed a course of action (COA) to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the Horn of Africa. Because of the mission, the resources available to the task force, and the nature of the conflict, the command chose a COA that uses Information Operations (IO) as the decisive strategy. Specifically, they have focused on the IO task of Information Engagement to accomplish the mission. CJTF-HOA's performance over the past 5 years has proved that IO is an adequate, feasible, and acceptable course of action to fight the GWOT in the Horn of Africa. Joint and Army doctrine currently specify how IO aligns with warfighting functions. The author proposes a change in that doctrinal alignment to better facilitate the synchronization and coordination of IO during planning and execution. This new doctrinal alignment also may facilitate the replication of CJTF-HOA's success in other regions of the globe. The revision of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, divides IO into five tasks and assigns certain staff responsibility for each task. Under this construct, the task of Information Engagement is part of the Command and Control warfighting function and G-7 has responsibility for it. The new construct eliminates the need for an IO Working Group. As the U.S. Military reduces troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it should apply this COA to other regions of the globe. To achieve the maximum benefit of this COA in new regions, the military must incorporate the lessons learned from CJTF-HOA. These lessons cover a range of topics, but the most important ones are command and control, interagency coordination, and time frame."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Garcia, Michelle M.
2007-06
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Chechen Conflict: A Case for U.S. Intervention
"With Russia's inability to improve conditions in Chechnya and the international community's failed attempts to negotiate a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, Islamic extremism in Chechnya is growing precipitously and risks spilling over into the neighboring republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria and the neighboring country of Georgia. The question this paper addresses, therefore, is: does the unresolved Chechen conflict and the spread of Islamic extremism warrant U.S. intervention? As this paper's analysis of the conflict demonstrates, the answer to this question is a resounding --yes. In fact, this paper argues that if the United States does not use its influence to resolve the Chechen conflict and thus preempt the growth of Islamic extremism in the North Caucasus, Chechnya risks devolving into a major front in the Global War on Terror."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Johnson, Mark E.
2006-05-25
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Occupation and Governance: The New Face of Operational Art
"The United States and many other countries are engaged in the Global War on Terror using all the elements of their national powers. Much of the diplomatic, economic and perhaps some of the military actions take place behind the scenes and often through proxies. Even so, given historical precedent and the plethora of rogue and failing states in existence today, future large-scale military intervention in some areas is virtually inevitable. A multinational military coalition is presently struggling to stabilize Iraq two years after initial occupation and governance operations met with limited success. This modern operation stands in sharp contrast to the notably successful occupations of Germany and Japan more that half a century ago. If these types of operations are inevitable, but the US military has lost some proficiency in their execution, it is incumbent upon professional soldiers to discover and remedy the problems."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Rhoden, Gregory L.
2006-05-25
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War of Ideas and the Role of Information Operations in Counterinsurgency
"Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States' armed forces and its coalition of allies have become deeply entrenched in the counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan. These struggles are not just counterinsurgencies, but they also represent the front lines of the nation's 'War of Ideas' between Western ideology and Islamic extremism, where influence and management of perceptions is paramount. Because of the inherently political nature of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations coupled with the dynamics of conflict within the information age, the role of information operations (I0) has assumed a new level of importance. [...]. This monograph analyzes the historical development of US IO doctrine and provides a discussion of the way ahead for common understanding among the services. Investigation into Clausewitz's theory of political conflict helps to reinforce how the role of I0 relates to kinetic operations based on the assessed nature of the conflict. Finally, an assessment of the new COIN manual FM 3-24, and analysis of the many considerations for proper understanding of the information environment provide scope to the challenges ahead for US forces in the COIN conflict. The monograph identifies that while new Joint I0 and Army COIN doctrines have provided a solid foundation for a change in understanding of the necessities for this contemporary conflict, there are still unresolved issues which may inhibit the commander's proper integration of 10. The monograph makes the following recommendations to improve the overall understanding and capability of 10 within the current conflict."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Hunton, Collin T.
2007-04-27
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Expanding the United States Army for 21st Century Roles and Missions: Foreign Legion or Foreign Augmentation?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph considers expanding the U.S. Army using non-citizens to man new units. Both the French Foreign Legion and British Brigade of Gurkhas provide useful examples of the types of forces needed by the United States to preserve American hegemony and win the GWOT [Global War on Terrorism]. This monograph presents models for an American foreign legion and indigenous units using the DTLOMS [Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Material, and Soldier] force development framework. While both concepts presented in this work would provide the U.S. Army with sorely needed additional manpower, the foreign legion model is the most feasible. In addition, the United States Army should actively recruit skilled non-citizens overseas through the promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service. Neither an American foreign legion based on the French model nor units of indigenous forces based on the British Gurkha model should be formed at this time. Two rationales led to this conclusion. First, the increasing militarization of American foreign affairs has had several unfortunate consequences, and this trend would be furthered by the creation of the units presented in this monograph. Second, the creation of an American foreign legion or battalions of foreign troops would continue to allow the youngest generations of Americans to forgo one of the primary obligations of citizenship - compulsory military service, thus indirectly exacerbating the 'Civil-Military Gap' and further eroding the trust and understanding between civilian and military leaders, possibly with dire consequences."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cyrulik, John M.
2004-05-26
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United States Army and Large Cities Prior to the Global War on Terror
"The United States Army has relied on a variety of doctrinal manuals for urban operations over the past seventy years. During this period, it conducted operations in Manila, Berlin, Tokyo, Seoul, Saigon, and Panama City, among other cities. While U.S. Army keystone doctrine changed many times to reflect new strategic contexts, urban doctrine remained relatively static. In particular, U.S. Army urban doctrine has never addressed effectively the unique requirements and characteristics of operations in large cities (those with a population over 750,000). Analysis of the history of U.S. Army operations in large cities, considered in relation to relevant doctrine and theory, illustrates the longstanding flaws in the U.S. Army's doctrine and mission execution. The analysis herein describes these challenges in detail, and provides recommendations for updating doctrine to address the special properties of all urban environments - particularly large cities."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Fuller, Samuel T.
2013-05-23
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Women in Combat Arms: A Study of the Global War on Terror
"The recent institutionalization of women in combat reignites a long standing debate on their roles in the military; a debate that elicits emotionally charged responses by proponents and critics alike. While much of the current discourse concerns hypothetical discussions of women in direct combat, there is a population of female soldiers that have contributed as front line 'trigger pullers' throughout the course of the past 12 years of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These women are Army aviators who have served in attack aviation roles, without restriction, since the beginning of major combat operations in the Global War on Terror. Given the significant implications of the political, social, cultural, and economic ramifications of women in combat, this paper synthesizes historical evidence and statistical data of female pilots' performance within attack aviation over the span of the past two conflicts in the Middle East. This research shows that over a decade of females serving on the front lines alongside their male counterparts, there is no significant stigma or other prohibitive factors that would degrade the effectiveness or lethality of combat arms units in war."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Peña-Collazo, Seneca
2013-05-23
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Postmodern Morals, Ends, and Means: Shifting Ideas About Why, How and for Whom Wars are Fought
From the abstract: "During the postmodern era moral reasoning on why and how nations fight has shifted. The just war tradition was founded during the fourth century in a system of thought based on natural law as defined by the Christian conception of God. This moral construct served as a means of valuing both humanitarian concerns and state sovereignty. Then, during the Enlightenment era, modernist thinkers removed God as a metaphysical basis of the just war tradition, and systematized it such that state sovereignty had greater value over humanitarian concerns. […] Therefore, there is a search for international bodies that can assume such authority. The National Security Council has accepted this responsibility, but inherently lacks the process to execute the principle to achieve postmodern purposes, so the search continues. […] A viable means exists in the postmodern technologically centric unmanned system. While there may be legitimate moral concerns surrounding drone use, when judged using the just war tradition, there are no moral concerns inherent in unmanned warfare that would prevent it from being used for humanitarian intervention. In fact, unmanned combat vehicles are well suited for such police style enforcement actions. Given the continuing search for an international authority to conduct humanitarian intervention and the viability of unmanned combat vehicles as a means to conduct such missions, these postmodern influences portend an international organization with the authority and means to conduct international police functions in otherwise sovereign states."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Vicars, Robert P., IV
2013-05-23
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Unintended Consequences of Killing Civilians
"Mistreatment of civilians not party to a large-scale, violent conflict is not new. The perceived lack of empathy for civilians (historically and presently) points to ambiguities about who the enemy is, rules of engagement, as well as the ongoing debate about the nature of military intervention in internal conflicts. In addition, examples of violence against civilians during the current war in the Middle East emphasize changes that have occurred within the media, politics, and military operations since World War II. This comparison is useful because it provides for reflection on the international laws written explicitly to protect civilians during war because of the devastation to the European continent during World War II. When American soldiers intentionally kill civilians of the population that needs protection, or otherwise violate the tenets of the Geneva Conventions, the media invites domestic and international responses, publicizing the debate. Political leaders of America have always declared their commitment to protecting human rights in the many nations where the U.S. military deploys its troops, yet incidences of Americans killing members of the protected population continue to occur. American soldiers should refrain from harming civilians during combat operations because it is counterproductive to mission accomplishment and results in a decline in support for military intervention forces. Elaborated throughout this work are the consequences of killing innocents: instant and ubiquitous media coverage and interpretation, political discourse involving questions about the efficacy of the American military in a counterinsurgency environment, and service members who developed a lack of restraint resulting from the complexity of military operations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Oehler, Sherry K.
2012
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Importance of Ethics in Counterinsurgency Operations
"The intent behind this paper was to develop a set of key principles that would support both planners and operators in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This set of principles would also be morally acceptable on an international level, which would not only support the conduct of operations but would lead to enhanced legitimacy and acceptance. The development of these principles is important as the current methods that the Coalition is employing in both Iraq and Afghanistan are not only ineffective, but they are increasing the rift in relations between the West and the Middle East."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Archer, Tony
2006-05-25
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Finding Weakness in Jihadist Propaganda
"The Global War on Terror is an ideological war being fought in the environment indicative of fourth generation warfare. Propaganda bypasses traditional defenses and strikes right at the center of gravity -- popular support. In a modern war of ideologies, communication is decisive; propaganda is cleverly designed, influential communication that compels associated populations to support the cause or leave the battlefield. The Jihadists seek social revolution and rely on propaganda to communicate the cause. Propaganda is especially effective because of the nature of globalized communications -- a picture, a video, or a statement quickly consumes the attention of the world media and is spread instantaneously. Communist China successfully completed a social revolution during the 20th Century. Their revolution has striking similarities to the current Jihadist social revolution. China had a significant capability the Jihadists do not; the Chinese government could control nearly all aspects of information within their country. Despite the advantages of globalized communications, the Jihadists do not 'own' the battlefield. They are effectively using the battleground (television, internet, satellite TV) but pale in comparison to America's potential. Today, America does little to compete with the Jihadists in the realm of information operations. America can win the war of ideology on the information battlefield should it ever decide to compete."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
King, Timothy R.
2007-05-01
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United States War on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End
"The monograph addresses trend analysis of drug control programs since 1993 and explores emerging indicators on drug war policy from the new Bush Administration. […]. Using principles of economic theory, the cocaine supply market would not exist were it not for the demand. It would appear that profits from the U.S. demand outweigh the risks associated with illegal production. If this researcher could come to this conclusion with vast amounts of public accessed data, why has the preponderance of fiscal resources gone to supply reduction rather than demand reduction? The research question is of interest to a student of operational art. For his understanding that policy formulation for national drug control is primarily an extension of political will. The military planner must understand the reality that the tactics of elections is driving the strategic formulation of policy. The get-tough approach represented by source country interdiction is easier politically to present to a nation that has grown accustomed to politically-correct rhetoric. Exploring the cognitive tension between the continued execution of a failing drug control strategy and the continued political success gained from the electorate is of value in understanding the role of national will. The monograph concludes that electoral politics was the reason why the preponderance of federal fiscal dollars went to supply programs rather than demand reduction programs. The United States drug policy has been driven by the need to appear tough on drugs, regardless of results."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Peavie, Barrett K.
2001-05-01
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Waking the Sleeping Giant at Pearl Harbor: A Case for Intelligence and Operations Fusion
From the abstract: "Despite the fact that for many years the United States conducted detailed planning the Japanese were still able to conduct a successful attack at Pearl Harbor. The 1907 war scare with Japan led to the initiation in American of war planning against the threat of Japanese aggression, and the establishment of a standing American capability at the Army War College. Plans continuously developed and annual tested. Based on these strategic plans, the Hawaiian Department implemented and developed Joint defense plans for Oahu. Historians have shown that the United States military possessed the intelligence to indicate an impending attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the ability to respond to the attack depended on two things: early warning, and effective defense planning. In 1941, radar -- the primary means of early warning -- remained a new technology. Radar proved to be effective and correctly detected the incoming attack but lacked the ability to discriminate between friendly or enemy aircraft. This monograph has particular significance given today's concern in America regarding homeland defense, since the lessons learned from analyzing the cause of the successful Pearl Harbor attack will offer insight to planners working on modern-day concerns like potential terrorist attacks against the United States involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. By determining whether poor planning or lack of early warning and response capability led to the tragedy of Pearl Harbor, this research will contribute to modern efforts to prepare for homeland defense."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Reyes, Blanca E.
2013-05-23
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Social Media Analytics: A New Approach for Cyberspace Enabled Understanding of Operational Environments
From the Abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to highlight the need to increase discourse within the Army on the impacts of cyberspace on operational environments. Current Army doctrine emphasizes network defense and offensive strike capabilities for cyberspace activities, but does not expound on focusing advanced analytical tools for increasing shared understanding of the cyberspace information environment; then using that understanding to solve problems existing in a dual cyberspace-land domain. Global interconnectedness and the speed of change demand a new approach. This research borrows from data analytics, social media, systems theory, sociology, and contemporary U.S. Army and Joint Doctrine. The paper uses the Army Design Methodology (ADM) to provide a common lexicon and model. The question for operational artists given the explosion of information technology over the last ten years is, 'How does the Army at corps level Joint Task Forces and below leverage cognitive information from cyberspace to create a more complete understanding of operational environments?' This monograph explores Social Media Analytics (SMA) as a capability for providing Army commanders and staffs with cyberspace tools for generating human centric understanding. The research addresses SMA applied to a gap in contemporary Joint and Army doctrine, and evaluates SMA as an approach to bridging that gap."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Lyons, Sean P.
2013-02
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Twenty Years of Evolutionary Change in the Department of Defense's Civil Support Mission
From the abstract: "Over the last twenty years, the Department of Defense's response enterprise for civil support missions has experienced evolutionary change and almost exponential growth. Three events served as the catalysts for the changes; the Tokyo Subway Sarin Gas attack, the 9/11 attacks, and Hurricane Katrina. Each event exposed critical shortfalls in the nation's, as well as DOD's, ability to respond to a domestic catastrophe in enough time to produce a life-saving effect. Once derived solely from warfighting capabilities that could be applied to domestic assistance, DOD now maintains Title 10 and Title 32 units, teams, and task forces specifically designed for civil support missions. Not only are DOD's capabilities split among two different governing Federal statutes, the Department has created a dichotomy in its response enterprises, one designed specifically to respond to a catastrophic CBRN incident and one to respond to incidents without a CBRN element. DOD can no longer afford to maintain this dichotomy, in part because of the duplicity of the capabilities involved and also because the dichotomy is not in line with current DOD strategy and doctrine for an all-hazards approach to civil support."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Anderson, Michael R.
2013-01
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Finding the Balance to Combat a Hybrid Threat
"Following Vietnam, the U.S. military focused on conventional state-on-state wars, and the Army task organized to face the Soviet Union in Europe. The Army's capstone Cold War doctrine, AirLand Battle, reached its pinnacle during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Refocusing from a conventional fight to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military changed its TTPs [Tactics, Technics, and Procedures] to combat the insurgent threat. Over the last decade, the U.S. military's sole attention to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in an entire generation of officers whose skills in combined arms maneuver has atrophied. A similar sort of atrophy in warfighting skills also occurred in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and contributed to Israel's failure during the Second Lebanon War. In 2006, the IDF sought a swift victory over the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Instead, the IDF fell victim to their past successes in the Six-Day War, Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Lebanon War, which reinforced their belief that overwhelming air power would compel the enemy to capitulate. For much of the two decades preceding the 2006 conflict, the IDF focused on counterinsurgency and constabulary operations against the Palestinians in the West Bank, and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. This emphasis led to a degradation of their combined arms maneuver skills. As the IDF's skills worsened, the Hezbollah organized itself conventionally with prepared defenses and a well-organized, trained, and highly motivated force. They acquired and adapted technology to defeat the Israeli forces in depth as the IDF's offensive moved into Lebanon. Hezbollah combined both conventional and unconventional tactics to defeat the IDF. This combination of tactics and organization is the essence of a hybrid threat. By synthesizing the TTPs from Afghanistan's counterinsurgency fight with the lessons from the IDF, this monograph will provide a model for the organization and training the U.S. military will need to defeat future hybrid threats."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Blanton, James F.
2013-01
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Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat
From the thesis abstract: "Americans readily identify Muslim extremism as a viable threat to America. However, they ignore or remain unaware of Christian extremism in the same context, despite the similarities in ideology that advocate violence against Americans. For example, the motivation behind Eric Rudolph's bombing of the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 was to 'embarrass and punish the U.S. government' for its pro-abortion stance. This monograph explores what, if any, domestic terror threat Christian extremism poses and follows the Constructivist approach: how ideas define structure, how this structure defines interests, and how actors take action as a result. Initially focusing on the history and core beliefs of the Christian Identity movement and radical fringes of Dominion and Reconstruction theology, this monograph identifies two major underlying themes in Christian extremism. The first is racism through the use of religion as an accelerant to promote violence. The second is religiously motivated terrorism to support what is perceived as God's will and law. In addition, this monograph analyzes federal law enforcement action against Christian extremism through a series of case studies that took place in Mountainhome, Arkansas, Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. The analysis of the catastrophic consequences from Ruby Ridge and Waco with the Oklahoma City bombing follows. Concluding this monograph are the lessons learned, comparison of federal law enforcement's action in each case study, and analyzing the tactics and leadership involved. Whereas the FBI's tactics and leadership exercised proved highly successful in Arkansas, they were disastrous in Idaho and Texas. Finally, this monograph provides a domestic terror threat assessment with recommended actions in what is not only a law enforcement issue, but a war of ideology between tolerance and understanding versus hate and bigotry."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wong, Frederick D.
2011-04-01
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Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments in the War on Terror
"This monograph explores the role of Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) abroad in the post-Cold War, post9/11 strategic security environment. Drawing on the work of National Defense University and Thomas Barnett, the author finds that the globalization of economies and markets has become the driving force of the international system, as nationalism and bipolarity had been in earlier ages. While globalization promises a better life for the developing world, it also enables transnational crime and nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda. These factors suggest the need to revamp and improve nontraditional national security instruments such as Coast Guard LEDETs. The requirement for a safe, secure, and functional maritime domain as a necessary and enabling condition of globalization suggests that enhanced LEDETs should be used to build the capacity of maritime security forces in conjunction with Theater Special Operations Command war-on-terror activities. A variety of factors suggests that the U.S. Government should first expand these efforts in maritime Southeast Asia."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bowen, Gary Russell
2006-05-25
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Challenges for This Kind of War: Modifying Army Awards for a New Century of Conflict
"The United States Army continues to execute counterinsurgency operations in support of the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan. However, inculcating a counterinsurgency ethos into the Army continues to be a challenge. The Army's reward system, which drives individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much-overlooked role in this endeavor. In the Army, as with most organizations, pay, promotion and awards form a tripod of extrinsic motivation, and represent tools that the institution can use to reward or reinforce specific behavior. Today and in the future, pay and promotion have a limited effect to promote and reinforce the development of a counterinsurgency ethos in the Army. The reasons are clear. The Army's award system, developed primarily during the World Wars, is static and rewards combat actions more common to high intensity operations rather than counterinsurgency (COIN). Furthermore, the 'Pyramid of Honor,' which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply ingrained in Army culture. Recently, the Army has spent significant energy creating and revising many facets of doctrine, including the creation of a counterinsurgency field manual. COIN doctrine calls for actions, which limit incentives in the award system. This monograph explains the paradox that results. New Army doctrine directs soldiers to work by, with, and through a host nation. Yet, in Afghanistan, the Army primarily rewards its soldiers for engaging and killing the enemy. This incongruity in Afghanistan produced the wrong kind of incentives and thus, unintended consequences that led to an endorsement for lethal methods as the default. This particular study makes an analysis of the specifics in Afghanistan to understand what the award system needs to consider as additional criteria for incentives. Better understanding of what criteria promotes this kind of action are paramount for success"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Clemmer, Brent Alan
2011-05-18
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On the Brink: Instability and the Prospect of State Failure in Pakistan
From the thesis abstract: "The ongoing military operations in Afghanistan underscore the importance of regional stability in Central and South Asia. While much of our attention remains focused on Afghanistan, the unstable nature of Pakistan creates a problematic scenario for the United States. Although the media and policy makers are showing a growing interest in the state, Pakistan's problems are not new. Instead, they represent a history of domestic, regional, and international troubles that leave the state in an unpredictable posture. Most importantly, these historical events, coupled with current political, economic, and security related issues, have created a fragile state with the propensity to fail. Therefore, this monograph highlights and explains many of Pakistan's problems under the framework of assessing the likelihood of state failure. Existing research provides the fundamental characteristics of fragile and failed states and serves as a benchmark for comparison to determine whether Pakistan is merely weak, in transition, or on the brink of failure. Pakistan's potential collapse would have severe consequences for many regional and international actors. However, the U.S. military, operating in Afghanistan, would face immediate and significant challenges in a failed state scenario. As a result, U.S. officials continue to reiterate the importance of Pakistan's stability. Yet, it may take years of continuous external support to ensure Pakistan's worst-case scenario does not occur."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Sentell, David Scott
2010-04-12
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Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terror
From the thesis abstract: "The United States is now in the eighth year of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). For America, the war began with the surprise attacks against targets in Washington D.C. and New York City on September 11, 2001. For al Qaeda, the war began centuries ago. Since the attacks of September 11th, the United States has failed to win a decisive strategic victory over al Qaeda. This monograph asks why. It contributes to the body of knowledge needed to understand the enemy and the operational environment of the Arab Muslim world, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of America's future wartime efforts against global jihadist movements in general and al Qaeda in particular. The monograph explores aspects of the Arab Muslim world which al Qaeda exploits and depends upon for their survival, and then examines al Qaeda itself. The research includes text, speeches, and analysis of Islamic thinkers such as Seyyed Qutb, and key jihadist leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. While not the only threat to American national security, al Qaeda is the threat that has proven capable of conducting complex and horrific attacks on a global scale. Therefore, the United States and its allies must decisively defeat al Qaeda in order to dissuade the further expansion of the global jihadist movement."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Waters, David R.
2010-05-15
