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Adaptability: Components of the Adaptive Competency for U.S. Army Direct and Organizational Level Leaders
"U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders faced challenges in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which combined to create an environment permeated by ambiguity and replete with uncertainty. Although it may be impossible to predict future operational environments, it is likely that adversaries will continue to apply asymmetric warfare against the U.S. to attenuate her superiority in conventional warfare. The purpose of this monograph is to determine whether U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders are equipped with the competency to adapt successfully in asymmetric environments. Doctrine cannot prognosticate the exact nature and form of asymmetric conflict, but it can forecast traits and conceptual knowledge required for leaders to maintain the initiative and dictate the terms of the operation. Emerging leadership doctrine should include adaptability as a competency consisting of five components. These components are: maintain situational awareness, know yourself and the adversary, take intelligent risks, exercise mental agility and demonstrate strength of character. Furthermore, the definition of adaptive leadership requires revision. This research posited a working definition: the capacity to recognize and respond to changing situations and variable circumstances within the operational environment and to proactively take steps to maintain the initiative and dictate the terms of the operation."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wyszynski, Joseph L., Jr.
2005-02-07
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Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations
"The purpose of this monograph is to study punitive attack and assess what makes these operations successful or unsuccessful. By surveying early international law we can see that attacking to avenge a loss or as retribution is an enduring and justified cause of war. The historical campaigns of both the British and the United States provide some excellent examples of punitive operations in execution. The twenty year fight by the British army against the Mad Mullah in Somaliland, and the United States Armys Punitive Expedition into northern Mexico in search of the bandit Poncho Villa, as well The United States 1986 air raid on the country of Libya are examples of punitive operations. Reponses against nations or actors that are punitive must be timely and warranted. Any action that seeks retribution or deterrence must have a limited and attainable objective. One important facet of punitive operations is in their residual deterrence value. Deterrence is the perception of the potential for the use of force. Potential force may be effective against sophisticated and organized polities; however, for primitive loosely organized enemies, the actual use of physical force may be the sole method for achieving a level of deterrence."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Newton, B. D.
2005-05-05
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Force Protection for Distribution Based-Logistics in Asymmetric Warfare
"United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that adversaries are likely to persist in seeking advantage through asymmetric warfare. Within this context, emerging doctrine on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Operations (EBO) must realistically apply to the U.S. Army, and more specifically, to Combat Service Support (CSS) leaders on the battlefield. In light of emerging doctrine, this monograph proposes necessary adaptations to force protection for Distribution-Based Logistics (DBL) under conditions of asymmetric warfare. Building on experience from Vietnam and contemporary operations in Iraq, this study examines the anticipated impact of the Joint Operational Environment (JOE) on CSS operations, including the key issue of tactical distribution. Among its conclusions, this study argues that the Army must insure that CSS leaders in the field have the ability to gain the required situational awareness to support and sustain the tactical commanders force momentum. In addition, the author argues that a transforming Army must balance efficiency and effectiveness to assure CSS units the necessary resources for mission accomplishment on the future asymmetric battlefield."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Spenard, Thomas M.
2005-05-26
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How Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence Sharing Challenges Between Conventional and Special Operations Forces?
This monograph examines why intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is more important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhance conventional forces capabilities and facilitate greater intelligence sharing with special operations forces. This study addresses how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces can overcome intelligence sharing challenges through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability. First, this paper analyzes the current operational environment that dictates the requirement for conventional and special operations forces to transform to achieve success during military operations. Furthermore, this paper examines the current doctrinal framework that guides intelligence sharing and dissemination within the U.S. Army and identifies different approaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S. Army doctrine, conventional doctrine, and specific special operations doctrine. Additionally, this paper reviews various theories that support the increased need and importance of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, and further identifies proposed methods to solve many of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encounter in intelligence sharing. This study also examines historical conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the most recent war in Afghanistan to illustrate how sharing intelligence directly impacts military operations. Lastly, this monograph provides possible recommendations and solutions addressing methods to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, through enhanced equipment, training, and interoperability.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Bredenkamp, Michele
2003-05-22
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Defining Success in the War on Terrorism
"Terrorism is not a unique phenomenon. It is merely a tactic of political violence to achieve a political end. An examination of past insurgencies reveals terrorism as a tactic to produce affects against the ruling government or the populace. Defining success in the war on terrorism requires an understanding of both the insurgent and terrorist operational environment in order to determine success criteria. Dr. Max G. Manwaring developed a theory on counterinsurgencies through an examination of 43 post World War II insurgencies. Manwaring's paradigm provides a model, which is applicable to measuring success in the war on terrorism."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ball, Michael A.
2004-05-26
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Operation Enduring Freedom as an Enabling Campaign in the War on Terrorism
"The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon left the American public in a state of anguish and anger. With the debris still smoldering in the streets of New York, Bush stated that the United States and all those who want global peace will stand united to 'win the war against terrorism.' Less than a month later, Bush announced the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the first military action in the broad 'campaign against terrorism.' James W. Reed wrote 'should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning' focusing on campaign planning and design. In the article, Reed describes the relationship between terminal and enabling campaigns. The terminal campaign 'seeks war termination as an endstate.' James W. Reed defines an enabling campaign as achieving 'some intermediate strategic objectives short of termination.' With this in mind, is Operation Enduring Freedom an effective enabling campaign to create conditions for the defeat of terrorism in the Central Command area of responsibility? The methodology for determining the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom is in two pieces. First, is the campaign adequate, feasible, and acceptable? This three part criteria is how joint doctrine evaluates effectiveness. Second, do the operational objectives nest within the strategic endstate? According to Reed, enabling campaigns help create the conditions for a terminal campaign. Therefore, a linkage between the operational objectives and the terminal campaign that achieves the strategic endstate is imperative. The Italian Campaign offers a historical case study of an enabling campaign. By comparing the Italian Campaign with Operation Enduring Freedom, the strengths and weakness of each generate lessons applicable to the future of the war on terrorism."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Clement, John G.
2003-05-22
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Pilotless Army in the Megalopolis
"This monograph answers the question, 'Can unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) supplant manned United States Army attack and reconnaissance helicopters in the conduct of future urban operations' and the answer is, 'not completely.' The future of US involvement in urban operations is likely to increase. Although Army aviation can provide mobility, intelligence gathering, and massive precision fires, its current aviation systems are highly vulnerable within the urban environment and a solution may lie in the employment of UAVs. In order to mitigate the risk to its aviators, equipment, and the supported ground forces, the Army needs to revise current doctrine to address the employment of Army aviation's attack and reconnaissance aircraft teamed with UAVs in urban operations. The analysis of this monograph demonstrates that Army aircrews are not able to independently complete the missions that may be required of it within the growing urban environment. Nor can UAVs be fielded to the units of action and be expected to independently conduct the current missions of attack and reconnaissance aircraft. The most effective solution lays in teaming manned and unmanned aviation assets and applying new doctrinal employment."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wegner, Robert G.
2004-05-26
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Environmental Scarcity as a Cause of Violent Conflict
"Gulf War images of oil soaked birds and burning oil wells continue to generate academic research on the environment as both a victim and a weapon of war. The resulting literature has sensitized policy makers and military leaders to the environmental costs of conflict and military preparedness. Regrettably, this narrow focus obscures a potentially more ominous role for the environment as a cause of conflict. Within the complex web of causality, the increasing scarcity of renewable resources such as fresh water, forests, and arable land portends to be the leading cause of conflict in the 21st century. This monograph proves that environmental scarcity is a cause of violent conflict. Using the Modified Conflict Causality Model and six case studies, the monograph shows that scarcity generates adverse social effects which, in turn, cause violent conflict. After proving causality, the monograph looks at three implications. First, recent Operations Other Than War in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti treated the symptoms of scarcity without solving the underlying environmental problems. Consequently, conflicts in those countries are likely to recur, rendering the long-term outcomes of the operations as failures. Second, conflicts arising from environmental scarcity will occur more frequently in the future, threatening U. S. national security interests. Third, doctrine reveals that the Army is unprepared intellectually to contend with scarcity as a cause of violent conflict."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
David, William E.
1996-04
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Liberator or Occupier: Indigenous Allies Make the Difference
"This monograph examines the potential roles of indigenous forces in the transition period from decisive combat through post conflict reconstruction. More specifically, should Unconventional Warfare doctrine assess, train and develop suitable resistance forces for a post conflict security role. Minimizing US ground presence in future conflicts asks the question, what missions are indigenous resistance forces suitable for? Within the Contemporary Operating Environment, resistance forces can bring unique skills, abilities and legitimacy to post conflict operations. In this current era of US military supremacy, asymmetric opponents will focus on post conflict to defeat US goals. The monograph will be evaluated in terms of three security related criteria: protection of populace, protection of key individuals, institutions, and infrastructure, and reform of local security institutions. A review of the Contemporary Operating Environment and its impact on Unconventional Warfare Doctrine establishes a baseline for developing criteria, assessing an Operation Provide Comfort case study and delineating potential critical tasks and events."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Shienle, Duke C.
2004-05-26
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Special Operations: Reexamining the Case for a Sixth Service
The end of communism changed the global strategic environment from that of a bipolar world with readily defined threats to that of a multipolar world marked by uncertainty. It is clearly evident that the organization of the Cold War military is not sufficient to meet future threats successfully. This paper examines the creation of the Air Force from the Army Air Corp at the end of the Second World War and uses evidence from this case study to argue for the creation of a sixth service of special operations forces. It argues that that the answer to the requirements for the future does not exist in current or previous doctrine. The solution requires a new Service that is trained, manned, and equipped to lead the strategy requirements that the United States faces for the foreseeable future; and, special operations forces have the unique capability to meet the strategy needs in the Global War on Terrorism and other global insurgency threats in the new multipolar environmental setting.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Overdeer, Douglas
2004-05-26
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Is U.S. Army Rear Area and Base Security Doctrine Sound for Sustaining Operations on the Noncontiguous Nonlinear Battlefield?
"Army FM 3-0, Operations replaced the term rear operations with sustaining operations, introduced fundamental changes to the operational framework, and suggested leaders use adaptive combinations of contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations with linear and nonlinear operations in the execution of full spectrum operations. This conceptual shift of sustaining operations on a noncontiguous nonlinear battlefield requires fundamental changes in rear area and base security doctrine. This monograph reviews Joint and Army doctrine; assesses the threats to sustainment operations base on the COE and Army transformation; and explores historical case studies of Russian operations in Afghanistan. The monograph recommends several changes to doctrine definitions, concepts, and capabilities. Recommendations include improving threat level and rear area definitions, introducing preemption and operational level force protection concepts, and enabling support organizations with organic, flexible force protection and preemptive capabilities."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Coston, Anthony M.
2003-05-22
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Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces
"The emphasis on special operations and specifically unconventional warfare (UW) has grown significantly since the end of the Gulf War. The contemporary operational environment (COE) in which the U.S. military operates today is dictating this emphasis. The COE is the complex global environment that exists today. It encompasses the effects of globalism, changes in the global power structure, the proliferation of technology and weapons of mass destruction, and the entire spectrum of threats that exist--from traditional nation-state actors to emerging non-state actors. The core purpose of Army Special Forces (SF) has been, and will continue to be UW. The ability to operate in this dynamic, ambiguous environment through, with, and by indigenous and surrogate forces often makes SF an ideal economy of force for operations in the COE. This study looks at the SF organization to determine what changes are indicated from the COE for it to continue to provide a viable, effective UW capability. The study first analyzes the historical origins and evolution of the SF organization from World War II through the Gulf War. From this analysis, the study identifies areas in which the SF organization needs to change in response to the COE."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ott, Paul A.
2002
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Unconditional Surrender: A Modern Paradox
"This study determines whether or not unconditional surrender leads to a more lasting peace. The answer is paradoxical"yes, unconditional surrender can achieve the desired effects; however, it is no longer a suitable policy in the twenty-first century, due to the threat of nuclear escalation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Using the methodology of historical and descriptive comparison, the findings reveal the following: persistence of bellicose means and will have a direct impact on the duration of the ensuing peace; and victory results in a more lasting peace when the enemys will is removed. Considerable attention should also be given to post war settlement efforts with regard to financial aid and reconstruction. The Marshall Plan is a prime example. The findings also discover the existence of a perceived cultural bias in the West towards warfighting. This bias is described as the Western lens, which places inordinate significance on the aspects of time and decisiveness that can produce false expectations. Although demanding unconditional surrender, carte blanche, is not likely in the foreseeable future, there are methods governments can use to ensure certain conditions for war termination are met unconditionally. As long as these conditions remove an adversarys belligerent intentions, then the possibility exists for an enduring peace to ensue."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Shoffner, Thomas A.
2003
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Preparing for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat within the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)
"This monograph investigates the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threat the US will face on the battlefield and in the homeland in what is now called the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). The monograph begins by examining the CBRN evolution and its impact to include recent conflicts. The monograph focuses on three areas. First, has the CBRN threat been adequately identified within the COE? This threat includes the possible agents and employment scenarios used against US Forces. Second, is the current force design within the US Army and US Army Chemical Corps properly structured to deal with the threat? Finally, based on the first two issues, what are the appropriate solutions? The monograph frames the US Armys current and future capabilities to operate in a CBRN environment. Army doctrine states US forces must operate in a CBRN environment with minimum degradation. The monograph provides a comparison of US Army capability against the COE CBRN threat construct. This comparison identifies the critical gap that currently exists between requirements and capabilities. Finally, the examination concludes that the US Army is not adequately postured to meet the CBRN COE threat. The monograph recommends the establishment of a multi-purpose CBRN organization at the Corps and Division level and a realignment of CBRN personnel and organizations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Farrior, Cedrick A.
2004-05-26
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Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia: An Effects-Based U.S. Regional Strategy against Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf
"Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia constitutes the second front in the Global War on Terrorism. Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf, transnational terrorist organizations with ties to Al Qaeda, have frustrated U.S. efforts to eradicate terrorism and provide regional stability. Thus far, they have successfully adapted to concerted, international efforts to reduce their sphere of influence. This monograph examines these terrorist groups through the lens of Dr. Bard O'Neill's insurgency framework with the aim of providing an effects-based counterterrorism strategy. The findings highlight an ineffective, regional strategy with deficiencies in regional diplomacy, economic reform, financial and judicial practices, and military organization. The findings recommend prioritized improvements in these areas, along with more efficient maritime control and customs procedures. The study also indicates the lack of an effective regional information campaign against terrorism. The compilation of these recommendations form an effects-based counterterrorism strategy needed to win in the Global War on Terrorism."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Carter, Michael E.
2005-05-26
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Comparison of the Security Strategies of the United States and the European Union: Is There a Common Approach in Combating Terrorism?
"A comparison of the security strategies used by the United States and the European Union shows that their analysis of new threats of terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is similar, as are their stated strategic goals. The main differences between the two entities can be found in the ways in which they intend to counter these threats and achieve their respective strategic goals. An analysis shows that the key differences between the two entities' response to terrorism and WMD are as follows: unilateralism versus multilateralism, preemption versus prevention, and legitimacy of the use of force to achieve strategic objectives. The United States tends to stress 'hard power' and military solutions with the option of preemption and a unilateralist 'go it alone approach.' It downplays the role of the United Nations, the role of Islam, and possible options of civilian conflict prevention. The European Union sees more merit in effective multilateralism and 'soft power' that combines economic, diplomatic, as well as military assets. This approach should allow the European Union to act as a 'robust civilian power.' However, the European Union's credibility as a foreign policy actor will depend on its being able to translate its strategy into plans and operations. Despite the disagreements in this transatlantic relationship, there is an urgent need and a common basis for cooperation in combating global terrorism. Complementarity, not conflict, should be the new transatlantic watchword."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Gersdorf, Torsten
2005-05-26
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Decisive Battle and the Global War on Terror
"With the quick military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, one might be lulled into thinking that the Global War on Terror will be a quick military fight in accordance with Weigley's American way of war. This study cautions against such views and the desire to employ the concept of decisive battle in this protracted war on terror. This study looks at the historical and theoretical basis for decisive battle and assesses its impacts on the current doctrine of our military. With this foundation, the study then uses limited references to three case studies that share similar characteristics with the Global War on Terror to assess the impact of decisive battle. In light of theory and the hard lessons of selected application, this study examines the relevance of decisive battle to the Global War on Terror. Comparison of the Global War on Terror with historical case studies demonstrates that military power will likely continue to play a prominent role in conflict termination, but the military itself is not enough. The very nature of the Global War on Terror requires more than quick military victory to produce conflict termination."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cross, John
2005-05-26
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Operational Implications of Private Military Companies in the Global War on Terror
"This monograph discusses the implications of private military companies (PMCs) in the global war on terror (GWOT). The recent upsurge in the use of PMCs to support the prosecution of the GWOT has impinged increasingly on what is traditionally seen as the state monopoly on violence. PMCs as entities on the stage of conflict are widely misunderstood and as a result, often operate in an area of scant regulation, limited oversight, and ineffective control. As PMCs become increasingly involved in operations, the implications for the military are wide ranging and planners and commanders need to be aware of the capabilities and limitations of PMCs. Currently, little doctrine and guidance exists on PMCs. Specifically, this monograph examines the myriad factors concerned with PMCs, their benefits and disadvantages. The monograph concludes that the considerable utility of PMCs should not be overlooked and that they can be valuable contributors and partners in the GWOT. Several areas regarding PMCs need attention. The study suggests that the rapid growth of the use of PMCs is largely unregulated and not under proper control. With over 15,000 PMC employees in Iraq, too little is known about them and the implications of their presence. A distinct lack of joint and single service doctrine on the subject is further exacerbating the problem. Until there is regulation, control, oversight, and a formal doctrinal framework regarding PMCs, they will not be able to be harnessed effectively to become a fully-fledged partner in the joint fight."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wallwork, Richard D.
2005-01-02
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Redefining the Global War on Terrorism: Developing a Clear Picture of a Fuzzy Objective
"This paper will argue that the development and implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power is critical to success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The paper discusses the flaws in declaring war on the method of terrorism rather than focusing on the actors or insurgents that use these methods. The paper analyzes Al-Qaida using the characteristics of successful insurgencies posed by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen in 'Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response.' The analysis of the underlying social, economic and political conditions that support an insurgency, Al-Qaida's ideology, leadership and strategy, and the sources of support that enable an insurgency provide valuable insights in developing a strategy to defeat it. A review of the National Strategy for Countering Terrorism demonstrates incongruencies that limit its effectiveness as a blueprint for counterinsurgency. Recommendations include: the formation of a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee to develop, implement and assess a counterinsurgency strategy implementing all aspects of national power; the reformation and revitalization of the executive branch, specifically the Department of State and the development of military leaders with critical thinking skills and breadth of knowledge."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Payne, Brian A.
2004-12-17
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Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces
"United States Army Special Forces (SF) has played a critical role in prosecuting the Global War on Terror. Their ability to wage unconventional warfare remains their trademark. Operations in Afghanistan and northern Iraq demonstrated SF's ability to successfully leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S. objectives. These UW campaigns were unique in many ways and suggest what future unconventional warfare operations in the Global War on Terror may look like. However, this was not guerilla warfare characterized by small units using hit and run tactics. This was positional warfare in which cities were taken, ground was held, and the enemy capitulated or defeated. The Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga functioned as surrogate armies in place of U.S. conventional forces and they were controlled by U.S. Army Special Forces. Analysis of the two most recent UW campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that cultural awareness and regional expertise are critical to conducting surrogate warfare, as well as the ability to function as an operational-level joint headquarters capable of planning and supporting a UW campaign."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Peltier, Isaac
2005-05-26
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Terrorism in the Iguazu Falls Region: $100 Bills, a DIME at a Time
"The Iguaza Falls, a once popular international tourist destination in the northeast corner of Argentina, is one of most beautiful places in South America. Located in the Tri Border Area (TBA), which consists of Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), Foz de Iguazu (Brazil), and Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), it is populated with between 12,000 to 40,000 Arabs and their descendants, as well as 30,000 Asians. The area is a lawless zone that is home to Islamic terrorists of Syrian and Lebanese descent and their sympathizers. Together they work in an informal economy of fundraising, narcotics trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, document and currency fraud, and the manufacture/movement of pirated goods. The porous borders of the region enable terrorist operatives of Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda and their splinter groups to pass through the TBA, easily conducting criminal activities to support worldwide terrorism. The United States needs to do more to counter this threat in the Western Hemisphere. Even with terror groups on the run after three years of intense pressure since 9/11, Hezbollah operates freely, especially in money laundering and the drug trade, in this South American safe-haven. Because of the full-time engagement of the United States in the Middle East, the threat has operated without the required level of attention of the United States for too long. A serious emphasis on the TBA is necessary for American security because of the region's proximity to the United States."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Smith, Hugh
2005-05-26
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U.S. Military Intervention in Colombia: Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations
"This monograph focuses on the strategic and operational considerations for US military intervention in fighting the complex conflict in Colombia as a potential base-planning document, while also analyzing the necessity of greater unified military action-to include its possibility for success, in order to solve Colombia's narco-terrorist, insurgent threat. The purpose of analysis is to provide a strategic and operational context of the narco-paramilitary-insurgent problem in Colombia, by utilizing operational design to understand the complexities of the primary threats and provide a conceptual framework for future planning. The conclusion is that the scope of the conflict is beyond Colombia's capacity to cope with based upon the strategic aims and operational capabilities of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug trade. Further, the Colombian government is failing because two critical elements necessary for democratic rule still do not exist, stability and security. Colombian strategy must change by developing political objectives and a military strategy aimed at restoring stability and security through an integrated effort by Colombia, its neighbors, and the United States."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Hernandez, Bryan P.
2003
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Doctrinal Lessons from Non-State Actors
"The mode of warfare is changing. State on state conflict is no longer the primary approach to war. A phenomenon known as Gray Area War is on the rise. Gray Area War is defined as a conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity and the method is combining elements of traditional war fighting with organized crime. This method of warfare is eclipsing state on state conflict. The world is changing at an alarming pace. Alvin and Heidi Toffler outline the cause of these changes and attribute them to the Third Wave. The Third Wave is built upon the information revolution and globalization. The shrinking world is causing fractures and divisions in many states throughout the world. Not only are states in decline, but so is the mode of warfare that states traditionally wage. Though state on state conflict is [sic] decline, warfare will continue."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Forte, Robert A.
2001
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Outsourcing and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): Contractors on the Battlefield
"Current Department of Defense (DOD) policy stresses the practicality of outsourcing non-direct warfare functions such as logistics, maintenance, transportation, and security. Inherently, this policy assumes that by outsourcing these functions the military's reliability, effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility are improved. However, outsourcing has not historically produced all of these effects, and in times of war or crisis, many functions previously outsourced were either placed back under direct military control or transferred to uniformed personnel. Like previous military conflicts in our history, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) shows that many of these historical problems, such as overcharging and poor/unreliable services by contractors, are still relevant today. This monograph examines outsourcing policies in relation to GWOT. It also traces the U.S military's past utilization of battlefield contractors starting from the American Revolution to the present in order to develop trends and lessons learned. A historical model is developed which is then applied to the current utilization of contractors to help predict future issues. An assessment of DOD's outsourcing policy in GWOT is also made using the following evaluation criteria: reliability, effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility. Lastly, the monograph makes several recommendations on how to improve DOD's outsourcing policies and doctrine."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Campbell, John C.
2005-05-26
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Regarding NATO: An Examination of the Alliance's Role in the Global War on Terrorism
"In this monograph we examine the current and potential military roles of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in the Global War on Terrorism, and advocate a stronger, revitalized partnership between the U.S. and the Alliance. The U.S. clearly requires strong allies if it is to achieve it's stated policy goals of establishing stable, secure, and democratic states where none existed before. Since the end of the Cold War NATO itself has been under a process of transformation, seeking to redefine itself in the absence of expansionist socialism. In addition to its rapid expansion into Eastern Europe-a necessary step to fill the vacuum left after the collapse of communism-the Alliance is moving rapidly towards establishing itself a major factor in international security and stability in the 21st century. With a revamped command and control architecture, as well as smaller, more professional and deployable, and technologically interoperable forces, NATO is poised to take on the same global challenges facing the U.S. The Alliance is essentially a strong, valuable, and as yet underutilized partner, in the Global War on Terrorism. In order to suggest a stronger partnership, this monograph seeks to establish that the U.S. and NATO share a common understanding of the threat in today's security environment."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Catlett, Geoffrey A.
2005-05-06
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Rapid, Decisive or Effective? The Applicability of Rapid Decision Operations in the Enforcement of the Bush Doctrine
"The monograph first defines the Bush Doctrine, using various Presidential speeches and the National Security Strategy. The Doctrine can be simplified as a commitment to preemptive war against terrorists groups, weak states that facilitate terrorist groups, and rogue states that sponsor terrorist groups. The central chapter of the monograph then defines Rapid Decisive Operations, highlighting its commitment to using asymmetrical effects in a rapid tempo to produce 'cybershock,' or the inability to react to American operations and demands. The fourth chapter then uses these four features of Rapid Decisive Operations and examines their utility against each of the three groups mentioned in the Bush Doctrine. The final chapters draws conclusions, and while Rapid Decisive Operations is not judged to be utterly without merit, the concept is found to lack applicability in the areas of warfare most likely to face the United States in coming decades. The monograph concludes by recommending that Joint Forces Command reexamine the assumptions underlying Rapid Decisive Operations and consider designing a new Joint Warfighting Concept from properly validated assumptions."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ollivant, Douglas A.
2004-04-21
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Some Principles of Human Intelligence and Their Application
"Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines, has through the course of the 20th century been less emphasized by the U.S. Army relative to the technical disciplines of signals intelligence and imagery intelligence. HUMINT should remain a key component of an intelligence system, as it can cue and be cued by the other disciplines and combine with them to be more effective than any of them would be by itself. Also, the Army is involved in low- and mid-intensity campaigns around the world and Army doctrine for these types of operations identifies the importance of HUMINT in their conduct. Army leadership has expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of Army HUMINT and stated that it needs improvement. To make such an improvement, principles of HUMINT are necessary so that the HUMINT system and its components, including the individual HUMINT collectors, may be properly designed or trained. Such principles may be derived from writings of theorists and practitioners of HUMINT."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Sayre, Robert, Jr.
2004-05-26
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Department of Defense Pre-positioning Programs: A Springboard for Deployments
"The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), asymmetrical warfare, and globalization spell uncertainty, and strategic responsiveness can be the key to winning this nation's wars. The U.S. defense strategy requires pre-positioning posture to enable faster force closure and to be more flexible; more expeditionary; more survivable against anti-access threats; more joint and supportive of emerging joint warfighting concepts; and consistent with new DoD basing initiatives. Since the mid-1970's, the DoD has relied on military pre-positioning programs as a means to project combat power. The equipment content of these programs and the Services' pre-positioning concepts are reflective of a Cold War strategy: a European-focused theater, engagement and forward basing, and conventional warfare against a predictable adversary. Post 9-11 events reflect a change from a predictable enemy to an unpredictable enemy, thus dictating the need for DoD to re-look at how it employs its pre-positioning concepts. Predominantly, the pre-positioning concepts are service specific and lack joint integration, joint doctrine, and joint training. Joint pre-positioning begins with developing common operational and logistics systems. Beginning with command and control (C2), DoD must identify a C2 structure capable of integrating the capabilities of all the services. From determining and developing common user parts, to asset visibility, to over all theater distribution, DoD must resource ways to integrate service pre-positioning concepts into a joint integrated program that is 'plug and play."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Woodhurst, Melinda S.
2004-05-26
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Operational Planning Issues for the Peaceful Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
"This monograph examines if the US Army in Korea is trained, equipped, and staffed to move directly into the last phase of a campaign plan, post-hostilities. As the new millennium dawns over the Korean Peninsula, literally the world's hopes and expectations for peace are at an all time high. This monograph will study current North and South Korean relationships, in order to glean information the U.S. Army planner will need in the event of moving directly into post-hostilities. Additionally four well know scenarios for North Korean collapse and eventual reunification are studied. Within each scenario, the Army planner has to discern how to optimize the plan and allow for the innumerable branches or sequels that will be required. In order to provide further background information to facilitate planning and assumptions, the interests of the four major powers are discussed. The common theme among the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia is to seek stability and prevent no one power from establishing a hegemonic influence or domination over northeast Asia. This will allow all the powers involved to freely focus on economic investment and trade in the region. The monograph concludes by using a fictitious scenario of DPRK collapse and developing strategic and operational end states that will need to be accomplished in order to meet the 2000 National Security Strategy for northeast Asia."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Stahl, Albert C.
2001-05-15
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Coercive Airpower in the Global War on Terror: Testing Validity of Courses of Action
"The issue of validity for coercive COAs requires planners to take into account a vastly changed political landscape since 9/11. Perhaps a toughened military doctrine is required to fight GWOT, where pragmatic considerations sometimes may have to give way to hard-line principles. One of the keys to success for air planners will be to avoid atrophy of thought. A certain rigidity can harden into extreme dogmatism, a condition that could reduce the potential success of airpower in GWOT. Anecdotes abound concerning the proper application of airpower, but unfounded confidence, arrogance that ignores political and military realities, combined with rhetoric that divides rather than unites, can create an ethos that is more detrimental than it is helpful. US airpower enjoys numerically and qualitatively superior advantages over the rest of the world, and continued mastery of basic airpower principles will continue to contribute to that advantage. Nonetheless, we have to remember the basics. Coercion is but one strategy air planners can implement, and the results of this monograph should at least provide a starting point for planning. However, original thought combined with hybrid strategies appears to be the way of the future for airpower application in GWOT."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cody, James R.
2003-05-22
