Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies" in: publisher
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Tactical Integration of Conventional and Special Operations Forces in Training for a Complex World
"Current army doctrine provides a guide for the integration of conventional and special operations forces in combat, but provides little direction to guide the integration of conventional and special operations forces in a peacetime training environment. This monograph seeks to determine if and how the US Army should formalize the integration of conventional forces and special operations forces in training for the complex future. By analyzing instances of integration of conventional and special operations forces in the first two years of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, this monograph concludes that peacetime integration in training should be emphasized more, particularly at the combat training centers. Because of the uncertainty inherent in the future operating environment, a formal model for this integration in training could not be developed. Regardless, an increase in integration of conventional and special operations forces in training will inherently provide a common understanding that can be applied to integration in combat."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Riley, Darren
2016-05-26
-
Russian Organizational Learning in the Context of the Afghanistan and Chechnya Counterinsurgencies
"Russia, like the United States, has experienced its struggles with counterinsurgency warfare. In Afghanistan, the Russian General Staff chose to approach the operation with a violently offensive mindset. This mindset prevented them from achieving their desired outcomes because they initially alienated the populace they needed to succeed. Then, when they realized their approach was not achieving the desired outcomes, they made only minor adjustments to their approach because they did not view this as a significant challenge to their military model. Then, when presented a similar situation in Chechnya, instead of approaching the operation using the lessons learned from Afghanistan, the General Staff chose to use the same violent tactics employed during the invasion of Afghanistan. This monograph seeks to understand this phenomenon. This monograph is applicable to the United States in that it demonstrates that a nation must not become wedded to a specific approach in order to succeed in future war. During the post-Vietnam era, the United States chose to put aside the lessons learned from counterinsurgency warfare and focus on a comfortable and conventional form of warfare. It seems America is doing the same thing again with respect to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, by focusing on evading such wars altogether."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Roh, Anthony M.
2014-12-04
-
North Korean Social Revolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime has increasingly become a global threat since the end of the Korean War. Their nuclear arms violations and human rights infringements have drawn the concern of the international community. The closed economy, tightly-controlled international borders, and indoctrinated population make it extremely difficult for the international community to influence or persuade the regime in Pyongyang to cease its problematic behavior. To change the government of the DPRK, North Koreans must remove the regime, and the most feasible way is to remove it from within. North Koreans are so heavily indoctrinated ideologically that it would be impractical to attempt to coerce them to reject it and oust their leader, whose reign rests on the direct lineage of the 'father' of the DPRK. North Koreans lack the knowledge, skill, and reason to revolt against the DPRK regime, but a select group of North Korean defectors and the assistance of a special operations element could facilitate a social revolution through the means of unconventional warfare. In the event of a social revolution gaining popularity and becoming effective in the removal of the DPRK regime, several states with different political and economic goals would likely conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in support of that particular state's interest. This research explores ways special operations forces could remove the DPRK regime by way of unconventional warfare through an existing resistance element. This is not to imply that the US is planning or would conduct such operations; it is only meant as a way of offering a look at what such operations -- conducted by any external actor -- might look like."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Mallicoat, James R.
2014-02
-
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
"The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) indirect approach to irregular warfare (IW) offers senior U.S. policy makers and military commanders a suitable model worthy of consideration for conducting long-term military operations against terrorist networks inside a partner nation's sovereign territory. However, the indirect approach does not represent a one-size-fits-all solution or approved template for conducting successful IW and defeating terrorist networks abroad. The JSOTF-P's indirect approach to IW is tailored specifically to the unique conditions of the Philippines operational environment and the regional military objectives established by senior policy makers. The indirect approach employed by the JSOTF-P offers a model for the U.S. military to combat regional/global terrorism inside a partner nation's sovereign territory under the following conditions: the U.S. has an established Country Team; the partner nation has established armed forces with an existing capacity to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; the partner nation's political establishment is sensitive to a large-scale, overt presence of American military personnel operating within the country or region; or the partner nation has a constitutional or otherwise legal prohibition against foreign military forces directly conducting combat operations within their sovereign territory."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Farris, Stuart L.
2009-05-21
-
Targeted Killing as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in the War On Terror
"This monograph examines the prohibition on assassination embodied within Executive Order 12333 and its effect on a U.S. policy of targeted killing of transnational terrorist leadership. Next this monograph will examine the numerous interpretations of applicable international law regarding terrorism and the states response. This examination will contrast the law enforcement model proposed by adherents of international humanitarian law, with international humanitarian law and the law of war model advocated by those who see the current 'war on terror' as an armed conflict between states and trans-national terrorists."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Machon, Matthew J.
2006-05-25
-
Long War in Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir's Caliphate
"One of the effects from the September 11th terrorist attacks was an intensified United States strategic partnership with the Central Asian states. Geographically, Central Asia is critical to the GWOT. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in neighboring Afghanistan, many of the Central Asian states provided over-flight access, including basing rights at Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base and Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air base. Partnership with Central Asian states afforded the United States the strategic and operational freedom of action to win in Afghanistan. After more than four years of an intensified U.S.-Central Asian partnership, regional stability in Central Asia is still threatened by Islamic extremism. Central Asian leaders have argued against liberal reforms in fear of Islamic extremist threats to foment more rebellions. One such threat is the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a transnational, radical Islamist political movement that aims to overthrow a Central Asian government and restore the Islamic Caliphate. The problem is that Hizb-ut-Tahrir is gaining popularity in Central Asia. The monograph's thesis is that the Central Asia region is at risk of devolving into a major front in the GWOT in the long term if the United States fails to use its influence to counter the Islamic extremist threat presented by Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation). The question this monograph attempts to answer is as follows: Can the Hizb-ut-Tahrir's ideology form the basis for a destabilizing collective movement in Central Asia? The author contends that it can. He illustrates this potential for destabilization by performing a risk analysis of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan is the subject of analysis because it is the only Central Asian country where the United States maintains a major military base. The author also proposes a number of U.S. and Central Asian government responses to the growing threat from Hizb-ut-Tahrir."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ruder, Daniel J.
2006-05-26
-
Keeping Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer: Operational Design for a Nuclear-Armed Iran
"The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has pursued a nuclear program since 1985. By February 2006, with the last round of international negotiations having failed, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) having reported the dossier to the United Nations Security Council, Tehran was on the precipice of being able to field a nuclear weapon at a time convenient to the IRI. A nuclear-armed Iran will change the strategic calculus in the Middle East and Central Asia and present new risks to U.S. interests in the region. This monograph addresses the issue of a nuclear-armed Iran from four perspectives: historical patterns of Iranian behavior with respect to foreign influence, a Western perspective of these patterns, a technical review of Iran's nuclear program, and a methodology called Systemic Operational Design (SOD). SOD is an application of Systems Theory to Operational Art that focuses on the relationships between the entities within a system to translate strategic direction and policy into an Operational Design. This systemic approach synthesizes the Iranian historical pattern of balancing one foreign power against another while simultaneously seeking to limit foreign influence. The author recommends an Operational Design to manage the risks posed by a nuclear-armed Iran that seeks to "keep our friends close and our enemies closer" by simultaneously pursuing economic growth and regional stability through the reopening of the U.S. embassy in Iran. This should occur simultaneous with disrupting the foreign networks that support the proliferation of nuclear technology in Iran as well as those that finance and support the foreign activities of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Umstead, Robert K.
2006-05-26
-
Expeditionary Border Security Operations: Eliminating the Seams
"This paper uses case studies in the Tri Border area of South America and the Trans Sahel region in Africa to examine the threat from a convergence of terrorist and criminal organizations toward complementary efforts and their use of porous border regions to conduct logistical activities. This convergence greatly expands the scope and capability of each individual terrorist or criminal organization and the cumulative effect can overwhelm the security forces of many nations and provide a critical link in a logistical network tracing a path to the border of the US."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Zinno, Michael J.
2008-05-22
-
Is Professional Military Education Preparing BCT Commanders for Command in the 21st Century?
"The Army of the 21st century has experienced a change in the nature of war with the asymmetric global war on terrorism. No longer is the Army facing the conventional armies of the past but is now facing an asymmetrical force which is causing the Army to change the tactical organizations and the way they fight. The Army is undergoing a major transformation process using modularization to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as the major maneuver element. The BCT enabled and organized with all of the elements previously found in the divisional organization created an organization with enormous capability while simultaneously creating new strategic leader requirements. The increased intellectual skills and abilities as a result of this organizational change must be addressed in Professional Military Education (PME) in order to prepare BCT commanders for the 21st century. Determining if PME is preparing BCT commanders for the 21st century requires an understanding of how the nature of warfare has changed and an understanding of the increased strategic role of the BCT and the strategic competencies required. Strategic competencies once defined, must be compared against the current PME available prior to BCT command. PME available to BCT commanders prior to BCT command is limited to Senior Service College (SSC) and attendance to the Pre-Command Course (PCC). Comparison and analysis of the strategic competencies to the curriculum provided in the US Army War College (AWC) and at the Pre-Command Course (PCC) will provide the necessary assessment to determine how PME is supporting BCT commanders."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Norris, John G.
2008-05-22
-
Organizing for War: Past and Present
"The monograph begins with a historical examination of the triangular concept that, was the foundation for the Army's reorganization and force design on the eve of World WAR II. Then the monograph examines the pentomic concept which developed during the early years of the Cold War and was the operational concept for the Army until 1961. The historical sketches provide a foundation for analysis using a three part methodology. The methodology considers the strategic requirements that shape the nation's needs for its army, the operational concept that determines how the Army will fight and the system processes that influence the size, shape and complexion of the force. The monograph continues with a discussion of Clausewitz' understanding of the nature of war in relation to the Army's view of military theory and doctrine. It concludes with an examination of the Army's current situation, identifying several problems the Army must carefully consider."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Orlov, II, Morton
1994-05-17
-
Blainey and the Bottom-Up Review: Increased Potential for Miscalculation and War in the 21st Century
"On 1 September, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell announced the results of the Clinton Administration's Bottom-up Review (BUR), to determine America's future defense needs. This analysis of the BUR identifies discrepancies with the methodology and underlying assumptions of the BUR. These flaws, in turn, resulted in serious deficiencies in the results of this important work. The BUR's point of departure for an examination of future defense needs was the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union. Rather than develop a comprehensive picture of the nature of war and peace in the 21st Century as a basis for force planning, the BUR assumes limited wars of the DESERT STORM variety are the model for future conflict."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Nicholson, John W., Jr.
1994-05-06
-
Wavell's Campaigns in the Middle East: An Analysis of Operational Art and the Implications for Today
"Today the United States confronts an uncertain world. The strategic environment has changed. It no longer has one main enemy and a military force to confront that foe. Instead, the United States must be prepared to deal with a multiple of possible threats as its military continues to downsize. This new regional orientation and world situation requires that the US Military be ready to fight simultaneous major regional contingencies to achieve the victories that the American people expect. Therefore, this study examines Field Marshall Wavell's campaigns in the Middle East in WW II to provide a historical case study of a similar situation. There he had to simultaneously conduct a large number of campaigns and operations over four theaters of operations against different enemies under difficult conditions to achieve strategic objectives. It compares this case study with the current strategic military requirements facing the US and current US Military doctrine to determine if the US is prepared to deal with multiple simultaneous regional contingencies."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Snead, III, Lawrence R.
1994-05-01
-
Rise of the Liberation Tigers: Conventional Operations in the Sri Lankan Civil War, 1990-2001
From the Thesis Abstract: "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which fought to establish a separate state for the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka until its annihilation in May 2009, developed impressive combat capabilities within a short time mostly without state sponsorship or the mass mobilization of the Tamil civilian population. The LTTE built its force structure with child fighters and crafted a secular cult of martyrdom that enabled it to raise a suicide bomber corps. In the early 1990s, the LTTE began to upgrade from a guerrilla force into an infantry force and formulated doctrine to destroy the bases of the Sri Lankan security forces. It later integrated its growing firepower to create a nascent combined-arms capability. The Tigers measured their success in tenns of their ability to fight the security forces, not in territory or control over people. By the end of the decade, they reached their high watermark after defeating a Sri Lanka Army division. The example of the LTTE challenges orthodox understanding of how nonstate armed groups generate combat power. Although the LTTE no longer exists, its example suggests that similar armed groups could emerge elsewhere, under the right conditions, to threaten the stability of other governments in the developing world."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Rodrigo, Nisala A.
2019-11-04
-
Developing Army Leaders through CGSOC/AMSP and BCTP
"How the Army prepares its officers to deal with the complexities of the battlefield is the purpose of this monograph. Specifically, this monograph will take a focused look at two distinct arms of the institutional training domain; the command and General Staff Officer's Course [CGSOC] and the Advanced Military Studies Program [AMSP] and the Battle Command Training Program [BCTP]…. This monograph provides an assessment on the Army's performance at these institutions and provides recommendations for improving them as well. The conclusion finds that the Army is doing a credible job in the training and education and makes the assertion that it is up to each individual officer to take ownership of his own development to ensure proficiency on the battlefield."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Beck, William T.
-
Are Current Psychological Operations Procedures Adequate in Information Warfare?
"This monograph discusses the ability of Psychological Operations forces to conduct information operations. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U S Army has struggled to adapt to an increasingly volatile series of missions. Many believe the likely conventional or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) threat will involve Information Warfare (IW) as part of the conflict. As a consequence, the army has begun to develop capabilities that allow it to fight more effectively in an information intensive environment. While some aspects of information warfare are conducted domestically, many are executed on foreign soil and involve extensive interaction with other governments, their population, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Each of these entities constitutes a potential target audience for psychological operations while executing information warfare. The importance of information warfare grows proportionally as the level of technological sophistication increases around the world. The U S Army is compelled to rely upon psychological operations forces to fill vital support roles in the conduct of information warfare. In this monograph, psychological operations capabilities will be measured using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study and to a lesser extent, recent OOTW operations. Based on the successes and failures found in these examinations, the monograph will draw conclusions as to the abilities of the psychological operations force to conduct information warfare."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Duff, Murray J.
1997-04-18
-
Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies
"How will U.S. national security policy be affected by terrorist exploitation of the Internet and related information technologies? Information operations are nothing new; they have been used in military operations throughout the history of conflict. Arguably, however, the combination of breakneck speed of technological advances in information management systems and evolving threats the U.S. national security are redefining forever the nature of warfare. Some proponents have seen the great promise of information operations as the capability to mitigate, if not eliminate, the fog and friction of war by 'seeing all'. Consequently, current information operations doctrine seems to be focused squarely on the advantages of using leading edge technologies to obtain real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, thus creating a 'common operating picture' of a more or less traditional battlefield. However, as the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington illustrate, we will likely continue to face significant threats from elusive, unconventional enemies operating in the shadows of a nontraditional 'battlefield'. Moreover, because of the proliferation of cheap, dual-use information technology, these enemies may possess now, or acquire in the future, the technical expertise and hardware to further their own political agendas, harass and frustrate U.S. attempts to conduct information operations (perhaps even to the extent of negating U.S. information superiority altogether), or directly attack the U.S. infrastructure or population. Information technology has thus given terrorists their own ability to 'see all' on their own traditional battlefield: the populations and civilian infrastructure of the nations they wish to influence or destroy."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Tibbetts, Patrick S.
2002-05-12
-
Assumption Based Campaign Planning
"The purpose of the [Army's Strategic Campaign Plan] ASCP was to permit the Army to quickly begin planning and to provide direction for the Army to meet its obligations under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The Army needed to quickly transition from a peace time to a war time status and be prepared to rapidly respond to directions from the highest levels of the nation, the Joint Staff, and the warfighting CINCs. The ASCP in its final form established the basis for the rapid transition from peace to war. This monograph discusses the challenges of planning at the strategic level of war, the techniques used to address those challenges, and the lessons learned experienced by the SAMS Fellows. This study covers the challenges the Army planning team faced and addresses: assembling the planning team; determining the campaign plan design; using assumption based planning and the Wedemeyer method; developing the plan using the elements of operational design; wargaming; and writing the actual ASCP. The paper also covers the lessons learned during the process of writing the ASCP from a planner's perspective. These lessons learned include insights on assumption based planning, the roles of a planner, and some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Mosher, Alan M.; Waters, Brian F; Johnson, Robert C., LTC
2002-05-14
-
Principles of Asymmetry
"This study explores the changes that might be called for in the Department of Defense (DOD) learning environment to meet the challenges facing the United States as it responds to the asymmetric threats of the 21st century. In DOD planning terms, the concept of an asymmetric threat can be included in the concept of irregular war. In addressing this question, the IDA study team concluded that the asymmetric or irregular threats in the 21st century were largely unpredictable. Given the uncertainty of the threat, the key skill that individuals, units, and teams of commanders and leaders need to learn is adaptability-defined as the degree to which adjustments are possible in practices, processes, or structures of systems to projected or actual changes of situation. In this context, the changes of situation are created by an asymmetric threat. Given this conclusion about the nature of the threats facing the United States, the study team set out to determine the elements of adaptability, to determine the extent to which the DOD learning establishment might already be focusing on adaptability learning, and to identify ways the DOD could facilitate efforts to learn to be adaptable."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Pomper, Stephen D.
2005-08
-
Information Superiority: Seeking Command of the Cyber-Sea
"This thesis examines the initial effort to formulate principles for information-based operations. Although it is impossible to explore each aspect of this transformation, it is worthwhile to examine current efforts by the US military to develop a doctrinal foundation for Information Operations (IO). It explores the ongoing struggle to capture within the confines of Joint military doctrine those critical features of this new age driven by information. The world community is increasingly dependent on reliable information traffic. Information has become a commodity and source of power unto itself. Alvin Toffler describes this period as the transformation of societies from 'second-wave' (industrial/mechanical) to 'third-wave' (information-based) means. The growing dependence of the US military on these infrastructures reveals potentially vulnerable elements of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). This monograph examines the need for a comprehensive IO doctrine. It yields a critical analysis of existing doctrine, illuminates several flaws within the current construct, and concludes with a suggested model for IO development."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Kardos, Thomas J.
2000-05-23
-
Brilliant Stiletto: Tactical Strikes and Preemption
"This monograph examines the implications for planning and conducting strike operations to achieve preemption of threats within the fundamentally altered post-Cold War security environment. The underlying premise is that doctrine and tactics based on the Cold War paradigm of combat are of limited relevance. Increasingly the nature of new threats and the blurring of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war resulting from the emerging security environment, advanced weapons technology and digital communications dictate the need for both lethal and non-lethal preemptive strikes supported by information operations. Five preemptive strike operations are presented and examined, and their characteristics identified. The five strike operations suitable for achieving preemption are interception, ambush, decapitation, critical link strike, and coup de main. These strike operations are further delineated into categories of counterforce and countersystem strikes for planning and targeting purposes."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Flynt, William C., III
1994-12-19
-
Promise of Persistent Surveillance: What Are the Implications for the Common Operating Picture?
"Defense and intelligence community initiatives to create persistent surveillance capabilities and enable access to the resultant continuous data streams will create significant change in the Joint Force and its partners operating across the domains and levels of war. The Joint Force must act in qualitatively different ways to deal with current and future threats, including the transnational extremist threat the United States will face for the coming decades. New operational concepts as envisioned by the U.S. Joint Forces Command guide service transformations, redefine linkages with other elements of national power, and seek full integration of the Joint Force with all its partners: Department of Defense (DoD), non-DoD, and multinational. Intelligence transformation from the Cold War Reconnaissance Paradigm to the Persistence Paradigm creates a qualitatively different type of intelligence support and moves actionable intelligence to the lowest levels of formations in this new operating construct. This new paradigm will enable United States, DoD, non-DoD, and coalition forces to act coherently through shared understanding, and to engage in adaptive planning and dynamic execution, outmatching global adversaries in agility and decision speed. The integrating mechanism for delivering persistent surveillance across all domains and levels of war will be the 21st century Common Operating Picture (COP). Enterprise data, collaborative planning, and networked actions will change command methods and control structures as the military conducts the global war against dispersed and distributed threats. Embedded decision aids, modeling, and an advanced neural network act as a synthetic brain to empower the lowest levels of formations and mission partners. The granularization of warfare, enabled by persistent surveillance feeds into the COP, will enable U.S. forces and security system partners to win the decision battle in the 21st century."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Pendall, David W.
2005-05-26
-
Relationship among Tasks, Centers of Gravity, and Decisive Points
"At the operational and strategic levels, military planners use the concepts of centers of gravity and decisive points to assist them in determining the best ways for accomplishing assigned tasks. By identifying the enemy's center of gravity, the planner determines the enemy assets that must be defeated to gain victory. On the other hand, by identifying the friendly center of gravity, the planner has determined the friendly assets that must be protected to retain freedom of action to attack the enemy's center of gravity. Since it may not be possible to directly attack enemy centers of gravity, friendly forces attack formations, positions, or support structures that lead directly to the center of gravity. These are referred to as decisive points....This monograph discusses the military theory of centers of gravity and its relationship to assigned tasks and decisive points. United States' joint and individual service doctrines and historical examples frame the discussion of theory. This monograph seeks to clarify the relationship among assigned tasks, centers of gravity, and decisive points to assist commanders and planners in determining how to best accomplish assigned tasks."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Springman, Jeffrey A.
1998-05-21
-
United States Military Intelligence Support to Homeland Security
From the thesis abstract: "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 identified a need for a better domestic intelligence capability. In order to prevent another attack on the homeland, one must first identify any failures in the current doctrine, theory, and practice regarding intelligence support to homeland security. This involves not only military intelligence, but also the various domestic and international intelligence organizations that maintain some degree of jurisdiction over intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. This monograph outlines how the new operational environment, current laws, regulations, and policies effecting domestic intelligence collection, and advocates establishing state level intelligence centers that rely heavily on the Reserve Component and which would enable better intelligence sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence communities at the local level."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wilmeth, James L., IV
2004-05-26
-
Cultural Understanding in Counterinsurgency: Analysis of the Human Terrain System
"In the years following the invasion of Iraq, the United States military did not fully realize or understand the complexity of the situation faced by soldiers operating at the tactical and operational level. Coupled with the presence of multiple insurgent networks throughout the country, sectarian violence along ethnic and religious divides resulted in an escalation of violence. This violence forced a realization that the conflict had entered a new phase, and the military looked to classic examples of counterinsurgency (COIN). Consequently, theater strategy and doctrine development began to focus on identifying the population as the center of gravity (COG) of the COIN effort. Along with this new strategy came the requirement for a deep understanding of the Iraqi culture and the ability to conduct research and learn about the cultural aspects of the Iraqi society. This capability was found to be missing in U.S. combat formations. To address this deficiency, the Human Terrain System (HTS) was created in 2006 as a means for units to better understand and leverage culture at the operational and tactical level. Since the initiation of the program, the HTS has deployed Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to Iraq and Afghanistan to integrate with brigades and augment existing staff structures with social science expertise. Initial reports from the field indicate the program to be largely successful. Despite reported success, the program has been the subject of much controversy, and questions remain as to whether it is the right solution for integrating cultural understanding into counterinsurgency operations. This monograph finds that although the HTS adequately fills the intended requirement by providing social science expertise down to the tactical level, it is also necessary to increase the cultural competence of the entire force."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Fawcett, Grant S.
2009-05-21
-
Repressive States and Insurgencies: Implications for Future Campaigns
"Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Coalition forces discovered that the military, security, and intelligence agencies of Iraq were well suited to transition into an insurgency after conventional defensive measures had failed. This paper argues that this is the habitual norm for repressive totalitarian regimes when faced with invasion. This paper examines existing counterinsurgency theories, and then uses the case study method to compare the Werwolf movement in 1945-46 Nazi Germany, the partisan resistance movement in the 1941-44 Soviet Union, and the ongoing Iraqi insurgency. It compares how these movements were planned, organized, manned, and executed. It examines the three insurgencies for common threads and themes. The conclusions of this paper are that repressive regimes are well suited to defend themselves through post-hostility guerrilla movements, and the decision to do so is common. The success or failure of such decisions is a function of several factors. These are the speed and strength of the occupying force, the ability of the defeated government's survivors to demonstrate unity of effort, and adequate time and safe areas for the regime survivors to rally and organize. Military planners should expect such movements as a likely outcome of victory and plan accordingly. Defeating such insurgencies is intensive in terms of time, troop commitment, and resources, however. Regardless of its prowess in fighting in high-intensity conflicts, the US military should expect to execute counterinsurgency operations as part of future expeditionary operations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Karagosian, John W.
2006-03-12
-
Intelligence Transformation: Using Threat Characteristics to Define Division Capabilities
"The Army's fielding of military intelligence companies to the modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) as part of the Army Transformation has created a loss of intelligence capability for the modular division commander. This monograph explores the intelligence requirements of a modular division conducting operations in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). It assesses the nature of the emerging security environment by comparing the U.S. Government's strategic and operational threat models with the characteristics of evidentiary threats in the current environment. It poses the following question: Does the intelligence system of a modular division have the capability to provide a focused and detailed understanding of a networked irregular threat? The results of this analysis provide three observations. First, the theoretical threat model the Army is using in its capabilities-based approach to force design may be based on a false premise. Second, the capabilities-based approach to force design may be insufficient for developing an intelligence organization, because intelligence operations are inherently threat-specific. Third, the Army must use a mix of matrix, multi-divisional, and functional organizational structures across the intelligence enterprise to provide a capability that is both flexible and knowledgeable. The diffusion of threats across the globe requires the Army to develop a globally deployable force supported by an intelligence capability with problem-specific knowledge. Success with new organizational concepts in the GWOT suggests that commanders must tailor the specialties required to counter the threat to their specific tactical problem. Organizational structure changes within the division and the use of matrix organizations can provide the flexibility the Army needs to tailor its divisional intelligence capability to the characteristics of specific threats."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Smith, Frank A.
2006-05-25
-
Airspace Command and Control in the Contemporary Operating Environment
"Airspace command and control in the combat zone is becoming more complex due to the proliferation of unmanned aircraft, and the introduction of host nation and civilian aircraft. The ability to deconflict and integrate multiple airspace users continues to challenge commanders operating in a system that was designed during the Cold War and optimized for traditional warfare fought on a linear battlefield. The current airspace command and control system struggles to adapt to the nonlinear environments in Iraq and Afghanistan where near real-time coordination and constant surveillance is required to detect and defeat an asymmetric enemy. The purpose of this paper is to determine if the current airspace command and control system is optimized for the contemporary operating environment. The research examines airspace command and control organizations and structures, airspace control procedures and methods, and relevant equipment limiting air and ground operations. The problems highlighted in these areas will prove the research hypothesis that the current airspace command and control system is not optimized for the contemporary operating environment."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Russell, Christopher John
2010-05-07
-
Winning the Long War: Amplifying Muslim Challenges to al-Qaeda
"Criticism and condemnation of al-Qaeda that originate from the worldwide Muslim community present the most formidable challenge to its existence and legitimacy as an organization and movement. There is ample literature that questions whether or not there are Muslim challenges to the ideology and harmful acts of violent extremists such as al-Qaeda. However there is a growing body of literature from the worldwide Muslim community that challenges al-Qaeda. Consequently, challenges to al-Qaeda that originate from the worldwide Muslim community are critical because they are a component in any strategy to defeat al-Qaeda. The identification, amplification, and exploitation of these Muslim challenges will serve to defeat al-Qaeda. The purpose of this monograph is to determine the nature of this Muslim challenge to al-Qaeda. This is accomplished by analyzing the recent revisions of the former mujahid that helped create al-Qaeda and developed its jihadi ideology, Sayyid Imam. In these revisions entitled Rationalizing Jihad, Sayyid Imam criticizes and condemns al-Qaeda and other violent extremists. To determine the legitimacy of his revisions, the major themes of Rationalizing Jihad are compared to the prescriptions in classical Islamic jurisprudence. Sayyid Imam's stature and influence within the mujahidin community is so great it prompted an immediate response from al-Qaeda's intellectual leader and second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. His response and that of nine other former and current mujahidin are analyzed in order to examine the rift in al-Qaeda's jihadi ideology and challenges to its tactics, strategy, and ideology. Finally, five recent initiatives by respected and prominent members of the worldwide Muslim community are analyzed to demonstrate the Muslim challenge to al-Qaeda."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Qureishi, Romeo C.
2011-05-12
-
Hezbollah: The Myth of Moderation
"This monograph examines Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Iran through a modified DIME [Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic] framework in order to determine whether Hezbollah has indeed experienced a fundamental shift away from Iranian-inspired Shi'ite extremism and violence and moved towards an ideology of moderation within Lebanon. Modified for the unique Islamic identity of Hezbollah and both Iran and Lebanon, a religion component has been added to the analysis in order to better understand which view of Islam these entities adhere to. Ultimately, this monograph will show that Hezbollah sees the authority of the Lebanese state as secondary to that of the regime in Tehran, and this informs both their thinking and their actions. This is of significant importance to both Lebanon and the United States, as the existence of a well-funded, well-armed sub-national jihadi group operating freely within a country with which the U.S. has diplomatic ties is immensely problematic."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Pick, Shaw S.
2011-03-21
-
Four Decades and Five Manuals: U.S. Army Strategic Leadership Doctrine, 1983-2011
"This monograph focuses on the articles, reports, opinions, studies, and research papers surrounding leadership doctrine from 1983-2011. Understanding each doctrine, reviewing the intellectual debate within the Army and across other leadership disciplines, examining the changes in the documents, and exploring future, proposed strategic leadership doctrine provides analysis. Beginning with the tactical, direct leadership attributes in 1983, the omission of operational and strategic leadership identified a gap in leadership at all levels. FM 22-103 established the first doctrine for command and leadership above the direct, tactical level. Coupled with the 1993 AR 600-100, leadership policies recognized direct, senior and executive leadership levels. The consolidation of leadership doctrine in 1999 placed the three levels of leadership together; however, with different definitions of the levels. FM 22-100, used direct, organizational and strategic, while the 1993 regulation used direct, senior and strategic. By 2007, the newly published documents agreed. Strategic leadership's importance to Army leaders continued to evolve and remained a much discussed and researched topic. National military and government leaders addressed the need to improve strategic leaders' ability to prepare for future conflicts while presenting how strategic leadership fits into leadership doctrine. Strategic leaders must understand the strategy of the organization, where the organization fits in the complex environment, and what the organization must do to be successful. The inclusion of strategic leadership references in doctrine improves the understanding necessary for a successful organization. The leadership traditions of the U.S. Army continue to codify the strategic leadership attributes necessary for success, accessible to all leaders, from the newest to the most senior."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Purvis, Joseph Keith
2011-02-15
