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Measuring Transnational Organized Crime Threats to US National Security
"In 2011 President Obama released the United States Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (SCTOC). The strategy identified Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) as a national security threat directed the creation of an Interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group (TMWG). The SCTOC tasked the TMWG to identify criminal networks that posed a sufficiently high national security threat to merit a whole-of-government approach to achieve their defeat. Unfortunately, the SCTOC did not include any methodology for differentiating between criminal networks. Organized crime typologies, models, and assessment tools do exist. However, not all these tools are necessarily suitable for the TMWG. The question was, therefore, is there an existing typology or assessment model that can identify the TOC groups that present the national security threat defined in the SCTOC? A literature review of existing organized crime assessments identified the three most common conceptual frameworks used to study organized crime. These frameworks are organization-based, activities-based, and harm-based. The SCTOC discussion of TOC most closely resembles an organization-based conceptual framework. Therefore, all activities-based, and harm-based typologies were ruled out. SCTOC also identified specific selection criteria that helped match the SCTOC with an appropriate organization-based typology. The most appropriate model must be simple, support UN common terms, include key SCTOC variables, and address links to terrorists. A number of organization-based typologies were analyzed. The research found that The United Nations report, 'Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries' meets the needs of the Threat Mitigation Working Group (TMWG) best. The UN typology is not designed to score TOC networks, so it is not an obvious choice, but it could be easily modified by the TMWG to rank-order TOC networks. The UN typology has the advantage of following the same conceptual model followed by the SCTOC. It is one of the few assessment tools to consider criminal links to terrorist organizations directly. It is also relatively simple, with clear definitions of all the relevant variables."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Spinuzzi, Marc A.
2016
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Wired Fast and Thinking Slow: Cyber Technology and the US Army
"Understanding the impacts of cyber technologies on war and warfare is increasingly critical for a planner's ability to design and execute operational art. The purpose of this monograph is to examine how the US Army describes cyberspace and the effects that cyber technologies have on military strategy and operational planning writ large. The work specifically examines how cyberspace increases the speed and quantity of social transactions over space with effects on military and social forces. Secondly it addresses how the Army recognizes the impact of cyber technology on identity formation and virtual identity of both friendly and enemy actors. The author concludes that society's and the Army's increasing dependence and activity in cyberspace marks a change in warfare that the Army has been slow to accept. Inadequate coverage of the implications of cyberspace throughout doctrine combined with insufficient emphasis in professional military education and training may limit the Army's potential in all levels of war."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wynne, Johanna Thompson
2016
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Nationalist to Transnational Insurgency: State Repression and Violent Extremist Scale Shift
"The phenomenon of global jihad, a transnational conflict often emerging from intra-state insurgency, highlights a weakness in states' security apparatus that non-state actors have exploited. In this study, I examine insurgencies that widen their objectives from nationalist or regional focus to transnational violent extremism -- a process of scale shift -- under conditions of state repression. My study shows that scale shift accelerates when state security forces repress and co-opt nationalist elements of an insurgency, insurgents in other countries support a transnational faction of the insurgency, and the transnational element becomes predominant. This suggests that the process of scale shift is characterized by decades of evolution based on transnational relationships, gradual replacement of nationalist goals, and diversification of resources to include external sources. I also find that the intervening variables of factional disunity, state repression, and state co-optation are key mechanisms for speeding and completing the scale shift. This research recommends five changes to the US military approach to defeating violent extremist organizations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Visel, Thomas
2016
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Influence of Law on Strategy
"Strategists must understand the legal dynamics that are exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence. Law has become a weapon of war--a practice that has come to be termed as 'lawfare'--used by weak states and non-state actors to block a strong state's legitimate use of armed force. Strong states also use lawfare to shape strategic narratives or to achieve objectives that not long ago might only have been achievable using force. Comparing how strong states and weak actors use lawfare reveals that the international legal arena is not a level playing field, and that only strong states are capable of practicing lawfare in a truly strategic sense. Strong states are adopting and adapting to the use of lawfare by weak states and non-state actors because strong states are better poised to extract continuing advantages from international law. No strong state will allow its vital interests to be litigated away."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Rousseau, Kevin G.
2016
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Understanding the Threat Ecosystem: a Concept for Intelligence Support to Special Warfare
"The current US Army operating concept, as described in TRADOC [U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command] Pamphlet 525-3-1, states that the evolving global operating environment contains diverse enemies, employing traditional, unconventional and hybrid strategies that threaten the security and vital interests of the United States. In this dynamic and emergent threat environment, the United States National Command Authority will turn increasingly to Special Operations Forces to conduct Special Warfare activates in order to mitigate or eliminate threats before they metastasize. Intelligence support to Special Warfare activities is critical to ensure the effective conduct of these sensitive activities, but the foundations of US Army Intelligence still retain the essence of a Cold War focus, understanding a known enemy who follows known doctrine. The focus on a reductionist approach to intelligence problems, parsing issues into sub-categories, can lead intelligence professionals away from seeing bigger picture patterns and trends. Military intelligence professionals in a complex world with an amorphous threat environment need to understand problems from a holistic approach. Drawing from the discipline of complexity research, this monograph argues that Special Warfare environments, dominated by the human."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Zimmerman, Douglas W.
2016
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Personal Disaster Preparedness Levels in the National Guard
"The Federal Government's model of Tiered Response for disasters assumes that National Guardsmen, when given a no-notice call to respond to an incident, will actually respond. This assumption may be true if the Guardsmen's area was unaffected, but might not be if it was affected. Surveys reveal a moderate level of disaster preparedness for civilians and a slightly higher level of preparedness for emergency responders. Unfortunately, there is no published data on emergency preparedness levels of households of National Guardsmen. This monograph helps fill that gap in the literature. Specifically, it asks and then answers the question: how prepared are National Guardsmen and do they meet, as a collective, FEMA's minimum criteria for preparedness levels? The collected data indicates National Guardsmen in the surveyed population of their respective states are more prepared for disaster than the general public, have comparable rates of preparedness as compared nationally to first responders, but do not meet FEMA's minimum preparedness goals."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ellis, Christopher M.
2016-05-04
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Mid-Course Corrections: Army Reserve's Campaign to Mitigate Its Officer Vacancies During the Global War on Terror
From the thesis abstract: "The United States Army Reserve (USAR) experienced exceptional utilization since 2001 in the Global Wars on Terrorism (GWOT), requiring its transformation from a strategic to operational posture. The Army and USAR used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to source combat rotations while executing this transformation, and currently plans to continue using it to plan readiness across the service. Throughout this endeavor, the USAR's officer vacancies were -- and will remain -- a key limitation to effective ARFORGEN manning. This monograph articulates the challenges the USAR faced related to officer vacancies and enumerates various mitigation efforts employed during the GWOT decade from 2001-2011. The author analyzes these efforts within the bounds of Unified Land Operations to identify whether the USAR implemented a campaign plan to address its vacancy problem. The USAR did not formally establish an Army Reserve Campaign Plan (ARCP) until 2010, and when established, the ARCP focused generally on personnel manning and distribution requirements, never addressing officer vacancies directly. However, the USAR's officer mitigation efforts are categorizable into four lines of effort: accessions, management, retention, and transition. In pursuing these LOEs, the USAR essentially executed the components of operational art to address its officer vacancy problem. Because it lacked formal planning and recognition, however, the USAR's officer vacancy mitigation campaign plan was insufficient to fully rectify its unfilled positions due to lack of proper phasing and transitions, poorly established end state, and ineffectively defining necessary or desirable conditions."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Numerick, Katherine
2012-05-17
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Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency Operations
From the thesis abstract: "Recent operations have forced the United States Army to re-examine the 'art' of fighting insurgencies. This monograph draws a correlation between insurgent organizations and organized criminal groups. Then, by extension, examines what the Army can learn from the law enforcement community. To limit the scope of this research, only criminal organizations in America were examined. Youth gangs and Mafia style organized crime are included in the study; however, international organized criminal groups are not. This work starts with a doctrinal examination of counterinsurgency operations. It then compares the nature of insurgent organizations to criminal organizations. It does so by correlating five common characteristics: leadership within the organization, organizational structure, culture of the organization, recruitment, and finances. The parallel between insurgents and organized criminals established, the law enforcement community is studied for ways to assist the Army in counterinsurgencies. Five concepts are identified as promising candidates for Army adoption, as well as evidence that the Army should dedicate more research to learn from law enforcement. All of these concepts are easier to adopt than a major weapons platform. These all have a very real potential to assist fighting current and future insurgencies faced by the United States Army."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Calese, Gary D.
2005-05-26
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U.S. COIN Doctrine: Betting the Future on a Too Distant Past
From the thesis abstract: "While the outcome of the Iraq war seems to have validated the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, the war in Afghanistan seems to indicate there are fundamental problems associated with its historical principles and concepts. Dr. Kilcullen and Dr. Gorka in 'An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference Between COIN [counterinsurgency operations] and Counterinsurgency' claim that the historical cases upon which the COIN doctrine was based were too limited and do not represent contemporary insurgencies. To evaluate their claim, the research sought to answer three key questions. First, is FM 3-24 based upon theories and concepts derived in the context of the 20th century? Second, is the doctrine too reliant upon customary scientific principles to be relevant in addressing complex human and social phenomena such as insurgency? Lastly, in light of a historical contemporary conflict, is the doctrine an adequate guide for action in the apparently uncertain and more complex 21st century? The evidence showed that FM 3-24's writers relied heavily on well-documented 20th century insurgencies to define COIN principles that guide action in the 21st century. As a result, FM 3-24 emphasizes principles and practices derived from post-colonial and Marxist contexts, not from conflicts occurring in the 21st century. The manual's over reliance on general principles indicates that the writers used a scientific approach to understanding and describing complex human and social phenomena. Examination of the Algerian Civil War further revealed that understanding context is an important factor in insurgencies because the principles codified in the manual may not be relevant to insurgencies occurring in the 21st century. These findings are troubling because they imply that the U.S. Army and other COIN forces may initiate future counterinsurgency campaigns with an inadequate guide to action."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Byrd, Christopher J.
2012
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Integrating Language and Culture
From the thesis abstract: "Foreign language proficiency and cultural understanding are critical skills that the United States Army must possess for continued success in future conflicts. Globalization has served to increase United States interaction with many other nations and transnational actors. There is a wider range of threats to national security. The Global War on Terrorism is illustrative of the increased ability of non-nation states to directly affect national security. If the United States wants to understand her enemies, anticipate threats, and respond appropriately to those threats, it is imperative that the ability of United States citizens to understand foreign languages and cultures be increased. […] The purpose of this research is to determine whether or not the United States Army has sufficient foreign language and culture skills to meet its requirements. If not, this monograph will offer possible solutions to the problem and recommendations as to what changes can be made to ensure that the Army continues to produce quality soldiers and officers who are capable of responding to the threats facing the nation. The thesis is that an understanding of language and culture are an integral part of military operations. Because language is a subset of culture, acquiring a foreign language means that a knowledge of culture is acquired at the same time. The Army must sustain an adequate corps of language trained and regionally oriented personnel in order to remain prepared to face the threats of the COE (Contemporary Operating Environment). The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) framework already incorporates language and culture in the analytical process but language and culture must be incorporated Army wide into planning and operations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ellis, Deborah M.
2005-05-26
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How Should the Joint Force Handle the Command and Control of Unmanned Aircraft Systems?
From the thesis abstract: "The purpose of this monograph is to formulate an improvement to and highlight deficiencies in the current manner of the command and control of unmanned aircraft systems [UAS]. The paper employs a historical method of analysis of the centralization of the command and control of airpower derived from the Casablanca Conference of 1943 during World War II. It then applies the classification problems associated with aircraft and discusses the lack of applicability of those taxonomies as technological advances make aircraft multi-role capable assets. This multi-role capability of armed unmanned aerial vehicles has the aircraft straddling the command and control line between being a simple reconnaissance platform and an air-to-ground strike platform. There are three recommendations that emerged from this research. The first is that the Department of Defense must appoint executive agents for unmanned aircraft systems. The second is that all Tactical 3, Operational/Theater, and Strategic UASs be centralized under the command and control of the air component commander. The third recommendation is to terminate the MQ-1 Predator program and increase procurement of the Sky Warrior aircraft."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cerone, Scott R.
2008
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Thinking Beyond Counterinsurgency: The Utility of a Balanced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration
From the thesis abstract: "This paper explores the military's role in the processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration (AR2). Its premise is that while the US and UK have devoted considerable intellectual energy and treasure to dealing with the current counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, little thought appears to have gone in to what happens once stability and a legitimate government have been restored. In fact, it is clear that in the long term, counter insurgency (COIN) operations are usually just the first step toward conflict resolution which is concluded with the culmination of the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration processes. This study examines the relationship between COIN operations and AR2 processes and assesses the military's role in both. The primary vehicle it uses to do this is a case study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland since 1969. The study concludes that it is vital that the governments and militaries of the US and the UK look beyond the current fight when conducting COIN operations. In doing so, they need to utilize an inclusive, balanced and responsive approach that advances political, economic and security processes in a way that avoids one area having an adverse affect on the others. Critically, wherever possible, COIN operations should be conducted in a way that sets the conditions for AR2. In particular, military operations should not be seen as an end in themselves, or even purely as a way to support a legitimate government, but rather, in terms of their contribution to the vital processes of AR2. "
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Clark, John Lockhart
2008-04-03
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Irregular Warfare in the Conventional Theater: An Operational Perspective
From the thesis abstract: "The purpose of this monograph is to determine a conceptual framework for the analysis of the problems involved of integrating irregular and conventional forces into the same theater of operations. The problem is considered from the perspective of the operational planner or commander who seeks to use irregular forces as an economy of force measure in conjunction with a conventional force. The elements of irregular warfare in the conventional theater are derived through the examination of the irregular fighter and irregular units to determine their unique attributes. These attributes are then used to determine the cases where an irregular force can be applied in a conventional theater as an economy of force asset. The elements of irregular warfare in the conventional theater are then used to describe a classic irregular-conventional campaign, the British and Arab effort in Palestine and the Hejaz Desert during World War I. This campaign provides a historical basis for the examination of the problem of integrating irregular and conventional forces, and is used as a medium to consider the elements of operational design and the operational planning process."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
McNulty, James W.
1993-05-14
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Organizational Change in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency
From the thesis abstract: "The creation of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) through realignment of the Customs Service and the Border Patrol was an incomplete step towards integrating border protection. In 2010, Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano approved CBP Commissioner Bersin's request to implement a Joint Field Command (JFC) structure modeled on Department of Defense unified commands. Although CBP has not conducted a formal assessment of the first JFC in Arizona, confusion surrounds whether to continue implementation. This study draws from organization theory to conduct a conceptual assessment of the JFC concept and CBP's change implementation. Theory stressing the importance of network characteristics illuminates how the JFC can theoretically facilitate the right blend of centralized and decentralized activities required to thrive in a complex border security environment better than CBP's current configuration. However, ongoing and future change efforts should be accompanied by a formal change concept of operations based on the insight of organization change models to help ensure the durability of change and likelihood it will be accepted by CBP personnel. The JFC organizational change effort is not foredoomed. Reasons giving CBP leadership pause are more a function of implementation methods and cultural resistance than the merits or demerits of regionally based joint organization."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Griffith, William J., IV
2012-05-17
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Muslim Prison Ministry: Hindering the Spread of the Radical, Militant, Violent and Irreconcilable Wing of Islam
From the thesis abstract: "Prisons and detention centers are recruiting grounds for radical Islamists. Addressing the violent Islamic ideology at the grass roots level may decrease the number of terrorist recruitment and increase the number of Muslims appealing to a nonviolent interpretation of the Qur'an. The author recommends an anti-violent Islamic ministry program which educates detainees and prisoners through Muslim clerics. Islamic and western countries are relying on moderate Muslim ministers to promote nonviolent ideologies to counter the terrorist recruitment. Egypt and Yemen are witnessing conversions by militant Islamists to moderate Muslims. The United Kingdom and France are appealing to moderate Muslim clerics to address the growing number of radicalized citizens in their prisons. This indirect approach focuses on conflict resolution and relies on Muslims who reject the violent interpretation of the Qur'an, commentaries, the hadith, the fiqh and the law. The solution is not an ecumenical reconciliation of the various religions of the world but a peaceful coexistence beginning with an intellectual understanding of the ideologies and empathy for the Muslims caught in the war between terrorist and the coalition forces trying to defeat the terrorist networks."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Dooghan, James K.
2006-05-25
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Interagency Cooperation: FEMA and DoD in Domestic Support Operations
From the abstract: "Hurricane Andrew was the worst natural disaster in American history. Its sustained winds in excess of 145 miles per hour razed entire neighborhoods. Debris was scattered dangerously throughout the area, restricting access and hindering assistance efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], the organization tasked with coordinating relief efforts in the wake of such disasters, tried for the first time to implement the Federal Response Plan (FRP), a document that had only been approved four months before Andrew made landfall. As the lead agency, FEMA coordinated the efforts of 26 governmental agencies and the American Red Cross. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has a role in disaster relief operations. Today, publications such as the Army's Field Manual 100-19, 'Domestic Support Operations', provides doctrinal principles for domestic support. But in 1993, DOD had little, if any, doctrine written on disaster relief. When FEMA's initial relief efforts fell well short of residents' and the administration's expectations, DOD assumed a much greater role. Some authors proposed placing DOD in charge of the national disaster assistance program DOD's executive agent is the Secretary of the Army. This paper studies the interagency cooperation between DOD and FEMA, focusing specifically on the evolution of doctrine and procedures for responding to natural disasters. While both FEMA and DOD have improved in their ability to respond to disasters, some obstacles remain. Funding pre-disaster activities and the inability to use Reserve forces are the two most significant remaining shortcomings. Additionallv, FEMA's failure to quickly integrate the lessons learned from previous disasters impacted negatively on response and relief operations after Hurricane Andrew."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Fischer, Carl E.
1997-05-22
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Evolution of India's Nuclear Program: Implications for the United States
From the thesis abstract: "Since India began developing its nuclear program it has continually encountered issues with the United States and other nuclearized countries over whether India should be able to establish a nuclear program, and subsequently a nuclear weapons program. Over the past 60 years, the Indio-U.S. relationship has swung from supporting India's nuclear ambitions to employing sanctions over nuclear weapon testing. Since the attacks of September 11, the U.S. has paid closer attention to the South Asian region, balancing their policies between the needed Pakistani support for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with the desire to maintain India as an economic partner and leverage against Chinese regional influence. This monograph examines the evolution of India's nuclear program as it developed from the 1940s through the 1990s and the current nuclear capabilities that they now possess. In addition, discussing the various U.S. reactions and policies during the time period as they relate to India is important to understand the relationship that currently exists between the two countries. As it approaches its seventh decade, the Indian nuclear program continues to develop improved weapons technologies with the potential to proliferate nuclear material to other countries, how should the U.S. address the various issues that have promulgated over the past 60 years as they relate to the future?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Creasman, David J.
2008-05-22
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Seasons of Change: Lessons from the Arab Spring
From the thesis abstract: "The Arab Spring is an event that has radically shifted the geopolitical landscape in one of the most volatile regions of the world. Many experts and policy makers were caught off guard by the speed and organizational ability that characterized these revolutions. As the dust settles and the United States begins to reassess the new environment, this monograph asserts that certain indicators can assist planners in predicting both the nature of potential revolutions and the likelihood of stability following revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. This study asserts that the civil military relationship in the affected countries is that primary variable. By analyzing economics, political pluralism and the civil-military relationships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, this monograph concludes the constant indicator for less violent revolutions, as well as the attainment of revolutionary goals, was a universally accepted civil-military relationship. This monograph also provides a framework for planners to approach potentially unstable countries, in order to provide better analysis for Geographic Combatant Commanders and civilian policymakers. Finally, this monograph suggests a more nuanced approach be taken in the execution of theater strategy, focusing more on the analysis of civil-military relations, followed by theater engagements that attempt to inculcate these norms."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Noble, Jason
2012-05-17
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Desert Guerrillas: Psychological, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Bedouin Which Lend Themselves to Irregular Warfare
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph addresses the suitability of Bedouin tribes for recruitment and employment as irregular forces. The study is motivated by force shortfalls and resource constraints in U.S. contingency planning for Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. A partial solution to these shortfalls and constraints is offered through the employment of Bedouin irregular forces to augment U.S. contingency operations in the area. The study examines the characteristics of Bedouin society and finds that those characteristics support the recruitment and employment of Bedouin irregular forces. Three historical case studies support this conclusion, demonstrating the effectiveness of Bedouin irregulars. The case studies analyze the use of Bedouin irregular forces in the unification of Saudi Arabia prior to the First World War; under T. E. Lawrence during his campaigns in the Hejaz and Palestine from 1916 to 1918; and during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman from 1971 to 1976. The monograph concludes that the Bedouin population of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula constitutes a critical resource, which could be exploited to provide irregular forces in support of U.S. operations in Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. Some suggestions are offered with respect to methods of employment for such forces. The paper closes with a review of issues requiring further study, including the need for a doctrine addressing irregular warfare, and for techniques to implement that doctrine."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Dempsey, Thomas A.
1988-11-14
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'Understanding First' in the Contemporary Operational Environment
From the thesis abstract: " The United States Army has predicated its ability to dominate the full spectrum of military operations on the ability to 'See First, Understand First, Act First and Finish Decisively.' During recent conventional operations, including Operation DESERT STORM and the major combat operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the U.S. Army has demonstrated an unmatched capability to combine advanced technology with superior training, leadership, organization and planning. The result is that the U.S. Army currently and for the foreseeable future enjoys an unassailable tactical overmatch against any conventional threat. The U.S. military's preeminence has, in effect, forced potential adversaries to adapt their approach to warfare if they are to succeed against U.S. forces. The result is the contemporary operational environment, such as the U.S. Army and its joint and coalition partners face in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM today. This environment is characterized by complexity, ambiguity, dynamism and uncertainty. The enemy takes full advantage of such an environment in order to exploit the asymmetric opportunities inherent in the COE [Contemporary Operational Environment] and to obviate the conventional strengths of the U.S. military. It can be reasonably argued that in such an environment, success for the U.S. Army hinges on its ability to 'understand first'. At issue is whether the U.S. Army's current approach to 'understanding first', developed to support situational understanding during conventional warfare, is effective in the COE. This study examines the concept of understand first and how this approach was applied to the major combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This study then examines whether this approach is proving effective in the COE as reflected in Iraq today and the implications for how the future force will 'understand first' as recent combat experiences influence the U.S. Army's efforts at transformation. From this analysis, the study identifies areas in which the U.S. Army must change its approach to 'understanding first' if it is to be effective in the COE."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Conner, William D.
2005-05-26
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America's Post-9/11 Grand Strategy: Matching the Response to the Threat, and Implications for U.S. National Power
From the abstract: "Following the terrorist attacks on September 11 , 200I , the Bush administration chose to pursue a broad, offensive, and preemptive campaign against terrorists and their purported state sponsors, versus executing a focused response against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. This monograph argues that over the course of the next decade, this broad strategy, primarily leveraging military power, diverted manpower and resources away from the immediate threat, emboldened al Qaeda, and weakened the comprehensive national power of the United States. The lessons of the United States' 9/ 11 response are profound, and should be studied by today 's and tomorrow's leaders in order to inform strategy development and decision-making in meeting tomorrow's national security challenges."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Fatur, Roy P.
2012-05-11
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Toward a Nation-Building Operating Concept
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph explores political science theory and contemporary practice to develop a structural framework for nation-building. The generalized framework is predicated on the observation that interagency operations can achieve a degree of self-synchronization by implementing a high-level operating concept. There are seven thematic attributes of a nation-building operating concept: persistent effort over time, the requirement for normative decisions during intervention, bottom-up development of representative and accountable institutions, transparency, incremental adaptation, and limited scope of indigenous government powers. These are derived from political science and economic theory, as well as observations of contemporary nation-building operations. These nation-building themes can help to resolve the disequilibrium in institutional power that characterizes most nation-building operations. A number of tools to support development of a context-specific operating concept for nation-building: a taxonomy of state strength for assessing structural weaknesses, a set of conflict regulating behaviors that facilitate settlements, a framework for DDR [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] activities, recommendations for balancing compulsory power of the state with the power of voluntary citizen association, techniques for reducing corruption, an institutional approach to security force assistance, and illustrative metrics for institution building. Success derives from broad support for political and economic development efforts. Progress is attained through self-synchronization of autonomous government and private sector agencies, rather than ad hoc bureaucratic control mechanisms."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
DeJarnette, John C.
2010-04-13
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Commander's Emergency Response Program: A Flawed Metric
From the thesis abstract: "Throughout its military history, the United States has demonstrated poor institutional memory resulting in a tendency to reinvent the wheel. The development of counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam, for instance, yielded valuable knowledge about combating an irregular enemy. Regardless, the subsequent foray into a counterinsurgent environment during Operation Iraqi Freedom proved problematic as the U.S. scrambled to adapt to yet another asymmetric threat. Operationally, the selection of performance metrics by the U.S. in complex and adaptive battlefields has mirrored this argument. Throughout the entirety of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. spent over $60 billion on reconstruction and stability of which the Commander's Emergency Response Program cost the U.S. taxpayer over $4 billion. Reminiscent of the poor selection of performance measures in Vietnam, the metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Commander's Emergency Response Program proved insufficient and resulted in the waste of time, money and resources."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Higgins, Michael J.
2012-09-25
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Resourcing the Army National Guard for its Domestic and Federal Missions
From the abstract: "The National Guard is an integral part of the military's operational force deployed around the world, and a first responder in case of a catastrophic disaster in the United States. The use of the Army National Guard has been evolving over the last decade, but for many of those years it has lacked modern equipment to conduct its federal and domestic missions. The September 11, 2001 attacks initiated the transformation of the Army National Guard for the 21st century. This paper explores the complexity of defining the National Guard's domestic and federal missions. Furthermore, it provides the background of equipment shortages found throughout the National Guard. The research reveals how the Army Force Generation model provides predictability for guardsmen about their potential deployment schedule; however, the model does not take into account the Army National Guard's domestic mission. The way forward for the Army National Guard to improve its execution of federal and domestic mission is the integration of dual-use equipment. This addition of dual-use equipment sets would increase the readiness posture of the Army National Guard. Finally, this paper provides recommendations on the future readiness of the Army National Guard to execute its dual missions. The National Guard's dual missions need to be refined clearly to articulate roles and responsibilities because there are several interpretations as what an Operational Force should be and how it should be resourced. In addition, the difficulty for the Army National Guard to delineate between Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and support to Civil Authorities missions is complicated. Therefore, resourcing the Army National Guard to execute these missions will strengthen our nation's defenses at home and abroad. "
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Ortega, Orlando G.
2009-05-21
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Effect Terrorist Labels Have on Military Operations
From the thesis abstract: "This research conducts an analysis of U.S. laws surrounding terrorism in order to assess the effects they have on military operations in asymmetric conflicts. Analysis is conducted through an introduction of U.S. terror laws and its intended purpose, contextualization of the term 'terrorist' in an attempt to expand understanding of what it is, and case studies of two organizations listed as a terrorist group by the Department of State. Content of the analysis also includes historical applications of terrorism in order to assess whether terrorism is acultural. Findings from this research and analysis of data indicates that terrorism is a strategy or a tactic-not an ideology. As currently written, U.S. laws do not distinguish between acts of terror and the ideology that employs it. Consequently, the laws, therefore, restrict tactical options available to military forces conducting operations in non-linear combat environments."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Anglin, Leighton W.
2011-10-27
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Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure?
From the monograph abstract: "Coercion theory centers on an actor's ability to influence the decision making of an opponent. This monograph examines military operations in Libya 2011, Operations Unified Protector and Odyssey Dawn, through the lens of coercion theory. It seeks to answer the question: if the United States and its allies attempted to apply coercion theory against Gaddafi preceding and during military operations, why did he seemingly exhibit no behavioral changes prior to his death? This monograph purports that even though Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector succeeded in supporting the removal of the Gaddafi regime, ultimately they represent a coercive failure. The military operations in Libya in 2011 illustrate several central tenets of coercion theory. First, in order for coercion to be possible, the stated desired behavioral change must actually be intended. Furthermore, coercive demands must contain a plausible way out. Also, national and coalition objectives and agendas must be thoroughly enumerated and accounted for. Most importantly, whereas coercion theory provides military planners an excellent starting point for asking relevant questions, it cannot serve as a formulaic overlay to inherently complex and unfamiliar situations."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Goodman, Richard A.
2012-10-23
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Convoy Security Shortfalls
From the abstract: "In October 1993, the Quick Reaction Force Headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia observed, "convoys are more vulnerable to attack than ground maneuver forces and should be planned and executed as a combat operation." During the period from 1993 to 2012, every major United States Army operation confirmed this reality. Logistics forces conducting ground convoys suffered 17 percent, or 167 soldiers, of all Army personnel killed in action during both Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom between November 2001 and September 2010. Whether high intensity as experienced during the March 2003 Iraq invasion or low intensity as seen during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from 1994 to 1995, sustainment organizations maintained the enduring requirement to conduct supply distribution operations with armed convoy escorts. Assumptions exist, based on the enduring concept of AirLand Battle introduced in the 1980s with Field Manual 100-5, that the Army conducted convoys as a rear area operation and that the rear area is secure. Sustainment brigade doctrine, published in 2009, countered that claim, indicating that, "supply routes are assumed not be secure on a high threat area." The asymmetric conflicts over the past 20 years were nonlinear and featured no rear area or front line. The Army clearly entered an era requiring armed escorts to ensure convoy protection This monograph examines multiple options available to operational level planners when considering and building theater distribution capability. Primarily, it focuses on the benefits and shortfalls of both internal and external armed convoy escort. Additionally, it provides historical examples of convoy operations in asymmetrical environments and the associated security challenges. Finally, this monograph offers multiple convoy security solutions for operational planners, force managers, and the sustainment doctrine community to consider for review and implementation."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Thompson, David L.
2012
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Iranian Refining Crisis: The Argument for Strategic Patience in Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran
From the thesis abstract: "The refining industry in Iran is facing a crisis caused by a growing shortfall in production capacity for gasoline and other light fuels to meet rapidly growing domestic demand. The industry is locked into a repetitive cycle of decline due to under investment in new facilities and total capacity, massive government energy and automotive subsidies that encourage continued growth in demand, and a poor investment climate that discourages badly needed foreign investment in the refining industry. The shortfall in refining capacity causes the government to import fuel, the costs of which are growing beyond the government's ability to control. This refining crisis creates an opportunity for the United States and its allies to exercise strategic patience in trying to influence the Iranian government's behavior in a direction more favorable to our interests. The Iranian government has demonstrated an ability to act pragmatically in order to stave off economic dislocation in the past. It is reasonable to assume they will do so again in response to the economic threat posed by the refining crisis. While a policy of strategic patience carries risk, the available evidence demonstrates that the current program of sanctions and economic pressure are likely to force a favorable change in Iranian behavior. "
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Selburg, Allan M.
2008-04-16
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Early Warning Signs and Indicators to Genocide and Mass Atrocity
"Non-Governmental Organizations, research and academic institutions, charities, and international organization efforts to track and monitor activities and conditions in high-risk settings provide uniquely useful indicators and warning of possible mass atrocity and genocide. Third party access to credible and legitimate information about conflict leading to genocide and mass atrocity through sound methodologies that inform, can be critical to effective U.S. efforts to meet its obligations under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Information is a key asset for policy makers' ability to determine actual or potential genocide and mass atrocity (GMA) situations. According to the military's assessment of requirements for responding to GMA, indications and warnings are central and an overall weakness in the U.S. approach. Third parties use different methodologies to observe and warn of instability, conflict, war, and genocide and mass atrocity. Third parties' warning signs and indicators provide information, context, and understanding of possible mass atrocity and genocide events. This research investigates the usefulness of third party GMA prevention advocates. It examined several third party methodologies for detecting GMA warning signs and indicators against criteria and asked: How effective are third party methodologies to provide warnings and indicators to possible mass atrocity and genocide events?"
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wisniew, Stephen Matthew
2012-12-06?
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It Matters How You Leave: A Study of Withdrawal and Conflict Renewal
"The question of whether the conduct of a military withdrawal matters to the renewal of violence is both timely and relevant given U.S. intentions to withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. This monograph uses Dr. Monica Duffy Toft's 'mutual benefit and mutual harm' theory on building an enduring peace in concert with doctrinal and theoretical considerations for the conduct of withdrawal as the framework for examining military intervention and subsequent withdrawal in two case studies, the British in Malaya and the U.S. in Vietnam. The case study analysis demonstrates that the conditions you leave after an intervention and the manner in which you leave both matter to the endurance of the peace. A limitation to the benefit/harm theory however, is that regardless of the stability achieved by the intervention and reinforced by the withdrawal, a determined external actor could foil that stability once forces are completely disengaged and the intervener's influence in the state is diminished. This does not change the requirement for military planners to ensure that the benefit/harm mechanisms are appropriately balanced throughout the campaign, and that the exit strategy is deliberate and coherent with the strategic and operational context and remains guided by an interest in stability. Additional considerations offered to inform military operational planning include the employment of metrics for disengagement and the orchestration of the withdrawal in terms of force sizing, capability decline, task reduction and balance, and geographical consolidation."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Cameron, Erica L.
2010-12-02
