Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "U.S. Army Command and General Staff College" in: publisher
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Use of National Guard Assets for Counterdrug Operations in the War on Drugs
This study explores the continued use of the National Guard in support of drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) and community based organizations (CBOs) in counterdrug operations. The National Guard, or militia, has been involved since its founding in what senior military leadership today calls non-traditional missions or military operations other than war (MOOTW). Civil support is not new for the National Guard, and neither is counterdrug operations. The National Guard has been involved in counterdug operations since 1977, and this role increased after President Reagan declared a War on Drugs in 1983, involving all of DOD. The use of the National Guard to provide domestic support to DLEAs and CBOs has grown into a mission that is relied upon by the DLEAs to perform their mission, and is mutually beneficial to the National Guard and the supported agencies. The National Guard provides countless hours of manpower support, and loans advanced technological equipment, which enhances the DLEAs as they perform their mission. The National Guard also benefits in this support because the missions enforce the skills necessary to perform their wartime mission. This study acknowledges the difficulty in measuring the success of National Guard involvement, but its continued participation is necessary to domestically protect the security of the United States.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
2002
-
Reviewing the Role of the Army National Guard in the Twenty-First Century
If the United States Army is to maintain land dominance in the future, it must think boldly and act aggressively at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The United States cannot afford to defer research, development, or fielding of new systems capable of leveraging our technological advancements. The active duty force must be the nation global 911 force. It must be capable of rapidly projecting combat power, quickly winning a major theater conflict, and then turn this re-shaped theater over to the Army National Guard for post-conflict stability and support operations (SASO). Upon completing this transition, the active component must immediately be prepared and postured to fight another major theater conflict. The monograph suggests that the Army s National Guard must be organized, trained, and prepared to handle all domestic and international humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It must be capable of augmenting other federal agencies for anti-drug and anti-terrorist efforts. It must be capable of satisfying requirements for long-term international peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, it must execute these missions with little to no active duty support. The monograph concludes that a United States Army with these capabilities will be able to execute peace keeping and other MOOTW operations without degrading its ability to execute two nearly simultaneous (or overlapping) major theater wars as part of the joint service team. Fixing shape, respond, and prepare responsibilities allows each component of the Army to build on their traditional strengths. It allows for a smaller, capable projection force while attempting to reduce the burden of funding on the American taxpayer. The solution is clear.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Chase, David W.
2001-02-01
-
Mechanization and the U.S. Marine Corps: Effective or Not?
This monograph discusses the evolution of Marine Corps mechanized forces and their role in future conflicts. In a crisis, joint force commanders will likely request early insertion of a mechanized Marine Expeditionary Brigade, using assets forward deployed aboard a Maritime Prepositioning Force squadron, because the MEB promotes the rapid build up of combat power even in an austere environment. Joint planners should understand that an MPS resourced MEB, with equipment and force structure designed for amphibious operations, cannot be employed in the same manner as an Army mechanized brigade. The monograph first examines whether the Marine Corps needs mechanized forces to fulfill assigned roles and missions. Since the National Security Act codified the Marine Corps' role as the nation's principle amphibious rapid response force, the evolving threat has forced the service to gradually increase its mechanized capabilities, largely through equipment modernization. The MPS resourced MEB is the end result of efforts to maintain a rapid insertion, amphibious-capable force that can deter opposing mechanized forces until heavier forces arrive. Next, the monograph contrasts the MEB with an Army balanced heavy brigade. The MEB is a partially mechanized infantry force that relies on air power to make up for a shortfall in ground antiarmor weapons systems. These characteristics limit the flexibility of the MEB in offensive operations and complicate operational planning. Limited armored antiarmor systems hinder the execution of maneuver dependant operations, specifically the envelopment and the penetration. On the other hand, the MEB is well suited for defensive operations and for any operations in restrictive terrain. The monograph concludes by analyzing how the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) will improve mechanized operations in the Marine Corps.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Wykoff, Michael D.
1996-04-30
-
Asymmetric Threat to U.S. National Security to the Year 2010
Asymmetric threats counter an adversary's strengths by focusing on its weaknesses. In the post-Cold War world asymmetric threats to U.S. national security are far more likely than they were just a decade ago. This paper considers asymmetric threats from the perspective of ends, ways, and means. It examines American and enemy ends, as well as several means of projecting force asymmetrically, and also suggests that symmetrical means of applying force can be asymmetric threats if they are used in certain ways. The paper concludes that perhaps the most serious threat to U.S. national security for the next ten years is the organizational culture of the Department of Defense and of its component services that leads them to prepare almost exclusively for symmetrical threats. The nation must maintain its ability to deter symmetric threats to U.S. national security, but that capability will be insufficient to protect against all of the threats that the nation is likely to face in the near future. While continuing to prepare to fight the wars the U.S. expects to fight, it must also begin devoting more resources to preparing to be hit where it does not expect to be.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Nagl, John A., 1966-
2001
-
Shaping the Engineer Force for the Asymmetric Threat
This monograph looks at the current state of the divisional engineer capability in both the heavy and light U.S. Army divisions. Its intent is to determine whether or not the divisional engineers are sufficiently capable of dealing with the challenges of the emerging asymmetric environment. The central theme behind this investigation is to investigate how the world has changed since the end of the cold war and whether or not Army Engineers are reacting to the changes. The loss of the global bipolar environment has given way to a new era of increased instability and the emergence of dangerous asymmetric threats. The Army has begun the process of adapting to the new environment through a long Transformation process that will eventually yield the Objective Force. Unfortunately, it will be several years before that force is ready to be used and the current force must be ready to counter real world threats. The methodology for this paper began with an investigation of the new asymmetric environment. The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) was chosen as the best model to compare engineer capabilities to. Divisional engineer capabilities were compared to several key principals that an asymmetric foe would likely use and a prioritized list of shortfalls was developed. The investigation looked at possible solutions to the shortfalls through reliance on echelon above division (EAD) augmentation and the new force developments embodied in the Force XXI concept and the Interim Force concept. The solutions suggested by EAD augmentation and force modernization both proved inadequate to overcome the shortfalls.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Katers, Nicholas W.
2002-05-21
-
Smart Weapons: Can We Fold the Nuclear Umbrella?
The United States has possessed smart weapons since the late 1960's. Each generation of smart weapons incorporated significant improvements in range, accuracy, and lethality over the previous generation. These continuing improvements led many military analysts to question the continued utility of Army tactical nuclear weapons. With the elimination of Army tactical nuclear weapons, the Army must assess if the effectiveness of smart weapons eliminates the need for Army tactical nuclear weapons. Following a discussion of the evolution of tactical nuclear weapons and smart weapons theories, capabilities, and employment doctrines, this monograph conducts a comparative analysis of tactical nuclear weapons and smart weapons.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Vokac, Robert H.
1991-12-17
-
Askaris, Asymmetry, and Small Wars: Operational Art and the German East African Campaign, 1914-1918
This monograph analyzed whether Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck used operational art to defeat British forces in the East African campaign of World War I. British forces were superior in quantity of men and equipment, but slow moving and heavily dependent on secure lines of communication. Lettow-Vorbeck's forces maintained an asymmetric advantage in mobility, knowledge of terrain, and responsive logistics. An analogy was suggested that the U.S. Army in the twenty-first century is similar to British forces in 1914, and the nation s future adversaries could potentially use Lettow-Vorbeck's unconventional warfare and asymmetric tactics woven together in a comprehensive campaign plan. This monograph reviewed the origins and characteristics of operational art. The Army s emerging doctrine, Student Text 3-0, Operations defines operational art as the use of military force to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategic, campaigns, major operations, and battles and serves as the entry point for discussion. A synthesis of Shimon Naveh and James Schneider's theories revealed five primary characteristics of operational art and was used as the criteria to evaluate the research question. The five characteristics were: operational objectives, operational maneuver, disruption, operational approach, and operational logistics. The East African campaign was analyzed from the perspective of Lettow-Vorbeck linking his strategic aim of forcing the British to commit forces to a secondary theater of operations to his limited resources. The four-year campaign was divided into three phases based on Lettow-Vorbeck's operational objectives and the correlation of forces. Significant tactical vignettes were examined as part of an over arching campaign plan.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Adgie, Kenneth P.
2000-02-01
-
Attacking Cell Phones With Sabots: Disintegration of an Asymmetrical Urban Threat in the Year 2025
In the light of a new emerging threat and its implication for an American Army exploring potential technologies and concepts for the year 2025; this monograph explores the following: Can the proposed Army after Next (AAN) tactical methods disintegrate an asymmetric enemy operating in an urban environment? The theory presented provides a useful tool to discover valid new approaches to counter asymmetric threats. Therefore, complexity theory and general systems theory form the foundation for understanding of disintegration theory as presented by Dr. James Schneider in his monograph: "Cybershock: Cybernetic Paralysis as a new form of Warfare." This monograph outlines the theoretical presuppositions and logic of disintegration theory to create a mental library of abstract concepts from which to generate viable tactical options to counter asymmetric urban threats. History then provides empirical evidence that adds pragmatism and validity to the more abstract concepts outlined by theory. The Battle of Mogadishu serves as a recent example.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Green, Wayne A.
1998-12-16
-
How the North Vietnamese Won the War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break in Response to Asymmetry
This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, an effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military. First, the monograph demonstrates the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths are the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discusses the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese. The monograph offers three different assessments. The first is how the U.S. was an asymmetry threat to the PAVN and Vietcong. This assessment was base of strategic asymmetry using the forms of asymmetry that are method, will, and patience. The method that both opponents selected to fight the war is what caused the U.S. to be asymmetric to the PAVN and Vietcong.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Ringler, Dale S.
2001-04-01
-
Mass: Evolving Tool of the U.S. Operational Artist
This monograph discusses the change in the use of mass by U.S. operational artists. As GEN Donn Starry observed, use of military force is based on certain operational concepts. If this in true and the traditional US concept of mass is in limited by domestic fiscal and global threat requirements, then one would expect a change in the US use of military force. By discussing the operational-level employment of mass in the US Civil War, WWII European Theater, and Operation Desert Storm, it is shown that US operational artists will probably strive to create the same effects of past mass use, despite a decrease in the means of mass. Maneuver, asymmetric attack, and combined operations are but three methods for achieving similar large-mass effects, required by the US operational-level warfighting style. This monograph is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the 'physics' of mass and related equations. It also includes the 'theory' of mass developed from Napoleonic warfare by Clausewitz and Jomini. The last part explains how Grant's 1864 Campaign set the stage for a unique US concept of mass, much different from its Napoleonic counterpart. The second section uses three test criteria to explore further changes in the use of mass. Two campaigns are used - WWII European Theater and Operation DESERT STORM.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
LeGare, J. Marc
1993-05-14
-
Theater Strategic and Operational Level Command and Control Warfare: The Legal, Moral, and Political Considerations of Leadership Targeting
The emerging operational environment of the United States military is characterized by a changing myriad of complex dimensions, the elements of which are often uncomfortably and in some cases drastically different from those encountered during the bipolar struggle of the Cold War. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States stands without peer in the realm of conventional militaries. US dominance in conventional military affairs creates an extreme asymmetric environment in which emerging adversaries perceive their only recourse to be an irrational form of unrestricted warfare. The challenge facing the US is how to psychologically prepare for and actively counter this extreme asymmetric threat. One of the most fundamental and possibly the most expedient way to counter this threat is through operational and strategic military leadership targeting. Unfortunately, military leadership targeting, often considered nothing more than assassination, is associated with various legal, moral, and political conventions that detract from its exploitation. This thesis explores these conventions in order to answer the question: Is the physical destruction element of command and control warfare (C2W) an admissible shaping operation at either the theater strategic or operational levels of war? This monograph examines the circumstances that originally fostered the association of military leadership targeting with assassination, demonstrating the legality of the former and the illegality of the latter. The legal disassociation provides a basis for scrutinizing the moral arguments for and against military leadership targeting so as to understand the moral acceptability of putting into action such a policy.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Brlecic, Jeffrey W.
2001-02
-
Reorganizing to Meet the Homeland Security Challenges of 2010
When President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security, he also approved a new Unified Command Plan and established Northern Command. The question was whether these new organizations are needed, or can increased funding for existing programs accomplish the same goal? Critics argued that Department of Homeland Security will only serve to confuse emergency efforts by creating yet another layer of bureaucracy in an already functioning system. Critics of Northern Command from the American Civil Liberties Union say its creation will allow US Forces to gather intelligence on citizens within the United States. The homeland security reorganization has three elements. First is the creation of the Department of Homeland Defense. Second is the realignment of 22 federal agencies underneath this vast office. Third is the change in the Unified Command Plan and the creation of Northern Command. To understand if this reorganization was necessary, a thorough threat analysis was conducted. The focus of the threat estimate was on past events, current capabilities, and predicted future capabilities. This served as a model of increasing terrorist activity within the United States. Next, to determine whether FEMA responded effectively to the threat, the study examined FEMA's incident management functions, particularly in consequence management. FEMA's capabilities were compared to the Homeland Security Task Forces requirements for homeland security in a post 11 September 01 environment. Lastly, the study reviewed existing legislation to determine whether the grants of authority to military forces operating in the United States are consistent with a contemporary understanding of civil liberties. Consequently, it was found that the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command were required to bring order to a complex system and provide the military with a command and control element respectively.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Letcher, Stephen A.
2003-05-22
-
Operational Maneuver from the Sea and the Vulnerability of Maritime Prepositioned Forces
As a force projection power, it is critical for the United States to retain the capability to introduce rapidly, credible and sustainable forces into theaters around the world. Maritime pre-positioned forces (MPF) are a key component supporting that force projection capability. Currently, there is insufficient strategic airlift to deploy rapidly and sustain heavy U.S. forces as they are currently structured. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm validated the value of the MPF concept. The ability to fly in ground forces and integrate them with equipment from pre-positioned shipping greatly enhanced the strategic responsiveness of the Marine Corps and the United States. This facilitated the rapid introduction of a credible ground force into the Persian Gulf Theater of Operations for the United States. The value of this capability was recognized by the United States Army, which has since begun to purchase roll-on, roll-off shipping of its own. America's adversaries, whether they are nation states posing a conventional threat or terrorist organizations presenting an asymmetric threat will not overlook this capability either. As adversaries develop anti-access capabilities, it is critical for the United States to assess continually, the vulnerability of our maritime pre-positioned forces. Forcible entry operations from the sea are a requirement for Marine Corps forces.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Mayette, Christopher T.
-
Intelligence Training for Stability and Support Operations -- Can the Military Intelligence Officers Advance Course do Better?
Futurists depict a world dominated by increased ethnically based transnational threats using asymmetric tactics to engage U.S. forces. These types of operations are categorized under the rubric of Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Currently our training strategy is to remain ready for Major Regional Conflict (MRC) and prepare for SASO on a case by case basis. This monograph examines the intelligence skills required to operate in a SASO environment and then evaluates how well the Military Intelligence Advanced Course (MIOAC) prepares students for SASO challenges. The monograph methodology is to define the intelligence skills required for SASO and validate the proposed skill set against doctrine and Mission Essential Task Lists for Army Intelligence XXI. Following definition of the skills a review of recent SASO operations to include; Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia document the quality of intelligence officer performance in SASO operational environments. MIOAC is then reviewed for how well it addresses operational shortfalls based on standards correlated to the intelligence skill set identified earlier. Finally the monograph concludes with recommendations for improving MIOAC within the constraints of the current TRADOC system as well as recommendations on a new paradigm for officer training.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Rotkoff, Steven W.
1999-05-27
-
Nullifying Effectiveness of Weapons of Mass Destruction (NBC) Through Integrated Land, Air, Space-Based Sensors Analysis
Despite the best-combined efforts of the world's five major powers (U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, and China), third world countries, rogue radical groups, and potential terrorist organizations continue their alarming proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies. Many in the government view the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the biggest threat to national security. This paper presents a concept for a near-future application of an integrated land, air, and space-based system of sensors, detectors, and analysis to provide critical immediate warning, reporting, and situational updates of NBC attacks. The paper then describes a concept that has a greater potential to achieve the U.S.' objective of convincing our enemies that NBC weapons will be ineffective against us. The underlying assumption is that when the U.S. and its coaltion partners develop the capability to deny or limit the effects of an enemy NBC attack and can promise a devastatingly dispropotional retaliation, then enemy weapons of mass destruction will become ineffective and the threat of their use will propotionately decline.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
King, William E., IV
1998-12
-
Chemical and Biological Defense of Ports of Debarkation: What Actions are Being Taken and How Effective are They?
"Operation Desert Shield displayed to the world what the U.S. and allied coalition forces could do given six months to flow combat power into ports unopposed. Recent studies commissioned by the Joint Staff concluded that the U.S. military will not have that luxury in the future. This conclusion compels the U.S. to reevaluate its airport and seaport of debarkation (APOD, SPOD) chemical and biological (CB) defense and consequence management strategy. Military analysts believe that a CB strike on the PODs will not rule out U.S. victory as long as the U.S. is willing to endure a prolonged conflict with significant casualties. This study explains the process needed to avoid paying this unnecessary price. An enemy CB attack on a POD during force projection presents a complex situation that demands significant advance preparation. The CB threat comes in many forms and the threat analysis process must be modified to identify each one. Only then can vulnerabilities be accurately assessed and mitigated. The current battlefield vulnerability analysis process, if applied to PODs, would result in a grossly inaccurate effect analysis. Defending against and recovering from a CB attack in the PODs are paramount for the preservation of U.S. strategy and the lives of U.S. service personnel."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Murray, Daniel S.
1999-06-04
-
Whither a Common Security for Southeast Asia?
"This thesis investigates the concept of common security in Southeast Asia. It examines the likelihood of the Southeast Asia countries developing some form of common security architecture within the time frame of the next ten to fifteen years. The concept of comprehensive security, encompassing elements of economic, political, internal (social) and military security, was used to identify the security interests of the Southeast Asia countries. The NATO common security model was then used as a baseline model for comparison to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a common security model for Southeast Asia. Through the process, the characteristics and likely form of a Southeast Asia common security model were identified. The conclusion highlights that further cooperation or integration in the military security dimension will have to be founded upon the economic security and internal political stability dimensions, which will form the cornerstones to the overall efforts in developing a comprehensive common security in Southeast Asia."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Sing, Chan Chun
1998-06-05
-
Deterring and Responding to Asymmetrical Threats
"This study examines the doctrinal definition of deterrence, reviews Bernard Brodie's deterrence theory and discusses the impacts of his theory upon state and nonstate actors. The study further defines the terms asymmetry and asymmetrical threats and reviews a World View Threat survey (European and American) that identifies these asymmetrical threats as Islamic fundamentalists. Additionally, the study presents the ends, ways, and means utilized by the Union Army during the Civil War, and the ends, ways, means utilized by the US Army during operations in Bosnia in order to deter asymmetrical threats. The study concludes by presenting operational commanders with five principles for consideration when designing campaign plans against asymmetrical threats. These five principles are 1) first strike capability, 2) force protection (second strike capability), 3) the ability to threaten sever consequences on the belligerent s interests, 4) sending a deterrence message, and 5) demonstrating the will and determination to conduct retaliatory strikes. Additionally, the study concludes that neither active, passive, nor retributive actions by themselves are effective in deterring asymmetrically threats; it is only when these three actions are integrated together into a single campaign plan where one can hope to deter asymmetrical threats and regain the deterrence equilibrium."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Reynolds, John W.
2003-05-22
-
Weaponization of Space: A Strategic Estimate
"The weaponization of space is a long debated topic. So far, space- based assets have not been targeted, although the technology exists to permit this kind of attack. The central research question is: Should the U.S. develop and employ space-based weapons? The nature of the threat leads the U.S. to three possible courses of action: keep space sanctuary, develop defensive weapons and measures only, or develop offensive and defensive weapons. Each course of action affects the U.S. national instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic, in different ways. The best course of action for the U. S. to take is to develop defensive weapons and measures only."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Steele, Claire E.
2001-06-01
-
United States Initiative for Chemical Weapons Arms Control
"This research investigates the US policy initiative renouncing the employment of chemical weapons (CW). The focus of the research is to determine if such an initiative will achieve the national objective for implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). If the initiative does not meet the national objective are there feasible options for the United States Government (USG)? In 1993, the USG established a policy banning the use of chemical weapons. This act may have won the battle for the moral high ground, but it will not deter nor eliminate the use of chemical weapons worldwide. The relative ease by which a nation can take various combinations of chemical compounds and produce a lethal chemical agent makes deterrence and/or complete elimination virtually impossible. The US should continue to employ the elements of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy regarding nonproliferation inclusive of a proven deterrent-CW. No use of CW or any weapon of mass destruction is best, but until the CWC is ratified a deterrent should be maintained by the US."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Scott, Reginald D.
1996-06-07
-
Integrating Digitization in Multinational Operations
"In all its modern wars the United States has fought as a member of a multinational coalition. Multinational operations are a key component of the National Security Strategy of the United States, which is built on the imperative of engagement. Although prepared to act alone, many of America's security objectives are best achieved or can only be achieved through alliances and other formal security structures, or as the leader of an ad hoc coalition formed around a specific objective. Numerous friction points between member nations inherently complicate multinational operations. Technological asymmetry among the potential coalition partners creates additional friction points in an already complicated scenario. The rapid advances in information technologies and their application to tactical warfare further aggravate this situation. This monograph examines the research question, "Is the establishment of liaison teams a feasible solution to share information on the digital battlefield in multinational operations." The author determines that liaison teams represent only a part of a feasible solution to the problem. Technology transfers and training, supplemented by liaison teams, offers the optimal solution to a complicated problem."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Danna, James W.
2000
-
Bush Administration's 'Global War on Terrorism' and the Long-Term Security Goals of the United States
"This thesis tests the proposition of whether the US is pursuing contradictory short- and long-term objectives in its search for security after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Discussion begins with a review of perspectives on security before and after this watershed event. The physical threat to security appears to dominate US security calculus over the short-term, but the long-term picture is less clear. This thesis examines how President George W. Bush's approach to the Global War on Terrorism has won some victories, but also produced setbacks. While these have not been critical, the approach has done little to attack the root causes of terrorism. Superpower emphasis on the military instrument of power overlooks the importance of nation building and similar tasks that highlight cooperation in an international environment. This might be a viable approach in the short-term, but to assume that the US will continue to enjoy single superpower status in the long-term might be risky. This thesis argues that US short- and long-term security objectives could well be contradictory without a persistent emphasis on full congruence between means and ends and between instruments and objectives."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Sommerseth, Leif P.
2003-06-06
-
China's Energy Security and the South China Sea
"The extraordinary economic rates of growth demonstrated in the Asia-Pacific region over the past decade are inextricably linked to an increase in energy consumption within the region. As annual consumption of energy resources continues to rise in order to fuel growing economies, energy demand in most countries has developed into energy need. Competition for energy in the name of energy security can take many forms. Contested claims, such as those driven by overlapping exclusive economic zones in maritime areas, have generally been settled through diplomacy. At other times, skirmishes involving military forces have resulted where words have failed. A textbook example of using the military in support of energy security is provided by China and its actions in the South China Sea against Vietnam and the Philippines. This study questions whether China believes access to the South China Sea is of vital interest, one directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of its future. Initial discussion focuses on review of Chinese economic and energy policies. Subsequent analysis details Chinese behavior within the broader context of international relations theory, concluding with discussion on Chinese policy, resource, and sovereignty issues specific to the South China Sea."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Ruscheinski, Stephen J.
2002-05
-
U.S. Army: A Relevant Force--Leapfrogging to the Twenty-first Century
"This paper analyzes the Army,-its relevance as determined by the service's ability to support national security strategy, operational theater strategies, and joint and combined tactical strategies, with an eye toward the emerging environment. These requirements guide the discussion to determine what kind of ground force would be appropriate for future conflict? In determining how the Army will adjust to meet requirements, the analysis will argue the service must balance developing warfighting readiness against furthering peacetime engagement capabilities. Accordingly, this study looks at the Army's capability to respond rapidly and decisively to threats, from major theater war to small scale contingencies, and counterterrorism operations. Disjointed efforts have found the force losing its relevance at the strategic and operational levels as the Army was no longer offering sufficient capabilities to the National Command Authority (NCA) and warfighting commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Equally impeded by the Army's disjointedness was the development of sufficient US strategic lift. Perhaps most significantly affecting the Army's ability to focus on future force development was its sizable investment in conventional Cold War weapon systems and its reluctance to trade current readiness for the future. The personal commitment of the new Army leadership though seems bent on reestablishing service relevancy."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Carlile, Tori R.
2000-06-02
-
Antiterrorism Doctrine Today: A Recipe for Disaster?
"This study examines current American military doctrine as it relates to antiterrorism, the prevention of terrorist activities directed at U.S. military personnel equipment, and resources. The study uses a doctrinal analysis model based upon the work of one of the foremost airpower doctrine proponents of the last twenty years. By a rigorous analysis of the fundamental, environmental and organizational aspects of current antiterrorism doctrine overlaid with the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects, the doctrine in force is shown to have some shortcomings. When the results of the analysis are superimposed on selected case studies, the deficiencies are validated. Recommendations for reforms are then proposed to address the inadequacies. The result is a more robust method of defeating the terrorist threat."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Weimer, James R.
1998-06-05
-
Future U.S. Navy Force Protection
"This study deals with providing force protection for the Navy's future, minimally manned surface combatants. Following the attack on the USS Cole, force protection became the Navy's primary warfare concern. In order to add experience and defensive depth, United States Coast Guard Port Security Units augmented Navy ships' force assets in providing Antiterrorism and Force Protection. Concurrently, the Navy set out to build the next family of surface combatants, the DD (X) class. One of the cornerstones of the program, as specified in the operational requirements document (ORD), is that the DD (X) have an 'optimally sized' crew of 95, not to exceed 150. This is nearly a 70 percent reduction from surface combatant crew sizes of today. How can the Navy reasonably expect to provide force protection for minimally manned combatants when it is having trouble doing so today? This study examines the tasks required to provide adequate force protection, the manning required to perform those tasks, and the associated manning costs. The analysis determined that the new DD (X) class will only be able to perform the force protection tasks if manned near the 150 personnel mark, and even then will require a security augmentation force, such as a Port Security Unit."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Zuzich, John M.
2002-05-31
-
Intrepidity, Iron Will, and Intellect: General Robert L. Eichelberger and Military Genius
"There are currently two contradictory schools of thought in the historiography of General Robert L. Eichelberger's generalship. One group of authors, John Shortal and Jay Luvaas, consider Eichelberger a brilliant World War II commander. Another author, Paul Chwialkowski, believes Eichelberger to be good, but not distinguished. This study attempts to develop a concise judgment of Eichelberger's leadership. The research analyzed Eichelberger's generalship using Clausewitz's theory of military genius as a model. The first step was to define military genius and to determine its components and subcomponents. Next, Eichelberger's pre-World War II education, mentorship, and training experiences were evaluated. The third step was to analyze Eichelberger's generalship during the Papua New Guinea, Netherlands New Guinea, and Philippines Campaigns of World War II to determine if he consistently demonstrated the qualities of military genius. This study concluded that Eichelberger definitively displayed the components of courage and determination but a judgment on his coup d'oeil required a more detailed examination and warranted further research. Eichelberger's leadership is relevant to today's military officer because he successfully defeated an enemy who employed many asymmetrical tactics of potential enemies in the contemporary operating environment: anti-access denial, defense in complex terrain, and fanatical fighting abilities."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fath, Matthew H.
2004
-
Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect
"Operation Iraqi Freedom introduced the phrase of 'Shock and Awe' into the general lexicon of US officers and the press alike. As a term it is an undefined and as an effect poorly understood, especially within the realm of asymmetric warfare. This thesis examines the effect of shock at both the tactical and operational level as well as within the realms of the symmetrical and asymmetrical battle and defines the tactical term of shock. It investigates the imposition of shock from a distance in line with the United States Armed Forces' expeditionary mindset and force projection capability. It utilizes several empirical studies and mathematical representation to describe shock and awe and attempts to represent a synthesis of medical and military studies through a graphic medium. The thesis shows that operational shock can be achieved, albeit it inefficiently, in a symmetrical environment through the cumulative effect of tactical shock whereas the traditional methods of imposing operational shock appear to fail in the asymmetrical case. Systems theory explains why the effect of shock is transient in nature at all levels. Resistance to shock at both the tactical and operational level is examined."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Blakesley, Paul J.
2004-06-17
-
Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations in Support of Army Special Operations Forces: What Changes are Required?
"Army Special Operations (ARSOF) are a significant contributing force in the Global War on Terrorism and have no explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support other than on an ad hoc basis. The EOD support provided ARSOF, while competent and trained for conventional operations, has not undergone any unique preparation for operations in support of ARSOF. There has been no formal effort to engage both ARSOF and EOD in order to optimize integration. This study assesses what can be done to insure that ARSOF is provided focused and trained EOD in support of missions in a unique operational environment. Conventional forces have ready access to EOD support though relationships established in the continental United States, the Combat Training Centers, and past contingency operations. The Army's Cold War focus, resulted in EOD being organized and equipped primarily to support conventional forces. The operational environment has changed. The US can no longer expect to fight predominately high intensity mechanized battles on linear, contiguous battlefields. Future opponents will employ asymmetric methods in order to avoid our strengths. ARSOF is central to combating these threats. Proliferation of CBRN technology and the continued use of improvised explosive devices in attacks globally demands a rigorous research effort."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Evans, Michael D.
2004
-
Asymmetric: Myth in United States Military Doctrine
"The word asymmetric and theory of it is embedded in US joint and services doctrine, professional magazines, and countless other military publications. As such, the term is used with ever-increasing frequency in military jargon. A problem is derived from this: definitions of the term vary widely across and within the services. This creates a larger problem when service members attempt to apply or react to asymmetry in their profession. This study examines whether US service personnel have an appreciation for the doctrinal term asymmetric or asymmetry. This central question requires a review of joint and services doctrine as well as contemporary professional works on the topic. From this, the study compares the results of an inter-service survey to determine if service members have appreciation for asymmetry in military operations. Service members' appreciation for the term asymmetric is as broad as the definitions provided by US military doctrine. Personnel most associate asymmetry with the accepted English definition--imbalanced or not equal. This is not wholly in accordance with the characteristics that doctrine provides. Without an appreciation of asymmetric methodology, US doctrine at all levels should abandon the word or make significant efforts to refine and train this doctrinal term and important concept."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Pomper, Stephen D.
2004
