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Urban Warfare: A Soldier's View
"Today there are fewer Marine and Army infantry squads than first-line fighter aircraft in active service. This state of affairs has been accepted because of a belief that distant fires and strategic intelligence so attrit an enemy that a close fight between opposing close-combat forces would be uneven and anticlimactic. However, recent experience conclusively proves this premise no longer holds. Science is not responsible for shaping the premise; the enemy is. He has adapted his style of war to draw us in close to the point on the battlefield where big science yields to small science. He has developed an operational fighting doctrine that greatly reduces his vulnerability to being killed from great distances. His effectiveness begins at the point of contact and diminishes quickly beyond the red zone. To gain a fresh perspective on the Nation's military needs, we must look at warfare from the bottom up (metaphorically at least) by walking point in Baghdad or Fallujah in the company of those soldiers and Marines who do most of the dying. By thinking about their tasks from the ground up we can better appreciate what they consider important. By watching close-combat soldiers in action, we can connect what they do at the tactical level to strategic essentials. What should we do to allow close combat soldiers and Marines to succeed in today's new, dangerous, and obscure era of warfare? How can we put American technology, intellect, and organizational abilities to work to ensure the safety and success of the young people who perform these difficult jobs?"
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Scales, Robert H., 1944-
2005-01
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Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience
This article focuses on the treatment of prisoners-of-war (POWs) by the U.S. Army, and the development of related Army doctrine. It presents lessons learned from selected case studies, including the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and military operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Haiti in 1994. Information on the Geneva Conventions is also given, as well as background information on doctrinal publications.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Gebhardt, James F., 1948-
2005-01
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Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment
"The United States is facing a drastically different security environment than it faced before 11 September 2001. In the past, adversaries confronted the United States with conventional armed forces backed by the industrial capabilities of a nation-state. Today, a single nonstate actor or terrorist group can attack the Nation and create untold destruction. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) defines a new security environment that includes these terrorist organizations and the nation-states and organizations that harbor them: "[T]he United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn." Terrorism took many forms after 11 September 2001, but the United States is primarily concerned with terrorists who possess a global strike capability and whose global reach makes them extremely elusive and difficult to define or engage. In response to this new security environment, SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld changed the military strategy in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) from a threat-based approach to a capabilities approach to better respond to the numerous threats the United States faces. By adopting this approach, defense planners can concentrate on how a potential enemy might engage the United States rather than concerning themselves with who that enemy is or where he will attack."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Emery, Norman E.; Werchan, Jason; Mowles, Donald G., Jr.
2005-01
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Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch
"To build the correct blend of capabilities necessary to conduct the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) during the information age, the Army should create an information warfare (IW) branch. Current information operations (IO) training and force composition are inadequate to meet the GWOT challenge. During the Army 2003 World Wide PSYOP [psychological operations] Conference, senior leaders discussed the future combined education path and the need for merging IO-related functional areas (FAs). In a paper titled 'Merging IO, PSYOP, and FAO [foreign area officer], Concept for the New Foreign Officer,' Major Fredric W. Rohm, Jr., proposed such a merger. The current FA30 (IO) program attracts officers from across the basic branches; however, most have little experience in core IO elements such as PSYOP, computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), military deception, and operational security (OPSEC). Currently, FA30 resides within the IO support career field, while key elements like FA39 (PSYOP) reside in the operations career field. Core pillars such as deception and CNO do not exist in an associated branch or functional area other than introductory training in the Army IO course. Currently, EW officers (EWOs) are in FA35G (Signal Intelligence [SIGINT]/EW) within the military intelligence (MI) branch, also in the operations career field. Few are available to serve as EWOs in division and corps IO cells because of their duties as SIGINT officers."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Brown, George C. L.
2005-01
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Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom
This article focuses on suicide bombing. It provides in-depth background information on what suicide bombing is and what the future will hold. "Persistent suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (in pre-, trans-, and post major combat operations) suggest this 'criminal-warfighting' technique will be used with increasing frequency against U.S. Army and allied forces deployed for combat and humanitarian missions in and around Islamic lands.2 Therefore, U.S. Army, Marine, and constabulary personnel must develop appropriate intelligence, countermeasure, and force-protection capabilities to interdict, mitigate, and respond to what has become a threat against U.S. forces in the global war against radical Islamic terrorism and insurgency."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Bunker, Robert J.; Sullivan, John P., 1959-
2005-01
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Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations
"The purpose of the paper, therefore, is to assess the impact and root causes of the U.S. Army's approach to and conduct of operations in OIF Phase 4, in order to demonstrate that, whilst not yet another Vietnam, it does need to be recognised as just as critical a watershed in U.S. Army development. The paper focuses on the moral and conceptual components of capability, since these are likely to prove the most contentious and present the U.S. Army with the greatest challenges. If you are the richest nation in the world, changing structures, systems and platform capabilities is one thing: changing the way your people think, interact and behave under extreme duress is much more difficult. Section 1 will analyse U.S. Army activity from immediately after the defeat of Saddam's forces in conventional combat until mid 2005, when this paper was drafted, in order to identify relevant trends and determine their impact on campaign success. Section 2 will consider these trends in the context of the Army as a whole, in order to offer wider supporting evidence and determine root causes. Section 3 will briefly assess the U.S. Army's response to lessons identified from this period of operations, and conclude. Since the purpose is to analyse an issue, rather than define policy, there are no specific recommendations."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Aylwin-Foster, Nigel
2004-11
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Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality?
Latin Americas Tri-Border Area (TBA), bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, is an area long rumored to be a hotbed of terrorist activity. The TBA, where illicit activities such as money laundering, arms and drug trafficking, counterfeiting and document falsification generate billions of dollars annually for criminals of all sorts, offers terrorists access to financing; weapons and other advanced military technologies; and various other forms of logistical support. Many have argued that the TBA is an ideal recruitment, training and staging area for terrorists due to the presence of a sympathetic population, and the easy through which the movement of both people and goods can be concealed. This article provides and in-depth analysis of the TBA and its relevance to the war on terror, United States options for combating terrorism in the region, future terrorist trend in the region and the necessity for expending the front of the war on terror to include the TBA.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Abbott, Philip K.
2004-09
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Understanding Fourth Generation War
"Rather Than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. I call this framework the Four Generations of Modern War. I developed the framework of the first three generations during the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The Marines kept asking, 'What will the Fourth Generation be like?' The result was an article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989: 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.'[…]. The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With that treaty, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars--families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises--using many different means, not just armies and navies. (Two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue.) Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Lind, William S.
2004-09
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Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare
"Counterguerrilla warfare, or the 'war against the flea,' is more difficult than operations against enemies who fight according to the conventional paradigm. America's enemies in the Global War on Terrorism, including those connected to 'the base' (al-Qaeda), are fighting the war of the flea in Iraq and Afghanistan. Employing terror to attack the United States at home and abroad, they strive to disrupt coalition efforts by using guerrilla tactics and bombings to protract the war in Iraq and elsewhere and to erode America's will to persevere. The war on al-Qaeda and its surrogates can be viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate the base and other networked terrorist groups who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in ungoverned or poorly governed areas where the humiliated and the have-nots struggle to survive. The U.S. military's preference for the big war paradigm has heretofore impeded the Army from seriously studying counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the Army has failed to incorporate many lessons from successful counterinsurgency operations. Because countering insurgents and terrorists remains a central mission of the U.S. military for the foreseeable future, it is better to incorporate lessons learned than to relearn lessons during combat. With the right mindset and with a broader, deeper knowledge of lessons from previous successes, the war against the flea can be won."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Cassidy, Robert M., Ph.D.
2004-09
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Gas, Mud, and Blood at Ypres: The Painful Lessons of Chemical Warfare
"A forgotten battlefield with significant lessons for the future, Ypres reminds us of one of the greatest fears in modern war-the use of chemical weapons. On 22 April 1915, the German Army introduced poison gas at Ypres, France, in an effort to break the stalemate across Flanders. With nearly 13,000 gas-related casualties, Ypres marked the first successful demonstration of the incapacitating effects of poison gas against entrenched soldiers. Although a previous attempt took place in February that same year at the Battle of Bolimov, Russia, the gas did not have the desired effect because low temperatures caused the poisonous vapors to freeze and drop to the ground. Even though the use of gas was successful at Ypres, it still posed several dilemmas for commanders. Reviewing literature and primary sources, four significant problems emerge: the human reaction to unfamiliar and terrifying weapons; the management of chemical casualties; considerations for multinational forces; and short-notice logistics requirements. Based on the outcomes at Ypres, analysts can hypothesize on how these themes might affect future conflicts."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Bundt, Thomas S.
2004-07
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Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence, Analysis
"The current Iraqi guerrilla war grew from a defeated hierarchical party-state structure. The army officer corps, Baathist party, and Fedayeen militia were secular state institutions drawn primarily from the ruling minority-Sunni Arab peoples. Much of the hierarchy and interrelations of the state structure remain intact in the remnant guerrilla organization. Foreign combatants, including al-Qaeda members and Chechens, have entered Iraq to fight the coalition. They do not blend in well, however, and many have since left or assumed specialized support roles such as bomb manufacturer, suicide bomber, or instructor. The Iraqi combatants have little experience in fighting as actual guerrillas, but some do have counterinsurgency experience against Kurds and Shia Iraqis. The insurgency has a strong urban component, particularly in Baghdad, Mosul, Fallujah, Al Sulaymaniyah, Samarra, and Tikrit. The rural guerrilla war is primarily restricted to the Sunni triangle west-northwest of Baghdad. The urban guerrillas rely primarily on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) because their marksmanship is not good. Iraqi guerrillas lack a ready sanctuary, but they are well funded with billions of U.S. dollars held by Iraq's former leaders."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Grau, Lester W.
2004-07
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Will We Need a Space Force?
"Differences in air and space environments require different air and space forces. Because of air forces' range and speed, airmen have a theater wide perspective. In combat, the air operations center (AOC) controls and organizes air forces at the theater-level. In contrast, space forces provide a global capability, and the effective employment of forces in space requires a global perspective. 11 Air forces are highly maneuverable. They can choose the time and place of attack, the route of attack, and the direction from which to attack. By contrast, space forces must expend energy to maneuver, cannot make large changes in their predictable flight paths, and carry limited fuel for maneuvering. The differences are so substantial that it logically follows that space forces should be a separate component of military forces, just as air, land, and sea components are."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Moorehead, Richard D.
2004-07
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America's Army Expeditionary and Enduring Foreign and Domestic
"As of Summer 2003, a higher percentage of the total Army appears committed to active combat operations than during any period since World War II.1 While the Army moves to transform at a forced pace, it still defends against the most certain foreign threat the continental United States (CONUS) has faced since the War of 1812. Change is not new; it is a staple of defense.2 However, new combinations of requirements--quick response (expeditionary) and long-term national commitments (enduring)--require unusual solutions both overseas and in CONUS. Several new challenges facing the Army are implementation requirements that stem from the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. These competing requirements include-- 1) Preemption of global terrorist attacks. 2) Support of domestic homeland security. 3) Reconstruction of failed states to eliminate sources of terrorism. 4) Evolving landpower for total-spectrum operations that accelerate Transformation across all services. The result is that America's Army must become more expeditionary--the first with the most--and more enduring--capable of providing long-term domination while rebuilding multiple failed states and defending the homeland."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Brown, Frederic Joseph
2003-12
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Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood
An examination of Al"Ikhwan al-muslimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood), an organization founded in Egypt in 1928, helps uncover the source of contemporary Islamist ideologies. The Muslim Brotherhood, whose prominent members include Sayed Qutb, who authored the influential jihadist pamphlet Maalim (Guidepost), and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaedas political ideologue, is credited with developing the foundation for the modern Islamist agenda. This article provides a historical overview of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, highlighting the organizations ideology, objectives and methods of operation. The article concludes with the author offering recommendations on how best to view contemporary Islamism and what should be done to root out those groups who this ideology to justify their violent activities.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Aboul-Enein, Youssef H.
2003-07
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Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army [May-June 2003]
"In this issue, 'Military Review' looks at several relevant topics for the military professional, including current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), and Officership. Special operations forces have stepped from the shadows to take a prominent place among U.S. Army forces fighting terrorism. Two articles draw from actual experiences in Afghanistan to consider how the Army might adjust doctrine to reflect lessons learned in the crucible of combat. A third article relates how electronic attack aircraft were integrated into conventional operations in Afghanistan. A fourth article argues that killing or kidnapping an enemy's political leadership is a legitimate act of war and can lead to quick and decisive victory. Also included is a look at the challenge that child combatants pose for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and elsewhere."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
2003
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Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture--a Challenge for the Urban Warrior
"Control architecture is the reasonably unobtrusive use of terrain, landscaping, structures, design, and technology to limit access, guide movement, thin and contain groups, or prevent entry to high-value buildings, urban centers, industrial sites, and affluent residential areas. While the control aspect of urban design mainly interests architects, others, such as city planners, public safety officials, and military professionals, should be aware of such control aspects. For example, a countrys military force might have to back up police and firefighters or capture a structure hardened by new technology. Military efforts to recapture important urban buildings are often spectacular. Examples are the 1980 British Special Air Service assault on the Iranian Embassy in London; the 1985 Colombian military assault on the Palace of Justice in Bogot; and the 1997 Peruvian military assault on the Japanese Ambassadors residence in Lima. Since then, many key buildings have been hardened and incorporate new control architecture. Hardened buildings present challenges to the military attacker, especially when attackers must limit collateral damage."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
2003
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Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly
"Historically, great powers have fought small wars and counterinsurgencies badly. They do not lose them so much as they fail to win them. Cassidy considers historical instances of this phenomenon and concludes that asymmetry in strategy, technology, or national will creates an Achilles heel for great powers. History offers many examples of big-power failures in the context of asymmetric conflict: the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest, the British in the American Revolution, the French in the Peninsular War, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and the Americans in Somalia. This list is not entirely homogeneous, and it is important to clarify that the American Revolution, the Peninsular War, and the Vietnam war are examples of great powers failing to win against strategies that combined asymmetric approaches with symmetric approaches. However, two qualifications are necessary when generalizing great powers' failures in small wars. First, big powers do not necessarily lose small wars; they simply fail to win them. In fact, they often win many tactical victories on the battlefield. However, in the absence of a threat to survival, the big powers' failure to quickly and decisively attain their strategic aim causes them to lose domestic support. Second, weaker opponents must be strategically circumspect enough to avoid confronting the great powers symmetrically in conventional wars."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Cassidy, Robert M., Ph.D.
2002-09
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Anthrax Scare: Tips for Leaders
This article presents an overview of the threat posed by Anthrax. The paper provides information regarding symptoms of anthrax infections and the manner in which the military handles force-protection and consequence management.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Trippon, John M.
2002-03
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256th Infantry Brigade (SEP) Conduct Civil Emergency/Natural Disaster Relief Operation T&EO
This document outlines the task steps and performance measures of the 256th Infantry Brigade when conducting civil emergency/natural disaster relief operations. The different phases covered include: preparation, response, employment, recovery and reconstruction, and deactivation at home station.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
2002
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Disaster Relief - Recovery: Stress Management
"After experiencing a stressful or traumatic event, it takes time for our minds, bodies, and spirits to adjust and rebalance. This is normal and expected. This pamphlet details some tips to help you - as an individual, parent and/or leader - to make this adjustment."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
2001-09-12
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Crowds, Mobs and Nonlethal Weapons
"Peacemaking is neither painless nor easy but fraught with danger, misperceptions and criticism. According to one political leader, 'Making peace, I have found, is much harder than making war.' To accomplish those difficult peacekeeping missions, being considered just is more important than being considered powerful. The payoff can be substantial, for 'the greatest honor history can bestow is that of peacemaker.' […]. While a violent mob is as formidable as an army, it lacks conventional attributes such as formal command and control architecture, definable objectives or a unified focus of effort. There is no independent will, but rather a loose and temporary coalition of intentions. […]. Furthermore, unlike armies, mobs can win by losing, because an issue is frequently decided by how the mob was treated, not whether their actions were successful."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Heal, Sid
2000-03
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Study Report: Water Consumption Planning Factors
"The last comprehensive water consumption planning factors study was conducted in 1983 and revised in 1988 and 1994. The US Army requires current, accurate planning factors to determine force structure and for combat planning. Force structure developers must determine the number and types of units required to support the total Army in world-wide commitments. Combat planners must determine the number and type units required to support specific operational plans and establish a phased deployment plan to ensure that support is available for deploying forces. This study revisited the factors currently in force, and challenged proponents of water consuming processes to validate or revise those factors."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
1999-06-15
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Army Lessons Learned and Successful TTPs for Hurricane Mitch Humanitarian Assistance: JTF Commander's Initial Impressions
"The JTF Commander provided the following guiding principles for his O-6 commanders during humanitarian assistance operations in Central America after Hurricane Mitch."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Nascimento, Leonel
1999
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Information Warfare: Task Force XXI or Task Force Smith?
The US Army is on the verge of suffering its greatest defeat in history; a defeat that will redefine revolution in military affairs on the informational battlefield. Why will this defeat occur you ask? Because the United States is not taking the defensive steps necessary to limit the effectiveness of a sophisticated, coordinated cyber war attack, despite the availability of proper tools. This article examines the growing potential for an informational disaster by exploring recent cyber war attacks and the threats posed by these attacks. After winning the first information-age war in the Persian Gulf, the United States could well be the next victim of information warfare.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Carver, Curtis A.
1998-09
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Domestic Support Operations: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
"During recent domestic support operations, including hurricane relief and civil disturbance operations, CALL identified the following key lessons which commanders should consider when tasked to support domestic support missions."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Cooper, Clay.
1997
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Operations Other Than War, Volume III: Civil Disturbance - L.A. Riots
"Civil Disturbance Operations is one facet of the U.S. Army's vital mission to conduct 'operations other than war'. The Los Angeles civil disturbance presented a unique opportunity for the U.S. Army to provide needed support and assistance to victims, and civilian and governmental agencies at the local, state and federal levels. The Los Angeles civil disturbance operation is a success story that demonstrated the readiness, training and deployability of our forces in time of need. This newsletter contains lessons and information on what began as a relatively small scale disturbance in south central Los Angeles. The disturbance spread rapidly, however, overwhelming local authorities. Emerging doctrine must pay particular attention to unique threat and closer relationships the military must have with civilian law enforcement agencies. It must detail the type of support necessary to deal with today's complex civil disturbance dilemmas, as well as provide guidance for the army to execute selective mobilization, which could include calling the National Guard into federal service."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
1993-11
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Operations Other Than War, Volume II: Disaster Assistance
This document suggests that "a formalized joint military-civil doctrine approach will greatly enhance the military's ability to execute disaster assistance operations. Developing doctrine should include manning levels for the various agencies, appropriate administrative staffing and equipment, and suggested task organization structures for the JTF (engineer, logistics, security, communications, medical and liaison). The doctrine should also include reference to policy publications and technical manuals related to the specific types of disaster. Army and joint interoperability with civil, state, and federal agencies needs refinement so the Army can be a knowledgeable participant in disaster assistance. Specific guidance is needed in deployment operations, assessment teams, task organization, and required materiel and staff manning levels."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
1993-10
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Illusive Victory: From Blast Furnace to Green Sweep
"Since Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney's staunch Department of Defense (DOD) letter of September 1989, the military has been actively supporting drug law enforcement agencies at home and abroad. In the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area, Operation Support Justice has provided continued military support to US ambassadors' counterdrug efforts and to the host nations' counterdrug infrastructures in order to attack drugs at the source. US Army Forces Command, by way of its continental armies and Joint Task Force 6, has been supporting major marijuana eradication operations, while the state governors' National Guard has been especially active in countering drugs at the growing source. Many of these operations are large-scale efforts involving interagency planning and civil-military cooperation in the execution of complex concepts for operations. Operations such as Green Sweep, Green Merchant, Ghost Dancer, Ghost Zone, Grizzly, Wipeout, Badge and Blast Furnace have become highly visible to citizens of the United States and South America, creating some curiosity as well as outright anger at military involvement. With another season for 'whack and stack' operations fast upon us, it would be useful to look at example interagency operations, one abroad and one at home, to explore just where these types of operations fit into our counterdrug strategies. Have they had any real impact on the drug threat? What is the significance of these large counterdrug operations? Do they fit our objectives? Are they backed with the requisite resources and long-term commitments needed to make their concepts work?"
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Mendel, William W.
1992-12
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Century Twenty-One: An Age of Terror and Violence
This study presents the view that violence both within and between societies, as demonstrated by events over 5000 years of human history, will continue well into the twenty-first century. It argues that terrorism (which it defines) is efficacious, inexpensive, and appealing enough to various alienated, estranged groups to make it an even more widespread phenomenon than it has been since 1945. It may even assume more ghastly forms, and the U.S. (and other nations) should prepare to cope with it.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Vought, Donald B.
1992-05-03
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18th Airborne Corps OPORD Hurricane Andrew Relief
This document outlines the response plan of the 18th Airborne Corps (Fort Bragg, NC) during Hurricane Andrew relief efforts.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
1992
