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Saving Military Families
The main focus of this article is that the military must do more about the high divorce and suicide rates among active duty personnel and veterans. From the text, " Military Commanders who recognize the critical relationship between family readiness and mission readiness are deeply concerned about the high divorce rate of military couples, as well as increasing suicide rates among military active duty personnel and veterans. Evidence in 2008 indicates that the Department of Veterans Affairs downplayed both the number of successful suicides and attempted suicides by veterans. A number of military spouse and veterans groups believe that the divorce rate, as calculated by the Department of Defense, seriously underestimates the extent of marital problems in the armed services, particularly ongoing problems among those who have made multiple combat deployments."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Gomulka, Gene Thomas
2010-01
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Military Review, The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army [January-February 2010]
"Military Review is printed bi-monthly in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, and quarterly in Arabic. Approximately 12,000 copies of the various editions are distributed in more than 100 countries. Military Review is widely quoted and reprinted in other publications throughout the world and is readily available for reference at research agencies, civilian university libraries, most most military libraries in the US and abroad, and electronically via the World Wide Web. Military Review provides a forum for the open exchange of ideas about military matters of importance to the U.S. Army with a focus on the concepts, doctrine, and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war. Military Review supports the education, training, and development of doctrine and the integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of the U.S. Army."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
2010-01
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Military Review, The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army [November- December 2009]
"Military Review is printed bi-monthly in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, and quarterly in Arabic. Approximately 12,000 copies of the various editions are distributed in more than 100 countries. Military Review is widely quoted and reprinted in other publications throughout the world and is readily available for reference at research agencies, civilian university libraries, most most military libraries in the US and abroad, and electronically via the World Wide Web. Military Review provides a forum for the open exchange of ideas about military matters of importance to the U.S. Army with a focus on the concepts, doctrine, and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war. Military Review supports the education, training, and development of doctrine and the integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of the U.S. Army."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
2009
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Biological Weapons Systems
"The purpose of this study is to examine a proposal to utilize biological weapons systems in present day military situations. The study is developed around the question: Why not employ biological weapons systems, now? [...] Four suppositions are selected as having the most applicability to current policies concerning biological weapons and military acceptance of the systems. These suppositions are examined in detail, first as current understanding of them affects nonacceptance of biological systems, and secondly as a better understanding of them would affect acceptance of biological systems. Authoritative authors and official publications in the field have been utilized to support both examinations of the chosen suppositions. Near the end of the study, two hypothetical tactical examples are presented of how biological weapons systems might be used, and the advantages that could accrue from their usage. A summary is presented, conclusions are derived and certain recommendations
are made for consideration."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Burnett, Neill C.
1985?
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Toward Strategic Communication
"A number of articles in the press this past year have reported that political and military leaders are frustrated because the government does not have an integrated process for delivering 'strategic communication' on issues of national importance, particularly the War on Terrorism. Frustration over the inability to coordinate and synchronize public information activities has been vented toward the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services. Others have voiced similar worries about a lack of cohesiveness and coordination within the Department of State and the National Security Council. In short, the question of how to transform public communication channels and methods to meet the challenges posed in an era of globalized, instantaneous, and ubiquitous media has caused concern and even alarm. Moreover, many, especially in the military, are worried that our enemies have already occupied and dominated the infosphere battlespace. Army doctrine has evolved greatly over the last three years to deal with this challenge. It acknowledges that the information domain truly is a battlespace and that acquisition of favorable media coverage supporting regional and national political objectives should be equated with seizing a form of key terrain. This view is reflected, for example, in Chapter 1 of the recently published FM [Field Manual] 3-24, 'Counterinsurgency', which states, 'The information environment is a critical dimension of such internal wars and insurgents attempt to shape it to their advantage.' The FM clearly recognizes that counterinsurgent operations must be equally sophisticated, flexible, and cognizant of the power of shaping information strategies. Against such a background then, let us ask, What is strategic communication? And how does it differ from the traditional means the government has used to inform the public?"
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Eder, Mari K.
2007-07
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CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future
"As the United States ends its third year of war in Iraq, the military continues to search for ways to deal with an insurgency that shows no sign of waning. The specter of Vietnam looms large, and the media has been filled with comparisons between the current situation and the 'quagmire' of the Vietnam War. The differences between the two conflicts are legion, but observers can learn lessons from the Vietnam experience--if they are judicious in their search. For better or worse, Vietnam is the most prominent historical example of American counterinsurgency (COIN)--and the longest--so it would be a mistake to reject it because of its admittedly complex and controversial nature. An examination of the pacification effort in Vietnam and the evolution of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program provides useful insights into the imperatives of a viable COIN program."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Andrade, Dale; Willbanks, James H.
2006-03
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Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency
"America began the 20th century with military forces engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and a number of other countries around the globe. During the past century, Soldiers and Marines gained considerable experience fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. While every insurgency is different because of distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all successful COIN campaigns are based on common principles. All insurgencies use variations of standard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign plan. In the Information Age, insurgencies have become especially dynamic. Their leaders study and learn, exchange information, employ seemingly leaderless networks, and establish relationships of convenience with criminal gangs. Insurgencies present a more complex problem than conventional operations, and the new variants have a velocity that previous historical insurgencies never possessed."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Crane, Conrad C.; Nagl, John A., 1966-; Cohen, Eliot A. . . .
2006-03
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Best Practices in Counterinsurgency
"We can discern 'best practices' common to successful counterinsurgencies by studying the past century's insurgent wars. Historical analysis helps us understand the nature and continuities of insurgencies over time and in various cultural, political, and geographic settings. While this does not produce a template solution to civil wars and insurrections, the sum of these experiences, judiciously and appropriately applied, might help Iraq defeat its insurgency. Nations on every continent have experienced or intervened in insurgencies. Not counting military coups and territorially defined civil wars, there are 17 insurgencies we can study closely and 36 others that include aspects we can consider. (See chart 1.) Assessment reveals which counterinsurgency practices were successful and which failed. A strategic victory does not validate all the victor's operational and tactical methods or make them universally applicable, as America's defeat in Vietnam and its success in El Salvador demonstrate. In both cases, 'learning more from one's mistakes than one's achievements' is a valid axiom. If we were to combine all the successful operational practices from a century of counterinsurgent warfare, the summary would suggest a campaign outline to combat the insurgency in present-day Iraq."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Sepp, Kalev I.
2005-05
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Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency
"After the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War, new debates began at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, about the changing nature of the threat environment. […]. Those who sought to learn about theoretical warfare areas other than Clausewitzian trinitarian warfare found but one elective on the subject of irregular warfare and could only learn about indirect war by reading Sun Tzu. Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare acolytes in high esteem. In fact, strategists marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. This attitude hindered the formulation of an unconventional warfare (UW) theory and kept irregular warfare out of strategic wargaming scenarios. In fact, strategists viewed counterinsurgency as a discipline with tactical and operational components that did not lend themselves to strategic consideration. Ironically, strategists continued to believe this even as all of the ingredients for a national security debate and the elevation of this form of war to a strategic art were forming around them. True strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare should consider time and space and the long strategic view. What will the critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT) be in the near future? One day we will find ourselves out of Iraq and Afghanistan with our force postured for the next crisis. What strategic direction will we take, and what should we be prepared to accomplish?"
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Celeski, Joseph D.
2006-03
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Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency
"Effective, accurate, and timely intelligence is essential to conducting any form of warfare, including counterinsurgency operations, because the ultimate success or failure of the mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort. The function of intelligence in counterinsurgency is to facilitate an understanding of the populace, the host nation, the operational environment, and the insurgents so that commanders may address the issues driving the insurgency. Insurgencies, however, are notoriously difficult to evaluate. The organization of the standard military intelligence system, developed for major theater warfare rather than counterinsurgency, compounds the difficulty. Intelligence systems and personnel must adapt to the challenges of a counterinsurgency environment to provide commanders the intelligence they require. This is a 'best practice' in counterinsurgency, without which counterinsurgency efforts will likely fail."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Teamey, Kyle; Sweet, Jonathan
2006-09
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Threat Analysis: Organized Crime and Narco-Terrorism in Northern Mexico
"Organized crime syndicates are modern enemies of democracy that relentlessly engage in kidnapping and assassination of political figures, and traffic not only in addictive and lethal substances, but also increasingly in human beings. To create an environment conducive to success in their criminal interests, they engage in heinous acts intended to instill fear, promote corruption, and undermine democratic governance by undercutting confidence in government. […]. In the long term, such actions erode individual civil liberties in America and Mexico by undermining both governments' abilities to maintain societies in which the full exercise of civil liberties is possible. This danger is ominously evident on the Mexican side of the border, where 86 percent of those responding to a poll in Mexico City in 2004 said they would support government restrictions of their civil rights in order to dismantle organized crime […]. These views suggest that an extremely unhealthy sociopolitical environment is evolving at America's very doorstep. We should see this not as a collateral issue associated with the War on Terrorism, but as a national security issue deserving of the same level of interest, concern, and resourcing as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article provides an ethnographic analysis of narco-terrorism, narcocorruption, and human trafficking in the northern states of Mexico, and an overview of Mexican organized crime and its destabilizing effect on Mexico's attempts to create a functioning, uncorrupt democracy."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Knowles, Gordon James
2008-01
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Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges
"Essentially, one of Al-Qaeda's leading strategists stated categorically that the group was using 4GW against the United States--and expected to win. Even this did not stimulate extensive discussion in the West, where the 9-11 attacks were seen as an anomaly, and the apparent rapid victories in Afghanistan and Iraq appeared to vindicate the Pentagon's vision of high-technology warfare. It was not until the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies began growing and the continuing campaign against Al-Qaeda faltered that serious discussion of 4GW commenced in the United States. Yet today, even within the small community of writers exploring 4GW, there remains a range of opinions on how to define the concept and what its implications are. This is a healthy process and essential to the development of a sound concept because 4GW, like all previous forms of war, continues to evolve even as discussions continue. That brings me to the purpose of this article: to widen the discussion on what forms 4GW may take and to offer a possible model for the next generation of war: 5GW."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Hammes, Thomas X.
2007
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Understanding Fourth Generation War
"Rather Than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. I call this framework the Four Generations of Modern War. I developed the framework of the first three generations during the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The Marines kept asking, 'What will the Fourth Generation be like?' The result was an article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989: 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.'[…]. The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With that treaty, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars--families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises--using many different means, not just armies and navies. (Two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue.) Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Lind, William S.
2004-09
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New Master of Wizard's Chess: The Real Hugo Chavez and Asymmetric Warfare
"Beginning with the election of Hugo Chavez Frias as President of Venezuela in 1998, the United States and Venezuela have exchanged a continuous series of acrimonious charges and countercharges. Each country has repeatedly argued that the other is engaged in a political, economic, military struggle for Western Hemisphere hegemony. […]. Who is this man, Hugo Chavez? How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted? What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America? In an attempt to answer these and related questions, we center our analysis on the contemporary geopolitical conflict context of current Venezuelan 'Bolivarian' policy. To accomplish this, a basic understanding of the historical, political, and institutional context within which national security policy is generated is an essential first step toward understanding the situation as a whole. Then, a 'levels of analysis' approach will provide a systematic understanding of how geopolitical conflict options have a critical influence on the logic that determines how such a policy as bolivarianismo might be implemented in the contemporary world security arena. This is the point from which we can generate strategic-level recommendations for maintaining and enhancing stability in Latin America."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Manwaring, Max G.
2005-09
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International Law and Terrorism
"We have been operating under the impression that the International Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is inimical to our effective prosecution of the war on terrorism. But what has come to be called lawfare is a weapon that rightly belongs in the hands of those who abide by the LOAC. I submit that our problem lies not with the LOAC, but with our failure to make our own superior claim to legitimacy over terror warfare. We have also failed to exploit legitimacy's strategic advantages in order to sever terrorist organizations and their sponsor states from the public support on which their success depends. Instead of dealing with the hyper-legalization of warfare with an uncoordinated series of isolated tactical solutions of opportunity, we need to develop a comprehensive, proactive lawfighting doctrine of our own. […]. Another possibility is to spearhead a movement to put real teeth into the LOAC in the form of provisions explicitly outlining sanctions for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Should we be successful, we must be prepared to see members of our own military tried for isolated violations such as those at Abu Ghraib. If we do a proper job of educating our troops to our moral and legal expectations, such incidents will be rare. But our enemies' entire way of war would be on trial before the court of public opinion because no way exists for terrorists to conduct war that does not contravene the LOAC."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Kellogg, Davida E.
2005-09
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Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism
"Just as the U.S. military has established its superiority in other arts of war, now, working with other U.S. Government organizations, it must strive for identity dominance over terrorist and national security threats who pose harm to American lives and interests. In the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), identity dominance means U.S. authorities could link an enemy combatant or similar national-security threat to his previously used identities and past activities, particularly as they relate to terrorism and other crimes. The U.S. military needs to know whether a person encountered by a warfighter is a friend or foe. […]. Fortunately, biometric technologies, based on a person's physiological or behavioral traits, can indelibly link a person to an identity or event. Names can be changed and documents forged, but a biometric is much less susceptible to alteration and forgery. Moreover, although many people have the same or similar names and many documents look alike, a person's biometrics tend to be robust and distinctive."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Woodward, John D., Jr.
2005-09
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Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare
"Counterguerrilla warfare, or the 'war against the flea,' is more difficult than operations against enemies who fight according to the conventional paradigm. America's enemies in the Global War on Terrorism, including those connected to 'the base' (al-Qaeda), are fighting the war of the flea in Iraq and Afghanistan. Employing terror to attack the United States at home and abroad, they strive to disrupt coalition efforts by using guerrilla tactics and bombings to protract the war in Iraq and elsewhere and to erode America's will to persevere. The war on al-Qaeda and its surrogates can be viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate the base and other networked terrorist groups who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in ungoverned or poorly governed areas where the humiliated and the have-nots struggle to survive. The U.S. military's preference for the big war paradigm has heretofore impeded the Army from seriously studying counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the Army has failed to incorporate many lessons from successful counterinsurgency operations. Because countering insurgents and terrorists remains a central mission of the U.S. military for the foreseeable future, it is better to incorporate lessons learned than to relearn lessons during combat. With the right mindset and with a broader, deeper knowledge of lessons from previous successes, the war against the flea can be won."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Cassidy, Robert M., Ph.D.
2004-09
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Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations
"The purpose of the paper, therefore, is to assess the impact and root causes of the U.S. Army's approach to and conduct of operations in OIF Phase 4, in order to demonstrate that, whilst not yet another Vietnam, it does need to be recognised as just as critical a watershed in U.S. Army development. The paper focuses on the moral and conceptual components of capability, since these are likely to prove the most contentious and present the U.S. Army with the greatest challenges. If you are the richest nation in the world, changing structures, systems and platform capabilities is one thing: changing the way your people think, interact and behave under extreme duress is much more difficult. Section 1 will analyse U.S. Army activity from immediately after the defeat of Saddam's forces in conventional combat until mid 2005, when this paper was drafted, in order to identify relevant trends and determine their impact on campaign success. Section 2 will consider these trends in the context of the Army as a whole, in order to offer wider supporting evidence and determine root causes. Section 3 will briefly assess the U.S. Army's response to lessons identified from this period of operations, and conclude. Since the purpose is to analyse an issue, rather than define policy, there are no specific recommendations."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Aylwin-Foster, Nigel
2004-11
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Reserve Component Mobilization: Improving Accountability, Effectiveness, and Efficiency
"A recent series of articles in USA Today revealed that more than 3 years after the invasion of Iraq, the military services were unable to state authoritatively how many service members have deployed. The Army was best able to answer the question, but what should have been a 'good news' story on this score was tainted by inconsistency among the various databases about the precise number of Soldiers who have participated in the Iraq campaign." This article looks at the factors contributing the discrepancies, and then looks at the steps the Army has taken to correct these errors. Some of the programs covered are U.S. Department of the Army Mobilization Processing System (DAMPS); Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS), and Deployment and Redeployment Tracking System (DARTS). The article concludes with an analysis of how these systems have both helped and aggravated the system, then offers a new system for tracking personnel status.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Chapman, Dennis P.
2006-05
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Crowds, Mobs and Nonlethal Weapons
"Peacemaking is neither painless nor easy but fraught with danger, misperceptions and criticism. According to one political leader, 'Making peace, I have found, is much harder than making war.' To accomplish those difficult peacekeeping missions, being considered just is more important than being considered powerful. The payoff can be substantial, for 'the greatest honor history can bestow is that of peacemaker.' […]. While a violent mob is as formidable as an army, it lacks conventional attributes such as formal command and control architecture, definable objectives or a unified focus of effort. There is no independent will, but rather a loose and temporary coalition of intentions. […]. Furthermore, unlike armies, mobs can win by losing, because an issue is frequently decided by how the mob was treated, not whether their actions were successful."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Heal, Sid
2000-03
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Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach
"The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have ushered in a new era of counterinsurgency to deal with Al-Qaeda-linked insurgent and terrorist organizations. The U.S. military's initial success in Afghanistan […] forced the enemy to adapt. To survive, Al-Qaeda has transformed itself into a flatter, more cellular organization that seeks to outsource much of its work. Thus, insurgency has become an Al-Qaeda priority in terms of rhetoric, recruitment, and spending. The connection between terrorism and insurgency is now well established, and in fact there is tremendous overlap between the two. The U.S. military, though, is struggling to adapt to protracted, insurgent-type warfare. America's affinity for high-tech conventional conflict and quick, kinetic, unilateral solutions that avoid contact with the local populace has slowed its response to this complex form of conflict. How, then, can the U.S. military tailor a more efficient, more effective approach to future military efforts against Al-Qaeda-linked groups around the globe? Specifically, how can the U.S. military implement a sustainable, low-visibility approach that is politically acceptable to our current and future partners, and that can help change the moderate Muslim community's perception of U.S. operations in the War on Terrorism (WOT)? The history of insurgent conflict during the Philippines Insurrection (1899- 1902), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946- 1954) shows that successful COIN operations are protracted efforts that rely heavily on indigenous security forces. Therefore, the U.S. WOT strategy should emphasize working indirectly 'through, by, and with' indigenous forces and building their capacity to conduct effective operations against common enemies."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Wilson, Gregory
2006-11
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Reforming the Madrasah: A Disregarded Dimension in the War on Terrorism
"Radical, violent Islamists understand the significance of education as a fulcrum in the war. They organize lines of operation under the assumption that long-term control of society depends on what the rising generations of Muslim youth are taught to believe--educating Muslim youth is vital to achieving the Islamists' long-term goals. The Taliban, for example, have attacked non-madrasah schools, murdered teachers, and intimidated parents and children. In 2006, they destroyed over 200 schools, killed 20 teachers, and drove more than 200,000 children from the classroom. The U. S. needs to undertake a major effort to reorient the madrasah system so that education in the Muslim world focuses less on reproducing repressive religious ideologies and more on teaching the skills needed to develop and globalize their economies; think critically and act independently; and exercise freedom of initiative. In the end, victory in the war of ideas will depend on how effectively we persuade Muslim leaders that madrasah reform is in the best interests of their societies and the Islamic faith."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Schmidt, Todd
2008-05
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Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947
"The press hailed the National Security Act of 1947, public law 80-253, as a major accomplishment. Headlines called it a 'Unification Bill,' although it fell far short of merging the Armed Forces. In fact, it created an independent Air Force and preserved the autonomy of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. The new law did not even create the Department of Defense--only the awkwardly named National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense with just three special assistants. The secretary had only limited power to 'establish general policies and programs' and 'exercise general direction, authority, and control' over the service departments. In 1949, amendments to the law gave the position more power and created a regular Department of Defense. However, there have been few other significant changes in the 60 years since Truman signed the original bill. The story behind the act is a tale of bitter interservice rivalry, clever alliance building with Congress, clashing ambitions--and, yes, a desire to strengthen America's defenses so it could exert global leadership and counter the emerging Soviet threat."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Stevenson, Charles A.
2008-05
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Al-Qaeda Media Machine
"[…] Osama bin-Laden occasionally decides to remind people that he's still around. He makes video appearances that first appear on Arabic television channels but which the world quickly sees on television or on multiple Web sites. Bin-Laden's message is 'Hey, they haven't caught me yet,' which cheers up his fans, but his threats and pronouncements are mostly terrorist boilerplate. For all the parsing of his sentences and scrutinizing of the color of his beard, hardly anything in his videos helps us better understand and combat terrorism. Meanwhile, significant Al-Qaeda media efforts go largely unnoticed by news organizations and the public. This myopia is characteristic of an approach to antiterrorism that focuses on Bin-Laden as terror-celebrity while ignoring the deep-rooted dynamism of a global enemy. Most jihadist media products make no mention of Bin-Laden, but they deserve attention because they are vital to Al-Qaeda's mission and to its efforts to extend its influence. Al-Qaeda has become a significant player in global politics largely because it has developed a sophisticated media strategy. Lacking a tangible homeland--other than, perhaps, scattered outposts in the wilds of Waziristan--Al-Qaeda has established itself as a virtual state that communicates with its 'citizens' and cultivates an even larger audience through masterful use of the media, with heavy reliance on the Internet. For every conventional video performance by Bin-Laden that appears on Al-Jazeera and other major television outlets, there are hundreds of online videos that proselytize, recruit, and train the Al-Qaeda constituency."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Seib, Philip
2008-05
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From Enduring Strike to Enduring Peace in the Philippines
"The contemporary struggle between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Islamic separatists in the Mindanao is the latest evolution of resistance in the Philippines. […]. The conflict in the Mindanao has at least three interrelated dimensions: political, security, and economic. The point at which these three dimensions converge is marked by tension, but it also holds the potential for cooperation. It is towards this point that efforts for peace, in the form of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2), should be directed. AR2, a multi-staged and multidimensional approach to healing a fractured society, is fundamental to achieving a sustained peace. While there have been many attempts to pacify the Mindanao via AR2, these overtures have mostly been short-lived and narrowly focused. Hence, the conflict persists, and it will continue to do so until the GRP expands the breadth of its proposed AR2 solutions. A broader offer of amnesty coupled with an energetic and productive reintegration program would be a testament to the GRP's sincerity and likely pave the path toward full reintegration and reconciliation for all sides. Properly applied, AR2 can assuage the secessionist movements, stabilize the political structure, increase security, and improve the economic posture of the Philippines. AR2 can give the Philippine government the construct it needs to proceed toward conflict resolution."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Morea, Gay J.
2008-05
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Title 10 Domestic Humanitarian Assistance: New Orleans
The 2nd Brigade,1st Calvary Division, was deployed to the Algiers district of New Orleans to provide humanitarian assistance after Hurricane Katrina. "In Baghdad, the 1st Cavalry Division had developed a counterinsurgency strategy with five specific logical lines of operation: combat operations, Iraqi security forces, essential services, local governance, and economic recovery. All five were executed concurrently and in the context of a larger informa¬tion operations program. The same operational construct served as the basis for the Black Jack Brigade's concept for Katrina relief operations, although the construct was modified to fit a semi-permissive, domestic environment and took into account the brigade's constitutional limitations under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Title 10 prevents active component federal forces from conducting law enforcement operations within the United States unless the president has declared martial law and suspended the Posse Comitatus Act. Neither of these necessary prerequisites occurred; thus, the brigade adjusted its construct accordingly to include-- Support operations; Civilian authorities and local governance; Essential services. Again, all lines of operation functioned within the context of an overarching information operations campaign that facilitated the military mission and helped inform civic leaders of the brigade's capabilities. As in Iraq, the desired end state in New Orleans was a stable environment in which the local authorities could reassume control."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Donahue, Michael C.
2008-05
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Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System
"The national security system that the president uses to manage the instruments of national power, and the manner in which Congress oversees and funds the system, do not permit the agility required to protect the United States and its interests in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. From 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and emerging threats to the homeland, 21st-century national security challenges demand more effective communication across traditional organizational boundaries. Meeting these challenges requires a common vision and organizational culture and better integration of expertise and capabilities. The current national security system was based on lessons from World War II and was designed to enable the president to fight the Cold War. Many of the assumptions underpinning this system are no longer valid. The world has moved on, and the United States needs to adjust commensurately to the new realities impinging on its security. The current system gives the president a narrow range of options for dealing with national security affairs and causes an over-reliance on the military instrument of national power. The cost of not changing this system is fiscally unsustainable and could be catastrophic in terms of American lives. To make needed changes, the U.S. government requires comprehensive reform of the statutory, regulatory, and congressional oversight authorities that govern the 60-year-old national security system."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Locher, James R., 1946-
2008-05
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Mathematical Literacy as a Fundamental Component of Training Cyber Warriors: Moving Beyond the Tools and Towards Fishing
This paper was a submission to the 2008 Fall Information & Cyberspace Symposium. "Our proposal is not to develop another tool that will solve one technological problem. Rather, our proposal is to develop within our operators the ability to think critically and creatively and to exploit technology as an enabler. While the buzzwords of "critically and creatively" are used often in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) communities, we offer a unique solution for aiding the development of these skills for our officer, enlisted, and civilian cyber professionals. We recommend the study of the language of mathematics. For the average cyber warrior, learning the language of mathematics allows one to extend their natural thought process into a structured method for solving problems. Mathematics is a way to organize and analyze what is happening around us. Mathematics is a way to quantify both the randomness and trends of events or data collected. Mathematics is a way to see and understand. Without understanding the underlying processes that generate results from technology and software systems, and especially the assumptions made by the mathematical models applied, it is not possible to interpret the results accurately or apply a tool effectively."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Huddleston, Samuel; Fox, Jonathan
2008-09-08
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Operations Targeting and Effects Synchronization Process in Northern Iraq
"In the early 4th century BCE [Before the Common Era] […] Gallic tribes sacked Rome. Faced with the first real threat to its existence, the young Roman state recognized the need to rethink how it organized for combat. Of the various changes adopted, the most important and extreme transformation was the abandonment of the Greek-style phalanx. This military organizational structure had been long-established as the most effective way to achieve success against opponents with a similar operational paradigm. […] Faced with a newly complex operating environment, the Romans took the transformative step of adopting the more flexible infantry formations of their most tenacious enemies, the Samnites. Today, America is experiencing an analogous military epiphany as its military adapts to complex, adaptive, and asymmetric operating environments that defy accepted military conventions. In January 2008, in the wake of its final after action review from its 2006-2007 deployment to northern Iraq, the U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division Headquarters found itself revising longstanding organizational thinking to adapt its structure to the new demands it would face in northern Iraq later that year. The division's new operational milieu presented an increasingly complex operating environment, an adaptive asymmetric threat, and a traditional staff organization ill-suited to deal adequately and effectively with either. The division recognized a vital requirement to rethink how to organize its staff to best meet the commander's vision and intent (as embodied in our campaign plan). We felt this reorganization should fulfill three critical roles: inform and enhance the commander's decision making cycle, create a logical nesting of our staff processes with the Joint architecture used by our higher headquarters, and make our subordinate units more effective in their counterinsurgency roles across northern Iraq."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Boylan, Gregory L.; Guthrie, Thomas P.; Caslen, Robert L.
2010
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U.S. Army Approach to Security Force Assistance
"As the U.S. military looks ahead to the first half of the 21st century, several global trends--globalization, technology availability, population growth, urbanization, increased resource demands, climate change, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--are shaping the international security environment. They place increasing stresses on governments to satisfy their citizens' legitimate expectations, including meeting their basic needs, receiving fair and impartial justice, and attaining increased prosperity and opportunities for themselves and their progeny. Governments unable to satisfy these aspirations risk losing their ability to govern. This loss creates opportunities for extremist groups to export terror and violence on behalf of radical ideologies. Ultimately, it becomes a setting for persistent conflict."
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Torrey, Bill; Redmond, Mike; Donnelly, Edward P.
2010-11
