Homeland Security Digital Library

SEARCH THE HSDL

Searching for terms: EXACT: "Tussing, Bert B." in: author

Results 1 - 21 (of 21) sorted by relevance sort by date

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

Streamlining National Security Workshop: The Homeland Group (September 5-7, 2001)

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This paper presents the preliminary findings and identifies some critical issues raised by The Homeland Group during the Workshop on Streamlining National Security 5 to 7 September 2001. Sixty subject matter experts gathered to discuss and explore concepts for restructuring certain areas within existing national security organizations.

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Menk, Peter D.; Tussing, Bert B.

2001-10
Consequence Management Symposium (August 21-23, 2001)

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
During a 21-23 August 2001 symposium a group of 80 subject matter experts examined the evolving policy and infrastructure surrounding Consequence Management. Participants concentrated on interagency and intergovernmental issues within this national challenge.

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Reynolds, Jeffrey C.; Tussing, Bert B.

2001-09
New Requirements for a New Challenge: The Military's Role in Border Security

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"U.S. border security is not what it used to be. Over the last three decades America's concerns have steadily escalated from what was once as much a humanitarian issue as a security issue, to concerns over paramilitary violence, organized crime, and international terrorism. The requirements to meet these concerns have likewise increased, to the point that anything less than an interagency and intergovernmental response will inevitably leave the nation's citizenry vulnerable to a new and expanding series of threats. The new threats portend a new challenge for the military, both active and reserve components. From the United States Northern Command through to the individual state's National Guard our leadership will be required to revisit its thinking, motivation, and ethos in addressing this particular 'law enforcement' requirement. It will require our government to decide which entities from the depth and breadth of its capabilities are best postured, best equipped, and best trained to meet the trials that lay ahead."

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

Tussing, Bert B.

2008-10
Setting the Scene for a Discussion of DoD's Role in Responding to Catastrophe

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This report is part of chapter one of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "The intellectual development of homeland security is beginning to move outside the beltway and Washington D.C., past the issue of training firemen and other first responders, and into the realm of academia. We are finally beginning to engage the intelligencia of the United States, within the university system. This is going to change the nature of the debate, because these experts in research and teaching have things to say that you might not want to hear about what constitutes homeland security, and what we should or should not be doing. This leads to a second point. I want to suggest to you a narrative -- how to think about homeland security. I am certainly moved by 9/11. Many of my students are moved by 9/11. But my faculty, by and large, is not. It does not do me any good to begin with a slide that talks about 9/11. I have quit talking about the global war on terrorism. Many people in the Unites States are not moved by that argument. In fact, there is a certain counter or backfire building against this argument as to why we are at war and isn't it in fact our own fault. So, I use a different narrative to explain our situation. I offer it to every audience because I think it is important that we have a common understanding of what we are doing and why. My first point is that the current problems of homeland security have nothing to do with whether or not there are Arab fundamentalist here and whether or not we are facing Islamic radicalism. It has everything to do with the maturity of technology so that small people now have access to big weapons."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.; McIntyre, David H.
From 'Defending Forward' to a 'Global Defense-in-Depth': Globalization and Homeland Security

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
In July of last year, the Bush administration published the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) which, while commendable in many ways, failed to take into account the effects of globalization in planning for the nation's security. Safeguarding America's homeland in an era of globalization requires a more comprehensive approach based on a "global defense-in-depth." The NSHS amounts to little more than a strategic directive for the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS), rather than a national strategy. It focuses principally on activities that take place within the nation's borders, making only a brief genuflection to the need for international cooperation. Other than a passing reference to Northern Command and its envisioned responsibilities in civil support, the NSHS fails to address the roles that the U.S. military's combatant commands should play. Finally, the NSHS fails to incorporate newly emerging technologies into an overarching strategic concept, or way, that would contribute to keeping Americans safe.

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

Echevarria, Antulio Joseph, 1959-; Tussing, Bert B.

2003-10
Reexamining the Role of the Guard and Reserves in Support to Civilian Authorities: Assessing the Evolving Relationship of the National Guard Bureau with Other Department of Defense Organizations in Responding to Crises

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"With the publication of its new charter, the NGB [National Guard Bureau] has been empowered with greater access, greater representation, and greater responsibility. Commensurate with all three, however, is a clear necessity for greater coordination between the Bureau and the states' National Guard, in order to provide for a rapid, integrated response in times of crises. For large-scale domestic incidents, the NGB's integrated planning with and through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and USNORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] should help in providing a streamlined integration of federal assets when and where they are needed most. Planning should take place far ahead of the requirement, followed by comprehensive programming and budgeting to ensure an effective integration of capabilities between all stakeholders. Finally, the Bureau, as a component of the military's support to civilian authorities, must work to exercise these concepts, to ensure that the envisioned ways and means designed to meet domestic response requirements are, indeed, sufficient to the task."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Forster, Scott; Tussing, Bert B.

2008-07
Rebalancing the Force: Weighing the Roles of the Components

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
Current rebalancing efforts underway within the Army will significantly reshape both the active and reserve components. Changes in mission focus, resource assignments, force structure and mobilizations processes are all likely as the Army seeks to implement the Secretary of Defense's guidance to rebalance the force. Background: "Conduct of the Global War on Terrorism has raised the involuntary mobilization of Army Reserve and National Guard forces to their highest levels since World War II. This increased reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) prompted the Secretary of Defense to direct the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to examine whether and how to "rebalance forces" in order to reduce the need to involuntarily mobilize the Guard and Reserve. The Army's mission analysis is well underway, and the resulting AC/RC force structure will impact how the components provide appropriate and ready forces in support of the entire spectrum of missions overseas and for Homeland Security."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Lindemann, Robert W.; Traylor, John C.; Tussing, Bert B.

2003-12
USAWC Supports U. S. Central Command Consequence Management Conference

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
In response to a request from the United States Central Command, the USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership recently facilitated an assessment of the command's Consequence Management program designed towards these ends, supporting the nations of the Gulf Cooperative Council, Jordan, and Egypt. The results of that assessment, taken from the perspective of representatives from Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, are addressed in this paper.

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.

2003-11
United States Army Pacific and United States Army War College Lead Trilateral Strategic Planning Initiative

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This document outlines an August 2002 workshop in which the United States and the Republic of the Philippines sought to achieve a uniform system of planning, programming and budgeting for decision making that links an overarching security strategy to specific defense programs, providing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints.

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.; Butts, Kent Hughes

2002-08
Weaving a National Surveillance System - The Role of Federal Healthcare

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"The nonprofit U.S. Medicine Institute for Health Studies on March 6, 2003, gathered decision-makers from government and the private sector to examine the need for a national surveillance system and how such a system might best be developed, given current, often disparate, attempts at various levels of disease detection. Opinions presented at this forum ranged from assertions that 'we have a long way to go' in developing a national system to reassurances that a national surveillance system in fact exists in the form of the current process for reportable diseases overseen by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The prevailing view, however, was that disease surveillance, to be useful, must be real-time, must be automatic and must be standards-based and undoubtedly will rely on DNA sequencing chips that can screen for a vast array of organisms There was hopefulness that the focus on bioterrorism will infuse neglected public health systems with new resources, yet caution that placing too much emphasis on bioterrorism could prove counterproductive in the long run, in that funding likely would dry up should no incident occur within the next several years."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Kievit, James; Tussing, Bert B.

2003-03-06
Fourth Annual U.S. Army War College Reserve Component Workshop: Reinforcing the First Line of Defense: The Role of the National Guard in Critical Infrastructure Protection

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"The Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support asserts that one of the most essential and promising areas of employment for the National Guard in defense of the homeland is Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). The strategy's authors believe that the comprehensive assessment of critical infrastructure sites (both DoD and non-DoD), and the protection of those sites as required, are both areas in which the Guard could serve vital functions. Concurrently, the strategy reminds us that the modern threat against our country will call for an 'unprecedented degree of shared situational awareness' between the interagency, state, local, tribal and private entities - a requirement that could be greatly facilitated by the traditional relationship between the Guard and the communities it serves. Seeking to validate this strategic approach and assist in the development of implementing activities, the Center for Strategic Leadership, in cooperation with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD-HD) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), convened the U.S. Army War College's fourth annual Reserve Component workshop, Reinforcing the First Line of Defense: The Role of the National Guard in Critical Infrastructure Protection. The forum was held from 15-17 August 2005, at the War College's Collins Center, in Carlisle, PA. The symposiums participants included the State Adjutants General of Indiana and New York, and representatives from ASD-HD; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Joint Staff; the NGB; U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); state homeland defense officials from Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey; the National Infrastructure Advisory Council; the Department of the Army staff; and others."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.; Dillon, Richard W.; Kievit, James

2005-08
Responding to the Unthinkable: The Reserve Components Role in Recovering from a Biological Incident

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"With the potential proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) capabilities throughout the world an already challenging security environment grows even more daunting every day. Whether occurring naturally, released unintentionally, or dispersed with a deliberately diabolic intent, the effects of a release of these mechanisms can transcend even the immediate devastation they may portend. Beyond massive death and injury, these agents could attack the very core of the Nation's security, economic strength, and physical and mental well-being. As such, the military component of this Nation's defense must begin pondering the 'unthinkable,' postulating the role it may have to play in mitigating, responding to, and recovering from this kind of catastrophe. With that possibility in mind, the United States Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership conducted a focused workshop bringing together over 100 participants from local, regional, state, and federal entities to review contemporary plans, policies, and procedures for Disaster Response, and to postulate how those initiatives could meet the required response following the catastrophic introduction of a CBRNE event. Particular focus was directed on how the Army's Reserve Components, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard, would fit into the equation. Three different scenarios were considered-one biological, one radiological, and one nuclear. This paper addresses the workshop's findings related to response following a pandemic biological incident in the United States."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Traylor, John C.; Tussing, Bert B.

2004-10
Annual Collins Center Senior Symposium: Aligning the Interagency Process for the War on Terrorism

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
Charges have been levied, from both inside and out of the United States government, that the War on Terrorism is currently encumbered by an interagency process ill-suited for the task. That process, developed for the challenges of the Cold War, is characterized by stove pipe operations and resourcing initiatives in an era that demands an efficient integration of efforts for results. Endeavors to address failed/failing states, reconstruction and stabilization, and other diverse efforts focused on the underlying conditions that foster terrorism appear to be disjointed, with no central authority (save the President himself) to direct them. As a result, parallel but separate agency concerns ripe for synergistic gains remain isolated, with no means of orchestrating limited ways and means towards the most effective set of ends in our strategies for combating terrorism. On 24 and 25 May 2005, the U.S. Army War Colleges Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a senior symposium to examine these purported shortcomings, and to focus on the question of how the interagency process can be improved to better address the War on Terrorism. The immediate intent of the symposium was to gather insights for incorporation into future studies, exercises and syllabus development addressing the threat of transnational terrorism. At the same time, the symposiums organizers hoped to use these same insights as a springboard for an expanded symposium. Both forums were supported by the Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Council.

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.; Butts, Kent Hughes

2005-06
DoD - Not the Department of Disaster

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This report is part of chapter one of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "The notion that the Department of Defense (DoD) should serve as the lead federal agency for major disasters and catastrophic events is not new. In 1992, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, discussions took place regarding this issue, and more recently, the topic resurfaced after Hurricane Katrina devastated areas of Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005. DoD is certainly capable of serving as the lead federal agency for catastrophic events and major disasters; but examining this issue from an operational rather than an academic point of view leads to the conclusion that a more useful and appropriate role for the department would be to enable and support other federal agencies--equally, or even better suited to lead the federal response efforts. In the event of a catastrophe, the DoD has three combatant commands which would be more than capable of anchoring the lead in a response to catastrophe: the United States Northern Command, the Pacific Command, and (perhaps less intuitively) the United States Southern Command. The experience and competence of the commands' leadership--coupled with the department's ability to conduct a wide variety of missions such as civil affairs, civil administration, reconstruction and restoration--lead many people to automatically default to the position that the DoD should serve as the lead agency in the event of a major disaster or catastrophe. The inherent capacities the department carries in the realms of communication, transportation, and a wide range of logistics capabilities only serve to reinforce this notion. Unfortunately, while this position is convenient from an operational point of view, this is not necessarily the best alternative."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.; Chavez, Richard
Strengthening Regional Cooperation in Central Asia / Central Asian States Disaster Response Conference 2003

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
Today's threats to stability are trans-national in nature and rarely contained within the borders of one country. In most cases the consequences of a major terrorist action or environmental disaster will quickly overwhelm the management capability and response assets of the affected nation. From introduction: "The world continues to get smaller, and the neighborhoods that it is composed of are becoming more dependent upon one another. Today's threats to stability are trans-national in nature and rarely contained within the borders of one country. In most cases the consequences of a major terrorist action or environmental disaster will quickly overwhelm the management capability and response assets of the affected nation. When that occurs the maintenance of stability relies on effective regional, and if required, international assistance. A government that attempts to "go it alone" in today's environment runs the risk of losing the confidence of its citizens and, as a result, its viability. As part of the United States' active efforts to forge new, productive international relationships to meet the challenges of the 21st century, encouraging stronger regional ties where few currently exist is a key policy initiative."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Turner, Curtis W.; Griffard, Bernard F.; Tussing, Bert B.

2003-11
Collins Center Senior Symposium: Examining Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategies

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"Among the leading concerns surrounding Homeland Security in the United States is Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Identifying, prioritizing, and providing for the protection of infrastructure so vital to the United States that its incapacity or destruction "would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters" is one of the most compelling issues facing the Department of Homeland Security, its interagency partners, state and local governments, and the private sector. On 25 May 2004, the Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a senior symposium dedicated to examining the United States' evolving strategies for the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets in our country. The forum brought together a distinguished panel of seven retired generals and senior civilian officials, from both the public and private sectors, all actively involved in homeland security issues. The immediate intent of the symposium was to gather insights on the directions taken by these strategies for use in future studies, wargames and syllabus development addressing the changing face of homeland security. At the same time, the Center hoped to use the insights as a springboard for an expanded symposium on CIP, "In Support of the Common Defense, " which took place at Collins Hall on from 25-26 August. By extension, the War College hoped to contribute in the search for the surest path to the inherently complex end of critical infrastructure protection."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Traylor, John C.; Butts, Kenneth; Tussing, Bert B.

2004-05
'Global' Homeland: International Perspectives on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"Given the immediacy in both time and space of the terrorist threat, it is easy to become overly focused on the issue as regards only the United States and the U.S. homeland. Yet, we are not in this alone. Other nations, international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, and transnational law enforcement agencies such as Europol and Interpol are deeply committed to the counter terror effort. Seeing the Global War on Terror from their perspective provides both greater insight and greater opportunities for crushing the enemies of civilized peoples throughout the world. A venue towards a better understanding of international perspectives on issues of domestic security and counterterrorism was recently held in London, at a Homeland Security Conference sponsored by the SMi group. Held from 23-24 February, the forum featured presentations depicting perspectives ranging from the private sector through local, national and international law enforcement agencies; to disparate national governmental efforts; on through regional and international alliances. Functional issues including port security, stemming the flow of terrorist financing defense against chemical, biological and radiological attacks and more were presented by subject matter experts from six different countries, the European Union, and NATO."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.

2004-05
Implementing a New Vision: Unity of Effort in Preparing for and Responding to Catastrophic Events

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"In an understandable concern over the division of requirements and responsibilities surrounding domestic security, the public and private partnership that must characterize our preparedness, response and recovery capabilities is frequently disjointed. Within the federal interagency effort, and proceeding through essential intergovernmental coordination activities before and after an incident, this discontinuity increases with the severity of the event. From civil-military interaction across federal, state and local efforts, to the coordination of private sector and community response, more must be done to achieve efficacies and efficiencies through unity of effort across the homeland security enterprise. This paper will highlight initiatives and point to new directions that must be taken to prepare our citizenry and respond to their needs in time of severe crises."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.

2011-03
Migration and Border Security: The Military's Role

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"In the United States, law enforcement and diplomatic instruments lead the migration and border security effort. The DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the principal federal law enforcement agency charged with enforcing agriculture, trade, drug and immigration regulations. They operate in all three border environments -- land, sea, and air -- within North America and internationally with cooperating governments. This effort is complemented by the U.S. Department of State's (DoS) 'Border Security Program.' Through proactive efforts in its embassies and consulates, DoS has improved information sharing, connectivity, and training to identify and prevent foreigners bent on doing harm from acquiring travel documents allowing them legal entry to the United States.5 The military's mission to defend U.S. borders from aggressors is principally accomplished through terrorist deterrence, detection, and interdiction before they reach the United States. However, events since 9/11 have led to the deployment of military forces to temporarily supplement and complement the CBP. Such was the case immediately following 9/11, when 1600 National Guard troops were federalized for duty on our northern and southern borders. Again, in 2004 following the intelligence community's assessment of a heightened threat along the northern border between Vermont, New Hampshire and New York, active duty and reserve component forces were deployed along those borders in the execution of Operation Winter Freeze. That augmentation took place between the federal election day and the presidential inauguration."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Griffard, Bernard F.; Tussing, Bert B.
Improving the Military's Domestic Crisis Response: Leveraging the Reserves

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"On 11 and 12 July 2006, the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership convened a symposium to examine the evolving, and potential role of the military's reserve components in responding to catastrophic incidents in the United States. The fifth of an annual series dedicated to issues surrounding the service reserves and the National Guard, this forum drew heavily from the lessons learned throughout the country's recent history of defense support to civil authorities (DSCA), and particularly from the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. The forum brought together over sixty participants from the service reserve components, the National Guard, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and its component commands, the Department of the Army, and others. Among the participants were 10 General Officers and Senior Executive Service members, who joined in receiving the event's recommendations and observations on a 'Blue Ribbon Panel' headed by the Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OSD-RA), and Mr. Frank Jones, Principal Director for Strategic Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (OSD-HD). The nexus of the symposium was straightforward: to address the military's role of how to prepare for the next domestic crisis, irrespective of its specific nature; how to effectively and efficiently employ the military's reserve component in the Nation's response; and how to better identify the appropriate sourcing, employment, and leveraging of a finite set of resources in the response effort. The principle objective of the symposium was to look beyond the existing roles of the reserve components to potential roles and capabilities, and examine how to better leverage those components in responding to 'Incidents of National Significance' (INS)."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.; Roth, James F.; Dillon, Richard W.

2006-08
Experimentation in Support of DoD's Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"On 23 and 24 September 2008, the Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a 'Limited Objective Experiment' (LOE) in support of the validation and refinement of the Department of Defense's (DoD) Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (HD-CS JOC). The event was the fourth in a series that envisions a total of 12 such experiments, all designed to help describe how Joint Force Commanders will conduct and support operations in this regime eight to twenty years in the future. Previous LOE's were hosted and facilitated by the National Defense University and the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security. The last two experiments have been hosted and conducted by CSL at Collins Hall. [...] The workshops were asked to consider how the uniformed component of the future Total Force could improve unity of effort--in terms of effectiveness and efficiencies--in planning, resourcing and executing homeland defense and civil support missions. Towards that end, the participants were asked to consider whether any of the DoD uniformed components possessed characteristics that are better-suited for the planning and execution of future HD-CS missions; to provide insights into what changes to the Total Force are warranted to improve unity of effort for those purposes; and, given the demands and potential demands of civil support, to examine the potential impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD if the Total Force components organize, train and equip for Civil Support missions."

Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

Tussing, Bert B.

2008-10