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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated January 10, 2008]
"On April 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an interim final rule (72 Federal Register 17688-17745) on chemical facility security, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The regulations require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. […]. High-risk facilities are to be categorized into tiers based on risk, and those with higher risk must comply with more stringent performance-based security requirements. Under the interim final rule, high-risk chemical facilities are required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. […]. While the interim final rule states it may preempt future state and local chemical facility security regulations, the 110th Congress has narrowed such preemption to when federal regulations have an 'actual conflict' with state and local regulations. These regulations highlight key issues debated in previous Congresses. These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; which chemical facilities should be considered as 'high-risk' and thus regulated; the scope of the risk-based performance standards for different tiers of high-risk chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of existing state chemical facility security regulation; and the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2008-01-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [September 29, 2011]
From the Summary: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2011. The 112th Congress debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continues to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-09-29
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [July 7, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses U.S. nuclear detection architecture and the creation in 2006 of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate and give oversight to the numerous programs within the US government which were created to detect "illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a 'global nuclear detection architecture.' Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture. This architecture is a complicated system of systems. Measuring the success of the architecture relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of additional investments are challenges. The DNDO is developing risk and cost methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-07-07
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated June 21, 2007]
From the Summary: "On April 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an interim final rule (72 'Federal Register' 17688-17745 (April 9, 2007)) on chemical facility security, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The regulations require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the DHS Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. The Secretary then determines which chemical facilities are high-risk, and thus need to comply with additional security requirements. High-risk facilities are to be categorized into tiers based on risk, and those with higher risk must comply with more stringent, performance-based security requirements. Under the interim final rule, high-risk chemical facilities are required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. The DHS Secretary is to approve or disapprove each step in the process, and may require the chemical facility to improve the submission or implementation. The interim final rule establishes a new category of protected information, Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), granting it a status between sensitive but unclassified and classified information. […] Since the statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities expires in 2009, policymakers may choose to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2007-06-21
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RMP Facilities in the United States as of February 2008 [March 4, 2008]
"This memorandum responds to your request regarding facilities submitting risk management plans (RMPs) to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). You requested an analysis of RMP facilities within the United States by potentially affected population. You also requested an analysis of facilities that were required by regulation to resubmit their information to the EPA but had not done so. Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), the EPA established a program requiring facilities possessing greater than certain threshold quantities of 140 chemicals to provide risk management plans to the EPA. As part of this reporting requirement, facilities are required to determine the worst-case scenario release from a single chemical process, using EPA criteria and guidelines. Facilities are also required to estimate the population potentially at risk from this worst-case scenario release by calculating the population that resides within a circle surrounding the facility, with the radius of the circle determined by the distance the worst-case scenario release might travel."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-03-04
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Federal Pause in Potentially Risky Influenza Research [November 24, 2014]
"Over several decades, Congress has enacted legislation to fund research into the origins and mechanisms of the causes and transmission of disease with the intent to spur the development of treatments and to improve public health. It has also enacted legislation in order to improve the security of biological pathogens. A recently implemented federal research moratorium has highlighted concerns about the general appropriateness of this research and the sufficiency of these biosecurity efforts. Policymakers focused on the intersection of public health and scientific research may question whether a moratorium appropriately balances federal interests in developing disease countermeasures with concerns over the potential of altered pathogens escaping research laboratories."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-11-24
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Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact [Updated December 1, 2004]
"The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons pose additional concerns beyond mass casualties. These weapons may contaminate the area in which they are used, emergency vehicles, and first responders. The wide array of potential symptoms from chemical, biological, and toxin weapons makes identification of the causal agent difficult and complicates treatment. Additionally, public fears relating to disease and poisoning could increase the effect of a chemical, biological, or toxin attack, as worried, unexposed people request treatment from medical facilities. In extreme cases, public hysteria has been postulated as an outcome from mass dissemination. Several initiatives are underway to reduce the potential value of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. One approach has been through funding significant increases in the public health system's preparedness and response capacity. Additionally, facilities and researchers possessing 'select agents' have been registered in a national database. Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of 'dual-use' equipment; further development of the public health system; federal incentives for research and development into chemical, biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines, countermeasures and detectors; informational public outreach programs to properly inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary media codes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-01
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Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating under a Continuing Resolution [December 17, 2007]
From the Summary: "On December 14, 2007, President Bush signed into law H.J.Res. 69. This law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through December 21, 2007, unless superceded [sic] by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally funded by the 11 regular appropriations bills. The 110th Congress has passed two appropriations bills, one funding the Department of Defense (Division A of P.L. [Public Law] 110-116) and one funding the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (H.R. 3043). The latter was vetoed on November 13, 2007, and an attempt to override this veto failed by a vote of 277-141. The continuing resolution funds most agencies at FY2007 levels. The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2007. Thus new civilian research and development programs and funding increases for existing activities, including the President's centerpiece programs such as the American Competitiveness Initiative, will be delayed until further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs, FY2007 funding was itself provided under a continuing resolution based on FY2006 appropriations. Therefore, these programs are operating in FY2008 with budgets similar to those of FY2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-12-17
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Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management [Updated January 26, 2006]
"On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Russia entered the negotiations seeking a 'legally binding document' that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Russia also wanted the new Treaty to contain a statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. The United States preferred a less formal process in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. This report covers the following topics: negotiations of the treaty, Russian objectives, U.S. objectives, reaching an agreement, the Treaty and its articles, U.S. and Russia's force structure, response and reaction, and the road ahead."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-01-26
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High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications [Updated September 9, 2003]
"Terrorist use of chemical agents has been a noted concern, highlighted after the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased Congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. High-threat chemical agents, which include chemical weapons and some toxic industrial chemicals, are normally organized by military planners into four groups: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event. High-threat chemical agents, depending on the type of agent used, cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. Some cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Others have caustic effects on contact. As a result, chemical attack treatment may be complicated by the need to identify at least the type of chemical used. Differences in treatment protocols for the various high-threat agents may also strain the resources of the public health system, especially in the case of mass casualties. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-09-09
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Electric Utility Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: Transformers, Towers, and Terrorism [April 9, 2004]
"The U.S. electric power system has historically operated at such a high level of reliability that any major outage, either caused by sabotage, weather, or operational errors, makes news headlines. The transmission system is extensive, consisting mainly of transformers, switches, transmission towers and lines, control centers, and computer controls. A spectrum of threats exists to the electric system ranging from weather-related to terrorist attacks, including physical attacks, as well as attacks on computer systems, or cyber attacks. The main risk from weather-related damage or a terrorist attack against the electric power industry is a widespread power outage that lasts for an extended period of time. […] Issues facing Congress include: What should be done to address vulnerabilities in the electric system? Who should be responsible for implementing appropriate actions? Who should pay? Should reliability guidelines or standards be implemented by the federal government or industry groups? And, who should be responsible for carrying out research and development to reduce vulnerabilities?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Abel, Amy; Parfomak, Paul W.; Shea, Dana A.
2004-04-09
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [November 10, 2009]
From the Document: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in October 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding its effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-11-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [Updated September 3, 2009]
From the Summary: "The granted the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in October 2009. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the manner of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. The Obama Administration and some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security authorities. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding its effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. […] Members have introduced several bills in the 111th Congress to address chemical facility security. Both the Senate-passed and House-passed versions of the DHS appropriations bill (H.R. 2892) would extend the existing statutory authority through October 4, 2010. Both appropriations bills provide additional chemical facility security funding relative to FY2009."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-09-03
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [February 25, 2014]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 506 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk. For additional analysis of CFATS implementation, see CRS Report R43346, 'Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-02-25
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [July 16, 2008]
"In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat." "The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate September 11, 2001, while others were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. These disparate programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and centralized oversight. […].The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-07-16
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Dual-Use Biological Equipment: Difficulties in Domestic Regulation [Updated January 22, 2004]
From the Summary: "Dual-use technologies, technologies with both civilian and military use, are often cited as lowering technical barriers to terrorist development of chemical and biological weapons. Export of these technologies is regulated through both domestic law and international agreement, but domestic sales are not. Dual-use biological equipment, whose military use includes the production of biological weapons, is employed in many different civilian and commercial applications, including academic research and the pharmaceutical, medical, and manufacturing industries. Consequently, regulating such equipment might have a marked economic impact and prove to be infeasible. Possible approaches to controlling this equipment include voluntary self-regulation and use of industry best practices by suppliers, licensing of equipment purchasers, registration of equipment, and application of civil penalties to suppliers for inappropriate end-use of equipment. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-01-22
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [January 11, 2007]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-01-11
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Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact [Updated June 30, 2003]
The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The
confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability
of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons
may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction
includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons.
Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons can produce mass casualties if
effectively disseminated, but have varying and different effects. Chemical weapons,
predominantly man-made chemicals, require the largest amounts of material to be
effective and cause their effects in minutes to hours. Biological weapons made of
naturally occurring pathogens require the least material to be effective, but generally
have an incubation period of several days before symptoms show themselves. Toxin
weapons, chemical agents formed by biological processes, are intermediate between
the two in both amount and timescale. Treatment protocols for chemical, biological,
and toxin weapons vary on a per-agent basis, ranging from weapons with effective
treatment and prophylaxis to weapons which have no known cure nor protection.
Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin
terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of "dual-use"
equipment; further development of the public health system; federal incentives for
research and development into chemical, biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines,
countermeasures and detectors; informational public outreach programs to properly
inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary media codes. This report
will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-06-30
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [Updated June 23, 2004]
This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-06-23
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Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [October 6, 2011]
From the Summary: "The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. […] The committee developed a rationing scheme for allocating the available helium-3. Some federal and private-sector users received no allocation or an amount less than they had planned. Several federal agencies are investigating alternative sources of helium-3 and ways to reduce the demand. Congressional attention appears predominantly focused on oversight of the current situation, how it arose, and the processes currently in place for addressing it. In future hearings and legislation, Congress may address additional issues, such as increasing the helium-3 supply, reducing demand, or changing how supply is allocated. This report discusses the nature of the shortage; federal actions undertaken so far to address it; current and potential sources of helium-3 and options for increasing the supply; current and projected uses of helium-3 and options for reducing the demand; and options for allocating the supply if it continues to fall short of the demand."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2011-10-06
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [May 20, 2004]
"This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-05-20
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [October 2, 2012]
From the Summary: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. [...] Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's [Department of Homeland Security's] effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). […] No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS [Department of Homeland Security]. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS [Department of Homeland Security], effectiveness of DHS [Department of Homeland Security] program management, and the availability of CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. […] Both appropriation and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress address chemical facility security. P.L. 112-175 extended the existing authority until March 27, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. 3216 and H.R. 5855, as passed by the House) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-10-02
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RMP Facilities in the United States as of May 2005 [June 27, 2005]
"Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), the EPA established a program requiring risk management plans to be provided to the EPA by facilities possessing greater than certain threshold quantities of 140 chemicals. As part of this reporting requirement, facilities are required to determine the worst-case scenario release from a single chemical process, using EPA criteria and guidelines. Facilities are also required to estimate the population potentially at risk from this worst-case scenario release by calculating the population that resides within a circle surrounding the facility, with the radius of the circle determined by the
distance the worst-case scenario release might travel."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2005-07-27
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated February 21, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-02-21
