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Publishing Scientific Papers with Potential Security Risks: Issues for Congress [July 12, 2012]
"The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders, are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. […] This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.
2012-07-12
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [May 21, 2010]
"The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Customs and Border Protection officers use radiation portal monitors to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. When combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, they provide a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-05-21
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [September 03, 2009]
"The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Radiation portal monitors are used to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. Combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, they provide for a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material. […]Laboratory and field tests of the ASPs, cost-benefit analyses, and other activities are under way to inform the Secretary's certification decision. Among the issues Congress faces are whether to further define the expected performance of the ASP systems through additional legislation; how to assess whether the ASP systems are technologically ready to be deployed; how to weigh the potential economic and security benefits of ASP deployment against its financial cost; and whether the certification process developed by DHS to establish a 'significant increase in operational effectiveness' is well founded."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2009-09-03
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [January 10, 2003]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either at the funding stage or before publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-01-10
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated July 9, 2003]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-07-09
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated February 2, 2006]
From the Summary: "Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of selective classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is third option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-02-02
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated February 2, 2004]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of select classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-02-02
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated December 16, 2004]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of select classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-16
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated November 13, 2006]
From the Summary: "Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of selective classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is third option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-11-13
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DHS S&T Directorate: Selected Issues for Congress [April 14, 2014]
From the Summary: "Both congressional and executive branch policy makers assert that science and technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and research and development (R&D) capabilities. The DHS supports both short- and long-term R&D activities. However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many years. The S&T Directorate and other DHS offices have not developed technological advances at the rate some Members of Congress expected. Since the establishment of DHS, the appropriations committees have often expressed displeasure at the rate of technology transfer, the direction of R&D efforts, and the ability of the S&T Directorate to align its resources and mission. In a time of increasing fiscal constraint, some Members have questioned whether S&T Directorate R&D activities should receive priority over other non-R&D activities. This report provides a brief overview of the S&T Directorate's mission, organization, and budgetary structure; a discussion of selected critiques of the S&T Directorate; and an analysis of selected issues facing congressional policy makers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-04-14
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DHS Directorate of Science and Technology: Key Issues for Congress [June 22, 2009]
From the Document: "The Directorate of Science and Technology is the primary organization for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With an appropriated budget of $932.6 million in FY2009, it conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own and funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national laboratories, industry, and universities. The directorate consists primarily of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as laboratory facilities and university programs, that cut across the divisions. The directorate is headed by the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. In the past, some Members of Congress and other observers have been highly critical of the directorate's performance. Although management changes have somewhat muted this criticism in recent years, fundamental issues remain. […] Congressional policymakers are widely expected to consider reauthorization legislation for DHS during the 111th Congress. Such legislation would likely include provisions that would affect the Science and Technology Directorate."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2009-06-22
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DHS Directorate of Science and Technology: Key Issues for Congress [February 1, 2008]
From the Document: "The Directorate of Science and Technology is the primary organization for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security. With a budget of $830.3 million in FY2008, it conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own; funds R&D conducted by industry, the Department of Energy national laboratories, other government agencies, and universities; and manages operational systems. The directorate consists primarily of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as laboratory facilities and university programs, that cut across the divisions. The directorate is headed by the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Admiral Jay M. Cohen."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-02-01
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DHS S&T Directorate: Selected Issues for Congress [May 3, 2013]
From the Document: "Both congressional and executive branch policymakers assert that science and technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and capabilities for research and development (R&D). The DHS supports both short- and long-term R&D activities. However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many years. The S&T Directorate and other DHS offices have not developed homeland security technological advances at the rate some Members of Congress expected. Since the establishment of DHS, the appropriations committees have often expressed displeasure at the rate of technology transfer, the direction of R&D efforts, and the ability of the S&T Directorate to align its resources and mission. In a time of increasing fiscal constraint, some Members have questioned prioritizing S&T Directorate R&D activities rather than other departmental needs. This report provides a brief overview of the S&T Directorate's mission, organization, and budgetary structure; a discussion of selected critiques of the S&T Directorate; and an analysis of selected issues facing congressional policymakers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-05-03
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BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism [November 19, 2003]
"The BioWatch Program uses a series of pathogen detectors co-located with Environmental Protection Agency air quality monitors. These detectors collect airborne particles onto filters, which are subsequently transported to laboratories for analysis. It is expected that this system will provide early warning of a pathogen release, alerting authorities before victims begin to show symptoms and providing the opportunity to deliver treatments earlier, decreasing illness and death. The BioWatch Program, funded and overseen by DHS, has three main elements each coordinated by different agencies, sampling, analysis, and response. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains the sampling component, the sensors that collect airborne particles. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) coordinates analysis, the laboratory testing of the samples, though testing is actually carried out in state and local public health laboratories. Local jurisdictions are responsible for the public health response to positive findings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is designated as the lead agency for the law enforcement response if a bioterrorism event is detected. The BioWatch Program has raised concerns in some quarters, with questions about its general effectiveness, the siting of pathogen detectors, the reliability of its results, its cost and workforce requirements, and the ability of public health officials to respond to BioWatch results. Efforts to develop integrated response plans, lower the system cost, and develop complementary and next-generation systems continue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Lister, Sarah A.
2003-11-19
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues and Options for Congress [February 8, 2011]
From the Document: "Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama's 2010 State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. […] Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures. Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs or creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting or creating programs may result in additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges. Maintaining or shrinking programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2011-02-08
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress [August 6, 2010]
"Recent reports by congressional commissions and others, the inclusion of bioterrorism issues in President Obama's State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. Several strategy and planning documents direct the federal government's biodefense efforts. Many different agencies have a role. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government could significantly improve its efforts to address the bioterrorism threat. Key questions face congressional policymakers: How sufficiently do the efforts already underway address the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should Congress alter, augment, or terminate these existing programs in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-08-06
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress [March 18, 2010]
"The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities are insufficient to face the threat. The federal government's efforts to address the perceived threat of bioterrorism span many different agencies and are organized and directed through several strategy and planning documents. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government's efforts to address the bioterrorism threat could be significantly improved. Key questions face congressional policymakers in these areas: Are the efforts already underway sufficient to face the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should these existing programs be altered, augmented, or terminated in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others? [...] Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and its oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers will likely be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-03-18
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Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects [December 13, 2012]
From the Document: "Experts believe that terrorist use of chemical agents is an event with low probability, but potentially high consequences. While terrorist groups may or may not have an increased interest in chemical agent acquisition and use, the domestic vulnerability of the United States to chemical attack remains an issue. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security of purported Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, and their potential use. Policy approaches to reducing chemical vulnerability have generally treated chemical agents as a group, rather than addressing specific agents. Additionally, military and civilian chemical agent detection have developed with little coordination, so that civilian toxic industrial chemical kits and military chemical weapons detectors have varying sensitivities and detection capabilities. Treatments for chemical exposure vary on a chemical by chemical basis. Because comparatively few individuals have been exposed to modern chemical weapons, health care providers have limited practical experience in treatment of chemical casualties, especially among civilians. While national efforts to reduce vulnerability to terrorist chemical agent use continue, it is not clear whether these efforts address the risks from those specific agents that pose the greatest danger. This report describes the different types of chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, their availability, treatment, and detection."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-12-13
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [March 25, 2009]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report analyzes the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program. "The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Radiation portal monitors are used to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, that are entering the United States. Combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, they provide for a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing so, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2009-03-25
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [December 30, 2010]
"The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Customs and Border Protection officers use radiation portal monitors to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. When combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, radiation portal monitors provide a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-12-30
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Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects [September 13, 2013]
From the Document: "The potential for terrorist use of chemical agents is a noted concern highlighted by the Tokyo sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such unconventional attacks. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security and use of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents. For analysis of chemical weapons in Syria, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R42848, 'Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress', coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin. Military planners generally organize chemical agents, such as chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, into four groups: nerve agents (such as sarin and VX), blister agents (such as mustard gas), choking agents (such as chlorine and phosgene), and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide). While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, terrorist use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-09-13
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [Updated March 3, 2020]
From the Summary: "Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F., Jr.; Shea, Dana A.
2020-03-03
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [August 14, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through October 4, 2012. The Obama Administration has requested a one-year extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-08-14
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [Updated April 19, 2013]
From the Summary: "In April 2013, envelopes sent to President Obama and a U.S. Senator tested positive for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans. Ricin has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although governments have investigated ricin's potential use as a military weapon, individuals have used ricin in small quantities. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is a select agent, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-04-19
