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National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated May 19, 2008]
This CRS report talks about "The National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility [NABF]," this is a facility being built by the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] and it would be a place where "scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases" could be done. Also, this research "may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostic and countermeasures, reducing the risk of a successful terrorist attack." More specifically, "this report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC [Plum Island Animal Disease Center], and community safety concerns." The report also provides the following background information in regards to the program: "the agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases […] To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] to engage in research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center [PIADC], off the coast of New York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA, conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-05-19
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated April 3, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high containment laboratory space becomes available. By law, research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is not permitted on the U.S. mainland. This policy would need to be changed before DHS could conduct FMD research at NBAF if it were sited on the U.S. mainland. Bills (H.R. 1717, H.R. 2419, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 2419) modifying this policy are being considered by in the 110th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-04-03
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [July 7, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses U.S. nuclear detection architecture and the creation in 2006 of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate and give oversight to the numerous programs within the US government which were created to detect "illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a 'global nuclear detection architecture.' Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture. This architecture is a complicated system of systems. Measuring the success of the architecture relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of additional investments are challenges. The DNDO is developing risk and cost methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-07-07
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated June 30, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses the directive for the development of agricultural "biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. [Further,] To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and intentional animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in animal disease research, including research into highly contagious animal pathogens and animal diseases not native to the United States. Such research activities have historically been performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on an island near Long Island, NY. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA still maintains an active research program at PIADC. The DHS, in cooperation with USDA, has established its own research and development program at PIADC. As the federal government undertakes new efforts in human biodefense and defense against agroterrorism, DHS has identified the PIADC facility as "reaching the end of its life cycle" and lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility performing this research. The Department of Homeland Security has announced that, to meet the obligations of HSPD-9, it will establish a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would have high-containment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC as well as other pathogens of interest. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and security and policy questions about coordination between DHS and USDA regarding the research to be conducted at NBAF. This report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC, and community safety concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-06-30
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [September 29, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2011. The 112th Congress debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continues to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-09-29
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [April 25, 2005]
"The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2005-04-25
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High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications [Updated September 9, 2003]
"Terrorist use of chemical agents has been a noted concern, highlighted after the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased Congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. High-threat chemical agents, which include chemical weapons and some toxic industrial chemicals, are normally organized by military planners into four groups: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event. High-threat chemical agents, depending on the type of agent used, cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. Some cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Others have caustic effects on contact. As a result, chemical attack treatment may be complicated by the need to identify at least the type of chemical used. Differences in treatment protocols for the various high-threat agents may also strain the resources of the public health system, especially in the case of mass casualties. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-09-09
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RMP Facilities in the United States as of May 2005 [June 27, 2005]
"Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), the EPA established a program requiring risk management plans to be provided to the EPA by facilities possessing greater than certain threshold quantities of 140 chemicals. As part of this reporting requirement, facilities are required to determine the worst-case scenario release from a single chemical process, using EPA criteria and guidelines. Facilities are also required to estimate the population potentially at risk from this worst-case scenario release by calculating the population that resides within a circle surrounding the facility, with the radius of the circle determined by the
distance the worst-case scenario release might travel."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2005-07-27
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated February 21, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-02-21
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Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating under a Continuing Resolution [December 17, 2007]
"On December 14, 2007, President Bush signed into law H.J.Res. 69. This law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through December 21, 2007, unless superceded by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally funded by the 11 regular appropriations bills. The 110th Congress has passed two appropriations bills, one funding the Department of Defense (Division A of P.L. 110-116) and one funding the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (H.R. 3043). The latter was vetoed on November 13, 2007, and an attempt to override this veto failed by a vote of 277-141. The continuing resolution funds most agencies at FY2007 levels. The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2007. Thus new civilian research and development programs and funding increases for existing activities, including the President's centerpiece programs such as the American Competitiveness Initiative, will be delayed until further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs, FY2007 funding was itself provided under a continuing resolution based on FY2006 appropriations. Therefore, these programs are operating in FY2008 with budgets similar to those of FY2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-12-17
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [October 2, 2006]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2006-10-02
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [March 8, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 18, 2011. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several [...] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the expiring statutory authority in order to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulation in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This last approach would leave chemical facility security regulation to the discretion of state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-03-08
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [December 14, 2009]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2009-12-14
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [February 16, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in October 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either shortor long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding its effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses have been considered during the reauthorization debate. These issues include the facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-02-16
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [July 13, 2009]
"The statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes, granted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the 109th Congress, expires in October 2009. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the manner of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional deliberation and debate. The Obama Administration and some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security authorities. The tension between continuing and changing the current regulatory program and statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding program effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. [...]. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses are likely to be considered during the reauthorization debate. These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies. Congress may take a variety of actions. Policymakers may choose to permanently or temporarily extend the expiring statutory authority to continue to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might choose to codify the existing regulation in statute to reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-07-13
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Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress [May 4, 2009]
"The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. […]. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose? […]. A key task for policymakers is to define their goals for enhancing oversight of high-containment laboratories. The focus of the oversight effort may affect which policy issues are addressed. For example, focusing on a registry of existing high-containment laboratory capacity may improve planning, coordination, and efficiency of use but provide relatively limited security benefits. […]. When weighing options to address these complex policy issues, policymakers may have to reconcile many competing and potentially conflicting national needs."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2009-05-04
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Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress [March 5, 2009]
"The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. Several departments and agencies have increased or are in the process of increasing their laboratory capacity. High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Indeed, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommends tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2009-03-05
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [January 13, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2012. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. [...] The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-01-13
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [October 7, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through November 18, 2011. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-10-07
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated April 28, 2008]
This CRS report discusses U.S. chemical facility security, regulation of the industry, and policy issues for Congress. "These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; which chemical facilities should be considered as "high-risk" and thus regulated; the scope of the risk-based performance standards for different tiers of high-risk chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of existing state chemical facility security regulation; and the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight. One key issue not directly addressed by the regulation is the role of inherently safer technology."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2008-04-28
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [February 10, 2012]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), including the position of its Director, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) to provide scientific and technological analysis and advice to the President. This codified and institutionalized a presidential science advice function that previously existed at each President's discretion. This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President, and discusses selected issues and options for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2012-02-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [May 27, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2011. The 111th Congress debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some Members of Congress supported an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. […] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate.These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-05-27
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Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [September 21, 2010]
"The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. After several years of demand exceeding supply, a call for large quantities of helium-3 spurred federal officials to realize that insufficient helium-3 was available to meet the likely future demand. Policymakers now face a number of challenging decisions. In the short term, these decisions are mainly about how to allocate a scarce resource in the face of competing priorities: science versus security, the private sector versus the public sector, and national needs versus international obligations. Applications with unique needs may pose particular challenges. For example, some types of cryogenic research can only be accomplished using helium-3, whereas in medical imaging and neutron detection, helium 3 has advantages but also alternatives. In the longer term, policymakers also face choices about how or whether to increase helium-3 supply or reduce helium-3 demand and about possible alternative mechanisms for allocating supply. It seems likely that a combination of policy approaches will be necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-09-21
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [November 10, 2009]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in October 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding its effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-11-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [Updated September 3, 2009]
"The granted the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in October 2009. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the manner of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. The Obama Administration and some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security authorities. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding its effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. […]Members have introduced several bills in the 111th Congress to address chemical facility security. Both the Senate-passed and House-passed versions of the DHS appropriations bill (H.R. 2892) would extend the existing statutory authority through October 4, 2010. Both appropriations bills provide additional chemical facility security funding relative to FY2009."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-09-03
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [May 20, 2004]
"This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-05-20
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Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact [Updated June 30, 2003]
The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The
confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability
of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons
may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction
includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons.
Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons can produce mass casualties if
effectively disseminated, but have varying and different effects. Chemical weapons,
predominantly man-made chemicals, require the largest amounts of material to be
effective and cause their effects in minutes to hours. Biological weapons made of
naturally occurring pathogens require the least material to be effective, but generally
have an incubation period of several days before symptoms show themselves. Toxin
weapons, chemical agents formed by biological processes, are intermediate between
the two in both amount and timescale. Treatment protocols for chemical, biological,
and toxin weapons vary on a per-agent basis, ranging from weapons with effective
treatment and prophylaxis to weapons which have no known cure nor protection.
Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin
terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of "dual-use"
equipment; further development of the public health system; federal incentives for
research and development into chemical, biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines,
countermeasures and detectors; informational public outreach programs to properly
inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary media codes. This report
will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-06-30
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 15, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2007-11-15
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [July 16, 2008]
"In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat." "The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate September 11, 2001, while others were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. These disparate programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and centralized oversight. […].The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-07-16
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [June 11, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through October 4, 2012. The Obama Administration has requested a one-year extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. […] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and efforts; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the range of facilities that DHS identifies as chemical facilities; and the ability of inherently safer technologies to achieve security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-06-11
