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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [August 9, 2006]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities have not been fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2006-08-09
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [January 13, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2012. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. [...] The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-01-13
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [October 7, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through November 18, 2011. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-10-07
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [September 29, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2011. The 112th Congress debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continues to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that are considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-09-29
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RMP Facilities in the United States as of February 2008 [March 4, 2008]
"This memorandum responds to your request regarding facilities submitting risk management plans (RMPs) to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). You requested an analysis of RMP facilities within the United States by potentially affected population. You also requested an analysis of facilities that were required by regulation to resubmit their information to the EPA but had not done so. Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), the EPA established a program requiring facilities possessing greater than certain threshold quantities of 140 chemicals to provide risk management plans to the EPA. As part of this reporting requirement, facilities are required to determine the worst-case scenario release from a single chemical process, using EPA criteria and guidelines. Facilities are also required to estimate the population potentially at risk from this worst-case scenario release by calculating the population that resides within a circle surrounding the facility, with the radius of the circle determined by the distance the worst-case scenario release might travel."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-03-04
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Comments on Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology [March 31, 2008]
"Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology is, according to its foreword, a 'descriptive baseline for homeland security research and development measures across the federal government ... developed with the cooperation of [other] federal agencies" and is a "first step in developing a more prescriptive plan.' Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology asserts that the baseline contained within the document ' will be used to provide an overarching strategy for addressing the science and technology needs for homeland security.' It is not a national homeland security R&D policy or a national homeland security R&D strategic plan. It is a compilation of science and technology requirements, gaps, strategic goals, and agency roles, responsibilities, accomplishments and ongoing activities, apparently inferred or extracted from a variety of existing strategies, plans, directives, and other sources."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-03-31
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated January 10, 2008]
"On April 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an interim final rule (72 Federal Register 17688-17745) on chemical facility security, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The regulations require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. […]. High-risk facilities are to be categorized into tiers based on risk, and those with higher risk must comply with more stringent performance-based security requirements. Under the interim final rule, high-risk chemical facilities are required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. […]. While the interim final rule states it may preempt future state and local chemical facility security regulations, the 110th Congress has narrowed such preemption to when federal regulations have an 'actual conflict' with state and local regulations. These regulations highlight key issues debated in previous Congresses. These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; which chemical facilities should be considered as 'high-risk' and thus regulated; the scope of the risk-based performance standards for different tiers of high-risk chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of existing state chemical facility security regulation; and the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2008-01-10
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [February 10, 2012]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), including the position of its Director, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) to provide scientific and technological analysis and advice to the President. This codified and institutionalized a presidential science advice function that previously existed at each President's discretion. This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President, and discusses selected issues and options for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2012-02-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated June 21, 2007]
"On April 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an interim final rule (72 Federal Register 17688-17745 (April 9, 2007)) on chemical facility security, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The regulations require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the DHS Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. The Secretary then determines which chemical facilities are highrisk, and thus need to comply with additional security requirements. High-risk facilities are to be categorized into tiers based on risk, and those with higher risk must comply with more stringent, performance-based security requirements. Under the interim final rule, high-risk chemical facilities are required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. The DHS Secretary is to approve or disapprove each step in the process, and may require the chemical facility to improve the submission or implementation. The interim final rule establishes a new category of protected information, Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), granting it a status between sensitive but unclassified and classified information. […] Since the statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities expires in 2009, policymakers may choose to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2007-06-21
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [Updated April 26, 2007]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations via H.R. 1 and S. 4."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-04-26
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Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security [Updated July 12, 2006]
"Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about the current state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk of a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemical facilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant or chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facility security. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemical facilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Many questions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should security measures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or should such regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required at chemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facility security or should chemical facilities bear security costs? Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining which chemical facilities should be protected by analyzing and prioritizing chemical facility security risks; identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk; and establishing what activities could enhance facility security to an acceptable level. Mechanisms for assessing security risk might include weighing the known or theoretical terrorist threat faced by a particular facility, the chemical hazards held at a facility, the quantities and location of those chemicals relative to the surrounding population, or the facility's industrial classification."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-07-12
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [Updated July 10, 2006]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. The federal government is a major source of life sciences research funding. Tension over the need to maintain homeland security and support scientific endeavor has led to renewed consideration of federal policies of scientific oversight. Balancing effective support of the research enterprise with security risks generated by such research has proven a complex challenge. Policies considered to address science and security generate tensions between federal funding agencies and federal funding recipients. To minimize these tensions while maximizing effective oversight of research, insight and advice from disparate stakeholders is generally considered essential. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was established as one tool to aid policymakers and researchers in assessing the risks of federally funded research in the life sciences. It aims to provide the Secretary of Health and Human Services and researchers a source for advice on dual-use research and other biosecurity issues. Advice rendered by the NSABB may shape research activities and standards practiced by researchers in life science research fields."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-07-10
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DHS Directorate of Science and Technology: Key Issues for Congress [February 1, 2008]
From the Document: "The Directorate of Science and Technology is the primary organization for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security. With a budget of $830.3 million in FY2008, it conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own; funds R&D conducted by industry, the Department of Energy national laboratories, other government agencies, and universities; and manages operational systems. The directorate consists primarily of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as laboratory facilities and university programs, that cut across the divisions. The directorate is headed by the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Admiral Jay M. Cohen."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-02-01
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated November 13, 2006]
From the Summary: "Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of selective classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is third option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-11-13
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [June 11, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through October 4, 2012. The Obama Administration has requested a one-year extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. […] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and efforts; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the range of facilities that DHS identifies as chemical facilities; and the ability of inherently safer technologies to achieve security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-06-11
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [January 11, 2007]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-01-11
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Publishing Scientific Papers with Potential Security Risks: Issues for Congress [July 12, 2012]
"The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders, are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. […] This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.
2012-07-12
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [October 2, 2006]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2006-10-02
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Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating under a Continuing Resolution [December 17, 2007]
"On December 14, 2007, President Bush signed into law H.J.Res. 69. This law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through December 21, 2007, unless superceded by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally funded by the 11 regular appropriations bills. The 110th Congress has passed two appropriations bills, one funding the Department of Defense (Division A of P.L. 110-116) and one funding the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (H.R. 3043). The latter was vetoed on November 13, 2007, and an attempt to override this veto failed by a vote of 277-141. The continuing resolution funds most agencies at FY2007 levels. The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2007. Thus new civilian research and development programs and funding increases for existing activities, including the President's centerpiece programs such as the American Competitiveness Initiative, will be delayed until further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs, FY2007 funding was itself provided under a continuing resolution based on FY2006 appropriations. Therefore, these programs are operating in FY2008 with budgets similar to those of FY2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-12-17
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [January 31, 2007]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed security regulations for chemical facilities, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The proposed regulations (71 Federal Register 78,276-78,332 (December 28, 2006)) require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the DHS Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. The Secretary would then determine what chemical facilities are high-risk, and thus need to comply with additional security requirements. The proposed security requirements would be performance-based, rather than prescriptive, and tiered, with facilities in higher tiers having more stringent requirements than those in lower tiers. High-risk chemical facilities will be required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. The DHS Secretary will approve or disapprove each step in the process, requiring the chemical facility to improve the facility submission or implementation in the case of disapproval."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2007-01-31
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Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact [Updated December 1, 2004]
"The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons pose additional concerns beyond mass casualties. These weapons may contaminate the area in which they are used, emergency vehicles, and first responders. The wide array of potential symptoms from chemical, biological, and toxin weapons makes identification of the causal agent difficult and complicates treatment. Additionally, public fears relating to disease and poisoning could increase the effect of a chemical, biological, or toxin attack, as worried, unexposed people request treatment from medical facilities. In extreme cases, public hysteria has been postulated as an outcome from mass dissemination. Several initiatives are underway to reduce the potential value of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. One approach has been through funding significant increases in the public health system's preparedness and response capacity. Additionally, facilities and researchers possessing 'select agents' have been registered in a national database. Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of 'dual-use' equipment; further development of the public health system; federal incentives for research and development into chemical, biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines, countermeasures and detectors; informational public outreach programs to properly inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary media codes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-01
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [April 12, 2013]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), including the position of its Director, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. [Public Law] 94-282) to provide scientific and technological analysis and advice to the President. This codified and institutionalized a presidential science advice function that previously existed at each President's discretion. This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President and discusses selected issues and options for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-12
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [April 1, 2013]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-01
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [April 18, 2013]
"In April 2013 envelopes sent to President Obama and a U.S. Senator tested preliminarily positive for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans. Ricin has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although governments have investigated ricin's potential use as a military weapon, individuals have used ricin in small quantities. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is a select agent, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-04-18
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [April 12, 2013]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] In FY2011, Congress sought to restrict OSTP from engaging in certain activities with China or any Chinese-owned company by prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for these activities (P.L. 112-10). The OSTP expended a portion of its FY2011 appropriation to engage in activities with China that Congress sought to proscribe. The Department of Justice and OSTP asserted that this congressional effort infringed upon the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign diplomacy. In contrast, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that OSTP violated the Antideficiency Act, though it did not speak to the constitutional issue. Congress enacted a similar restriction for FY2012 (P.L. 112-55) and FY2013 (P.L. 113-6) and may continue its interest in the debate over its ability to restrict the activities of OSTP. Among other issues Congress may wish to consider are the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy foci of OSTP; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-12
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [March 7, 2013]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-03-07
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Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating under a Continuing Resolution [October 27, 2008]
"On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). Division A of this law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through March 6, 2009, unless superseded by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally funded by nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. The same law also includes the other three FY2009 appropriations acts: one funding the Department of Defense (Division C of P.L. 110-329), one funding the Department of Homeland Security (Division D of P.L. 110-329), and one funding military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies (Division E of P.L. 110-329). The continuing resolution funds most other agencies and programs at FY2008 pre-supplemental levels. The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2008. Thus new civilian research and development programs and funding increases for existing activities will be delayed until further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs, FY2008 funding was provided under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which largely extended FY2007 funding levels. FY2007 funding was provided under a continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) based on FY2006 appropriations. Therefore, some programs are operating in FY2009 with budgets similar to those of FY2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-10-27
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DHS S&T Directorate: Selected Issues for Congress [May 3, 2013]
From the Document: "Both congressional and executive branch policymakers assert that science and technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and capabilities for research and development (R&D). The DHS supports both short- and long-term R&D activities. However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many years. The S&T Directorate and other DHS offices have not developed homeland security technological advances at the rate some Members of Congress expected. Since the establishment of DHS, the appropriations committees have often expressed displeasure at the rate of technology transfer, the direction of R&D efforts, and the ability of the S&T Directorate to align its resources and mission. In a time of increasing fiscal constraint, some Members have questioned prioritizing S&T Directorate R&D activities rather than other departmental needs. This report provides a brief overview of the S&T Directorate's mission, organization, and budgetary structure; a discussion of selected critiques of the S&T Directorate; and an analysis of selected issues facing congressional policymakers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-05-03
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Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia [May 14, 2013]
"The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that is primarily used as a fertilizer whose use generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Schierow, Linda-Jo; Szymendera, Scott
2013-05-14
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [March 25, 2009]
"Detection of and protection against illicit acquisition and use of special nuclear material (SNM) is a longstanding concern of the U.S. government. Since the development of nuclear weapons, federal agencies have been involved in securing U.S. nuclear assets against diversion, theft, and attack. Similarly, concerns that terrorists or non-state actors might acquire a nuclear weapon or the materials necessary to construct one have led to federal efforts to track, detect, and secure such materials domestically and abroad. Preventing a terrorist or non-state nuclear attack within the United States involves more than detection of the nuclear weapon. A larger system of deterrence, counterproliferation, and response activities are established to address the nuclear threat. Intelligence information gathering regarding the intent and capability of terrorist and non-state groups and law enforcement activities that disrupt the formation and action of these groups play key roles in preventing initial acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials. Another crucial step subsequent to the detection of illicit nuclear or radiological materials is successful interdiction of these materials. Nevertheless, this report addresses only the global nuclear detection architecture, not programs focusing on events prior or subsequent to the detection opportunity."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-03-25