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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 21, 2010]
"On December 20, 2010, CBS News reported that the Department of Homeland Security had uncovered a credible threat of attacks using poisons, such as ricin, in salad bars and buffets. Ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although ricin's potential use as a military weapon was investigated, its predominant use has been in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-12-21
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [April 18, 2013]
"In April 2013 envelopes sent to President Obama and a U.S. Senator tested preliminarily positive for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans. Ricin has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although governments have investigated ricin's potential use as a military weapon, individuals have used ricin in small quantities. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is a select agent, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-04-18
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [Updated February 4, 2004]
"On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation and injection, causing organ damage that can lead to death. While research continues on new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure, no approved treatments or prophylaxis for human use currently exist. Research to develop sensitive, portable detectors capable of detecting the release of ricin is ongoing. Although ricin was investigated as a potential military weapon, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use, is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-02-04
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [September 03, 2009]
"The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Radiation portal monitors are used to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. Combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, they provide for a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material. […]Laboratory and field tests of the ASPs, cost-benefit analyses, and other activities are under way to inform the Secretary's certification decision. Among the issues Congress faces are whether to further define the expected performance of the ASP systems through additional legislation; how to assess whether the ASP systems are technologically ready to be deployed; how to weigh the potential economic and security benefits of ASP deployment against its financial cost; and whether the certification process developed by DHS to establish a 'significant increase in operational effectiveness' is well founded."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2009-09-03
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [February 17, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 111th Congress extended this authority through March 4, 2011, and debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some Members of Congress supported an extension, either short or long term, of the existing authority. Other Members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-02-17
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues and Options for Congress [February 8, 2011]
From the Document: "Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama's 2010 State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. […] Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures. Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs or creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting or creating programs may result in additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges. Maintaining or shrinking programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2011-02-08
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [April 19, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 18, 2011. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several [...] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the expiring statutory authority in order to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulation in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This last approach would leave chemical facility security regulation to the discretion of state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-04-19
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [March 8, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 18, 2011. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several [...] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the expiring statutory authority in order to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulation in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This last approach would leave chemical facility security regulation to the discretion of state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-03-08
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [November 15, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in December 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either shortor long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies. [...] The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83) extended the existing statutory authority through October 4, 2010, and provided DHS with additional chemical facility security funding relative to FY2009. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111- 242) extended the statutory authority through December 3, 2010. The House of Representatives has passed H.R. 2868, which addresses chemical facility, water treatment facility, and wastewater treatment facility security. This legislation includes provisions of H.R. 3258 and H.R. 2883. H.R. 2868 has been ordered reported as amended by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Members have introduced other bills in the 111th Congress to address security at chemical facilities and other facilities that possess chemicals. S. 2996/H.R. 5186 would extended the existing authority until October 4, 2015, and establish chemical security training and exercise programs. H.R. 2477 would extend the existing statutory authority until October 1, 2012. H.R. 261 and S. 3599 would alter the existing authority. S. 3598 would authorize EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] to establish certain risk-based security requirements for wastewater facilities. In addition, draft legislation is reportedly under development by the Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-11-15
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Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [December 22, 2010]
"The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. After several years of demand exceeding supply, a call for large quantities of helium-3 spurred federal officials to realize that insufficient helium-3 was available to meet the likely future demand."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-12-22
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [December 23, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in March 2011. The 111th Congress took action to extend this program and debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some members of Congress supported an extension, either short or long term, of the existing authority. Other members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-12-23
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress [March 18, 2010]
"The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities are insufficient to face the threat. The federal government's efforts to address the perceived threat of bioterrorism span many different agencies and are organized and directed through several strategy and planning documents. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government's efforts to address the bioterrorism threat could be significantly improved. Key questions face congressional policymakers in these areas: Are the efforts already underway sufficient to face the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should these existing programs be altered, augmented, or terminated in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others? [...] Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and its oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers will likely be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-03-18
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [May 21, 2010]
"The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Customs and Border Protection officers use radiation portal monitors to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. When combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, they provide a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-05-21
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DHS Directorate of Science and Technology: Key Issues for Congress [June 22, 2009]
From the Document: "The Directorate of Science and Technology is the primary organization for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With an appropriated budget of $932.6 million in FY2009, it conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own and funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national laboratories, industry, and universities. The directorate consists primarily of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as laboratory facilities and university programs, that cut across the divisions. The directorate is headed by the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. In the past, some Members of Congress and other observers have been highly critical of the directorate's performance. Although management changes have somewhat muted this criticism in recent years, fundamental issues remain. […] Congressional policymakers are widely expected to consider reauthorization legislation for DHS during the 111th Congress. Such legislation would likely include provisions that would affect the Science and Technology Directorate."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2009-06-22
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [July 13, 2009]
"The statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes, granted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the 109th Congress, expires in October 2009. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the manner of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional deliberation and debate. The Obama Administration and some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security authorities. The tension between continuing and changing the current regulatory program and statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding program effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. [...]. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses are likely to be considered during the reauthorization debate. These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies. Congress may take a variety of actions. Policymakers may choose to permanently or temporarily extend the expiring statutory authority to continue to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might choose to codify the existing regulation in statute to reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-07-13
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Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress [May 4, 2009]
"The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. […]. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose? […]. A key task for policymakers is to define their goals for enhancing oversight of high-containment laboratories. The focus of the oversight effort may affect which policy issues are addressed. For example, focusing on a registry of existing high-containment laboratory capacity may improve planning, coordination, and efficiency of use but provide relatively limited security benefits. […]. When weighing options to address these complex policy issues, policymakers may have to reconcile many competing and potentially conflicting national needs."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2009-05-04
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [February 16, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in October 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either shortor long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding its effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses have been considered during the reauthorization debate. These issues include the facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-02-16
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [March 25, 2009]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report analyzes the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program. "The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Radiation portal monitors are used to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, that are entering the United States. Combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, they provide for a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing so, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2009-03-25
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Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress [March 5, 2009]
"The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. Several departments and agencies have increased or are in the process of increasing their laboratory capacity. High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Indeed, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommends tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2009-03-05
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated February 2, 2004]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of select classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-02-02
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated February 2, 2006]
From the Summary: "Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of selective classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is third option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-02-02
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated October 1, 2002]
"Much of the U. S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyberattack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. A draft version of The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace has been released. Contained within are a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that Department of Energy standards for securing control systems be implemented. Possible policy options for congressional consideration include further development of uniform standards for infrastructure cyber-protection, growth in research into encryption methods for industrial control systems, enhancing information sharing between industry and government representatives, potentially through expanded exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, and mandating assessments by industry to determine and reduce cyber-vulnerabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2002-10-01
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Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security [Updated April 12, 2006]
"Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about the current state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk of a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemical facilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant or chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facility security. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemical facilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Many questions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should security measures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or should such regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required at chemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facility security or should chemical facilities bear security costs? Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining which chemical facilities should be protected by analyzing and prioritizing chemical facility security risks; identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk; and establishing what activities could enhance facility security to an acceptable level."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-04-12
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated July 14, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectors potentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical, and energy sectors. The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high and range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace, released in February 2003, contains a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that standards for securing control systems be developed and implemented."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-07-14
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated April 23, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyberattack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace was released and contained a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that standards for securing control systems be developed and implemented. Possible policy options for congressional consideration include further development of uniform standards for infrastructure cyber-protection, growth in research into encryption methods for industrial control systems, assessing the effectiveness of the new exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act and the integration of previous offices in the new Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-04-23
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BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism [November 19, 2003]
"The BioWatch Program uses a series of pathogen detectors co-located with Environmental Protection Agency air quality monitors. These detectors collect airborne particles onto filters, which are subsequently transported to laboratories for analysis. It is expected that this system will provide early warning of a pathogen release, alerting authorities before victims begin to show symptoms and providing the opportunity to deliver treatments earlier, decreasing illness and death. The BioWatch Program, funded and overseen by DHS, has three main elements each coordinated by different agencies, sampling, analysis, and response. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains the sampling component, the sensors that collect airborne particles. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) coordinates analysis, the laboratory testing of the samples, though testing is actually carried out in state and local public health laboratories. Local jurisdictions are responsible for the public health response to positive findings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is designated as the lead agency for the law enforcement response if a bioterrorism event is detected. The BioWatch Program has raised concerns in some quarters, with questions about its general effectiveness, the siting of pathogen detectors, the reliability of its results, its cost and workforce requirements, and the ability of public health officials to respond to BioWatch results. Efforts to develop integrated response plans, lower the system cost, and develop complementary and next-generation systems continue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Lister, Sarah A.
2003-11-19
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [January 10, 2003]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either at the funding stage or before publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-01-10
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated July 9, 2003]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-07-09
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated December 16, 2004]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of select classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-16
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated January 20, 2004]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectors potentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical, and energy sectors. The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. Efforts in increasing the cyber-security of control systems occur both at federal government facilities and, in critical infrastructure sectors, through industry groups. The Department of Energy National Laboratories, the Department of Defense, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology all have programs to assess and ameliorate the cyber-vulnerabilities of control systems. Industry-based research into standards, best practices, and control system encryption is ongoing in the natural gas and electricity sector."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-01-20
