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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [May 9, 2014]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policy makers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. […] The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to additional focus on DHS's ability to identify noncompliant facilities. The West Fertilizer Company had not reported to DHS under the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] program, though it appeared to have possessed more than screening threshold quantities of chemicals of interest. While DHS had engaged in previous activity to identify facilities that had not complied with CFATS reporting requirements, DHS did not identify the West Fertilizer Company. Congressional policy makers have questioned the sufficiency of DHS efforts to identify these noncompliant 'outlier' facilities. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-05-09
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Federal Pause in Potentially Risky Influenza Research [November 24, 2014]
"Over several decades, Congress has enacted legislation to fund research into the origins and mechanisms of the causes and transmission of disease with the intent to spur the development of treatments and to improve public health. It has also enacted legislation in order to improve the security of biological pathogens. A recently implemented federal research moratorium has highlighted concerns about the general appropriateness of this research and the sufficiency of these biosecurity efforts. Policymakers focused on the intersection of public health and scientific research may question whether a moratorium appropriately balances federal interests in developing disease countermeasures with concerns over the potential of altered pathogens escaping research laboratories."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-11-24
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [October 2, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. [...] Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's [Department of Homeland Security's] effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). […]. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS [Department of Homeland Security]. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS [Department of Homeland Security], effectiveness of DHS [Department of Homeland Security] program management, and the availability of CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. […] Both appropriation and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress address chemical facility security. P.L. 112-175 extended the existing authority until March 27, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. 3216 and H.R. 5855, as passed by the House) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-10-02
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [January 11, 2007]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-01-11
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [March 25, 2009]
"Detection of and protection against illicit acquisition and use of special nuclear material (SNM) is a longstanding concern of the U.S. government. Since the development of nuclear weapons, federal agencies have been involved in securing U.S. nuclear assets against diversion, theft, and attack. Similarly, concerns that terrorists or non-state actors might acquire a nuclear weapon or the materials necessary to construct one have led to federal efforts to track, detect, and secure such materials domestically and abroad. Preventing a terrorist or non-state nuclear attack within the United States involves more than detection of the nuclear weapon. A larger system of deterrence, counterproliferation, and response activities are established to address the nuclear threat. Intelligence information gathering regarding the intent and capability of terrorist and non-state groups and law enforcement activities that disrupt the formation and action of these groups play key roles in preventing initial acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials. Another crucial step subsequent to the detection of illicit nuclear or radiological materials is successful interdiction of these materials. Nevertheless, this report addresses only the global nuclear detection architecture, not programs focusing on events prior or subsequent to the detection opportunity."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2009-03-25
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [March 28, 2006]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. The federal government is a major source of life sciences research funding. Tension over the need to maintain homeland security and support scientific endeavor has led to renewed consideration of federal policies of scientific oversight. Balancing effective support of the research enterprise with security risks generated by such research has proven to be a complex challenge. Policies considered to address science and security generate tensions between the federal funding agency and the recipient of federal funding. To minimize these tensions while maximizing effective oversight of research, insight and advice from the disparate stakeholders is generally considered essential."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-03-28
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated January 20, 2004]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectors potentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical, and energy sectors. The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. Efforts in increasing the cyber-security of control systems occur both at federal government facilities and, in critical infrastructure sectors, through industry groups. The Department of Energy National Laboratories, the Department of Defense, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology all have programs to assess and ameliorate the cyber-vulnerabilities of control systems. Industry-based research into standards, best practices, and control system encryption is ongoing in the natural gas and electricity sector."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-01-20
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Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security [Updated April 12, 2006]
"Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about the current state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk of a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemical facilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant or chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facility security. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemical facilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Many questions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should security measures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or should such regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required at chemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facility security or should chemical facilities bear security costs? Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining which chemical facilities should be protected by analyzing and prioritizing chemical facility security risks; identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk; and establishing what activities could enhance facility security to an acceptable level."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-04-12
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [January 31, 2007]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed security regulations for chemical facilities, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The proposed regulations (71 Federal Register 78,276-78,332 (December 28, 2006)) require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the DHS Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. The Secretary would then determine what chemical facilities are high-risk, and thus need to comply with additional security requirements. The proposed security requirements would be performance-based, rather than prescriptive, and tiered, with facilities in higher tiers having more stringent requirements than those in lower tiers. High-risk chemical facilities will be required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. The DHS Secretary will approve or disapprove each step in the process, requiring the chemical facility to improve the facility submission or implementation in the case of disapproval."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2007-01-31
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated July 14, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectors potentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical, and energy sectors. The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high and range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace, released in February 2003, contains a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that standards for securing control systems be developed and implemented."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-07-14
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated April 23, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyberattack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace was released and contained a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that standards for securing control systems be developed and implemented. Possible policy options for congressional consideration include further development of uniform standards for infrastructure cyber-protection, growth in research into encryption methods for industrial control systems, assessing the effectiveness of the new exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act and the integration of previous offices in the new Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-04-23
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated October 1, 2002]
"Much of the U. S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyberattack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. A draft version of The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace has been released. Contained within are a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that Department of Energy standards for securing control systems be implemented. Possible policy options for congressional consideration include further development of uniform standards for infrastructure cyber-protection, growth in research into encryption methods for industrial control systems, enhancing information sharing between industry and government representatives, potentially through expanded exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, and mandating assessments by industry to determine and reduce cyber-vulnerabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2002-10-01
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [September 4, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-04
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated October 4, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. […] To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in research on animal diseases not native to the United States at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) off the coast of New York. With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. DHS has established a foreign animal disease research program in cooperation with USDA at PIADC. DHS has identified the facility as outdated and too limited to continue to be the primary research facility. […] The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues that may interest Congress. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, prioritization, and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high-containment laboratory space becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Grotton, Frank; Monke, James
2007-10-04
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RMP Facilities in the United States as of February 2008 [March 4, 2008]
"This memorandum responds to your request regarding facilities submitting risk management plans (RMPs) to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). You requested an analysis of RMP facilities within the United States by potentially affected population. You also requested an analysis of facilities that were required by regulation to resubmit their information to the EPA but had not done so. Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), the EPA established a program requiring facilities possessing greater than certain threshold quantities of 140 chemicals to provide risk management plans to the EPA. As part of this reporting requirement, facilities are required to determine the worst-case scenario release from a single chemical process, using EPA criteria and guidelines. Facilities are also required to estimate the population potentially at risk from this worst-case scenario release by calculating the population that resides within a circle surrounding the facility, with the radius of the circle determined by the distance the worst-case scenario release might travel."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-03-04
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Comments on Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology [March 31, 2008]
"Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology is, according to its foreword, a 'descriptive baseline for homeland security research and development measures across the federal government ... developed with the cooperation of [other] federal agencies" and is a "first step in developing a more prescriptive plan.' Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology asserts that the baseline contained within the document ' will be used to provide an overarching strategy for addressing the science and technology needs for homeland security.' It is not a national homeland security R&D policy or a national homeland security R&D strategic plan. It is a compilation of science and technology requirements, gaps, strategic goals, and agency roles, responsibilities, accomplishments and ongoing activities, apparently inferred or extracted from a variety of existing strategies, plans, directives, and other sources."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-03-31
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated January 10, 2008]
"On April 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an interim final rule (72 Federal Register 17688-17745) on chemical facility security, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The regulations require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. […]. High-risk facilities are to be categorized into tiers based on risk, and those with higher risk must comply with more stringent performance-based security requirements. Under the interim final rule, high-risk chemical facilities are required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. […]. While the interim final rule states it may preempt future state and local chemical facility security regulations, the 110th Congress has narrowed such preemption to when federal regulations have an 'actual conflict' with state and local regulations. These regulations highlight key issues debated in previous Congresses. These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; which chemical facilities should be considered as 'high-risk' and thus regulated; the scope of the risk-based performance standards for different tiers of high-risk chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of existing state chemical facility security regulation; and the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2008-01-10
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 20, 2005]
"On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exist, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detectors is ongoing. Although the potential of ricin as a military weapon was investigated, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.
2005-12-20
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [Updated June 23, 2004]
This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-06-23
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Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management [Updated January 26, 2006]
"On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Russia entered the negotiations seeking a 'legally binding document' that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Russia also wanted the new Treaty to contain a statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. The United States preferred a less formal process in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. This report covers the following topics: negotiations of the treaty, Russian objectives, U.S. objectives, reaching an agreement, the Treaty and its articles, U.S. and Russia's force structure, response and reaction, and the road ahead."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-01-26
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Dual-Use Biological Equipment: Difficulties in Domestic Regulation [Updated January 22, 2004]
"Dual-use technologies, technologies with both civilian and military use, are often cited as lowering technical barriers to terrorist development of chemical and biological weapons. Export of these technologies is regulated through both domestic law and international agreement, but domestic sales are not. Dual-use biological equipment, whose military use includes the production of biological weapons, is employed in many different civilian and commercial applications, including academic research and the pharmaceutical, medical, and manufacturing industries. Consequently, regulating such equipment might have a marked economic impact and prove to be infeasible. Possible approaches to controlling this equipment include voluntary self-regulation and use of industry best practices by suppliers, licensing of equipment purchasers, registration of equipment, and application of civil penalties to suppliers for inappropriate end-use of equipment. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-01-22
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Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security [Updated July 12, 2006]
"Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about the current state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk of a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemical facilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant or chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facility security. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemical facilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Many questions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should security measures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or should such regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required at chemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facility security or should chemical facilities bear security costs? Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining which chemical facilities should be protected by analyzing and prioritizing chemical facility security risks; identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk; and establishing what activities could enhance facility security to an acceptable level. Mechanisms for assessing security risk might include weighing the known or theoretical terrorist threat faced by a particular facility, the chemical hazards held at a facility, the quantities and location of those chemicals relative to the surrounding population, or the facility's industrial classification."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-07-12
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated February 15, 2007]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities...Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2007-02-15
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [Updated July 10, 2006]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. The federal government is a major source of life sciences research funding. Tension over the need to maintain homeland security and support scientific endeavor has led to renewed consideration of federal policies of scientific oversight. Balancing effective support of the research enterprise with security risks generated by such research has proven a complex challenge. Policies considered to address science and security generate tensions between federal funding agencies and federal funding recipients. To minimize these tensions while maximizing effective oversight of research, insight and advice from disparate stakeholders is generally considered essential. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was established as one tool to aid policymakers and researchers in assessing the risks of federally funded research in the life sciences. It aims to provide the Secretary of Health and Human Services and researchers a source for advice on dual-use research and other biosecurity issues. Advice rendered by the NSABB may shape research activities and standards practiced by researchers in life science research fields."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-07-10
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated November 21, 2006]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities...Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-11-21
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated October 4, 2006]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-10-04
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Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact [Updated December 1, 2004]
"The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons pose additional concerns beyond mass casualties. These weapons may contaminate the area in which they are used, emergency vehicles, and first responders. The wide array of potential symptoms from chemical, biological, and toxin weapons makes identification of the causal agent difficult and complicates treatment. Additionally, public fears relating to disease and poisoning could increase the effect of a chemical, biological, or toxin attack, as worried, unexposed people request treatment from medical facilities. In extreme cases, public hysteria has been postulated as an outcome from mass dissemination. Several initiatives are underway to reduce the potential value of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. One approach has been through funding significant increases in the public health system's preparedness and response capacity. Additionally, facilities and researchers possessing 'select agents' have been registered in a national database. Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of 'dual-use' equipment; further development of the public health system; federal incentives for research and development into chemical, biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines, countermeasures and detectors; informational public outreach programs to properly inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary media codes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-01
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [Updated April 26, 2007]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations via H.R. 1 and S. 4."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2007-04-26
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated September 10, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in foreign animal disease research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. The DHS has identified the PIADC facility as too old and limited to continue to be the primary facility performing this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). […] The final construction costs would depend on the site location and actual construction time lines, but are projected to exceed $460 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated June 21, 2007]
"On April 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an interim final rule (72 Federal Register 17688-17745 (April 9, 2007)) on chemical facility security, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Section 550). The regulations require chemical facilities possessing amounts and types of substances considered by the DHS Secretary to be hazardous to notify DHS and undergo a consequence-based screening process. The Secretary then determines which chemical facilities are highrisk, and thus need to comply with additional security requirements. High-risk facilities are to be categorized into tiers based on risk, and those with higher risk must comply with more stringent, performance-based security requirements. Under the interim final rule, high-risk chemical facilities are required to create and submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment; create and submit to DHS a site security plan, addressing the vulnerability assessment and complying with the performance-based standards; and implement the site security plan at the chemical facility. The DHS Secretary is to approve or disapprove each step in the process, and may require the chemical facility to improve the submission or implementation. The interim final rule establishes a new category of protected information, Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), granting it a status between sensitive but unclassified and classified information. […] Since the statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities expires in 2009, policymakers may choose to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2007-06-21
