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Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia [May 14, 2013]
"The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that is primarily used as a fertilizer whose use generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Schierow, Linda-Jo; Szymendera, Scott
2013-05-14
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [February 17, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 111th Congress extended this authority through March 4, 2011, and debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some Members of Congress supported an extension, either short or long term, of the existing authority. Other Members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the level of detail provided to DHS and the availability of inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with the CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-02-17
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Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [December 22, 2010]
"The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. After several years of demand exceeding supply, a call for large quantities of helium-3 spurred federal officials to realize that insufficient helium-3 was available to meet the likely future demand."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-12-22
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [December 23, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in March 2011. The 111th Congress took action to extend this program and debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some members of Congress supported an extension, either short or long term, of the existing authority. Other members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-12-23
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [December 10, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in December 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remain an issue of congressional debate. Some members of Congress support an extension, either short or long term, of the existing authority. Other members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. [...] The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83) extended the existing statutory authority through October 4, 2010, and provided DHS with additional chemical facility security funding relative to FY2009. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111- 242) extended the statutory authority through December 3, 2010. P.L. 111-290 extended the statutory authority through December 18, 2010. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 2868, an authorization bill which addresses chemical facility, water treatment facility, and wastewater treatment facility security. This legislation includes provisions of H.R. 3258 and H.R. 2883. H.R. 2868 has been ordered reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Senate bill ordered reported differs significantly from the House-passed version. Members have introduced other bills in the 111th Congress to address security at chemical facilities and other facilities that possess chemicals. S. 2996/H.R. 5186 would extended the existing authority until October 4, 2015, and establish chemical security training and exercise programs. H.R. 2477 would extend the existing statutory authority until October 1, 2012. H.R. 261 and S. 3599 would alter the existing authority. S. 3598 would authorize EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] to establish certain risk-based security requirements for wastewater facilities. In addition, draft legislation is reportedly under development by the Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-12-10
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [November 15, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in December 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remains an issue of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either shortor long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the reauthorization debate. These issues include the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; and the role of inherently safer technologies. [...] The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83) extended the existing statutory authority through October 4, 2010, and provided DHS with additional chemical facility security funding relative to FY2009. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111- 242) extended the statutory authority through December 3, 2010. The House of Representatives has passed H.R. 2868, which addresses chemical facility, water treatment facility, and wastewater treatment facility security. This legislation includes provisions of H.R. 3258 and H.R. 2883. H.R. 2868 has been ordered reported as amended by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Members have introduced other bills in the 111th Congress to address security at chemical facilities and other facilities that possess chemicals. S. 2996/H.R. 5186 would extended the existing authority until October 4, 2015, and establish chemical security training and exercise programs. H.R. 2477 would extend the existing statutory authority until October 1, 2012. H.R. 261 and S. 3599 would alter the existing authority. S. 3598 would authorize EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] to establish certain risk-based security requirements for wastewater facilities. In addition, draft legislation is reportedly under development by the Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-11-15
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [April 19, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 18, 2011. [...] The DHS is in the process of implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several [...] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the expiring statutory authority in order to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulation in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This last approach would leave chemical facility security regulation to the discretion of state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-04-19
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 21, 2010]
"On December 20, 2010, CBS News reported that the Department of Homeland Security had uncovered a credible threat of attacks using poisons, such as ricin, in salad bars and buffets. Ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although ricin's potential use as a military weapon was investigated, its predominant use has been in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-12-21
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Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [January 27, 2015]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. […] This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2015-01-27
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Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [February 25, 2015]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,600 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of April 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,316 of the approximately 4,200 facilities then regulated. The DHS reported in December 2014 that it now regulates approximately 3,600 facilities, approximately 2,700 of which have final risk assignments. The DHS authorizes a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS approves the site security plan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2015-02-25
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 25, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2008-11-25
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Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management [December 7, 2004]
"The threat of terrorist detonation of a dirty bomb, one type of radiological dispersal device (RDD), has focused public attention on efforts to counter use of this weapon. An RDD attack might cause casualties, economic damage, and, potentially, public panic, though experts disagree on the likely magnitude of each of these effects. The impact of an RDD attack would depend on many variables, such as meteorological conditions, type and amount of radiological material, duration of exposure, and method of dispersal. Issues of potential congressional interest include the level of federal funding for research and development of medical countermeasures against RDDs and the appropriateness of current standards for environmental decontamination following an RDD attack. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-07
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [March 28, 2016]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] Several recurrent OSTP issues face Congress: the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy areas for OSTP focus; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST. Some in the S&T community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of prioritization and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and that PCAST has insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Sargent, John F.
2016-03-28
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [March 7, 2013]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-03-07
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Publishing Scientific Papers with Potential Security Risks: Issues for Congress [March 18, 2013]
"The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders, are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. […] This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-03-18
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [November 26, 2012]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' [...] In FY2011, Congress sought to restrict OSTP from engaging in certain activities with China or any Chinese-owned company by prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for these activities (P.L. 112-10). The OSTP expended a portion of its FY2011 appropriation to engage in activities with China that Congress sought to proscribe. The Department of Justice and OSTP asserted that this congressional effort infringed upon the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign diplomacy. In contrast, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that OSTP violated the Antideficiency Act, though it did not speak to the constitutional issue. Congress enacted a similar restriction for FY2012 (P.L. 112-55) and FY2013 (P.L. 112-175) and may continue its interest in the debate over its ability to restrict the activities of OSTP. Among other issues Congress may wish to consider are the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy foci of OSTP; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2012-11-26
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [April 12, 2013]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] In FY2011, Congress sought to restrict OSTP from engaging in certain activities with China or any Chinese-owned company by prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for these activities (P.L. 112-10). The OSTP expended a portion of its FY2011 appropriation to engage in activities with China that Congress sought to proscribe. The Department of Justice and OSTP asserted that this congressional effort infringed upon the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign diplomacy. In contrast, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that OSTP violated the Antideficiency Act, though it did not speak to the constitutional issue. Congress enacted a similar restriction for FY2012 (P.L. 112-55) and FY2013 (P.L. 113-6) and may continue its interest in the debate over its ability to restrict the activities of OSTP. Among other issues Congress may wish to consider are the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy foci of OSTP; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-12
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [April 1, 2013]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-01
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [April 12, 2013]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), including the position of its Director, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. [Public Law] 94-282) to provide scientific and technological analysis and advice to the President. This codified and institutionalized a presidential science advice function that previously existed at each President's discretion. This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President and discusses selected issues and options for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-12
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [April 18, 2013]
"In April 2013 envelopes sent to President Obama and a U.S. Senator tested preliminarily positive for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans. Ricin has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although governments have investigated ricin's potential use as a military weapon, individuals have used ricin in small quantities. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is a select agent, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-04-18
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Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating under a Continuing Resolution [October 27, 2008]
"On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). Division A of this law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through March 6, 2009, unless superseded by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally funded by nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. The same law also includes the other three FY2009 appropriations acts: one funding the Department of Defense (Division C of P.L. 110-329), one funding the Department of Homeland Security (Division D of P.L. 110-329), and one funding military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies (Division E of P.L. 110-329). The continuing resolution funds most other agencies and programs at FY2008 pre-supplemental levels. The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2008. Thus new civilian research and development programs and funding increases for existing activities will be delayed until further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs, FY2008 funding was provided under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which largely extended FY2007 funding levels. FY2007 funding was provided under a continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) based on FY2006 appropriations. Therefore, some programs are operating in FY2009 with budgets similar to those of FY2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-10-27
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [June 22, 2016]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] Several recurrent OSTP issues face Congress: the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy areas for OSTP focus; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC [National Science and Technology Council] in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST. Some in the S&T community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of prioritization and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and that PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology] has insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2016-06-22
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [August 17, 2017]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2017-08-17
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [August 2, 2013]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to additional focus on DHS's ability to identify noncompliant facilities. The West Fertilizer Company had not reported to DHS under the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] program, though it appeared to have possessed more than threshold quantities of chemicals of interest. While DHS had engaged in previous activity to identify facilities that had not complied with CFATS reporting requirements, DHS did not identify the West Fertilizer Company. Congressional policymakers have questioned the sufficiency of DHS efforts to identify these noncompliant 'outlier' facilities. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-08-02
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [Updated April 27, 2007]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. […] The success of the NSABB [National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity] in addressing federal concerns related to biodefense and biosecurity may influence congressional action. Absent an existing, effective mechanism to address potentially controversial issues raised by federally funded dual-use research, policymakers could act to establish an oversight mechanism through legislation. Should the NSABB be successful in linking the scientific and security communities and developing guidelines for effective scientific selfoversight, the board could evolve into a forum that policymakers may use to consider the intersections of science and security. Whether the tools available to the federal government are adequate to assess and control security risks from federally funded research or if additional authorities may ultimately need to be developed is yet to be determined. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2007-04-27
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [Updated February 4, 2004]
"On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation and injection, causing organ damage that can lead to death. While research continues on new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure, no approved treatments or prophylaxis for human use currently exist. Research to develop sensitive, portable detectors capable of detecting the release of ricin is ongoing. Although ricin was investigated as a potential military weapon, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use, is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-02-04
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [November 15, 2013]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. […] Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, 348 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-11-15
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [October 18, 2013]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, 253 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-10-18
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [December 11, 2014]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through December 11, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-12-11
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [November 7, 2014]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policy makers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on December 11, 2014. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policy makers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. […] This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-11-07
