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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated July 14, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectors potentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical, and energy sectors. The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high and range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace, released in February 2003, contains a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that standards for securing control systems be developed and implemented."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-07-14
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated April 23, 2003]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been perceived as a high priority. Industries potentially affected by a cyber-attack on industrial control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical and energy sectors. The federal government has issued a warning regarding an increase in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing both interest by international terrorist organizations in critical infrastructure and increases in cyberattack on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems could be high, ranging from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace was released and contained a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integration of public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions that standards for securing control systems be developed and implemented. Possible policy options for congressional consideration include further development of uniform standards for infrastructure cyber-protection, growth in research into encryption methods for industrial control systems, assessing the effectiveness of the new exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act and the integration of previous offices in the new Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-04-23
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BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism [November 19, 2003]
"The BioWatch Program uses a series of pathogen detectors co-located with Environmental Protection Agency air quality monitors. These detectors collect airborne particles onto filters, which are subsequently transported to laboratories for analysis. It is expected that this system will provide early warning of a pathogen release, alerting authorities before victims begin to show symptoms and providing the opportunity to deliver treatments earlier, decreasing illness and death. The BioWatch Program, funded and overseen by DHS, has three main elements each coordinated by different agencies, sampling, analysis, and response. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains the sampling component, the sensors that collect airborne particles. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) coordinates analysis, the laboratory testing of the samples, though testing is actually carried out in state and local public health laboratories. Local jurisdictions are responsible for the public health response to positive findings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is designated as the lead agency for the law enforcement response if a bioterrorism event is detected. The BioWatch Program has raised concerns in some quarters, with questions about its general effectiveness, the siting of pathogen detectors, the reliability of its results, its cost and workforce requirements, and the ability of public health officials to respond to BioWatch results. Efforts to develop integrated response plans, lower the system cost, and develop complementary and next-generation systems continue."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Lister, Sarah A.
2003-11-19
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [May 27, 2011]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2011. The 111th Congress debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some Members of Congress supported an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. […] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate.These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-05-27
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [January 10, 2003]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either at the funding stage or before publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-01-10
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated July 9, 2003]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-07-09
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Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact [Updated June 30, 2003]
The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The
confirmation of terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability
of the United States to such attack have highlighted the potential that these weapons
may be used as weapons of terror. The framework of weapons of mass destruction
includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons.
Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons can produce mass casualties if
effectively disseminated, but have varying and different effects. Chemical weapons,
predominantly man-made chemicals, require the largest amounts of material to be
effective and cause their effects in minutes to hours. Biological weapons made of
naturally occurring pathogens require the least material to be effective, but generally
have an incubation period of several days before symptoms show themselves. Toxin
weapons, chemical agents formed by biological processes, are intermediate between
the two in both amount and timescale. Treatment protocols for chemical, biological,
and toxin weapons vary on a per-agent basis, ranging from weapons with effective
treatment and prophylaxis to weapons which have no known cure nor protection.
Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin
terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of "dual-use"
equipment; further development of the public health system; federal incentives for
research and development into chemical, biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines,
countermeasures and detectors; informational public outreach programs to properly
inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary media codes. This report
will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2003-06-30
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Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress [Updated December 16, 2004]
From the Summary: "There is a lack of consensus regarding the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of select classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an 'Asilomar-like' process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-12-16
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Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat [Updated January 20, 2004]
"Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security for these systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectors potentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone, water, chemical, and energy sectors. The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest in critical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. The potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial control systems range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affecting multiple states for an extended duration. Efforts in increasing the cyber-security of control systems occur both at federal government facilities and, in critical infrastructure sectors, through industry groups. The Department of Energy National Laboratories, the Department of Defense, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology all have programs to assess and ameliorate the cyber-vulnerabilities of control systems. Industry-based research into standards, best practices, and control system encryption is ongoing in the natural gas and electricity sector."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-01-20
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Dual-Use Biological Equipment: Difficulties in Domestic Regulation [Updated January 22, 2004]
"Dual-use technologies, technologies with both civilian and military use, are often cited as lowering technical barriers to terrorist development of chemical and biological weapons. Export of these technologies is regulated through both domestic law and international agreement, but domestic sales are not. Dual-use biological equipment, whose military use includes the production of biological weapons, is employed in many different civilian and commercial applications, including academic research and the pharmaceutical, medical, and manufacturing industries. Consequently, regulating such equipment might have a marked economic impact and prove to be infeasible. Possible approaches to controlling this equipment include voluntary self-regulation and use of industry best practices by suppliers, licensing of equipment purchasers, registration of equipment, and application of civil penalties to suppliers for inappropriate end-use of equipment. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2004-01-22
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [Updated June 23, 2004]
This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-06-23
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Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress [December 30, 2010]
"The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and nextgeneration replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). Customs and Border Protection officers use radiation portal monitors to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. When combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, radiation portal monitors provide a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-12-30
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress [August 6, 2010]
"Recent reports by congressional commissions and others, the inclusion of bioterrorism issues in President Obama's State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. Several strategy and planning documents direct the federal government's biodefense efforts. Many different agencies have a role. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government could significantly improve its efforts to address the bioterrorism threat. Key questions face congressional policymakers: How sufficiently do the efforts already underway address the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should Congress alter, augment, or terminate these existing programs in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-08-06
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Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress [Updated April 28, 2008]
This CRS report discusses U.S. chemical facility security, regulation of the industry, and policy issues for Congress. "These issues include what facilities should be considered as chemical facilities; which chemical facilities should be considered as "high-risk" and thus regulated; the scope of the risk-based performance standards for different tiers of high-risk chemical facilities; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of existing state chemical facility security regulation; and the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight. One key issue not directly addressed by the regulation is the role of inherently safer technology."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Tatelman, Todd
2008-04-28
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [July 7, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses U.S. nuclear detection architecture and the creation in 2006 of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate and give oversight to the numerous programs within the US government which were created to detect "illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a 'global nuclear detection architecture.' Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture. This architecture is a complicated system of systems. Measuring the success of the architecture relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of additional investments are challenges. The DNDO is developing risk and cost methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2008-07-07
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 20, 2005]
"On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exist, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detectors is ongoing. Although the potential of ricin as a military weapon was investigated, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.
2005-12-20
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Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security [December 29, 2005]
"Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about the current state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk of a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemical facilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant or chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facility security. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemical facilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Many questions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should security measures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or should such regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required at chemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facility security or should chemical facilities bear security costs? […] In some cases, proposed legislation complements existing law, while in others overrides it. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1562, the Chemical Facility Security Act of 2005, H.R. 2237, the Chemical Security Act of 2005, and S. 2145, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, contain provisions requiring vulnerability assessment and the creation of security plans, though details vary. This report will discuss current chemical facility security efforts, issues in defining chemical facilities, policy challenges in developing chemical facility security legislation, and the various policy approaches. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2005-12-29
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [August 14, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through October 4, 2012. The Obama Administration has requested a one-year extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-08-14
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [October 2, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. [...] Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's [Department of Homeland Security's] effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). […]. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS [Department of Homeland Security]. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS [Department of Homeland Security], effectiveness of DHS [Department of Homeland Security] program management, and the availability of CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. […] Both appropriation and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress address chemical facility security. P.L. 112-175 extended the existing authority until March 27, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. 3216 and H.R. 5855, as passed by the House) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-10-02
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Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [October 6, 2011]
"The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. […] The committee developed a rationing scheme for allocating the available helium-3. Some federal and private-sector users received no allocation or an amount less than they had planned. Several federal agencies are investigating alternative sources of helium-3 and ways to reduce the demand. Congressional attention appears predominantly focused on oversight of the current situation, how it arose, and the processes currently in place for addressing it. In future hearings and legislation, Congress may address additional issues, such as increasing the helium-3 supply, reducing demand, or changing how supply is allocated. This report discusses the nature of the shortage; federal actions undertaken so far to address it; current and potential sources of helium-3 and options for increasing the supply; current and projected uses of helium-3 and options for reducing the demand; and options for allocating the supply if it continues to fall short of the demand."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2011-10-06
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President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [November 26, 2012]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' [...] In FY2011, Congress sought to restrict OSTP from engaging in certain activities with China or any Chinese-owned company by prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for these activities (P.L. 112-10). The OSTP expended a portion of its FY2011 appropriation to engage in activities with China that Congress sought to proscribe. The Department of Justice and OSTP asserted that this congressional effort infringed upon the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign diplomacy. In contrast, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that OSTP violated the Antideficiency Act, though it did not speak to the constitutional issue. Congress enacted a similar restriction for FY2012 (P.L. 112-55) and FY2013 (P.L. 112-175) and may continue its interest in the debate over its ability to restrict the activities of OSTP. Among other issues Congress may wish to consider are the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy foci of OSTP; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2012-11-26
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Electric Utility Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: Transformers, Towers, and Terrorism [April 9, 2004]
"The U.S. electric power system has historically operated at such a high level of reliability that any major outage, either caused by sabotage, weather, or operational errors, makes news headlines. The transmission system is extensive, consisting mainly of transformers, switches, transmission towers and lines, control centers, and computer controls. A spectrum of threats exists to the electric system ranging from weather-related to terrorist attacks, including physical attacks, as well as attacks on computer systems, or cyber attacks. The main risk from weather-related damage or a terrorist attack against the electric power industry is a widespread power outage that lasts for an extended period of time. […] Issues facing Congress include: What should be done to address vulnerabilities in the electric system? Who should be responsible for implementing appropriate actions? Who should pay? Should reliability guidelines or standards be implemented by the federal government or industry groups? And, who should be responsible for carrying out research and development to reduce vulnerabilities?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Abel, Amy; Parfomak, Paul W.; Shea, Dana A.
2004-04-09
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [November 30, 2012]
"Even before September 11, 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern about the safety and security of facilities possessing certain amounts of hazardous chemicals. The sudden release of hazardous chemicals from facilities storing large quantities might potentially harm many people living or working near the facility. Historically, chemical facilities engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Following September 11, 2001, some states enacted laws requiring additional consideration of security at chemical facilities. Congress debated whether the federal government should reduce the risk such facilities pose by regulating them for security purposes. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority. This statutory authority expires on March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested a one-year extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. [Senate bill] 3216 and H.R. 5855) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for congressional reauthorization of this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration. Finally, it discusses legislation in the 112th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-11-30
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Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects [December 13, 2012]
From the Document: "Experts believe that terrorist use of chemical agents is an event with low probability, but potentially high consequences. While terrorist groups may or may not have an increased interest in chemical agent acquisition and use, the domestic vulnerability of the United States to chemical attack remains an issue. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security of purported Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, and their potential use. Policy approaches to reducing chemical vulnerability have generally treated chemical agents as a group, rather than addressing specific agents. Additionally, military and civilian chemical agent detection have developed with little coordination, so that civilian toxic industrial chemical kits and military chemical weapons detectors have varying sensitivities and detection capabilities. Treatments for chemical exposure vary on a chemical by chemical basis. Because comparatively few individuals have been exposed to modern chemical weapons, health care providers have limited practical experience in treatment of chemical casualties, especially among civilians. While national efforts to reduce vulnerability to terrorist chemical agent use continue, it is not clear whether these efforts address the risks from those specific agents that pose the greatest danger. This report describes the different types of chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, their availability, treatment, and detection."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-12-13
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [December 21, 2012]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2012-12-21
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [January 31, 2013]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-01-31
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Publishing Scientific Papers with Potential Security Risks: Issues for Congress [March 18, 2013]
"The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders, are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. […] This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-03-18
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [January 18, 2013]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-01-18
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [February 7, 2005]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being tested for suitability in airport operation. Their technical capabilities have not been fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.); Shea, Dana A.
2005-02-07
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Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [August 9, 2006]
"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities have not been fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2006-08-09
