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• DHS S&T Directorate: Selected Issues for Congress [May 3, 2013]

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  From the Document: "Both congressional and executive branch policymakers assert that science and technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and capabilities for research and development (R&D). The DHS supports both short- and long-term R&D activities. However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many years. The S&T Directorate and other DHS offices have not developed homeland security technological advances at the rate some Members of Congress expected. Since the establishment of DHS, the appropriations committees have often expressed displeasure at the rate of technology transfer, the direction of R&D efforts, and the ability of the S&T Directorate to align its resources and mission. In a time of increasing fiscal constraint, some Members have questioned prioritizing S&T Directorate R&D activities rather than other departmental needs. This report provides a brief overview of the S&T Directorate's mission, organization, and budgetary structure; a discussion of selected critiques of the S&T Directorate; and an analysis of selected issues facing congressional policymakers."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-05-03
• Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia [May 14, 2013]

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  "The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that is primarily used as a fertilizer whose use generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.; Schierow, Linda-Jo; Szymendera, Scott

  2013-05-14
• Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress [March 25, 2009]

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  "Detection of and protection against illicit acquisition and use of special nuclear material (SNM) is a longstanding concern of the U.S. government. Since the development of nuclear weapons, federal agencies have been involved in securing U.S. nuclear assets against diversion, theft, and attack. Similarly, concerns that terrorists or non-state actors might acquire a nuclear weapon or the materials necessary to construct one have led to federal efforts to track, detect, and secure such materials domestically and abroad. Preventing a terrorist or non-state nuclear attack within the United States involves more than detection of the nuclear weapon. A larger system of deterrence, counterproliferation, and response activities are established to address the nuclear threat. Intelligence information gathering regarding the intent and capability of terrorist and non-state groups and law enforcement activities that disrupt the formation and action of these groups play key roles in preventing initial acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials. Another crucial step subsequent to the detection of illicit nuclear or radiological materials is successful interdiction of these materials. Nevertheless, this report addresses only the global nuclear detection architecture, not programs focusing on events prior or subsequent to the detection opportunity."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2009-03-25
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [August 2, 2013]

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  "Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to additional focus on DHS's ability to identify noncompliant facilities. The West Fertilizer Company had not reported to DHS under the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] program, though it appeared to have possessed more than threshold quantities of chemicals of interest. While DHS had engaged in previous activity to identify facilities that had not complied with CFATS reporting requirements, DHS did not identify the West Fertilizer Company. Congressional policymakers have questioned the sufficiency of DHS efforts to identify these noncompliant 'outlier' facilities. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-08-02
• Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia [July 31, 2013]

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  "The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that can be used as a fertilizer, a use that generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate coated in wax and stored in paper bags caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.; Schierow, Linda-Jo; Szymendera, Scott

  2013-07-31
• DHS S&T Directorate: Selected Issues for Congress [April 14, 2014]

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  From the Summary: "Both congressional and executive branch policy makers assert that science and technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and research and development (R&D) capabilities. The DHS supports both short- and long-term R&D activities. However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many years. The S&T Directorate and other DHS offices have not developed technological advances at the rate some Members of Congress expected. Since the establishment of DHS, the appropriations committees have often expressed displeasure at the rate of technology transfer, the direction of R&D efforts, and the ability of the S&T Directorate to align its resources and mission. In a time of increasing fiscal constraint, some Members have questioned whether S&T Directorate R&D activities should receive priority over other non-R&D activities. This report provides a brief overview of the S&T Directorate's mission, organization, and budgetary structure; a discussion of selected critiques of the S&T Directorate; and an analysis of selected issues facing congressional policy makers."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-04-14
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [August 12, 2014]

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  "This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policy makers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-08-12
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [July 17, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 819 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-07-17
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [July 10, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 4,000 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-05-09
• Statutory Authority for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): A Comparison of H.R. 4007 and P.L. 109-295, Section 550 [July 17, 2014]

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  "The 109th Congress provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes through Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295). This statutory authority contains a termination date, after which the statutory authority expires. The current termination date is October 4, 2014. Subsequent Congresses have attempted to provide a new authorization for the current statutory authority, which DHS implements through the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). In the 113th Congress, several bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate. One, H.R. 4007, has passed the House. H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, incorporates much of the language in the existing statute. Consequently, its authorities would generally encompass the existing authorities, and its implementation by DHS may retain a similar regulatory structure. Indeed, the bill expressly would allow DHS to use existing CFATS regulations to implement its provisions. Unlike the existing statute, H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, as amended). It would create a new title, Title XXI, called Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. Another key difference between H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, and the existing statute is the absence of a termination date for the statutory authority. The statutory authority would be permanent, though H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, includes a limited three-year authorization of appropriations."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-07-17
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [April 2, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then authorizes. The DHS also inspects high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans and later for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 4,300 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of February 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,325 of the approximately 4,200 regulated facilities. The DHS 'authorizes' a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS 'approves' the site security plan. As of April 2014, DHS had authorized 1,335 site security plans; conducted 912 authorization inspections; and approved 649 site security plans."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-04-02
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [May 9, 2014]

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  "This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policy makers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-05-09
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [April 16, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 649 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk. For additional analysis of CFATS implementation, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R43346, 'Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-04-16
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [May 9, 2014]

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  "Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policy makers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. […] The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to additional focus on DHS's ability to identify noncompliant facilities. The West Fertilizer Company had not reported to DHS under the CFATS [chemical facility anti-terrorism standards] program, though it appeared to have possessed more than screening threshold quantities of chemicals of interest. While DHS had engaged in previous activity to identify facilities that had not complied with CFATS reporting requirements, DHS did not identify the West Fertilizer Company. Congressional policy makers have questioned the sufficiency of DHS efforts to identify these noncompliant 'outlier' facilities. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-05-09
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [September 16, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 900 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-09-16
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [September 15, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,900 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-09-15
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [October 14, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through December 11, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 900 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-10-14
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [October 14, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,900 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of April 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,316 of the approximately 4,200 facilities then regulated. The DHS reported in October 2014 that it now regulates approximately 3,700 facilities, though it did not report the number with final risk assignments. The DHS authorizes a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS approves the site security plan."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-10-14
• Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects [September 13, 2013]

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  From the Document: "The potential for terrorist use of chemical agents is a noted concern highlighted by the Tokyo sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such unconventional attacks. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security and use of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents. For analysis of chemical weapons in Syria, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R42848, 'Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress', coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin. Military planners generally organize chemical agents, such as chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, into four groups: nerve agents (such as sarin and VX), blister agents (such as mustard gas), choking agents (such as chlorine and phosgene), and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide). While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, terrorist use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-09-13
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [October 18, 2013]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, 253 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-10-18
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [November 15, 2013]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. […] Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, 348 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-11-15
• Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management [December 7, 2004]

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  "The threat of terrorist detonation of a dirty bomb, one type of radiological dispersal device (RDD), has focused public attention on efforts to counter use of this weapon. An RDD attack might cause casualties, economic damage, and, potentially, public panic, though experts disagree on the likely magnitude of each of these effects. The impact of an RDD attack would depend on many variables, such as meteorological conditions, type and amount of radiological material, duration of exposure, and method of dispersal. Issues of potential congressional interest include the level of federal funding for research and development of medical countermeasures against RDDs and the appropriateness of current standards for environmental decontamination following an RDD attack. This report will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2004-12-07
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [December 11, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through December 11, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-12-11
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [May 17, 2013]

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  "Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-05-17
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [November 7, 2014]

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  "Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policy makers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on December 11, 2014. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policy makers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. […] This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-11-07
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [February 25, 2015]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,600 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of April 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,316 of the approximately 4,200 facilities then regulated. The DHS reported in December 2014 that it now regulates approximately 3,600 facilities, approximately 2,700 of which have final risk assignments. The DHS authorizes a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS approves the site security plan."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2015-02-25
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [January 27, 2015]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. […] This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2015-01-27
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [November 27, 2013]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 362 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-11-27
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [January 6, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then authorizes. […] This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities for compliance. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policy makers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-01-06
• Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 20, 2005]

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  "On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exist, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detectors is ongoing. Although the potential of ricin as a military weapon was investigated, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.

  2005-12-20