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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [Updated March 3, 2020]
From the Summary: "Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F., Jr.; Shea, Dana A.
2020-03-03
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Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [September 21, 2010]
From the Summary: "The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. After several years of demand exceeding supply, a call for large quantities of helium-3 spurred federal officials to realize that insufficient helium-3 was available to meet the likely future demand. Policymakers now face a number of challenging decisions. In the short term, these decisions are mainly about how to allocate a scarce resource in the face of competing priorities: science versus security, the private sector versus the public sector, and national needs versus international obligations. Applications with unique needs may pose particular challenges. For example, some types of cryogenic research can only be accomplished using helium-3, whereas in medical imaging and neutron detection, helium 3 has advantages but also alternatives. In the longer term, policymakers also face choices about how or whether to increase helium-3 supply or reduce helium-3 demand and about possible alternative mechanisms for allocating supply. It seems likely that a combination of policy approaches will be necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2010-09-21
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Comments on Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology [March 31, 2008]
"Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology is, according to its foreword, a 'descriptive baseline for homeland security research and development measures across the federal government ... developed with the cooperation of [other] federal agencies" and is a "first step in developing a more prescriptive plan.' Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology asserts that the baseline contained within the document ' will be used to provide an overarching strategy for addressing the science and technology needs for homeland security.' It is not a national homeland security R&D policy or a national homeland security R&D strategic plan. It is a compilation of science and technology requirements, gaps, strategic goals, and agency roles, responsibilities, accomplishments and ongoing activities, apparently inferred or extracted from a variety of existing strategies, plans, directives, and other sources."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Moteff, John D.; Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-03-31
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [Updated December 12, 2014]
From the Executive Summary and Introduction: "Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). [...] This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2014-12-12
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [May 27, 2011]
From the Summary: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2011. The 111th Congress debated the scope and details of reauthorization. Some Members of Congress supported an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members called for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority was exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. […] Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contributed to the reauthorization debate. These issues included the adequacy of DHS resources and effort; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the universe of facilities that should be considered as chemical facilities; and the role of inherently safer technologies in achieving security goals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2011-05-27
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Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy Issues, and Options for Congress [December 10, 2010]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. This authority expires in December 2010. The 111th Congress is taking action to reauthorize this program, but the scope and details of its reauthorization remain an issue of congressional debate. Some members of Congress support an extension, either short or long term, of the existing authority. Other members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. The tension between continuing and changing the statutory authority is exacerbated by questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security. [...] The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83) extended the existing statutory authority through October 4, 2010, and provided DHS with additional chemical facility security funding relative to FY2009. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111- 242) extended the statutory authority through December 3, 2010. P.L. 111-290 extended the statutory authority through December 18, 2010. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 2868, an authorization bill which addresses chemical facility, water treatment facility, and wastewater treatment facility security. This legislation includes provisions of H.R. 3258 and H.R. 2883. H.R. 2868 has been ordered reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Senate bill ordered reported differs significantly from the House-passed version. Members have introduced other bills in the 111th Congress to address security at chemical facilities and other facilities that possess chemicals. S. 2996/H.R. 5186 would extended the existing authority until October 4, 2015, and establish chemical security training and exercise programs. H.R. 2477 would extend the existing statutory authority until October 1, 2012. H.R. 261 and S. 3599 would alter the existing authority. S. 3598 would authorize EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] to establish certain risk-based security requirements for wastewater facilities. In addition, draft legislation is reportedly under development by the Department of Homeland Security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2010-12-10
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National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated May 19, 2008]
This CRS report talks about "The National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility [NABF]," this is a facility being built by the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] and it would be a place where "scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases" could be done. Also, this research "may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostic and countermeasures, reducing the risk of a successful terrorist attack." More specifically, "this report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC [Plum Island Animal Disease Center], and community safety concerns." The report also provides the following background information in regards to the program: "the agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases […] To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] to engage in research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center [PIADC], off the coast of New York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA, conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-05-19
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated June 30, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses the directive for the development of agricultural "biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. [Further,] To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and intentional animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in animal disease research, including research into highly contagious animal pathogens and animal diseases not native to the United States. Such research activities have historically been performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on an island near Long Island, NY. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA still maintains an active research program at PIADC. The DHS, in cooperation with USDA, has established its own research and development program at PIADC. As the federal government undertakes new efforts in human biodefense and defense against agroterrorism, DHS has identified the PIADC facility as "reaching the end of its life cycle" and lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility performing this research. The Department of Homeland Security has announced that, to meet the obligations of HSPD-9, it will establish a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would have high-containment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC as well as other pathogens of interest. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and security and policy questions about coordination between DHS and USDA regarding the research to be conducted at NBAF. This report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC, and community safety concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-06-30
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated April 3, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high containment laboratory space becomes available. By law, research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is not permitted on the U.S. mainland. This policy would need to be changed before DHS could conduct FMD research at NBAF if it were sited on the U.S. mainland. Bills (H.R. 1717, H.R. 2419, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 2419) modifying this policy are being considered by in the 110th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-04-03
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated November 21, 2006]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities...Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-11-21
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated October 4, 2006]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-10-04
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [April 25, 2005]
"The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2005-04-25
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 15, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2007-11-15
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated February 15, 2007]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities...Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2007-02-15
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated October 4, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. […] To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in research on animal diseases not native to the United States at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) off the coast of New York. With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. DHS has established a foreign animal disease research program in cooperation with USDA at PIADC. DHS has identified the facility as outdated and too limited to continue to be the primary research facility. […] The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues that may interest Congress. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, prioritization, and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high-containment laboratory space becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Grotton, Frank; Monke, James
2007-10-04
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated September 10, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in foreign animal disease research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. The DHS has identified the PIADC facility as too old and limited to continue to be the primary facility performing this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). […] The final construction costs would depend on the site location and actual construction time lines, but are projected to exceed $460 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-10
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [September 4, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-04
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [January 5, 2006]
"The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-01-05
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [December 14, 2009]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2009-12-14
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 25, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2008-11-25
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [Updated October 8, 2019]
From the Document: "Historically, advice to the President was provided through advisors and boards without statutory authorities. Congress moved in 1976 to codify a formal mechanism for presidential science advice. The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), including the position of its Director, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to provide scientific and technological analysis and advice to the President. This act codified and institutionalized a presidential science advice function that previously existed at each President's discretion. This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President and discusses selected recurrent issues for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F., Jr.; Shea, Dana A.
2019-10-08
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [August 17, 2017]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2017-08-17
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [March 28, 2016]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] Several recurrent OSTP issues face Congress: the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy areas for OSTP focus; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST. Some in the S&T community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of prioritization and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and that PCAST has insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Sargent, John F.
2016-03-28
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Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview [June 22, 2016]
"Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] Several recurrent OSTP issues face Congress: the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy areas for OSTP focus; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC [National Science and Technology Council] in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST. Some in the S&T community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of prioritization and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and that PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology] has insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.
2016-06-22
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [Updated April 27, 2007]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. […] The success of the NSABB [National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity] in addressing federal concerns related to biodefense and biosecurity may influence congressional action. Absent an existing, effective mechanism to address potentially controversial issues raised by federally funded dual-use research, policymakers could act to establish an oversight mechanism through legislation. Should the NSABB be successful in linking the scientific and security communities and developing guidelines for effective scientific selfoversight, the board could evolve into a forum that policymakers may use to consider the intersections of science and security. Whether the tools available to the federal government are adequate to assess and control security risks from federally funded research or if additional authorities may ultimately need to be developed is yet to be determined. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2007-04-27
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [Updated July 10, 2006]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. The federal government is a major source of life sciences research funding. Tension over the need to maintain homeland security and support scientific endeavor has led to renewed consideration of federal policies of scientific oversight. Balancing effective support of the research enterprise with security risks generated by such research has proven a complex challenge. Policies considered to address science and security generate tensions between federal funding agencies and federal funding recipients. To minimize these tensions while maximizing effective oversight of research, insight and advice from disparate stakeholders is generally considered essential. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was established as one tool to aid policymakers and researchers in assessing the risks of federally funded research in the life sciences. It aims to provide the Secretary of Health and Human Services and researchers a source for advice on dual-use research and other biosecurity issues. Advice rendered by the NSABB may shape research activities and standards practiced by researchers in life science research fields."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-07-10
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Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity [March 28, 2006]
"Policymakers have addressed the threat of biological weapons and biosecurity issues for many years. An issue garnering increased attention is the potential for life sciences research intended to enhance scientific understanding and public health to generate results that could be misused to advance biological weapon effectiveness. Such research has been called 'dual-use' research because of its applicability to both biological countermeasures and biological weapons. The federal government is a major source of life sciences research funding. Tension over the need to maintain homeland security and support scientific endeavor has led to renewed consideration of federal policies of scientific oversight. Balancing effective support of the research enterprise with security risks generated by such research has proven to be a complex challenge. Policies considered to address science and security generate tensions between the federal funding agency and the recipient of federal funding. To minimize these tensions while maximizing effective oversight of research, insight and advice from the disparate stakeholders is generally considered essential."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-03-28
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [April 1, 2013]
"Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-04-01
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Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [March 7, 2013]
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2013-03-07
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Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating under a Continuing Resolution [October 27, 2008]
"On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). Division A of this law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through March 6, 2009, unless superseded by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally funded by nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. The same law also includes the other three FY2009 appropriations acts: one funding the Department of Defense (Division C of P.L. 110-329), one funding the Department of Homeland Security (Division D of P.L. 110-329), and one funding military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies (Division E of P.L. 110-329). The continuing resolution funds most other agencies and programs at FY2008 pre-supplemental levels. The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2008. Thus new civilian research and development programs and funding increases for existing activities will be delayed until further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs, FY2008 funding was provided under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which largely extended FY2007 funding levels. FY2007 funding was provided under a continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) based on FY2006 appropriations. Therefore, some programs are operating in FY2009 with budgets similar to those of FY2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)
2008-10-27
