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• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [July 17, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 819 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-07-17
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [August 12, 2014]

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  "This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policy makers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-08-12
• Statutory Authority for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): A Comparison of H.R. 4007 and P.L. 109-295, Section 550 [July 17, 2014]

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  "The 109th Congress provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes through Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295). This statutory authority contains a termination date, after which the statutory authority expires. The current termination date is October 4, 2014. Subsequent Congresses have attempted to provide a new authorization for the current statutory authority, which DHS implements through the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). In the 113th Congress, several bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate. One, H.R. 4007, has passed the House. H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, incorporates much of the language in the existing statute. Consequently, its authorities would generally encompass the existing authorities, and its implementation by DHS may retain a similar regulatory structure. Indeed, the bill expressly would allow DHS to use existing CFATS regulations to implement its provisions. Unlike the existing statute, H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, as amended). It would create a new title, Title XXI, called Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. Another key difference between H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, and the existing statute is the absence of a termination date for the statutory authority. The statutory authority would be permanent, though H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, includes a limited three-year authorization of appropriations."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-07-17
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [May 17, 2013]

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  "Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-05-17
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [November 27, 2013]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 362 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-11-27
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [April 2, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then authorizes. The DHS also inspects high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans and later for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 4,300 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of February 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,325 of the approximately 4,200 regulated facilities. The DHS 'authorizes' a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS 'approves' the site security plan. As of April 2014, DHS had authorized 1,335 site security plans; conducted 912 authorization inspections; and approved 649 site security plans."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-04-02
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [January 6, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then authorizes. […] This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities for compliance. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policy makers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-01-06
• President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [January 13, 2014]

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  "Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' […] Some in the S&T [Science and Technology] community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of policy setting and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and PCAST insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.

  2014-01-13
• President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress [February 7, 2014]

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  "Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that 'The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.' Further, 'The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.' The President nominates the OSTP Director, who is subject to confirmation by the Senate. In many Administrations, the President has concurrently appointed the OSTP Director to the position of Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST), a position that allows for the provision of confidential advice to the President on matters of science and technology. While Congress can require the OSTP Director to testify, the APST may decline requests to testify on the basis of separation of powers and/or executive privilege. The APST manages the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), an interagency body established by Executive Order 12881 that coordinates science and technology (S&T) policy across the federal government. The APST also co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), a council established by Executive Order 13539 and composed of external advisors who provide advice to the President. In the Obama Administration, John Holdren is both the OSTP Director and the APST."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sargent, John F.; Shea, Dana A.

  2014-02-07
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [February 25, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 506 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk. For additional analysis of CFATS implementation, see CRS Report R43346, 'Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-02-25
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [April 16, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 649 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk. For additional analysis of CFATS implementation, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R43346, 'Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-04-16
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [May 9, 2014]

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  "This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policy makers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-05-09
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [September 16, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through October 4, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 900 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-09-16
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [October 14, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this authority through December 11, 2014. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 900 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-10-14
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [October 14, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,900 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of April 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,316 of the approximately 4,200 facilities then regulated. The DHS reported in October 2014 that it now regulates approximately 3,700 facilities, though it did not report the number with final risk assignments. The DHS authorizes a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS approves the site security plan."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-10-14
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [September 15, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,900 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-09-15
• Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress [July 10, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top- Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 4,000 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-05-09
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [Updated December 12, 2014]

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  From the Executive Summary and Introduction: "Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). [...] This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2014-12-12
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [December 21, 2012]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2012-12-21
• Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [February 7, 2005]

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  "The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being tested for suitability in airport operation. Their technical capabilities have not been fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.); Shea, Dana A.

  2005-02-07
• Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues [August 9, 2006]

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  "The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives trace detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities have not been fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic, which was addressed by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), continues to be of congressional interest in the 109th Congress. This report will not be updated."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)

  2006-08-09
• Electric Utility Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: Transformers, Towers, and Terrorism [April 9, 2004]

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  "The U.S. electric power system has historically operated at such a high level of reliability that any major outage, either caused by sabotage, weather, or operational errors, makes news headlines. The transmission system is extensive, consisting mainly of transformers, switches, transmission towers and lines, control centers, and computer controls. A spectrum of threats exists to the electric system ranging from weather-related to terrorist attacks, including physical attacks, as well as attacks on computer systems, or cyber attacks. The main risk from weather-related damage or a terrorist attack against the electric power industry is a widespread power outage that lasts for an extended period of time. […] Issues facing Congress include: What should be done to address vulnerabilities in the electric system? Who should be responsible for implementing appropriate actions? Who should pay? Should reliability guidelines or standards be implemented by the federal government or industry groups? And, who should be responsible for carrying out research and development to reduce vulnerabilities?"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Abel, Amy; Parfomak, Paul W.; Shea, Dana A.

  2004-04-09
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [November 30, 2012]

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  "Even before September 11, 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern about the safety and security of facilities possessing certain amounts of hazardous chemicals. The sudden release of hazardous chemicals from facilities storing large quantities might potentially harm many people living or working near the facility. Historically, chemical facilities engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Following September 11, 2001, some states enacted laws requiring additional consideration of security at chemical facilities. Congress debated whether the federal government should reduce the risk such facilities pose by regulating them for security purposes. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority. This statutory authority expires on March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested a one-year extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. [Senate bill] 3216 and H.R. 5855) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for congressional reauthorization of this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration. Finally, it discusses legislation in the 112th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2012-11-30
• Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security [December 29, 2005]

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  "Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about the current state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk of a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemical facilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant or chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facility security. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemical facilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Many questions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should security measures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or should such regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required at chemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facility security or should chemical facilities bear security costs? […] In some cases, proposed legislation complements existing law, while in others overrides it. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1562, the Chemical Facility Security Act of 2005, H.R. 2237, the Chemical Security Act of 2005, and S. 2145, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, contain provisions requiring vulnerability assessment and the creation of security plans, though details vary. This report will discuss current chemical facility security efforts, issues in defining chemical facilities, policy challenges in developing chemical facility security legislation, and the various policy approaches. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2005-12-29
• National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [January 5, 2006]

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  "The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2006-01-05
• Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress [October 6, 2011]

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  "The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. […] The committee developed a rationing scheme for allocating the available helium-3. Some federal and private-sector users received no allocation or an amount less than they had planned. Several federal agencies are investigating alternative sources of helium-3 and ways to reduce the demand. Congressional attention appears predominantly focused on oversight of the current situation, how it arose, and the processes currently in place for addressing it. In future hearings and legislation, Congress may address additional issues, such as increasing the helium-3 supply, reducing demand, or changing how supply is allocated. This report discusses the nature of the shortage; federal actions undertaken so far to address it; current and potential sources of helium-3 and options for increasing the supply; current and projected uses of helium-3 and options for reducing the demand; and options for allocating the supply if it continues to fall short of the demand."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.)

  2011-10-06
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [January 31, 2013]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. […] The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-01-31
• Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress [January 18, 2013]

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  "Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis. Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policymakers expressed concern over the security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal security regulations to mitigate these risks. In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policymakers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congress may extend the existing authority, revise the existing authority to resolve potentially contentious issues, or allow this authority to lapse. This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.

  2013-01-18
• Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia [July 31, 2013]

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  "The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that can be used as a fertilizer, a use that generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate coated in wax and stored in paper bags caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.; Schierow, Linda-Jo; Szymendera, Scott

  2013-07-31
• Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia [May 14, 2013]

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  "The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that is primarily used as a fertilizer whose use generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Shea, Dana A.; Schierow, Linda-Jo; Szymendera, Scott

  2013-05-14