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ROK Army's Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK
This monograph examines the possibility of North Korea's collapse and course of action for a stability and support operation to deal with the collapse. North Korea seems fairly stable in terms of political, socio- ideological, military and diplomatic perspectives. However, the country needs to improve its economy to survive for an extended period. The only ways it can improve its economy is to open borders and engage with the rest of the world. North Korea also needs to do substantial market oriented reform to attract investment form outside and to encourage its people to work. The recent activities of the North, including the June 2000 summit can be understood in this regard. However, it will be facing the danger of exposing its people to information that is the most critical vulnerability of the regime. The collapse and subsequent stability and support operations is still possible. When the North collapses, the strategic interests of the world s major powers are centered around the stability and economic prosperity of Korea. They all want to get access to the new markets while don't want instability due to massive migration, spill over violence, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The best course of action to deal with the collapse of North Korea is the ROK Army to lead the multinational and interagency stability operation and support operation. The collapse and unification can happen much faster than expected. Once begun, there will be not much time to prepare. The ROK Army needs to be prepared to lead the stability and support operation in coordinate with the major powers to deal with North Korea s collapse. It must seize the initiative for unification while minimizing foreign intervention to prevent the repetition of the unpleasant history of the UN protectorate from happening.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Ryoo, Moo B.
2001
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No Gun Ri Incident: Implications for the U.S. Army
This monograph analyzes the common cause of the three incidents, Balangiga, No Gun Ri, and My Lai and discusses implications for the U.S. Army to prevent such incidents from recurring. The Balangiga incident took place in the last quarter of 1901, in Samar Island, the Philippines. The No Gun Ri incident happened between July 25 and 29, 1950 during the Korean War in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The My Lai incident occurred between March 16 and 17, 1968, in Vietnam. In all three cases, the U.S. forces were involved in killing a large number of noncombatants. The monograph identifies three common elements that contributed to the cause of those incidents. First, in all three cases, the U.S. forces were not prepared to fight the enemy in an environment where the line between combatant and non-combatant is blurred. Understanding the U.S. forces conventional fighting capabilities, the adversaries employed asymmetric means to negate their weakness, which was guerrilla type or unconventional warfare. On the other hand, the U.S. forces tried to confront the enemy in a conventional way. Second, in all three cases, the command climates motivated the soldiers to commit the wrongdoing. Some indicators that contributed in forming negative command climate include: dehumanization of the local populations, shared desire for revenge among soldiers and breakdown of small unit leadership. Lastly, the U.S. civilian and military leadership did not take proper disciplinary measures when the incidents had taken place. They did not punish soldiers for their wrongdoing and commanders for their command criminal responsibility according to the law. In the information age, the consequences of killing noncombatants extend far from the center.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Ryoo, Moo B.
2001-05
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