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Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues [December 14, 2017]
"The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. Disposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and the Russian Federation. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons, to begin in 2018. Russia suspended its participation in the agreement in October 2016 due to what it called 'hostile actions' by the United States. However, both countries appear to be continuing their plans for surplus plutonium disposition. [...] The debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. The Administration asserts that the rising cost estimates for MFFF are unsustainable in the current budget environment and proposes a different disposal method. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE's [Department of Energy] Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Holt, Mark; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-12-14
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Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea: In Brief [December 4, 2017]
"U.S. Presidents have faced the question of whether to negotiate with the North Korean government to halt Pyongyang's nuclear program and ambitions. [...] Among the questions related to negotiations with Pyongyang are their utility, timing, scope, and goals. This report summarizes past formal nuclear and missile negotiations between the United States and North Korea, also known by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and highlights some of the lessons and implications that can be drawn from these efforts."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Manyin, Mark E.
2017-12-04
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North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress [November 6, 2017]
"North Korea's apparently successful July 2017 tests of its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, along with the possibility that North Korea (DPRK) may have successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead, have led analysts and policymakers to conclude that the window for preventing the DPRK from acquiring a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States is closing. These events appear to have fundamentally altered U.S. perceptions of the threat the Kim Jong-un regime poses to the continental United States and the international community, and escalated the standoff on the Korean Peninsula to levels that have arguably not been seen since 1994. A key issue is whether or not the United States could manage and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea if it were to become capable of attacking targets in the U.S. homeland, and whether taking decisive military action to prevent the emergence of such a DPRK capability might be necessary. Either choice would bring with it considerable risk for the United States, its allies, regional stability, and global order. Trump Administration officials have stated that 'all options are on the table,' to include the use of military force to 'denuclearize'--generally interpreted to mean eliminating nuclear weapons and related capabilities from that area. One potential question for Congress is whether, and how, to employ the U.S. military to accomplish denuclearization, and whether using the military might result in miscalculation on either side, or perhaps even conflict escalation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
McInnis, Kathleen J.; Feickert, Andrew; Manyin, Mark E. . . .
2017-11-06
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North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress [October 27, 2017]
"North Korea's apparently successful July 2017 tests of its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, along with the possibility that North Korea (DPRK) may have successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead, have led analysts and policymakers to conclude that the window for preventing the DPRK from acquiring a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States is closing. These events appear to have fundamentally altered U.S. perceptions of the threat the Kim Jong-un regime poses to the continental United States and the international community, and escalated the standoff on the Korean Peninsula to levels that have arguably not been seen since 1994. A key issue is whether or not the United States could manage and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea if it were to become capable of attacking targets in the U.S. homeland, and whether taking decisive military action to prevent the emergence of such a DPRK capability might be necessary. Either choice would bring with it considerable risk for the United States, its allies, regional stability, and global order. Trump Administration officials have stated that 'all options are on the table,' to include the use of military force to 'denuclearize,'--generally interpreted to mean eliminating nuclear weapons and related capabilities--from that area."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
McInnis, Kathleen J.; Feickert, Andrew; Hildreth, Steven A. . . .
2017-10-27
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States' Obligations Under Additional Protocols to IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements [October 23, 2017]
"Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) treaty, which entered into force in 1970, requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), which are of indefinite duration, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These agreements are based on a model described in Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153), which states that such agreements 'should provide for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied' to all nuclear material of potential proliferation concern 'in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' The scope of a CSA agreement is not limited to nuclear material declared by a state, but includes all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within that country. This was a change from the pre-NPT version of IAEA safeguards, described in Information Circular 66 (INFCIRC/66), which depended on verifying declared material at specific facilities. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the IAEA's ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to a CSA is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government. After a CSA enters into force, the government is required to provide the IAEA with lists of all nuclear material in the country and nuclear facilities, along with associated design information. The agency subsequently verifies the correctness and completeness of those declarations using various verification methods."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-10-23
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
"The Syrian civil war, now in its seventh year, continues to present new challenges for U.S. policymakers. Following a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and subsequent U.S. defensive strikes against Syrian military infrastructure and pro-Syrian regime forces, several Members of Congress have called on the President to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Some Members have questioned the President's authority to launch strikes against Syria in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes in Syria, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation of the Syria conflict. [...] U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening U.S. adversaries or alienating U.S. partners. The Trump Administration and Members of the 115th Congress--like their predecessors--face challenges inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation, counterterrorism, civilian protection, and stabilization goals in Syria's evolving conflict."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-10-13
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Syria's Chemical Weapons: Continuing Challenges [September 08, 2017]
"Since 2014, when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) announced completion of the destruction of Syria's declared chemical weapons (CW), questions have persisted on the extent of Damascus's undeclared CW and production capacity. International investigators have confirmed repeated chemical weapons attacks in Syria, including chlorine gas attacks attributed to the Asad regime, as well as an April 4, 2017, attack using sarin nerve agent."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-09-08
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North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs [September 6, 2017]
From the Overview: "North Korea is making rapid advancements in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches. In 2016, North Korea conducted two nuclear weapons tests and 26 ballistic missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. To date in 2017 North Korea has test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with five failures), including two launches in July that many ascribe as ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). It then conducted a nuclear test on September 3. These tests and official North Korean statements suggest that North Korea is striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that might evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces their deterrent and coercive diplomacy strategy--lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability--but it also raises serious questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may further examine these advances' possible effects on U.S. policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-09-06
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [August 10, 2017]
"After six years of conflict, the challenges posed to U.S. national security by the situation in Syria have multiplied and evolved. Initial unrest and the Syrian government's violent response fueled U.S. concerns about Syria's stability and civilian protection in the midst of the 2011 'Arab Spring.' The country's descent into brutal war created a multifaceted regional crisis, marked by the mass displacement of civilians, the emergence and empowerment of violent armed Islamist extremist groups, gross human rights abuses and war crimes, the use of chemical weapons, the proliferation of arms, and the covert and overt intervention of outside actors. Over time, U.S. policymakers have appeared to feel both compelled to respond to these interlocking crises and cautious in considering potentially risky options for doing so, such as the commitment of military forces or the provision of lethal assistance to combatants. The Obama Administration supported various partner forces in Syria, while calling for Asad's ouster through a negotiated transition."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-08-10
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The Nuclear Ban Treaty: An Overview [July 10, 2017]
"Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UN GA) has called for nuclear disarmament. UNGA Resolution A/71/258 (2016) called on UN member states to negotiate in 2017 a legally binding Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the nuclear 'ban treaty.' Negotiations were held in New York, February 27-March 31, and June 15-July 7. At the end of the conference, 122 countries voted to approve the treaty. Singapore abstained, and the Netherlands voted against it, citing conflicts between the treaty and the Netherland's commitments as a member of NATO. Article 1 says that adherents would never 'develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' This includes a prohibition on hosting nuclear weapons that are owned or controlled by another state. Nor would states parties transfer, receive control over, or assist others in developing nuclear weapons. They also would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 7 requires states to give assistance to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons and provide for environmental remediation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-07-10
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation: In Brief [June 12, 2017]
"The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs were reorganized starting with the FY2016 request. There are now two main mission areas under the DNN appropriation: the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program (NCTIR). NCTIR was previously funded under Weapons Activities. According to the FY2016 budget justification, 'These transfers align all NNSA funding to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear proliferation and terrorism in one appropriation.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-06-12
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [May 26, 2017]
"A deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and a U.S. military strike in response on April 6 returned the Syrian civil war-now in its seventh year-to the forefront of international attention. In response to the April 4 attack, some Members of Congress called for the United States to conduct a punitive military operation. These Members and some others since have praised President Trump's decision to launch a limited strike, although some also have called on the President to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Other Members have questioned the President's authority to launch the strike in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-05-26
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U.S.-South Korea Relations [May 23, 2017]
"South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is one of the United States' most important strategic and economic partners in Asia. Congressional interest in South Korea is driven by both security and trade interests. Since the early 1950s, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty commits the United States to help South Korea defend itself. Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK, which is included under the U.S. 'nuclear umbrella.' Washington and Seoul cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by North Korea. The two countries' economies are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner and the United States is South Korea's second- largest trading partner. Between 2009 and the end of 2016, relations between the two countries arguably reached their most robust state in decades. Political changes in both countries in 2017, however, have generated uncertainty about the state of the relationship."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2017-05-23
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [May 16, 2017]
"A deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and a U.S. military strike in response on April 6 returned the Syrian civil war--now in its seventh year--to the forefront of international attention. In response to the April 4 attack, some Members of Congress called for the United States to conduct a punitive military operation. These Members and some others since have praised President Trump's decision to launch a limited strike, although some also have called on the President to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Other Members have questioned the President's authority to launch the strike in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation. Since taking office in January 2017, President Trump has stated his intention to 'destroy' the Syria-and Iraq-based insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym 'Da'esh'), and the President has ordered actions to 'accelerate' U.S. military efforts against the group in both countries. In late March, senior U.S. officials signaled that the United States would prioritize the fight against the Islamic State and said that Syrian President Bashar al Asad's future would be determined by the Syrian people. Nevertheless, following the April 4 attack, President Trump and senior members of his Administration have spoken more critically of Asad's leadership, and it remains to be seen whether the United States will more directly seek to compel Asad's departure from power while pursuing the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-05-16
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [April 26, 2017]
"A deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and a U.S. military strike in response on April 6 have returned the Syrian civil war-now in its seventh year-to the forefront of international attention. In response to the April 4 attack, some Members of Congress called for the United States to conduct a punitive military operation. These Members and some others since have praised President Trump's decision to launch a limited strike, with some calling on the President to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Other Members have questioned the President's authority to launch the strike in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-04-26
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [April 7, 2017]
"A deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and a U.S. military strike in response on April 6 have returned the conflict--now in its seventh year--to the forefront of international attention. In response to the April 4 attack, some Members of Congress called for the United States to conduct a punitive military operation. These Members and some others since have praised President Trump's decision to launch a limited strike, with some calling on the president to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Other Members have questioned the president's authority to launch the strike in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation. Since taking office in January 2017, President Trump has stated his intention to 'destroy' the Syria-and Iraq-based insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh), and the president has ordered actions to 'accelerate' U.S. military efforts against the group in both countries. U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening U.S. adversaries or alienating U.S. partners. The Trump Administration and Members of the 115th Congress-like their predecessors-face challenges inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation, counterterrorism, civilian protection, and stabilization goals in a complex, evolving conflict."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-04-07
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [January 6, 2017]
"The rise of the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) and Russia's military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government have reshaped debates over U.S. policy toward the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, now in its sixth year. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern and central Syria, from which it continues to launch assaults on forces opposed to and aligned with the government of President Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting elsewhere pits government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom receive limited U.S. assistance. Russian military intervention in support of Asad poses a direct challenge to U.S. goals in Syria, and has raised new questions about the future of the conflict and U.S. strategy. Since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 4.8 million Syrians into neighboring countries as refugees (out of a total population of more than 22 million). More than 6.3 million other Syrians are internally displaced and are among more than 13.5 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The United States remains the largest bilateral provider of such assistance, with almost $6 billion in U.S. funding identified to date. [...] U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening Asad, the Islamic State, or other anti-U.S. armed Islamist groups. [...]"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-01-06
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [December 27, 2016]
"In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-12-27
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [December 6, 2016]
From the Summary: "In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-12-06
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U.S.-South Korea Relations [October 20, 2016]
"South Korea [...] is one of the United States' most important strategic and economic partners in Asia, and since 2009 relations between the two countries arguably have been at their most robust state in decades. Several factors drive congressional interest in South Korea-related issues. First, the United States and South Korea have been military allies since the early 1950s. [...] Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK [Republic of Korea] and South Korea is included under the U.S. 'nuclear umbrella.' Second, Washington and Seoul cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by North Korea. Third, the two countries' economies are closely entwined and are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner and the United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner. South Korea has repeatedly expressed interest in and consulted with the United States on possibly joining the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement, which has been signed, but not yet ratified by the current 12 participants. [...] Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic concern of the U.S.-South Korean relationship. [...] On broad strategic matters in East Asia, while South Korean and U.S. perspectives overlap, there are areas of significant differences. For instance, South Korea often hesitates to take steps that antagonize China and has shown mistrust of Japan's efforts to expand its military capabilities. North Korea's 2016 nuclear weapons tests and missile launches, however, potentially have shifted the geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia in ways that could bring the United States and South Korea closer together on the best approaches to China and Japan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2016-10-20
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Recent Developments in U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation [October 13, 2016]
"On October 3, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree suspending participation in a bilateral U.S.- Russia weapons plutonium disposal agreement (the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, or PMDA). The next day, Russia suspended participation in a 2013 cooperative agreement on nuclear- and energy-related research and terminated a third from 2010 on exploring options for converting research reactors from weapons-usable fuel. These agreements are part of a suite of nonproliferation and nuclear security agreements the two countries concluded starting in the 1990s to prevent diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Russia's recent steps contribute to a continuing decline in U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation that accelerated in 2014 after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Russia has not suspended its participation in the New START arms control agreement that reduces nuclear warheads. [...] The Russian suspensions come at a time of increased tension in U.S.-Russia relations due to the collapse of a recent ceasefire agreement in Syria the two countries had brokered. The same day Russia suspended the PMDA, the State Department announced the United States was suspending its 'participation in bilateral channels with Russia' to sustain the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria, citing Russia's failure 'to live up to its own commitments.' In a statement on the PMDA suspension, the Russian Foreign Minister said Moscow's decision was 'a signal to Washington that it cannot use the language of force, sanctions and ultimatums with Russia while continuing to selectively cooperate with our country only when it benefits the U.S.'"
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Welt, Cory
2016-10-13
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [September 28, 2016]
"The rise of the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) and Russia's military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government have reshaped debates over U.S. policy toward the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, now in its sixth year. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern and central Syria, from which it continues to launch assaults on forces opposed to and aligned with the government of President Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting elsewhere pits government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom have received limited U.S. assistance. Russian military intervention in support of Asad poses a direct challenge to U.S. goals in Syria, and is raising new questions about the future of the conflict and U.S. strategy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-09-28
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [September 1, 2016]
"A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, 'My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.' However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT 'education' campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses. There will be at least one hearing in the 114th Congress--a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016. […] This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated 'Safeguards' and Net Assessments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, discusses safeguards--unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties--and their relationship to the CTBT."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-09-01
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [August 1, 2016]
From the Summary: "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-08-01
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [July 14, 2016]
From the Summary: "Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments over the past two decades. These assessments indicate that [1] there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and [2] Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-07-14
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [June 14, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-06-14
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [April 13, 2016]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-04-13
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U.S.-South Korea Relations [March 28, 2016]
From the Summary: "South Korea (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is one of the United States' most important strategic and economic partners in Asia, and since 2009 relations between the two countries arguably have been at their most robust state in decades. Several factors drive congressional interest in South Korea-related issues. First, the United States and South Korea have been military allies since the early 1950s. The United States is committed to helping South Korea defend itself, particularly against any aggression from North Korea. Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK and South Korea is included under the U.S. 'nuclear umbrella.' Second, Washington and Seoul cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by North Korea. Third, the two countries' economies are closely entwined and are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner and the United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner. South Korea has repeatedly expressed interest in and consulted with the United States on possibly joining the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement, which has been signed, though not yet ratified by the current 12 participants."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2016-03-28
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March 2016 Nuclear Security Summit [March 14, 2016]
From the Document: "To mobilize world leaders to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials, the President hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, DC, in April 2010. A second summit was held in South Korea in March 2012 and a third in the Netherlands in March 2014. A fourth summit is to be held in Washington, DC, on March 31 and April 1, 2016. Two official side events are to be held during the summit: an industry-led conference and a nongovernmental experts conference. [...] The summit process has given attention to a wide range of nuclear and radiological source security measures, such as training for those handling the materials, detection of smuggled material, the threat of diversion by insiders, nuclear forensics, emergency response, and cyber-security at nuclear facilities. The U.S. government has worked both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Removing weapons-usable nuclear materials from more countries has been a major area of focus since the first summit."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-03-14
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [February 26, 2016]
"This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2016-02-26
