Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham" in: author
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2013]
"Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. […] A major policy concern of the United States has been the use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria, which could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. […] On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with 'military action against Syrian regime targets' in response to the August 21 attack and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons 'on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2013-09-30
-
Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress [August 30, 2013]
"The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration's plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons. Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.; Feickert, Andrew
2013-08-30
-
Assistance to North Korea [December 24, 2008]
"For four decades after the end of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. strategy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly referred to as North Korea) was relatively simple: deter an attack on South Korea. This included a freeze on virtually all forms of economic contact between the United States and North Korea in an attempt to weaken and delegitimize the North Korean government. In the 1990s, two developments led the United States to rethink its relationship with the DPRK: North Korea's progress in its nuclear weapons and missile programs and massive, chronic food shortages there. In response, the United States in 1995 began providing the DPRK with foreign assistance, which has totaled over $1.2 billion. This aid has consisted of energy assistance, food aid, and a small amount of medical supplies. (See Table 1.) U.S. aid fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in FY2006. The Bush Administration halted energy assistance in the fall of 2002, following North Korea's reported admission that it had secretly been developing a uranium-based nuclear program. This energy assistance, which primarily took the form of heavy fuel oil, was channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). After a decade of being one of the largest providers of food aid to North Korea, the United States gave no food aid in FY2006 or 2007, in large part due to new restrictions that the North Korean government imposed upon humanitarian agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2008-12-24
-
Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress [September 12, 2013]
"Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed, or are in the process of destroying, these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs. The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. The largest-scale use to date was on August 21, 2013. A U.N. inspection team began working in Syria on August 19, 2013 and completed their mission on August 31. Laboratories are currently analyzing samples collected by the inspectors."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.; Feickert, Andrew
2013-09-12
-
U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress [March 24, 2014]
"U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation on nuclear energy and nonproliferation has grown in recent years along with closer bilateral economic, military, and diplomatic ties. In 2010, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding that Obama Administration officials said would be a 'stepping stone' to a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. This agreement was signed by the two countries in December 2013. Under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended), this agreement is subject to congressional review. The nuclear cooperation agreement is expected to comply with all the terms of the Atomic Energy Act as amended and therefore will be a 'non-exempt' agreement. This means that it will enter into force upon the 90th day of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a Joint Resolution disapproving the agreement. Vietnam would be the first country in Southeast Asia to operate a nuclear power plant. Vietnam has announced a nuclear energy plan that envisions installing several nuclear plants, capable of producing up to 14,800 megawatts of electric power (MWe), by 2030. Nuclear power is projected to provide 20%-30% of the country's electricity by 2050. Significant work remains, however, to develop Vietnam's nuclear energy infrastructure and regulatory framework."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Holt, Mark; Manyin, Mark E.
2014-03-24
-
Foreign Assistance to North Korea [April 2, 2014]
"Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in assistance: slightly more than 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. Since early 2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea, though episodically there have been discussions about resuming large-scale food aid. Additionally, the Obama Administration officials have said that they would be willing to consider other types of aid if North Korea takes steps indicating that it will dismantle its nuclear program, a prospect that most analysts view as increasingly remote. As of March 2014, barring an unexpected breakthrough, there appears little likelihood the Obama Administration will provide large-scale assistance of any type to North Korea in the near future. Members of Congress have a number of tools they could use to influence the development and implementation of aid programs with North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-04-02
-
Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [April 9, 2014]
"In order for the United States to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The AEA also provides for exemptions to these requirements, export control licensing procedures, and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2014-04-09
-
U.S.-South Korea Relations [February 12, 2014]
"South Korea is one of the United States' most important strategic and economic partners in Asia, and for the past five years relations between the two countries (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) have been arguably at their best state in decades. Members of Congress tend to be interested South Korea-related issues for a number of reasons. First, the United States and South Korea have been allies since the early 1950s. The United States is committed to helping South Korea defend itself, particularly against any aggression from North Korea. The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK and South Korea is included under the U.S. 'nuclear umbrella.' Second, Washington and Seoul cooperate over how to deal with the challenges posed by North Korea. Third, South Korea's emergence as a global player on a number of issues has provided greater opportunities for the two countries' governments, businesses, and private organizations to interact and cooperate with one another. Fourth, the two countries' economies are closely entwined and are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States' sixth-largest trading partner. The United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner. In late 2013 and early 2014, South Korea took the first steps toward possible entry into the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Rinehart, Ian E. . . .
2014-02-12
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [April 9, 2014]
"Fighting continues across Syria, pitting government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom also are fighting amongst themselves. Since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 2.6 million Syrians into neighboring countries as refugees (out of a total population of more than 22 million). Millions more Syrians are internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance, of which the United States remains the largest bilateral provider, with more than $1.7 billion in funding identified to date. U.S. nonlethal assistance to opposition forces was placed on hold in December 2013, as fighting in northern Syria disrupted mechanisms put in place to monitor and secure U.S. supplies. Administration officials have since resumed some assistance to select opposition groups. […] The United States and other members of the United Nations Security Council seek continued Syrian government cooperation with efforts to remove chemical weapons from Syria and provide relief. The Security Council also has endorsed principles for a negotiated settlement of the conflict that could leave members of the current Syrian government in power as members of a transitional governing body, an outcome that some opposition groups reject."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Humud, Carla E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-04-09
-
Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [May 11, 2015]
"All three countries discussed in this report have short-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea also have medium-range ballistic missiles; North Korea has intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three occasions; Iran and Syria's nuclear programs have raised suspicions that those countries are pursuing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has, according to the IC [intelligence community], halted its nuclear weapons program, and Syria does not appear to have an active nuclear weapons program. Congress has held numerous hearings regarding these countries' nuclear and missile programs. It has also passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. 106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies' exports assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea, and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries' missile and nuclear programs. Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation because the number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years. This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2015-05-11
-
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 11, 2015]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. […] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-05-11
-
U.S.-Republic of Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement [June 30, 2015]
"On June 15, the United States and South Korea (ROK) signed a new civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to replace the existing agreement, which entered into force in 1974. The United States and South Korea have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for over 50 years. This cooperation includes commercial power reactor projects as well as research and development work on safety, safeguards, advanced nuclear reactors, and fuel cycle technologies. In March 2014, the two countries extended the current nuclear cooperation agreement for two years to allow for more negotiating time (P.L. 11381). The new agreement's duration is 20 years, with an automatic renewal of five years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Holt, Mark
2015-06-30
-
U.S.-South Korea Relations [October 8, 2015]
"South Korea (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is one of the United States' most important strategic and economic partners in Asia, and since 2009 relations between the two countries arguably have been at their most robust state in decades. Members of Congress tend to be interested in South Korea-related issues for a number of reasons. First, the United States and South Korea have been treaty allies since the early 1950s. The United States is committed to helping South Korea defend itself, particularly against any aggression from North Korea. Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK and South Korea is included under the U.S. 'nuclear umbrella.' Second, Washington and Seoul cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by North Korea. Third, the two countries' economies are closely entwined and are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States' sixth largest trading partner and the United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner. South Korea has taken the first steps toward possible entry into the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiations. […] The United States and South Korea signed a new civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in mid- June 2015 to replace the existing agreement, which entered into force in 1974. The agreement, which provides the legal foundation for nuclear trade between the countries, automatically will go into effect in the fall of 2015 unless Congress disapproves it, a move that would be subject to presidential veto."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2015-10-08
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [July 15, 2015]
"The expanding international confrontation with the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) has reshaped long-standing debates over U.S. policy toward the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, now in its fifth year. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern and central Syria, from which it continues to launch assaults on forces opposed to and aligned with the government of President Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting elsewhere pits government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom have received limited U.S. assistance. [...] U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening the Asad government. Similar questions arise in relation to options for countering the Islamic State without bolstering other anti-U.S. Islamists and vice versa. Anti-Asad armed forces and their activist counterparts have improved their coordination in some cases, but remain divided over tactics, strategy, and their long-term political goals for Syria. Powerful Islamist forces seek outcomes that are contrary in significant ways to stated U.S. preferences for Syria's political future. The United Nations Security Council has demanded a halt to the use of chemicals as a weapon of war in the country and seeks continued Asad government cooperation with plans to verifiably dismantle its chemical weapons program."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Humud, Carla E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-07-15
-
North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation [July 21, 2015]
"North Korea has presented one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. […] As U.S. policy toward Pyongyang evolved through the 2000s, the negotiations moved from a bilateral format to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States). Although the talks reached some key agreements that laid out deals for aid and recognition to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization, major problems with implementation persisted. The talks have been suspended throughout the Obama Administration. As diplomacy remains stalled, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile programs in the absence of any agreement it considers binding. Security analysts are concerned about this growing capability, as well as the potential for proliferation to other actors. […] North Korea's intransigence and the stalled negotiations present critical questions for the Obama Administration. Do the nuclear tests and successful long-range missile launch fundamentally change the strategic calculus? Has North Korea's capacity to hurt U.S. interests increased to the point that new diplomatic and perhaps military options should be considered more carefully? What could the Six Party Talks achieve if North Korea insists on recognition as a nuclear-armed state? Does the United States need a strategy that relies less on Beijing's willingness to punish Pyongyang? Do North Korea's nuclear advances mean that Obama's approach (known as 'strategic patience') is too risky to continue? What is the most effective way to isolate the regime diplomatically and financially? Should such efforts be balanced with engagement initiatives that push for steps toward denuclearization?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Rinehart, Ian E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2015-07-21
-
Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [August 5, 2015]
"In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-08-05
-
U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement [August 18, 2015]
"Negotiated by the Reagan Administration nearly 30 years ago, the current U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is set to expire on December 30, 2015. President Obama submitted a new 30-year U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement for congressional review on April 21, 2015. Among other provisions, the agreement would allow for uranium enrichment up to a level less than 20% U-235 and Chinese reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material at safeguarded facilities. The required congressional review period ended on July 31. Such agreements are often called '123 agreements' because they are required by Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (P.L. 95-242). They are a prerequisite for any significant nuclear cooperation with another country, such as exports of nuclear power plants and components and the transfer of nuclear material. Since the original agreement was concluded before China was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), some changes to the text were required. The recently submitted renewal agreement complies with the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and therefore was subject to a review period totaling 90 days of continuous session. If no resolution of disapproval is passed into law before that deadline, then the agreement may enter into force. No resolution of disapproval was passed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Holt, Mark; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2015-08-18
-
Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord [November 26, 2014]
"On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the 'P5+1') finalized an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) requiring Iran to freeze many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from some international sanctions. The period of the interim deal was to be six months, during which time Iran and the P5+1 would attempt to reach a comprehensive deal on the long-term status of Iran's nuclear program. […] Throughout 2014, the attention of the international community increasingly turned to the potential outcome of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear accord. […] In July, the two sides announced that progress--and Iran's compliance with the JPA provisions--justified extending the JPA until November 24, 2014. Intensive negotiations attempted to finalize a deal by that deadline, but the two sides again announced that more time was needed to close still significant gaps in their positions. […] On November 24, Iran and the P5+1 announced that they were extending the talks--and all provisions of the JPA--with the intent of finalizing a detailed agreement by June 30, 2015. […] Some U.S. allies, as well as some in Congress, assert a concern that the P5+1 might accept an accord that does not ensure that Iran could not utilize its nuclear infrastructure to develop a nuclear weapon. Some countries in the region, including the Persian Gulf monarchies, express concern that a final accord would prompt a broader U.S.-Iran rapprochement that could cause the United States to retreat from the Middle East."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-11-26
-
Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Tlaks on a Comprehensive Accord [February 2, 2015]
"On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the 'P5+1') finalized an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) requiring Iran to freeze many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from some international sanctions. The period of the interim deal was to be six months, during which time Iran and the P5+1 would attempt to reach a comprehensive deal on the long-term status of Iran's nuclear program. The main elements of the JPA are requirements that Iran freeze, in effect, its production of enriched uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235--the form of enriched uranium in Iran's stockpile that has caused the most concern; dilute and convert the 20% enriched uranium and 5% enriched uranium stocks to other forms that would take time to reverse; halt key elements of its heavy-water reactor program that could lead to a plutonium bomb; and provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with additional information about its nuclear program, as well as access to some nuclear-related facilities which are not covered by Iran's IAEA safeguards agreement. […] The main outstanding issues reportedly center on the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program; the duration of the comprehensive accord; and the extent and sequencing of the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. On November 24, Iran and the P5+1 announced that they were extending the talks--and all provisions of the JPA--with the intent of finalizing a detailed agreement by June 30, 2015. The parties have stated they would first attempt to reach an overarching framework for the agreement by March 24, 2015."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-02-02
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [October 9, 2015]
"The rise of the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) and Russia's military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government have reshaped debates over U.S. policy toward the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, now in its fifth year. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern and central Syria, from which it continues to launch assaults on forces opposed to and aligned with the government of President Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting elsewhere pits government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom have received limited U.S. assistance. […] Anti-Asad armed forces and their activist counterparts have improved their coordination in some cases and share antipathy toward Russia's intervention, but they remain divided over tactics, strategy, and their long-term political goals. Powerful Islamist forces seek outcomes that are contrary in significant ways to stated U.S. preferences for Syria's political future. The United Nations Security Council has endorsed new efforts at negotiation and has created a new body empowered to assign responsibility for the use of chemicals as a weapon of war in Syria. The 114th Congress is now considering proposed appropriations (H.R. 2685, S. 1558, and H.R. 2772) and authorization legislation (H.R. 1735) related to Syria. For more information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R43727, 'Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities,Funding, and Issues for Congress,' by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco, and CRS Report R43612, 'The 'Islamic State' Crisis and U.S. Policy', by Christopher M. Blanchard et al."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Humud, Carla E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-10-09
-
Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [December 3, 2015]
"In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-12-03
-
North Korea's January 6, 2016, Nuclear Test [January 7, 2016]
"North Korea announced that it successfully tested a 'hydrogen bomb' (its fourth nuclear test) on January 6, 2016. The official statement also called the device an experimental or 'pilot H-bomb.' It emphasized that North Korea would continue its policy of both building up its nuclear weapons program and developing its economy in parallel, and said that North Korea would not proliferate nuclear weapons to others. The statement reiterated that North Korea would not suspend or dismantle its nuclear weapons program unless the United States changed its 'hostile policy' toward the country. Observers have been anticipating a new nuclear test by North Korea since a December 2015 statement by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un claimed that the country had a hydrogen bomb. Earlier statements by North Korean scientists cited fusion technology development, the basis for a hydrogen bomb, in the country. The U.S. Geological Survey detected a non-earthquake seismic event with a magnitude of 5.1 near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) said in a January 6 statement and press briefing that its monitors had detected a seismic event at the same North Korean location as the February 2013 nuclear test, and that the 'seismic signals are largely consistent with those picked up during the last announced nuclear test on 12 February 2013.' The U.S. government has said that it was a nuclear test, but a White House spokesman said that initial data was 'not consistent' with North Korean claims of detonating a hydrogen bomb."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-01-07
-
North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation [January 15, 2016]
"North Korea has presented one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the official name for North Korea), although since 2000 contact at a lower level has ebbed and flowed. Negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program have occupied the past three U.S. administrations, even as some analysts anticipated a collapse of the isolated authoritarian regime. North Korea has been the recipient of over $1 billion in U.S. aid (though none since 2009) and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions. [...] Although the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea is the nuclear weapons program, there are a host of other contentious issues, including Pyongyang's missile programs, conventional military forces, illicit activities, and abysmal human rights record.
This report will be updated periodically."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Rinehart, Ian E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma
2016-01-15
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [January 14, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. [...] However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-01-14
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [February 12, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-02-12
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [June 14, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-06-14
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [August 1, 2016]
From the Summary: "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-08-01
-
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [April 13, 2016]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-04-13
-
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [September 1, 2016]
"A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, 'My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.' However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT 'education' campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses. There will be at least one hearing in the 114th Congress--a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016. […] This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated 'Safeguards' and Net Assessments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, discusses safeguards--unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties--and their relationship to the CTBT."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-09-01
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [September 28, 2016]
"The rise of the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) and Russia's military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government have reshaped debates over U.S. policy toward the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, now in its sixth year. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern and central Syria, from which it continues to launch assaults on forces opposed to and aligned with the government of President Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting elsewhere pits government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom have received limited U.S. assistance. Russian military intervention in support of Asad poses a direct challenge to U.S. goals in Syria, and is raising new questions about the future of the conflict and U.S. strategy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-09-28
