Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham" in: author
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments [November 21, 2007]
"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program -- including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates -- and assesses current developments in verifying dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities as agreed in the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks include the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea, and were begun in August 2003 to attempt to resolve the current crisis over North Korean nuclear weapons. Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. North Korea may have produced enough additional plutonium for five nuclear warheads since 2002. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense and that it would bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of under 1 kiloton. The United States and other countries condemned the test, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, that requires North Korea to (1) refrain from nuclear or missile tests, (2) rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and (3) abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. On February 13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with other members of the Six-Party Talks to begin the initial phase (60 days) of implementing the Joint Statement from September 2005 on denuclearization."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2007-11-21
-
Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord [March 27, 2015]
"On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the 'P5+[plus]1') finalized an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) requiring Iran to freeze many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from some international sanctions. The period of the interim deal was to be six months, during which time Iran and the P5+1 would attempt to reach a comprehensive deal on the long-term status of Iran's nuclear program. The main elements of the JPA are requirements that Iran freeze, in effect, its production of enriched uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235--the form of enriched uranium in Iran's stockpile that has caused the most concern; dilute and convert the 20% enriched uranium and 5% enriched uranium stocks to other forms that would take time to reverse; halt key elements of its heavy-water reactor program that could lead to a plutonium bomb; and provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with additional information about its nuclear program, as well as access to some nuclear-related facilities which are not covered by Iran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The JPA has been seen as slowing Iran's build-up of nuclear material and improving the international community's ability to identify Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has complied with its JPA obligations, according to the IAEA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2015-03-27
-
North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation [July 21, 2015]
"North Korea has presented one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. […] As U.S. policy toward Pyongyang evolved through the 2000s, the negotiations moved from a bilateral format to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States). Although the talks reached some key agreements that laid out deals for aid and recognition to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization, major problems with implementation persisted. The talks have been suspended throughout the Obama Administration. As diplomacy remains stalled, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile programs in the absence of any agreement it considers binding. Security analysts are concerned about this growing capability, as well as the potential for proliferation to other actors. […] North Korea's intransigence and the stalled negotiations present critical questions for the Obama Administration. Do the nuclear tests and successful long-range missile launch fundamentally change the strategic calculus? Has North Korea's capacity to hurt U.S. interests increased to the point that new diplomatic and perhaps military options should be considered more carefully? What could the Six Party Talks achieve if North Korea insists on recognition as a nuclear-armed state? Does the United States need a strategy that relies less on Beijing's willingness to punish Pyongyang? Do North Korea's nuclear advances mean that Obama's approach (known as 'strategic patience') is too risky to continue? What is the most effective way to isolate the regime diplomatically and financially? Should such efforts be balanced with engagement initiatives that push for steps toward denuclearization?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Rinehart, Ian E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2015-07-21
-
North Korea's January 6, 2016, Nuclear Test [January 7, 2016]
"North Korea announced that it successfully tested a 'hydrogen bomb' (its fourth nuclear test) on January 6, 2016. The official statement also called the device an experimental or 'pilot H-bomb.' It emphasized that North Korea would continue its policy of both building up its nuclear weapons program and developing its economy in parallel, and said that North Korea would not proliferate nuclear weapons to others. The statement reiterated that North Korea would not suspend or dismantle its nuclear weapons program unless the United States changed its 'hostile policy' toward the country. Observers have been anticipating a new nuclear test by North Korea since a December 2015 statement by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un claimed that the country had a hydrogen bomb. Earlier statements by North Korean scientists cited fusion technology development, the basis for a hydrogen bomb, in the country. The U.S. Geological Survey detected a non-earthquake seismic event with a magnitude of 5.1 near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) said in a January 6 statement and press briefing that its monitors had detected a seismic event at the same North Korean location as the February 2013 nuclear test, and that the 'seismic signals are largely consistent with those picked up during the last announced nuclear test on 12 February 2013.' The U.S. government has said that it was a nuclear test, but a White House spokesman said that initial data was 'not consistent' with North Korean claims of detonating a hydrogen bomb."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-01-07
-
North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation [July 27, 2018]
"North Korea has posed one of the most persistent U.S. foreign policy challenges of the post-Cold War period due to its pursuit of proscribed weapons technology and belligerence toward the United States and its allies.[...] Efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program have occupied the past four U.S. Administrations, and North Korea is the target of scores of U.S. and United Nations Security Council sanctions. Although the weapons programs have been the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea, other U.S. concerns include North Korea's illicit activities, such as counterfeiting currency and narcotics trafficking, small-scale armed attacks against South Korea, and egregious human rights violations. In 2018, the Trump Administration and Kim regime appeared to open a new chapter in the relationship. After months of rising tension and hostile rhetoric from both capitals in 2017, including a significant expansion of U.S. and international sanctions against North Korea, Trump and Kim held a leaders' summit in Singapore in June 2018. The meeting produced an agreement on principles for establishing a positive relationship. The United States agreed to provide security guarantees to North Korea, which committed to 'complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' The agreement made no mention of resolving significant differences between the two countries, including the DPRK's ballistic missile program. Trump also said he would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, labeling them 'provocative,' during the coming U.S.-DPRK nuclear negotiations. Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2018-07-27
-
Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues [December 14, 2017]
"The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. Disposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and the Russian Federation. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons, to begin in 2018. Russia suspended its participation in the agreement in October 2016 due to what it called 'hostile actions' by the United States. However, both countries appear to be continuing their plans for surplus plutonium disposition. [...] The debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. The Administration asserts that the rising cost estimates for MFFF are unsustainable in the current budget environment and proposes a different disposal method. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE's [Department of Energy] Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Holt, Mark; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-12-14
-
North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs [August 2, 2018]
"North Korea has made rapid advancements in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches. [...] Since the June 2018 Singapore Summit between President Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un, reports have surfaced showing the dismantlement of a rocket engine test stand at the Sohae satellite launch complex. Although the test stand could be rebuilt, some observers see this as a positive development toward denuclearization while others have suggested the stand was no longer needed for liquid-fuel engines, as North Korea may be opting instead to test and deploy solid rocket motors for their missiles. There have also been reports that North Korea may now be producing liquid-fueled ICBMs at another facility outside the North Korean capital, but other experts point out developments there are not yet clear. Despite the absence of any missile launch activity or nuclear tests in 2018 to date, previous tests and official North Korean statements suggest that North Korea is striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that might evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces their deterrent and coercive diplomacy strategy--lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability--but it also raises serious questions about crisis stability and escalation control."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2018-08-02
-
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [September 1, 2016]
"A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, 'My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.' However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT 'education' campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses. There will be at least one hearing in the 114th Congress--a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016. […] This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated 'Safeguards' and Net Assessments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, discusses safeguards--unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties--and their relationship to the CTBT."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-09-01
-
North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs [Updated June 6, 2019]
From the Overview: "North Korea has made recent advancements in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches. In 2016, North Korea conducted 2 nuclear weapons tests and 26 ballistic missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. In 2017, North Korea test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with 5 failures), including 2 launches in July and another in November that many ascribe as ICBM tests (intercontinental ballistic missiles). Most recently, North Korea tested short-range ballistic missiles on May 4 and 9. It last conducted a nuclear test in September 2017. In April 2018, Kim Jong Un said that nuclear and ICBM testing was no longer necessary. U.N. Security Council resolutions ban all ballistic missile tests by the DPRK. Testing as well as official North Korean statements suggest that North Korea is striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that might evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy-- lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability--but it also raises serious questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may further examine these advances' possible effects on U.S. policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2019-06-06
-
North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs [Updated January 29, 2019]
"North Korea has made rapid advancements in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches. In 2016, North Korea conducted two nuclear weapons tests and 26 ballistic missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. In 2017, North Korea test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with five failures), including two launches in July and another in November that many ascribe as ICBM tests (intercontinental ballistic missiles). It last conducted a nuclear test in September 2017. The North Korean leader pledged to work toward 'complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' in the U.S.-DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] Singapore Summit statement. In its 2019 assessment to Congress, the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] said that 'North Korea is unlikely to give up all of its nuclear weapons and production capabilities, even as it seeks to negotiate partial denuclearization steps to obtain key US and international concessions.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2019-01-29
-
North Korea: A Chronology of Events from 2016 to 2020 [May 5, 2020]
From the Introduction: "This report provides a detailed chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea from January 2016, when North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, through the end of March 2020. (For background, the chronology includes a number of milestone events before 2016.)"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Smith, Kirt
2020-05-05
-
Diplomacy with North Korea: A Status Report [Updated June 19, 2020]
From the Overview: "United States-North Korea diplomacy to curb North Korea's nuclear and missile programs has been stalled since February 2019, and observers see little chance for progress in the coming months. In June 2020, tension increased on the Korean Peninsula, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea's official name) turned more belligerent, blowing up an inter-Korean liaison office inside North Korea and threatening to interfere in upcoming U.S. elections, among other moves. Since President Donald Trump first agreed in March 2018 to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to discuss North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, the Trump Administration has emphasized the importance of developing a strong leader-to-leader relationship. The strategy appears to presume better results than the working-group negotiations employed by previous administrations. Trump and Kim have held three meetings: in Singapore (June 2018); Hanoi (February 2019); and Panmunjom (June 2019). The personal diplomacy defused the U.S.-DPRK hostility that had developed in 2017, raising alarms that war could break out on the Korean Peninsula. The diplomacy also has helped preserve North Korea's self-imposed moratoria on nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile tests. Despite Kim's 2018 pledge to denuclearize, President Trump's approach to North Korea has been called into question by the absence of progress in negotiations, the DPRK's renewed hostility, allegations of sanctions-busting trade, and Pyongyang's continued enhancements to its military capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham . . .
2020-06-19
-
Nuclear Ban Treaty: An Overview [Updated October 29, 2020]
From the Document: "Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the UN General Assembly (UN GA) has called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. UNGA Resolution A/71/258 (2016) called on UN member states to negotiate in 2017 a legally binding Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), also known as the nuclear 'ban treaty.' Negotiations ended on July 7, 2017, when 122 countries voted to approve the treaty. Singapore abstained, and the Netherlands voted against it, citing conflicts between the treaty and its commitments as a member of NATO. The United States and 40 other states did not participate in negotiations. To date, 84 countries have signed and 50 countries have ratified the treaty. In accordance with Article 15, the TPNW will enter into force 90 days following the 50th ratification, which will be on January 22, 2021. Civil society groups advocated for a nuclear ban, and in 2017, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the nongovernmental International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for its advocacy role."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2020-10-29
-
Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation: In Brief [Updated December 8, 2020]
From the Summary: "The Department of Energy's (DOE's) nonproliferation and national security programs provide technical capabilities to support U.S. efforts to 'prevent, counter, respond' to the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide, including by both states and non-state actors. These programs are administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency established within DOE in 2000. NNSA is responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, providing nuclear fuel to the Navy, nuclear and radiological emergency response, and nuclear nonproliferation activities. NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is funded under the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) account. This report addresses the programs in the DNN account, appropriated by the Energy and Water appropriations bill. The FY2021 request for DNN appropriations was $2.031 billion. The proposal included unobligated prior year balances. The reduction continues an earlier trend to reduce prior-year carryover balances. According to the budget justification, the decrease of 6.2% from the FY2020-enacted level is due to 'completion of funding for contractual termination' of the mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) project at the Savannah River Site."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2020-12-08
-
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 8, 2018]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration has offered some support for existing agreements, but has argued that the United States lacks a 'willing partner' in Russia and, therefore, will not pursue further agreements as long as Russia remains in violation of existing arms control treaties."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2018-05-08
-
Peace Treaty with North Korea? [April 19, 2018]
"After months of rising tension and hostile rhetoric between Pyongyang and Washington, in March 2018 President Donald J. Trump agreed to attend a summit in spring 2018 with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) issued the invitation and said that North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) was ready to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons and missile programs. The meeting, which is to follow a scheduled April 27, 2018, summit between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jaein, would be the first ever between leaders of the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Lawrence, Susan V.; Manyin, Mark E. . . .
2018-04-19
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [April 18, 2018]
"The Syria conflict, now in its eighth year, remains a significant policy challenge for the United States. U.S. policy toward Syria in the past several years has given highest priority to counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL/ISIS), but also included assistance to opposition-held communities, support for diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the civil war, and the provision of humanitarian assistance in Syria and surrounding countries. The counter-IS campaign works primarily 'by, with, and through' local partners, per a broader U.S. strategy initiated by the Obama Administration and continued with modifications by the Trump Administration. The United States has simultaneously advocated for a political track to reach a negotiated settlement between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and opposition forces, within the framework of U.N.-mediated talks in Geneva."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2018-04-18
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [April 7, 2017]
"A deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and a U.S. military strike in response on April 6 have returned the conflict--now in its seventh year--to the forefront of international attention. In response to the April 4 attack, some Members of Congress called for the United States to conduct a punitive military operation. These Members and some others since have praised President Trump's decision to launch a limited strike, with some calling on the president to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Other Members have questioned the president's authority to launch the strike in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation. Since taking office in January 2017, President Trump has stated his intention to 'destroy' the Syria-and Iraq-based insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh), and the president has ordered actions to 'accelerate' U.S. military efforts against the group in both countries. U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening U.S. adversaries or alienating U.S. partners. The Trump Administration and Members of the 115th Congress-like their predecessors-face challenges inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation, counterterrorism, civilian protection, and stabilization goals in a complex, evolving conflict."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-04-07
-
June 12 Trump-Kim Jong-un Summit [June 12, 2018]
From the Document: "On June 12, 2018, President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met in Singapore to discuss North Korea's nuclear program, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the future of U.S. relations with North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK). During their summit, the first-ever meeting between leaders of the two countries, Trump and Kim issued a brief joint statement in which Trump 'committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK,' and Kim 'reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2018-06-12
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
"The Syrian civil war, now in its seventh year, continues to present new challenges for U.S. policymakers. Following a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and subsequent U.S. defensive strikes against Syrian military infrastructure and pro-Syrian regime forces, several Members of Congress have called on the President to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Some Members have questioned the President's authority to launch strikes against Syria in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes in Syria, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation of the Syria conflict. [...] U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening U.S. adversaries or alienating U.S. partners. The Trump Administration and Members of the 115th Congress--like their predecessors--face challenges inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation, counterterrorism, civilian protection, and stabilization goals in Syria's evolving conflict."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-10-13
-
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response [January 6, 2017]
"The rise of the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) and Russia's military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government have reshaped debates over U.S. policy toward the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, now in its sixth year. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern and central Syria, from which it continues to launch assaults on forces opposed to and aligned with the government of President Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting elsewhere pits government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, some of whom receive limited U.S. assistance. Russian military intervention in support of Asad poses a direct challenge to U.S. goals in Syria, and has raised new questions about the future of the conflict and U.S. strategy. Since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 4.8 million Syrians into neighboring countries as refugees (out of a total population of more than 22 million). More than 6.3 million other Syrians are internally displaced and are among more than 13.5 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The United States remains the largest bilateral provider of such assistance, with almost $6 billion in U.S. funding identified to date. [...] U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening Asad, the Islamic State, or other anti-U.S. armed Islamist groups. [...]"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Humud, Carla E.; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-01-06
-
The Nuclear Ban Treaty: An Overview [July 10, 2017]
"Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UN GA) has called for nuclear disarmament. UNGA Resolution A/71/258 (2016) called on UN member states to negotiate in 2017 a legally binding Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the nuclear 'ban treaty.' Negotiations were held in New York, February 27-March 31, and June 15-July 7. At the end of the conference, 122 countries voted to approve the treaty. Singapore abstained, and the Netherlands voted against it, citing conflicts between the treaty and the Netherland's commitments as a member of NATO. Article 1 says that adherents would never 'develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' This includes a prohibition on hosting nuclear weapons that are owned or controlled by another state. Nor would states parties transfer, receive control over, or assist others in developing nuclear weapons. They also would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 7 requires states to give assistance to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons and provide for environmental remediation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-07-10
-
Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress [December 8, 2014]
"U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements ('123' agreements), which are bilateral agreements with other governments or multilateral organizations, have several important goals, including promoting the U.S. nuclear industry, which is increasingly dependent on foreign customers and suppliers, and preventing nuclear proliferation. Increased international interest in nuclear power has generated concern that additional countries may obtain fuel-making technology that could also be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Ensuring the peaceful use of transferred nuclear technology has long been a major U.S. objective, and Congress has played a key role. […] In recent years, some observers and Members of Congress have advocated that the United States adopt new conditions for civil nuclear cooperation. These would include requiring potential recipients of U.S. civil nuclear technology to forgo fuel-making enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. Such protocols augment the IAEA's legal authority to inspect nuclear facilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Holt, Mark
2014-12-08
-
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 2, 2011]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. [...] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report will be updated annually, or as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-05-02
-
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues [December 16, 2009]
"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program--including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates--and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. However, the scope and success of a uranium enrichment program may be limited. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK's nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the extent of a uranium enrichment program, or proliferation activities. [...]. North Korea's failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear facilities, and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. North Korea claimed it tested a nuclear weapon on May 25, 2009, which is estimated as larger than the 2006 blast, but still modest. Through its official news agency, North Korea claimed in September 2009 that it was conducting 'experimental uranium enrichment' and in November 2009 that it had reprocessed spent fuel at the Yongbyon facility and had begun to weaponize the resulting plutonium."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2009-12-16
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [October 15, 2009]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. [...] Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-15
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [September 28, 2009]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. […]. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-28
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [July 30, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-07-30
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [January 13, 2011]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 60-90 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-01-13
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [October 7, 2010]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-10-07
