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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated March 18, 2019]
From the Document: "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms."
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2019-03-18
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Recent Developments in U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation [October 13, 2016]
"On October 3, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree suspending participation in a bilateral U.S.- Russia weapons plutonium disposal agreement (the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, or PMDA). The next day, Russia suspended participation in a 2013 cooperative agreement on nuclear- and energy-related research and terminated a third from 2010 on exploring options for converting research reactors from weapons-usable fuel. These agreements are part of a suite of nonproliferation and nuclear security agreements the two countries concluded starting in the 1990s to prevent diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Russia's recent steps contribute to a continuing decline in U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation that accelerated in 2014 after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Russia has not suspended its participation in the New START arms control agreement that reduces nuclear warheads. [...] The Russian suspensions come at a time of increased tension in U.S.-Russia relations due to the collapse of a recent ceasefire agreement in Syria the two countries had brokered. The same day Russia suspended the PMDA, the State Department announced the United States was suspending its 'participation in bilateral channels with Russia' to sustain the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria, citing Russia's failure 'to live up to its own commitments.' In a statement on the PMDA suspension, the Russian Foreign Minister said Moscow's decision was 'a signal to Washington that it cannot use the language of force, sanctions and ultimatums with Russia while continuing to selectively cooperate with our country only when it benefits the U.S.'"
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Welt, Cory
2016-10-13
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U.S.-Australia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress [January 18, 2011]
"Australia and the United States have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy since the mid-1950s. The framework for this cooperation is a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement as required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. President Obama transmitted the text of the latest renewal agreement to Congress on May 5, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Congress had 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement is considered approved at the end of this time period. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions or standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement. On November 30, 2010, the House passed H.R. 6411 by voice vote. The bill would have approved the agreement even if the required congressional review period is not reached. The Senate has not yet acted on its version of the bill (S. 3844). The required congressional review period was reached on December 3, 2010. The United States and Australia first concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. That agreement was updated in 1979. Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium exports to the United States. The United States is also a major processor of Australian uranium sold to other countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear power plants, but it operates one research reactor."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Vaughn, Bruce, 1963-
2011-01-18
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North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues [January 20, 2011]
"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program--including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates--and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK's [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist.Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. In September 2005, members of the Six-Party Talks (United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea) issued a Joint Statement on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-01-20
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Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) [January 18, 2011]
"The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was formed to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. The Initiative was announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003. PSI does not create a new legal framework but aims to use existing national authorities and international law to achieve its goals. Initially, 11 nations signed on to the 'Statement of Interdiction Principles' that guides PSI cooperation. As of January 2011, 97 countries (plus the Holy See) have committed formally to the PSI principles, although the extent of participation may vary by country. PSI has no secretariat, but an Operational Experts Group (OEG), made up of 21 PSI participants, coordinates activities. Although WMD interdiction efforts took place with international cooperation before PSI was formed, supporters argue that PSI training exercises and boarding agreements give a structure and expectation of cooperation that will improve interdiction efforts. Many observers believe that PSI's 'strengthened political commitment of like-minded states' to cooperate on interdiction is a successful approach to counter-proliferation policy. But some caution that it may be difficult to measure the initiative's effectiveness, guarantee even participation, or sustain the effort over time in the absence of a formal multilateral framework. Others support expanding membership and improving inter-governmental and U.S. interagency coordination as the best way to improve the program. President Obama in an April 2009 speech said that PSI should be turned into a 'durable international institution.' The Administration's 2010 Nuclear Security Strategy said it would work to turn PSI into a 'durable international effort.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-01-18
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Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power [March 2, 2011]
"After several decades of widespread stagnation, nuclear power is attracting renewed interest. New license applications for 30 reactors have been announced in the United States, and another 541 are under construction, planned, or proposed around the world. In the United States, interest appears driven, in part, by tax credits, loan guarantees, and other incentives in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, as well as by concerns about carbon emissions from competing fossil fuel technologies. A major concern about the global expansion of nuclear power is the potential spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology--particularly uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing--that could be used for nuclear weapons. Despite 30 years of effort to limit access to uranium enrichment, several undeterred states pursued clandestine nuclear programs, the A.Q. Khan black market network's sales to Iran and North Korea representing the most egregious examples. However, concern over the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies may be offset by support for nuclear power as a cleaner and more secure alternative to fossil fuels. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have expressed optimism that advanced nuclear technologies being developed by the Department of Energy may offer proliferation resistance. Both Administrations have also pursued international incentives and agreements intended to minimize the spread of fuel cycle facilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Holt, Mark; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Andrews, Anthony
2011-03-02
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 2, 2011]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. [...] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report will be updated annually, or as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-05-02
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [April 27, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking-- cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-04-27
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress [January 11, 2011]
"The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Russia entered into force after an exchange of diplomatic notes on January 11, 2011. The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. The agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by President George W. Bush on September 8, 2008, in response to Russia's military actions in Georgia. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the agreement to Congress on May 10, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Under U.S. law, Congress had 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. Since it was not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, the agreement was considered approved at the end of this time period on December 8, 2010. This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russian policies toward Iran. These issues were relevant to the debate when the agreement was being considered in the 111th and 110th Congresses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-01-11
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [January 13, 2011]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 60-90 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-01-13
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U.S.-Australia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress [December 1, 2010]
"Australia and the United States have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy since the mid-1950s. The framework for this cooperation is a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement as required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the latest renewal agreement to Congress on May 5, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Congress has 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement will be considered approved at the end of this time period. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions or standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement. On November 30, 2010, the House passed H.R. 6411 by voice vote. The bill would approve the agreement even if the required congressional review period is not reached. The Senate has not yet acted on its version of the bill (S. 3844). The United States and Australia first concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. That agreement was updated in 1979. Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium exports to the United States. The United States is also a major processor of Australian uranium sold to other countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear power plants, but it operates one research reactor."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Vaughn, Bruce, 1963-
2010-12-01
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U.S.-South Korea Relations [December 8, 2010]
"Since late 2008, relations between the United States and South Korea (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) have been arguably at their best state in decades. By the middle of 2010, in the view of many in the Obama Administration, South Korea had emerged as the United States' closest ally in East Asia. Of all the issues on the bilateral agenda, Congress has the most direct role to play in the proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Congressional approval is necessary for the agreement to go into effect. In early December 2010, the two sides announced they had agreed on modifications to the original agreement, which was signed in 2007. South Korea accepted a range of U.S. demands designed to help the U.S. auto industry and received some concessions in return. In the United States, the supplementary deal appears to have changed the minds of many groups and members of Congress who previously had opposed the FTA, which is now expected to be presented to the 112th Congress in 2011. If Congress approves the agreement, it would be the United States' second largest FTA, after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S.-South Korean coordination over policy towards North Korea has been particularly close. The Obama and Lee Administrations have adopted a medium-to-longer-term policy of 'strategic patience' that involves three main elements: refusing to return to the Six-Party Talks without an assurance from North Korea that it would take 'irreversible steps' to denuclearize; gradually attempting to alter China's strategic assessment of North Korea; and using Pyongyang's provocations as opportunities to tighten sanctions against North Korean entities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Taylor, Mi Ae; Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2010-12-08
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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status [October 18, 2010]
"Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in considering the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferationspecific legislation in the 111th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on the regimes. The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006 and 2009, Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in non-compliance with its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including greater restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT with nuclear weapons, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain in the treaty regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2010-10-18
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [October 7, 2010]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-10-07
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress [September 17, 2010]
"The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. The agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by President George W. Bush on September 8, 2008, in response to Russia's military actions in Georgia. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the agreement to Congress on May 10, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Congress has 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement will be considered approved at the end of this time period. This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russian policies toward Iran. These issues were also relevant to the debate when the agreement was being considered in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2010-09-17
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U.S.-Australia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2010]
"Australia and the United States have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy since the mid-1950s. The framework for this cooperation is a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement as required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the latest renewal agreement to Congress on May 5, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Congress has 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement will be considered approved at the end of this time period. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions or standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement. The United States and Australia first concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. That agreement was updated in 1979. Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium exports to the United States. The United States is also a major processor of Australian uranium sold to other countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear power plants, but it operates one research reactor."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Vaughn, Bruce, 1963-
2010-09-30
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea [March 12, 2010]
"Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, of which about 60% has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. As of early March 2010, the United States is not providing any aid to North Korea, except for a small medical assistance program. The Obama Administration, along with the South Korean government, have said that they would be willing to provide large-scale aid if North Korea takes steps to irreversibly dismantle its nuclear program. The main vehicle for persuading Pyongyang to denuclearize is the Six-Party Talks, involving North Korea, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The Talks have not met since late 2008. U.S. energy and food aid to North Korea fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in 2006. The Bush Administration resumed energy aid in the fall of 2007 after progress was made in the Six-Party Talks -- involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia -- over North Korea's nuclear program. The United States and other countries began providing heavy fuel oil (HFO) in return for Pyongyang freezing and disabling its plutonium-based nuclear facilities. However, no additional energy assistance has been provided through the Six-Party process since North Korea withdrew from the talks in 2009, following condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North Korea's April 2009 launch of a suspected longrange missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear device."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Manyin, Mark E.
2010-03-12
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [April 16, 2010]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking-- cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2010-04-16
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea [September 9, 2009]
"Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, about 60% of which has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. U.S. aid fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in 2006. The Bush Administration resumed energy aid in the fall of 2007, after progress was made in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program. [...]. Some have speculated that a desire for increased food donations led Pyongyang to moderate its behavior toward the United States and South Korea in the summer of 2009. If so, the Obama Administration must make a number of decisions, including: whether to resume food aid; if so, whether to condition all or part of its assistance on expansive levels of access and monitoring; and whether to pressure South Korea and China to impose similar conditions on their food aid. [...]. This report will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid to North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Manyin, Mark E.
2009-09-09
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [Updated April 1, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "U.S. military commanders continue to be concerned about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons in a destabilized Pakistan. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified March 31, 2009, that 'Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.' […] Pakistani efforts to improve the security of the country's nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-04-01
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Assistance to North Korea [May 20, 2009]
"Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, about 60% of which has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. U.S. aid fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in 2006. The Bush Administration resumed energy aid in the fall of 2007, after progress was made in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program. […]. North Korea's failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks, would restart its nuclear facilities and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. The United States had been providing technical assistance to North Korea to help in the nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took legislative steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. In its FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations budget request, the Obama Administration has asked for over $150 million for North Korea-related energy and denuclearization assistance. This money would supplement existing resources in the event of a breakthrough with North Korea. In separate committee actions, House and Senate appropriators denied these requests. However, they did approve monies for the State Department's general emergency non-proliferation fund that the Administration could use in North Korea. […]. This report will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid to North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Manyin, Mark E.
2009-05-20
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [May 15, 2009]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. Pakistan does not have a stated nuclear policy, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is thought to be primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan's top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan's international proliferation network. Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-05-15
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North Korea's Nuclear Weapons [May 5, 2009]
"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program--including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates--and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. North Korea may have produced enough additional plutonium for five nuclear warheads between 2002 and 2007. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence has emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. However, the scope and success of this program may be limited, and North Korea says it does not have a uranium enrichment program. […]. North Korea's failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear facilities, and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. Although progress had been made in disabling North Korea's plutonium production, these steps can be reversed. The reprocessing facility at Yongbyon would take months to restart. Other facilities at Yongbyon may take longer to restore. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK's nuclear weapons production capabilities and warhead sophistication, or the extent of an uranium enrichment program and proliferation activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2009-05-05
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North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues [May 26, 2009]
"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program--including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates--and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. North Korea may have produced enough additional plutonium for five nuclear warheads between 2002 and 2007. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence has emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. However, the scope and success of this program may be limited, and North Korea says it does not have a uranium enrichment program.[...]. North Korea's failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear facilities, and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. Although progress had been made in disabling North Korea's plutonium production, these steps can be reversed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2009-05-26
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [Updated June 12, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-06-12
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [July 30, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-07-30
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North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 [July 23, 2009]
"The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea's second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctions on North Korea's arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the case with an earlier U.N. resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test, Resolution 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea's regime and its weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Resolution 1874. In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being 'tainted' by handling any DPRK transaction."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Niksch, Larry A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki
2009-07-23
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North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 [July 1, 2009]
"The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea's second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctions on North Korea's arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. [...] This report summarizes and analyzes Res. 1874. On the surface, financial sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea) and its prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary effect... unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being 'tainted' by handling any DPRK transaction. A ban on luxury goods will only be effective if China begins to deny North Korea lucrative trade credits. Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented... While procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous and optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki; Manyin, Mark E. . . .
2009-07-01
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [February 2, 2010]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.- Russian relationship."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-02
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [February 23, 2010]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-23
