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VA Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1994), as Reported to the House [July 27, 2015]
"This report describes the VA Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1994) as reported to the House by the Committee on Veterans Affairs on July 23, 2015, and compares it to current law where appropriate. A press account has reported that Chairman Jeff Miller may meet with all committee members to seek views of the minority before floor action. As a result of this meeting, it is possible that the final bill that will go to the House floor may have some provisions that differ from those that the Committee reported. This report provides a section-by-section description of the act: Section 1 is the short title, 'VA Accountability Act of 2015.' Section 2 would authorize the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to expedite removing or demoting most employees for misconduct. Section 3 would require an individual appointed (1) to a permanent position in the competitive service or (2) as a career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (SES) to serve an 18-month probationary period before the appointment would become final. Section 4 would establish a process for handling whistleblower complaints. Section 5 would establish specific requirements for VA's senior executive performance appraisal system and would require the Secretary of the VA to reassign senior executives to a new position at least every five years. It would also require a review of, and a plan for improvements to, the current management training program for senior executives. […] Section 10 would require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the amount of time department employees spent in carrying out organizing activities related to labor organizations and the amount of space in department facilities used for such activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.; Carey, Maeve P.; Isaacs, Katelin P., 1980- . . .
2015-07-27
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Expedited Removal Authority for VA Senior Executives (38 U.S.C. § 713): Selected Legal Issues [November 10, 2015]
"This report discusses selected legal issues relating to the authority for summary removal of individuals in senior executive positions at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act, P.L. 113-146, enacted on August 7, 2014, created this authority by adding Section 713 to Title 38 of the United States Code. It authorizes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove an individual in a senior executive position from federal service or transfer him or her to a position in the General Schedule if the Secretary determines that the individual's performance or misconduct warrants removal. This report addresses whether this authority raises a constitutional question under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a deprivation of a property right to continued federal employment and whether a court would have jurisdiction to hear a case brought by a senior executive who had been removed pursuant to it. The Supreme Court has held that a nonprobationary government employee who is removable for cause, as distinguished from at-will, has a property right in continued employment. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that property may not be deprived without due process of law. According to the Court, an agency may not remove such an employee from government employment without due process rights of notice and an opportunity to respond to charges. The employee also is entitled to a hearing either before or after removal. A hearing must be provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.
2015-11-10
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Expedited Removal Authority for VA Senior Executives (38 U.S.C. § 713): Selected Legal Issues [August 21, 2015]
From the summary: "Most of the civilian federal workforce is covered by one of two retirement systems: (1) the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) for individuals hired before 1984 or (2) the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) for individuals hired in 1984 or later. FERS annuities are fully funded by the sum of employee and employer contributions and interest earned by the Treasury bonds held by the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). The federal government makes supplemental payments into the CSRDF on behalf of employees covered by the CSRS because employee and agency contributions and interest earnings do not meet the full cost of the benefits earned by employees covered by that system. […] Because CSRS retirement benefits have never been fully funded by employer and employee contributions, the CSRDF has an unfunded liability. The unfunded liability was $785.0 billion in FY2013. According to actuarial estimates, the unfunded liability of the CSRDF will continue to rise until about FY2025, when it will peak at $834.8 billion. From that point onward, the unfunded liability will steadily decline and is projected to be eliminated by FY2090. Actuarial estimates indicate that the unfunded liability of the CSRS does not pose a threat to the solvency of the trust fund. There is no point over the next 80 years at which the assets of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund are projected to run out."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.
2015-08-21
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Expedited Removal Authority for VA Senior Executives (38 U.S.C. § 713): Selected Legal Issues [March 4, 2016]
"This report discusses selected legal issues relating to the authority for summary removal of individuals in senior executive positions at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act, P.L. 113-146, enacted on August 7, 2014, created this authority by adding Section 713 to Title 38 of the United States Code. It authorizes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove an individual in a senior executive position from federal service or transfer him or her to a position in the General Schedule if the Secretary determines that the individual's performance or misconduct warrants removal. This report addresses whether this authority raises a constitutional question under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a deprivation of a property right to continued federal employment and whether a court would have jurisdiction to hear a case brought by a senior executive who had been removed pursuant to it."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.
2016-03-04
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Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social Security Benefit Entitlement Issues [September 17, 2014]
"Calculations indicating that the Social Security program will not be financially sustainable in the long run under the present statutory scheme have fueled the current debate regarding Social Security reform. This report addresses selected legal issues that may be raised regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits as Congress considers possible changes to the Social Security program in view of projected long-range shortfalls in the Social Security Trust Funds. Social Security is a statutory entitlement program. Beneficiaries have a legal entitlement to receive Social Security benefits as set forth under the Social Security Act. The fact that Social Security benefits are financed by taxes on an employee's wages, however, does not limit Congress's power to fix the levels of benefits under the Social Security Act or the conditions upon which they may be paid. Congress's authority to modify provisions of the Social Security program was affirmed in the 1960 Supreme Court decision in 'Flemming v. Nestor', wherein the Court held that an individual does not have an accrued 'property right' in his or her Social Security benefits. The Court has made clear in subsequent court decisions that the payment of Social Security taxes conveys no contractual rights to Social Security benefits."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lanza, Emily M.; Nicola, Thomas J.
2014-09-17
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Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social Security Benefit Entitlement Issues [June 7, 2013]
"Calculations indicating that in the long run the Social Security program will not be financially sustainable under the present statutory scheme have fueled the current debate regarding Social Security reform. This report addresses selected legal issues which may be raised regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits as Congress considers possible changes to the Social Security program, and in view of projected long-range shortfalls in the Social Security Trust Funds. Social Security is a statutory entitlement program. Beneficiaries have a legal entitlement to receive Social Security benefits as set forth under the Social Security Act. The fact that Social Security benefits are financed by taxes on an employee's wages, however, does not limit Congress's power to fix the levels of benefits under the Social Security Act or the conditions upon which they may be paid. Congress's authority to modify provisions of the Social Security program was affirmed in the 1960 Supreme Court decision in 'Flemming v. Nestor,' wherein the Court held that an individual does not have an accrued 'property right' in his or her Social Security benefits. The Court has made clear in subsequent court decisions that the payment of Social Security taxes conveys no contractual rights to Social Security benefits. Congress has the power to legislatively promise to pay individuals a certain level of Social Security benefits, and to provide legal evidence of Congress's 'guarantee' of the obligation of the federal government to provide for the payment of such benefits in the future. While Congress may decide to take whatever measures necessary to fulfill such an obligation, courts would be unlikely to find that Congress's unilateral promise constitutes a contract which could not be modified in the future. In addition, a congressional promise not to reduce a specific level of Social Security benefits payable to certain eligible individuals would likely not overcome the constitutional principle, subject to due process considerations, that one Congress may not bind a subsequent Congress to legislative action or inaction."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Swendiman, Kathleen S.; Nicola, Thomas J.
2013-06-07
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Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social Security Benefit Entitlement Issues [Updated March 23, 2005]
"Social Security reform is a major issue currently under debate in the 109th Congress. Impetus for this debate stems from calculations indicating that in the long- run the current program will not be financially sustainable under the present statutory scheme. This report addresses selected legal issues which may be raised regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits as Congress considers possible changes to the Social Security program, and in view of projected long-range shortfalls in the Social Security Trust Funds. Social Security is a statutory entitlement program. Beneficiaries have a legal entitlement to receive Social Security benefits as set forth under the Social Security Act. However, Social Security benefits are not directly measured by the amount of payments made through the years into the system. Thus, the fact that Social Security benefits are financed by taxes on an employee's wages does not limit Congress' power to fix the levels of benefits under the Social Security Act, or the conditions upon which they may be paid. Congress's authority to modify provisions of the Social Security program, was affirmed in the 1960 Supreme Court decision in Flemming v. Nestor, wherein the Court held that an individual does not have an accrued 'property right' in his or her Social Security benefits. The Court has also made clear in subsequent court decisions that the payment of Social Security taxes conveys no contractual rights to Social Security benefits. The courts will accord strong deference to social legislation such as contained in the Social Security Act where Congress exercises its power to provide for the general welfare."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.; Swendiman, Kathleen S.
2005-03-23
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [January 4, 2013]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of two types of debt: (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal debt limit currently stands at $16,394 billion. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit and, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Levit, Mindy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Thomas J.
2013-01-04
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [February 11, 2011]
"The federal government's statutory debt limit is currently $14,294 billion (P.L. 111-139).1 On January 6, 2011, Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner issued a letter to Congress stating that the debt limit would be reached sometime between March 31 and May 16, 2011. Treasury has subsequently revised these estimates saying they now expect to reach the debt limit sometime between April 5, 2011, and May 31, 2011, due to an upward revision to projected receipts and a downward revision in projected debt to be issued to government trust funds. […] This report examines the possibility of the federal government reaching its statutory debt limit and not raising it, with a particular focus on government operations. First, the report explains the nature of the federal government's debt, the processes associated with federal borrowing, and historical events that may influence prospective actions. It also includes an analysis of what could happen if the federal government may no longer issue debt, has exhausted alternative sources of cash, and, therefore, depends on incoming receipts or other sources of funds to provide any cash needed to liquidate federal obligations.3 Finally this report lays out considerations for increasing the debt limit under current policy and what impact fiscal policy could have on the debt limit going forward."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.; Nuschler, Dawn; Shelton, Alison M. . . .
2011-02-11
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [May 31, 2012]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of two types of debt: (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal debt limit currently stands at $16,394 billion. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit and, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period. After a lengthy debate over the debt limit in the summer of 2011, the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) on August 2, 2011, provided for an increase in the debt limit to its current level. Secretary Geithner has stated that the current debt limit will likely be reached before the end of the year and the use of extraordinary measures could likely stave off an increase in the debt limit until early 2013."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Levit, Mindy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Thomas J. . . .
2012-05-31
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [June 3, 2011]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of two types of debt: (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal debt limit currently stands at $14,294 billion. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit and, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' […] The need to raise (or lower) the limit during a session of Congress is driven by previous decisions regarding revenues and spending stemming from legislation enacted earlier in the session or in prior years. Nevertheless, the consideration of debt-limit legislation often is viewed as an opportunity to reexamine fiscal and budgetary policy. Consequently, House and Senate action on legislation adjusting the debt limit often is complicated, hindered by policy disagreements, and subject to delay."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.; Brass, Clinton T.; Levit, Mindy R. . . .
2011-06-03
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [April 27, 2011]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of two types of debt: (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal debt limit currently stands at $14,294 billion. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit and, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period. [...] It is extremely difficult for Congress to effectively influence short-term fiscal and budgetary policy through action on legislation adjusting the debt limit. The need to raise (or lower) the limit during a session of Congress is driven by previous decisions regarding revenues and spending stemming from legislation enacted earlier in the session or in prior years. Nevertheless, the consideration of debt-limit legislation often is viewed as an opportunity to reexamine fiscal and budgetary policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Levit, Mindy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Thomas J.
2011-04-27
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [July 27, 2011]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of two types of debt: (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal debt limit currently stands at $14,294 billion. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit and, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. […] It is extremely difficult for Congress to effectively influence short-term fiscal and budgetary policy through action on legislation adjusting the debt limit. The need to raise (or lower) the limit during a session of Congress is driven by previous decisions regarding revenues and spending stemming from legislation enacted earlier in the session or in prior years. Nevertheless, the consideration of debt-limit legislation often is viewed as an opportunity to reexamine fiscal and budgetary policy. Consequently, House and Senate action on legislation adjusting the debt limit often is complicated, hindered by policy disagreements, and subject to delay."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Levit, Mindy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Thomas J. . . .
2011-07-27
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [November 21, 2013]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of two types of debt: (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal debt limit is currently suspended through February 7, 2014. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit which, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nuschler, Dawn; Nicola, Thomas J.; Brass, Clinton T. . . .
2013-11-21
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Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations [February 19, 2013]
"Controversy continues over the appropriate role that Congress should play in regulating U.S. military operations against foreign entities. U.S. action against Libya reignited consideration of long-standing questions concerning the President's constitutional authority to use military force without congressional authorization, as well as congressional authority to regulate or limit the use of such force. There may be a renewed focus in the 113th Congress on whether or to what extent Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President's authority to conduct military operations in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, or other locations. This report begins by discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant court cases. It considers Congress's constitutional authority to end a military conflict via legislative action; the implications that the War Powers Resolution or the repeal of prior military authorization may have upon the continued use of military force; and other considerations which may inform congressional decisions to limit the use of military force via statutory command or through funding limitations. The report discusses Congress's ability to limit funding for U.S. participation in hostilities, examining relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund these activities in the event that appropriations are cut. The report then provides historical examples of measures that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress's authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in ongoing military operations. Although not beyond debate, such limitations appear to be within Congress's authority to allocate resources for military operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elsea, Jennifer; Garcia, Michael John; Nicola, Thomas J.
2013-02-19
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Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq [Updated April 24, 2007]
"This report begins by providing background and discusses constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presents a historical overview of relevant court cases. Next, it discusses Congress's power to rescind prior military authorization and the consequences of such a repeal. Evaluating relevant jurisprudence and the pertinent provisions of the War Powers Resolution, it concludes that the repeal of the AUMF, absent the further denial of appropriations or the establishment of a specific deadline for troop withdrawal, would likely have little, if any, legal effect on the continuation of combat operations. Finally, the report discusses Congress's ability to limit funding for military operations in Iraq. It examines relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund operations in the event Congress were to restrict appropriations for the war. There follows a summary of measures passed by both Houses in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 1591, related to the redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq. The report concludes by providing a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress's authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in Iraq. Although not beyond debate, such a restriction appears to be within Congress's authority to allocate resources for military operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elsea, Jennifer; Garcia, Michael John; Nicola, Thomas J.
2007-04-24
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Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq [January 29, 2007]
"President Bush's announced plan to increase the number of troops participating in military operations in Iraq has raised questions regarding Congress's authority to limit or possibly terminate the U.S. military role in Iraq. It has been suggested that the President's role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces provides sufficient authority for his deployment of additional troops, and any efforts on the part of Congress to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles. While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to concede that it is within Congress's authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it has been suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the war in Iraq would amount to an 'unconstitutional condition.' The question may turn on whether the President's proposal is a purely operational decision committed to the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, or whether congressional action to prevent the carrying out of the proposal is a valid exercise of Congress's authority to allocate resources using its war powers and power of the purse."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elsea, Jennifer; Nicola, Thomas J.
2007-01-29
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Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations [September 8, 2011]
"Controversy continues over the appropriate role that Congress should play in regulating U.S. military operations against foreign entities. U.S. action against Libya reignited consideration of long-standing questions concerning the President's constitutional authority to use military force without congressional authorization, as well as congressional authority to regulate or limit the use of such force. As Congress considers defense authorization and appropriations bills for FY2012, there may be a renewed focus on whether or to what extent Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President's authority to conduct military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or other locations. […] The report discusses Congress's ability to limit funding for U.S. participation in hostilities, examining relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund these activities in the event that appropriations are cut. The report then provides historical examples of measures that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress's authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in ongoing military operations. Although not beyond debate, such limitations appear to be within Congress's authority to allocate resources for military operations. Portions of this report are taken from an earlier report, CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL33837, 'Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq', by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and Thomas J. Nicola."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elsea, Jennifer; Garcia, Michael John; Nicola, Thomas J.
2011-09-08
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Congressional Authority To Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq [February 27, 2008]
"This report begins by providing background, discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant court cases. It discusses Congress's power to rescind prior military authorization, concluding, in light of relevant jurisprudence and the War Powers Resolution, that the repeal of the AUMF, absent the further denial of appropriations or the establishment of a specific deadline for troop withdrawal, would likely have little, if any, legal effect on the continuation of combat operations. The report discusses Congress's ability to limit funding for military operations in Iraq, examining relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund operations if appropriations are cut. There follows a summary of relevant measures included in the vetoed FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 1591, and the enacted act, H.R. 2206. The report provides historical examples of measures that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress's authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in Iraq. Although not beyond debate, such a restriction appears to be within Congress's authority to allocate resources for military operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elsea, Jennifer; Nicola, Thomas J.; Garcia, Michael John
2008-02-27
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9/11 Commission Recommendations: Intelligence Budget [September 27, 2004]
"This report identifies the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with respect to the intelligence budget. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, known as the 9/11 Commission, on July 22, 2004 recommended replacing the Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the United States government; and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that contribute to it. The National Intelligence Director would submit a unified budget for national intelligence and would receive an appropriation for national intelligence and apportion appropriated funds to appropriate agencies in the intelligence community...This report also describes the intelligence budget process under current law to explain the effect of these recommendations and presents the current budget authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as budget provisions in two bills, S. 2774 and H.R. 5040, that include all Commission recommendations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nicola, Thomas J.
2004-09-27
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Homeland Security and Labor-Management Relations: NTEU v. Chertoff [Updated August 14, 2006]
"The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") with the authority to develop a separate human resources management system for the employees of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). On February 1, 2005, final regulations to define and implement the new system were published in the Federal Register. Shortly after the regulations were issued, the National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU") and several other labor organizations filed a lawsuit, alleging that DHS and OPM exceeded the authority granted to the agencies under the Homeland Security Act. On August 12, 2005, a U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined parts of the new regulations involving labor-management relations and the Merit Systems Protection Board in NTEU v. Chertoff. The district court on October 7, 2005, denied a motion by DHS and OPM to modify its injunction of labor-management relations regulations. On June 27, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed some conclusions of the district court, reversed others, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. This report examines the opinions of the district court and court of appeals."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shimabukuro, Jon O.; Nicola, Thomas J.
2006-08-14
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [September 19, 2013]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. The federal government's statutory debt limit currently stands at $16,699 billion ($16.699 trillion). Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit which, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Levit, Mindy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Thomas J. . . .
2013-09-19
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Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations [March 27, 2015]
"The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit. Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit which, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of 'extraordinary measures.' Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period. It is extremely difficult for Congress to effectively influence short-term fiscal and budgetary policy through action on legislation adjusting the debt limit. The need to raise (or lower) the limit during a session of Congress is driven by previous decisions regarding revenues and spending stemming from legislation enacted earlier in the session or in prior years. Nevertheless, the consideration of debt limit legislation often is viewed as an opportunity to reexamine fiscal and budgetary policy. Consequently, House and Senate action on legislation adjusting the debt limit is often complicated, hindered by policy disagreements, and subject to delay."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Levit, Mindy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Thomas J. . . .
2015-03-27
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