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Proper Role of Special Operations Forces in the Pan Sahel Region of Africa
"Although the center of gravity on the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) and radical Islam is Iraq, Africa has emerged into the spotlight of global counter-terror operations because of repeated appearances of Africans among the foreign fighters in Iraq and mounting evidence that this continent will become the next al Qaeda hotbed. After dismantling Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven their effectiveness in fighting this non-traditional enemy, particularly with the help of partner-nation militaries. As the designated lead on synchronizing the GWOT efforts for DOD, US SOF remain focused on the Middle East, while continuing to operate in other regions where terrorists may seek sanctuary. The main U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in Africa have been focused on Somalia and the Horn of Africa. This threat now has expanded to the Trans-Sahara region, also known as Pan Sahel, where traditional caravan routes can provide hideouts and staging areas for international and regional terrorists and criminals. This paper analyzes the proper role of SOF Operations in the Pan Sahel region of Africa during phase zero operations."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Baker, Anthony P.
2006-10-10
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Legitimacy as a Guiding Principle Should be Measured during All Phases of Operations to Determine the Degree of Operational Objective Accomplishment in the Global War on Terror
"From the days of Roman conquest through the U.S. Marshal Plan, legitimacy was a principle that directed actions and operations. This paper defines what legitimacy means to U.S. Military operations today, and its applicability to operational planning. It explains the impact legitimacy can have on public opinion and provides a rudimentary understanding of how legitimacy considerations become a significant factor in fighting the GWOT [Global War on Terror]. Finally, the paper draws conclusions concerning the failure to include legitimacy as a principle in planning operations."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Daugherty, Daniel J.
2006-05-17
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Suicide Terrorism: Deadly Tactic or Operational Art at Work?
"Terrorist groups have repeatedly used suicide attacks in an attempt to achieve their strategic objectives. There is minimal argument that these groups demonstrate a profound understanding of both the strategic and tactical levels of war, however there is little mention of their understanding of the operational level of war. An analysis of suicide terror attacks over the past 25 years indicates that developed terrorist groups (including Al Qaeda and many others) understand the operational level and practice the tenets of operational art. This knowledge is crucial in developing a response to counter what has become a prevalent and effective terrorist tactic. This paper provides background information on the development of the suicide attack as an effective terrorist tactic. It analyzes several terrorist groups and their utilization of suicide attacks to achieve strategic objectives. Finally, the paper reaches conclusions about the groups' awareness and use of operational art concepts, and provides recommendations for assisting the development of a counterterrorism game plan."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Smith, Scott P.
2009-05-04
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Targeted Killings: A Legally Viable, High Risk Course of Action
"On 11 December 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that targeted killings were not strictly prohibited under international law. Analysis of the court case and supporting documents will illustrate that the position taken by the court is sound in it's legal judgment and provides the United States Military and other Government Organizations a powerful tool. Analysis of centers of gravity on the middle to lower end of the range of military operations, with regard to counterinsurgency operations specifically, will show that the center of gravity rests squarely with the local population. In combining the two, it will be shown that just because targeted killings are legal they, for the majority part, run counter to the struggle the United States wages for legitimacy in it's fight so far from home. Operational commanders have many tools in their varied operations fighting insurgencies and terrorism. This paper provides further guidance on the employment of targeted killings, resulting in operational commanders who have less ambiguity on when to employ the tactic, when not to and when to seek legal and higher echelon guidance."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Terry, David C.
2009-05-04
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Road to Effective Integration
"As the global campaign against terrorism continues, the contributions of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have reached unprecedented levels. Some claim that these assets are essential to the armed forces' ability to conduct modern warfare. Due to these systems' capabilities, combatant commanders are requesting ever-greater numbers of unmanned vehicles. However, the employment of more UAS in the theater of operations comes at a price: there are tremendous challenges associated with unmanned aircraft (UA) sharing airspace with manned assets. There have been at least two recent collisions between unmanned and rotary-wing aircraft at lower altitudes in Iraq, as well as numerous near misses with fixed-wing aircraft at higher altitudes. Existing airspace management problems will be further compounded by introduction of additional assets into congested airspace. The effective integration of unmanned aircraft into the battlespace will only occur with concurrent changes in doctrine, organization, training, and materiel. The synergy created by a blended force of manned and unmanned assets will be of great benefit to the Joint Force Commander (JFC)."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Petrock, Christopher T.
2006-02-13
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Unsolved Mystery of Coalition Command and Control
"The current U.S. National Security Strategy places great emphasis on multinational cooperation and execution for all facets of the Global War on Terror. Current political realities and the stretched state of our deployed military forces are likely to increase that focus during President Bush's second term and beyond. While working through alliances and coalitions for missions as diverse as peacekeeping or conventional war, Command and Control (C2) problems continue to severely limit multinational military effectiveness. Despite multiple post-Cold War military interventions shared by the U.S. and its European allies, a readily adaptable or in-place C2 structure remains elusive. This has led to the twofold problem of decreasing warfighting effectiveness and jeopardizing some or all of coalition objectives. However, a successful C2 structure is attainable through steadfast insistence on unity of effort, doctrinal advances, and assured multinational interoperability. Several recent examples of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or coalition Command and Control failures exemplify how this critical principle of war continues to be neglected at the expense of money, time, and lives. Current endeavors to strengthen the ability of NATO or coalitions to establish clear, functional command structures are investigated. Finally, some recommendations and simplified examples for how they might play out in potential scenarios serve to illustrate how multinational military operations can be improved."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Wilson, C. Todd
2005-02-14
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Say Again? Lessons from Hurrican Katrina in Spectrum Management and Communications Interoperability
"The concepts of electromagnetic spectrum management and communications interoperability are nothing new or revolutionary. They are core functions that enable successful command and control for the Joint Force Commander throughout the range of military operations. The importance of these functions cannot be stressed enough. When properly planned for and executed, electromagnetic spectrum management and communications interoperability ensure issues such as interference, duplication of effort and friction are eliminated. In the particular case of disaster relief, they become even more imperative since the destruction of the communications infrastructure within a disaster area is very likely. Hurricane Katrina provided perhaps the greatest illustration of this fact. Without question, the relief operation following Hurricane Katrina was a monumental task and performed admirably by all those involved. However, the operation was not a smooth success. The issues of interference, duplication of effort and friction were all realized due to the inability of the JTF-Katrina Commander's staff to effectively manage the electromagnetic spectrum and resolve communications interoperability issues. Furthermore, the JTF-Katrina Commander's ability to exercise command and control and maintain situational awareness was nearly non-existent leading to coordination issues and delays in the relief efforts. Fortunately, these issues can be resolved and lessons can be derived for future disaster relief operations."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Canfield, Justin M.
2010-03-05
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Developing Objective-Based Measures of Effectiveness for Maritime Container Security
"Maritime container security has been identified as a critical vulnerability in the U.S. national strategy to prevent a terrorist attack on the United States. Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, there has been an increased interagency effort to close the security gaps in the maritime domain, with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) acting as lead agent. Maritime security initiatives have been implemented and the security posture has been improved, but progress has often been measured by efficiency-based level of effort rather than by effectiveness that is objective-based. Development of objective-based measures of effectiveness (MOEs) can be accomplished by analyzing previous similar low-intensity conflicts, such as counterdrug and humanitarian assistance operations. From these, operational commanders today may develop objective-based MOEs for their decision-making process in order to properly allocate limited resources. This paper proposes guidelines that any operational commander could use to develop objective-based MOEs. The purpose of this paper is not to present an exhaustive list of specific MOEs that should be used in the maritime container security domain, but rather to offer guidelines for developing objective-based MOEs that can serve as effective tools in the decision-making process."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Ducharme, Douglas R.
2005-05-17
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Closing the Gaps: Why Changes are Needed in Law and Policy to Improve Homeland Security
"In the last twenty to thirty years the threat to the United States has grown from straightforward state actors to include the less well defined threats posed by terrorists. The most likely threat of violence to the US homeland is not from an organized military operation but from terrorists. Historically, terrorist threats have been addressed by law enforcement agencies. Meeting this threat as from the US as possible means using the military, and since the threat is likely to be terrorist in nature, it follows that combating it will require at least some law enforcement actions. However, current laws and policies preclude many such actions by the military, thus opening gaps in our defense. that could be exploited, deliberately or fortuitously, by our enemies. These gaps must be closed if US Northern Command, as the DoD component charged with assisting in homeland security, is to be successful in its homeland security role. To accomplish this, the Posse Comitatus Act and DODD 5525.5 should be thoroughly revised."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Minium, Scott A.
2009-10-22
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Maritime-Based UAVs: A Key to Success for the Joint Force Commander
"Historically, drones have been used extensively to support a plethora of U.S. military operations from land-based locations; the precision and lethality of applying these assets in the counterterrorism (CT) realm is well documented. Recently the U.S. Navy has offered the Joint Force Commander (JFC) an effective and efficient means of prosecuting targets of opportunity through the employment of sea-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets. These UAVs can give the JFC a capability close to the fight; an asset at his disposal to improve operational and tactical flexibility and a relocatable launch platform minus the concerns of a land-based footprint. This paper will consider the employment of maritime-based UAVs (mbUAVs) as a JFC asset from an operational art, factors and functions perspective. Employment of these assets has created an enormous appetite at the operational level for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to support CT operations. Focusing on the advantages of employing this maritime-based asset with its unique capabilities in ISR will require further doctrine development in order to adequately assist the JFC in his decision making process; it will also provide recommendations for the same and access the potential uniqueness and flexibility of these assets in the littorals and on the high seas."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Gerhart, Michael R.
2015-05-18
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Filling the Void: Private Security Companies, Operational Functions, and the Devolution of Global Security
"The Long War, sparked by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed a tenuous international security situation. U.S. global interests are increasingly at risk and the U.S. military is the primary protector of these interests. Due to limited resources, the U.S. military is increasingly challenged to provide the level of presence and security needed to effectively deter, dissuade or defeat the enemy around the globe. Private Security Companies (PSC) are uniquely positioned to fill the growing security void, but require appropriate oversight. This paper argues that Geographic Combatant Commanders should advocate for needed legal reforms and formally include PSCs in theater-strategic and operational planning across applicable operational functions to protect U.S. interests. It first establishes a clear picture of the current security environment and then looks at the history of PSCs. Second, it draws conclusions that validate the need for PSCs and further describes how they are used across operational functions. Finally, this paper recommends legal reforms and proposes further integration of PSCs into operational functions."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Sage, Christopher S.
2008-04-23
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Unity of Command: An Answer to the Maritime Homeland Security Interagency Quagmire
"Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) and Defense (MHD) of the United States have evolved since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. However, effective operational command and control (C2) to ensure unity of effort of the myriad federal and state agencies involved in MHS still does not exist to prevent or recover from a terror attack or natural disaster. This paper examines the development of current U.S. structure for MHS involving the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DoD), and other federal and civil agencies with often overlapping, confusing, and conflicting jurisdictions. A proposal is made to expand DHS capability with an operational unified command structure comparable to the military. DHS would exercise increased authority under the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) for disaster response (DR). A new combatant commander (CCDR) for DHS with two geographic maritime Joint Task Forces (JTFs) based on the Joint Inter Agency Task Force -- South (JIATF-S) model would conduct counter terror (CT) and counter narcotic (CN) operations with support from all other federal, state, and local agencies."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Hanson, Darren J.,
2008-10-31
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Military and the Drug War: Operational Art at an Impasse?
"America has been losing the war on drugs for over fifteen years. Why? This paper will examine the reasons for the limited success enjoyed by United States government agencies, and in particular, the military. Some of the major causes of frustration for the military in fighting this perplexing war include: lack of training, lack of desire, lack of funded programs, interagency coordination problems, difficulties with operational design, difficulties coordinating operations with other nations, inability to translate the stated national strategy into achievable military objectives, absence of a flexible infrastructure, limited diplomatic success, lack of a unified command structure, and widespread corruption of foreign agencies at all levels. Each of these has contributed to a rather ineffective counter-drug campaign which has left many national agencies frustrated. The courageous men and women who risk their lives fighting this tragic war are in search of a more robust and efficacious counter-drug strategy. This essay will examine the limited role which the military plays in counter-drug operations, analyze how the strategic goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy are pursued by military planners, and illustrate how a more aggressive military strategy is not likely to foster better results."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Guse, Stephen
1997-02-07
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Non-Lethal Weapons: Considerations for the Joint Force Commander
"The allure of non-lethal weapons has continued to grow, and will only accelerate as the United States continues to confront complex irregular combat scenarios, often in urban environments. Despite their promise, numerous concerns about their development and use have been raised by persons both in and out of the military. While all the concerns deserve consideration, this paper discusses the issues raised primarily by those outside the military. The concerns raised need to be addressed by everyone in the non-lethal weapons community, from the most senior policy-makers to the most junior soldier employing them. This paper focuses on what the operational commander can do to attend to potential complaints against non-lethal weapons. It is the thesis of this paper that properly crafted Rules of Engagement are one tool that the operational commander can use. General guidelines for use when developing Rules of Engagement are offered to minimize the concerns raised and help ensure the legitimacy of both the weapons employed and the United States."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Voetberg, Jeffrey W.
2007-10-05
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NGOs in the Operational Theater: What Commanders Need to Understand and How to Work Together
"The United States military will continue to conduct operations in asymmetric conflicts which resemble our latest endeavors in Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These two conflicts will likely be the prototypes for future military operations. Therefore, future commanders will encounter Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in their Areas of Operation (AO) with increasing regularity. The Operational Commander and his subordinates must look for ways to improve their inter-actions with these non-state actors to better achieve operational end-states. Commanders must have a better appreciation of what NGOs are and how they operate. In addition, the Commander must balance his primary task of providing security in post-conflict or stability operations and balance that with NGO conduct in the host nation. Commanders will find that balancing the task of security and providing for quality of life improvement projects is very challenging. Leadership at the operational and tactical levels will be the critical ingredient for success with the NGO community. This paper examines the problems of fluid security environments in relation to NGOs. It also provides some defined measures that can improve the NGO to commander relationship beyond the present Civil Affairs model. Some of these suggestions are the result of the author's experience as an Observer Controller at the National Training Center, Civilians on the Battlefield integration."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Scheidt, Kenneth W.
2005-02-14
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Surface Engagement Groups: Bridging the Disconnect between Today's Fleet and Tomorrow's Maritime Mission
"The United States Navy possesses the most capable and most powerful naval force in history. Today's Navy is a relic of the Cold War era, in which the force was built to fight and win a large blue-water naval conflict. While the Navy remains postured and capable of fighting a large, high intensity conflict at sea, it only now is gaining credible capability in the long forgotten green and brown water operating areas. The CNO Guidance of 2006 directs the Navy in a new direction; Tomorrow's Navy will be widely dispersed into numerous regions, establish partnerships with international forces through the '1,000 Ship Navy', gain regional and cultural familiarity, and be able to shape the operating environment to deter and defeat asymmetric and non-traditional threats. The Navy operates on the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Group constructs. Strike Groups alone cannot sustain increased forward presence on the scale directed by the CNO. The Navy must reform its deployment and employment methods to match its fleet with its mission. By downsizing strike groups to their absolute essence and regrouping the remaining force into regionally focused Surface Engagement Groups, the Navy will be able to achieve the commander's intent in the 2006 CNO's Guidance."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Kochendorfer, John
2006-10-10
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Effects-Based Operations: Success Across the Spectrum of Conflict
"Although effects-based operations (EBO) is not a new concept for waging war, it is rarely thought of as a methodology that can be applied across the spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives. This paper argues that the EBO methodology should be used as the joint standard to ensure success for America in symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. By first analyzing trends in the world's political environment, this paper will show the necessity of harnessing all instruments of national power in an integrated effort to defeat our adversaries. Second, this paper will highlight how EBO has taken hold as the joint standard, although doctrine and training has been slow in documenting progress across the services. Third, this paper will look at the steady development of EBO since Gulf War I while focusing on the lessons learned from that conflict, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. Last, this paper will discuss the future of American combat and the prospect for winning America's wars with EBO."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Logeman, Keith M.
2005-02-14
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Maritime Security Operations: A New Global View and Whispers of Mahan
"The attacks on '9/11' highlighted critical vulnerabilities in our national security and economic infrastructures that have resulted in increased security measures at our airports, seaports and borders. In spite of the numerous directives and measures to increase our safety, no greater vulnerability exists than through the vastness, complexity and ambiguity of the maritime domain. The intended focus of this paper is to examine current maritime security operations (MSO) and the specific challenges our maritime security forces face combating terrorism within the vast and evolving maritime domain. This paper challenges the current approach to maritime domain awareness, suggesting that the reader focus on failed states and their proximity to maritime domains and critical maritime infrastructure, rather than on the maritime domain as a subset of a failed state. This would provide a better focus for effective maritime security operations, and further the development of domain awareness."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Carelli, Paul A.
2006-02-13
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FBI: A Partner in Counterinsurgency Operations
"This paper will inform the operational commander how the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] can participate in a counterinsurgency campaign. It will document what is already in place, how the FBI investigator attacks organized and or disorganized criminal enterprises and how the Bureau uses the task force approach to combat those groups. It will draw parallels between organized criminal enterprises and insurgency groups. The purpose of this paper is to provide some insight as to an effective way to implement FBI and other law enforcement agents in a counterinsurgency campaign. Because many of the current joint FBI and U.S. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are classified, this unclassified paper will not provide details on specific structures in place and the operational successes that have resulted from those arrangements. This paper will outline the existing relationships, point out parallels in methods and targets, and suggest a potential use for the assets."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Giacalone, John
2006-10-23
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Cultural Intelligence for the Commander: A Necessary Ingredient
"The need for J2s to consolidate and incorporate cultural intelligence into their enemy assessment to improve the value of credible and actionable intelligence to the Combatant Commander has never been greater. The 21st century is upon us, and we are now arrayed against distinctive adversaries with dramatically different cultures. This new threat increases the nature of issues intelligence is asked to address and the nature of the information that bears on those issues. One significant source of information that has been under utilized is that of the adversary's culture. If intelligence is truly about knowing the enemy, we need to rethink how cultural intelligence can be used to support operations. Today intelligence systems and processes remain tuned to the Cold War. Subsequently, paradigms established by theater J2s do not assess or effectively analyze the cultural aspect of an enemy's values, beliefs, or behaviors to the effort required. Our current inability to factor cultural background into our analysis leaves us subject to unnecessary ignorance and indecision. Lack of cultural intelligence will lead to misperception, misinterpretation, and misrepresentation of the enemy that could have adverse effects on military operations. On the other hand, a firm grasp of the adversary's culture can facilitate achieving operational objectives with far less consequences Culture profoundly influences the intent and actions of our adversaries. Instead of treating it as an obstacle to be 'worked around' we should strive to use it as an asset -- a lens that can help us identify their critical vulnerabilities."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Franz, Peter
2005-02-14
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'Good For The Goose, Good For The Gander;' a Coast Guard Model for the Thousand-Ship Navy
"As a nation at war, facing a diverse set of new challenges, the stakes are high and are growing for the United States. The nation needs to expand its 'operationalization' of the national fleet and ensure the Coast Guard and Navy work together to most effectively utilize multi-mission assets. An enhanced national fleet along with international engagement in pursuit of the '1,000 ship Navy' is the most critical enabling force for securing the maritime domain. The purpose of this research paper is to present the Coast Guard Caribbean Support Tender (CST) model which is a key and quintessential element for building international partnership and the Thousand-Ship Navy. It provides a Combatant Commander with an economically viable, diplomatically acceptable, and operationally proven solution to employ in order to increase regional stability and build partnerships. Finally, it concludes with a view on how the Coast Guard multi-mission capabilities and international partnerships make it ideal to contribute in realizing the vision of a Thousand-ship Navy. Given the likelihood that some of the future naval conflicts will occur in the littoral vice open ocean, The Coast Guard's unique skills must be capitalized upon and fully utilized."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Cinalli, David A.
2006-10-23
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Realizing the 1000-Ship Navy
"While addressing the August 2005 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen unveiled what many consider the cornerstone of the United States Navy's new maritime strategy, the formation of a global fleet, or a 1000-Ship Navy. Admiral Mullen did not use this euphemism to describe a thousand ships directly doing our Republic's bidding, but rather a global maritime security arrangement, designed to synergize the collective maritime capabilities of our allies to further security in the maritime domain. Admiral Mullen's initiative was born partly out of the globalization driven need ensure free, and unfettered access to the global commons by legitimate merchant traffic, and the realities of an ever shrinking American fleet's inability to conduct global sea-control unilaterally. This paper highlights the genesis of the global fleet initiative, its requirements, and likely roles in international security. It explains the current nature of coalition building and provides a recommended departure from current paradigms required to realize the global fleet."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Uhls, Dan (Daniel)
2006-10-23
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Look Out Below: Islamic Terrorism in South America
"With hundreds of millions of dollars of financial support, ease of movement into the United States because of false passports and visas provided by corrupt South American government officials, and a sympathetic population filled with anti-American sentiment, the Islamic terrorist threat is very real in South America and should be a major security concern for the United States. While U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) receives most of the attention from U.S. political and military leaders due to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the ongoing conflict in Iraq, and recent developments in Iran, the many threats in South America, to include Islamic terrorists, narco-terrorists, corrupt government officials, and the growing relationships among the three, is reason enough to elevate U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) from its current level of importance to one demanding the highest attention. In order to combat the growth of Islamic terrorism in South America, the United States must disrupt the conditions such as corruption, lawlessness, prevalence of drugs, and anti-Americanism that allow this terrorism to thrive."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Cruz, Christopher A.
2006-02-13
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Perils Facing the One Thousand Ship Navy
"The one thousand ship navy concept and the Global Maritime Partners Initiative are both part of an ongoing effort to define a new maritime strategy. This paper explains the expanded list of maritime security threats articulated by ADM Mullen, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations. It also outlines the efforts to develop cooperative relationships to confront these threats which negatively impact the globalized economy. Such relationships facilitate information and intelligence sharing with commercial maritime interests, other U.S. government organizations involved with maritime security and international counterparts. This paper outlines the strengths and weaknesses of these ideas in terms of implementation of a new maritime strategy. Finally, the paper makes recommendations regarding public diplomacy, intra-U.S. government cooperation, international cooperation and technology application to eliminate barriers which inhibit implementation of these ideas."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Marshall, Margaret
2006-10-23
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Applying Some Concepts of Operational Art to Coast Guard Operations
"The issue of illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration in the maritime domain presents a challenge to the organizations charged with protecting the borders of the United States. As an agency responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary instrument for interdicting illegal maritime migration. Except in extreme circumstances of mass migration, the Coast Guard has relied on the principle of effective presence to accomplish its mission and done so with measurable success. However, with the growing transnational criminal nature of human trafficking and increased pressure on U.S. maritime borders due to tougher border enforcement, the Coast Guard should seek to expand its concept of operations for interdiction of human smuggling in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard could do this by inviting relevant agencies to participate in a Joint Interagency Task Force to bring a unified effort to counter maritime smuggling. Furthermore, the Coast Guard should apply the appropriate concepts of operational art consistent with joint doctrine in planning and executing its mission to ensure the most effective and efficient application of national resources."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Conley, Christopher J.
2008-04-23
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Maritime Security on the Horn of Africa: Threading the Needle at a Seam of Responsibility
"The Horn of Africa is among the most dangerous areas of the world for maritime activity. Given the scarcity of regional capabilities to police these waters, Coalition naval forces maintain a maritime security presence in the region. These forces have had some notable successes, but face a complex challenge in suppressing piracy and human smuggling. At the heart of this maritime problem is the vast and ungoverned land area of Somalia, in which chaos creates too many incentives and not enough deterrence for maritime criminal activity. The recent creation of a United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) places the landmass of Africa (except Egypt) inside the AFRICOM AOR. As a result, the dynamic waters surrounding the Horn of Africa will soon lay on a seam between the USCENTCOM AOR and USAFRICOM AOR, creating new challenges and opportunities for conducting maritime security operations in the region. This paper will first discuss the operational factors that affect maritime security efforts to date. It will then examine command and control implications brought about by the creation of USAFRICOM and the combatant commanders shifting seams of responsibility. Finally, it will make recommendations on how to work effectively across this dynamic seam of responsibility to the benefit of both USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Finman, Brian J.
2007-11-06
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Deployable Operations Group: A Model for a National Unified Interagency Rapid Response Command
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created after the attacks on September 11, 2001 to consolidate all the domestic agencies responsible for protecting America's borders and national infrastructure under a single department. Since the attacks, nationwide preparedness efforts have established numerous federal rapid response teams, which are coordinated during a federal interagency response under the National Incident Management System. This hastily formed interagency command can become clumsy, because normally each of these rapid response teams is managed and functions under their independent agency. The U.S. government has unparalleled capability and capacity to respond to crisis events, but this arrangement lacks unity of command which hinders coordination and unity of effort. The newly updated National Response Framework (NRF) and recently developed Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) process provide a strategic and upper operational skeleton for interagency coordination, but do not provide the degree of unity of effort needed to avoid duplication and inefficiency in a time critical response. If each of the highly capable and independent rapid response teams scattered throughout the federal government were managed under a single body, instead of through their parent agencies, the national response effort could have increased interoperability and harmonization. This paper describes how incorporating multi-agency rapid response forces under a single unified command could better coordinate the domestic All-Hazards federal rapid response."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Cooper, Eric M.
2008-05-22
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Remaining 'Semper Paratus' in the 21st Century
"The United States Coast Guard been designated as the Executive Agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for maritime homeland security. Response efforts in the aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina highlight the difficulties associated with trying to coordinate large scale operations that cross the boundaries of federal, state, and local authorities. Twenty first century threats require the ability to rapidly assess developing events and adjust response measures accordingly. The Coast Guard must continue to seek ways that will effectively leverage the full capacity of response assets at all levels of government. As such, the Coast Guard should institutionalize a Command and Control structure that is functional within the scope of the National Response Framework, and simultaneously provides the operational level commander with the ability to serve as a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. In doing so, Coast Guard service doctrine needs to be developed that clarifies the role of the operational level commander, identifies a crisis action planning process, and addresses the various legal constraints associated with multi-agency response operations."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Turdo, Michael
2008-04-23
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Maritime Homeland Security and Defense: Developing a Baseline Concept of Operations
"The missions of Maritime Homeland Security/Defense are hardly defined beyond the simple meanings of the words. Since 9/11, the danger of a maritime terrorist attack on the United States has become very real, yet little doctrine exists specifying the roles and responsibilities of services and agencies participating in the effort. This paper explains the difference between Maritime Homeland Security and Defense and how the different missions should be viewed. This paper outlines how a maritime threat evolves and examines the maritime domain in order to understand how best to use assets to accomplish the mission. Finally, this paper emphasizes the necessity for established commands and communication networks."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Steffen, James W.
2008-04-23
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Noncombatants in the Long War: The End of Innocence?
"Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001 thrust the United States into the Long War, legal analysts, political commentators, and members of the armed forces recognized the need to re-examine the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and its impact on military operations. Most popular interpretations of this body of law seem to place undue restrictions on the use of military force in modern warfare, particularly in an environment where America's enemies are increasingly difficult to identify. This paper argues that international law's current definitions of 'combatants' and 'non-combatants' are obsolete. The analysis begins with a brief look at the origins of international law as it relates to combatants and non-combatants. It then examines the nature of war in the 21st century, focusing on the increasing role of 'lawfare' and the rising incidence of 'concealment warfare' and their effect on the legal distinction between civilians and terrorists. The paper concludes by offering a new, more modern and practical interpretation of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant to help operational planners and targeteers better employ military force against enemies who routinely work to blur the line between them."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Bailey, Thomas M.
2006-05-16
