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Towards a Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century
"Amid the celebrations following the end of the Cold War, many cautioned it was too soon for the United States to relax its guard, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was too good to be true. As time parted the veil of uncertainty, it became evident that the Cold War had yielded to a new paradigm oriented on regional threats and issues. The forces of the former Soviet Union were in disrepair, and the reemergence of a peer competitor capable of challenging U.S. security interests on a global scale was unlikely in the near-term Less than ten years from the beginning of a new century, the Armed Forces of the United States faced the challenge of reshaping their strategic visions and force structures for a changing security environment."
National War College (U.S.)
Martin, J.R.; Gunzinger, Mark Alan
1996
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No Sympathy for the Devil: Searching for a New Operational Doctrine to Guide Military Response to Terrorism
"This paper has stopped short of fleshing out a full operations-to-tactics link for counterterrorist operations, or to fully outline a new structure to integrate civilian and military counterterrorist capabilities. These are two areas where more work needs to be done than we have hands doing it I am convinced the scenarios laid out at the beginning of this paper will become reality in the not too distant future. Our tendency to be in "denial" about terrorism and to treat it as a criminal act finesses the fact that criminals do not generally document their movements and build networks of political, medical, technological and financial support the way that terrorist groups do. This might suggest that the Italian Mafia or Russian Mafia are borderline terrorist organizations, and indeed they may be. But we need greater precision in our operational definitions to know who the enemy is and how to fight him."
National War College (U.S.)
Young, Frank J.
1997
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International Law and Terrorism: America Reprises 'The Lone Ranger' in Response to International Terrorism
"The United States launched tomahawk cruise missiles against suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and a terrorist-affiliated chemical plant in the Sudan. Suspects in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya are to stand trial in New York. Reputed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden reportedly had a sealed indictment returned by a New York grand jury. These actions reflect some recent developments in the U.S. response against international terrorism. Although it is a reliable assumption that significant diplomatic coordination with other nations occurred during these incidents, they were predominantly unilateral actions on the part of the United States. The question presented by the author is twofold: (1) What, if any, international rules exist to deal with terrorists and other new and dangerous nonstate actors on the world scene?; and (2) Is the United States pursuing the most prudent policy in its response to the problems of terrorism and other transnational threats? The author contends that, in its visceral response to international terrorism, the sword of the United States may be cutting the Gordian knot of international law without sufficiently deliberating the use of indirect or co-optive power. It would be untenable to challenge the proposition that the United States must lead the global effort against terrorism. Nonetheless, an enhanced U.S. strategy should intensify efforts to create a comprehensive international legal framework for addressing terrorism and threats from other transnational actors. Skillful development of the role of international law would be consistent with McDougal's wise quotation that law is 'an integral part of the world power process.' A new international legal framework for responding to terrorism would promote global order in the next millennium more effectively than continuing the U.S. policy of unilateral efforts against terrorism."
National War College (U.S.)
Finnie, Michael E.
1998-09
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United States' National Security Strategy: A Hamiltonian Solution for the Iranian Conundrum
"Iran has posed a major conundrum for American national security strategists for a quarter century-and this challenge is growing, with grave consequences for America's national security. The last five administrations have attempted to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, to deter it from being the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism and, to a lesser degree, to influence the nation to adopt principles of a liberal democracy-all with poor results. The real conundrum in these efforts has been finding an effective way to achieve these ends when Iran's government is a bifurcated system in which conservative clerics dominate one section and moderate reformers dominate the other part of their government. The administration's strategy of coercion towards Iran is failing and should be replaced with an engagement policy largely focused on trade and economic integration. The nation's coercion strategy uses denial to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and compellence to stop its sponsorship of terrorism and WMD development. This policy is not effective because Iran is making progress towards producing a nuclear weapon and continues to support terrorism. Furthermore, the reformers are steadily losing power to the conservatives. The United States needs a positive engagement policy that focuses on changing Iran's 'ends' and not a denial strategy that focuses on Iran's 'ways' and 'means'. This paper analyzes the strategy towards Iran, starting with national interests."
National War College (U.S.)
Bacon, Donald
2003-10-24
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Code of Conduct and the Vietnam Prisoners of War
"The purpose of this paper its to review the Code of Conduct in the perspective of the Vietnam prisoner of war experience and to recommend any changes that should be made to the code itself and to the training and indoctrination of the members of the Armed Forces in the Code of Conduct. Additionally, recommendations are presented for the education of the members of the Armed Forces and the U.S. public in order to minimize the use of POWS by future enemies as political hostages and propaganda vehicles."
National War College (U.S.)
McCain, John, 1936-
1974-04-08
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Tightening the Screws: Restoring Security in Colombia
"In today's international environment, with Palestine, Iraq, and North Korea dominating the headlines, does Colombia really matter? According to the recently published National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the Bush Administration certainly thinks so: 'In Colombia, we recognize the link between the terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provid[ing] basic security to the Colombian people.' With these words, the Bush Administration reaffirms Colombia's importance in its Latin American policy, and highlights the country's central position in the 'wars' on drugs and terrorism. As the source for 80 percent of the cocaine imported into the U.S., and a nation in conflict with American-designated terrorist groups, Colombia represents a convergence of major American interests. Equally important, Colombia is a democracy--albeit weak--effecting orderly transitions of power throughout most of its history."
National War College (U.S.)
Stough, Michael S.
2003
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United States National Security Strategy for Colombia: Is Plan Colombia the Right Solution?
"The security relationship between the United States and Colombia has reached a critical junction, and the entire South American continent is watching. Colombia is on the brink of overcoming many of the problems the country has experienced in the past half century -- ending the narcotics trade, eliminating the three major guerrilla organizations that have plagued internal security, getting the economy back on track, and gaining international approval for improving human rights. The United States must make sure that Colombia succeeds. A stable and democratic Colombia is a national interest of the United States, primarily because of the threat of drugs, and the tremendous impact that associated narco-terrorism could have on the nation. A close look at the elements of the United States National Security Strategy for Colombia will reveal that the US strategy is working, and that the US-Colombian relationship will be the model for engaging other democratic countries on the continent. The blueprint for the United States strategy is 'Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State,' a five year, interagency plan that uses US military, economic, and diplomatic instruments to assist Colombia. Funded by Congress in 2000, Plan Colombia is an extremely effective strategy, and with some minor adjustments, should be continued past 2005."
National War College (U.S.)
Waggett, Michael L.
2004
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President's Decision to Attack Afghanistan and Sudan: Conflicting Decision Styles Yields Controversy and Criticism
From the thesis abstract: "On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombs exploded outside of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 250 persons. Over the course of the next two weeks, decision making processes were placed into motion cased upon the analysis of intelligence data. These processes culminated in President Clinton's decision to authorize J.S. military attacks against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on August 21st. As could be expected, the President's decision to launch a retaliatory strike was met with both support and criticism. In this instance, however, a perceived requirement for secrecy caused confusion in, and thereby criticism from many of the national-level actors normally involved in such decisions. An examination of the process using two models for decision-making reveals several possible justifications for this criticism."
National War College (U.S.)
Gillies, Randolph S.
1998-12-14
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Clinton National Security Strategy
"The single point of agreement among contemporary authors on the subjects of national security and international affairs appears to be that the world has changed as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War environment, old rules and relationships have lost at least some of their relevance, leaving leaders and governments to formulate new strategies for meeting the challenges presented by current circumstances. This paper will briefly outline the environmental changes confronting today's leaders, then describe and critique the Clinton Administration's May 1997 National Security Strategy as the blueprint for achieving America's safety, security, and prosperity in this environment. The critique will assert that while admirable for its breadth and ambition, the strategy first lacks a compelling unifying theme, substituting idealistic and utopian goals for concrete interests, and second, fails to prioritize clearly its proposed interests. This leaves the reader, as well as agencies or organizations attempting to comprehend or implement the strategy, without a hierarchy for resource allocation or a basis for making necessary tradeoffs between competing or conflicting demands. Finally, it will broadly sketch an alternative construct for a regionally focused strategy based on a clear statement and hierarchy of American interests within a regional, multilateral framework."
National War College (U.S.)
Keith, Kevin M.
1998
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United Nations Special Commission: Future Roles in Non-Proliferation and Regional Security?
"The first objective of this report is to explore the disparity between United States declaratory policy and actual force capabilities. This report will secondarily pose questions and purpose decision making criteria which are essential to ensure successful future nuclear strategic force employment and planning. This report is primarily concerned with the gap in U.S. declaratory and operational (or action) policy as it applies to current counterforce targeting problems. It is important to distinguish between declaratory policy and actual operational policies to appreciate the complexities of the debate and to resolve questions concerning future force planning."
National War College (U.S.)
Kessler, J. Christian
1994
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Strategy for Iran
This report discusses the optimal strategy for the United States in dealing with Iran's nuclear policies and support of terrorism. According to the author, "the Bush administration continues with most of the containment policies begun by the Clinton administration. But does this strategy take the correct approach? Some argue that current policy toward Iran is largely ineffective. Recent events support this claim. Instead of a hard line stance, perhaps a more nuanced approach might produce better results. Therefore, the United States' strategy for Iran should be to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons, promote regime change, and deter support for terrorism. This can best be accomplished through a series of carrots as well as sticks in order to achieve the desired outcome. This means of 'smart engagement' will be primarily the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power." Thomas explores the strategic environment for the United States in the region, and then explains the concept of "smart engagement" as it applies to Iran. This is followed by a discussion of the stakeholders and their values, specifically Iran and the United States. The author then expands upon the implementation of his strategy.
National War College (U.S.)
Thomas, Gary L.
2004
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Fixing US Special Operations. Rational Actors Not Allowed
"The United States Special Operations Command was established as a result of a glaring US military weakness and with the rational consensus of all players. Several, less than sterling, US military operations in the 1980s, exposed glaring weaknesses in the individual and collective Special Operations Forces of all services-especially with interoperability. In addition, terrorism and military operations at the lowest end of the conflict spectrum placed an ever-increasing premium on "Special Operations" type actions. With a consensus on the existence of a problem(s), surely a Rational Actor solution would emerge. The puzzling aspect from first glance, is that it took a Congressional Act to solve what certainly appears to be strictly military deficiencies. I will examine the Congressional "fix" to our Special Operations problems and the reactions from the key players-including all services. This approach should provide an insight into which model of decision-making is employed, as well as the effects of civilian control of the military."
National War College (U.S.)
1993
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Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of Strategic U.S. Policy
"The United States has fewer and less important interests at stake in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other major region of the world. In general, the area poses little threat to U.S. physical security and well being. There is no regional adversary currently capable of posing a physical threat to the U.S. nor is one likely to emerge in any foreseeable future. Nor are there any raw materials or goods and services indigenous to the region so critical to U.S. economic and security interests that their loss would have a serious impact on our welfare. The most serious threats to U.S. interests emanating from Sub-Saharan Africa are posed by a laundry list of troubles associated with the underdeveloped world, including drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation, and disease. But these are irritants rather than substantial threats. […] It seems to be clearly the case that the limited threats to U.S. interests that emanate from Sub-Saharan Africa have their genesis in the political and economic failures of the region. These same failures also explain why the region appears to have so little to offer of a positive nature. If the current political and economic detritus could be replace with good governance and genuinely market oriented economies the threats currently posed by the region would almost certainly diminish or evaporate and the continent would begin to play a more active and positive role in the world economy. For these reasons, the United States has an overarching, if still modest, interest in seeing Sub-Saharan Africa develop sustainable liberal political and economic institutions."
National War College (U.S.)
Alquier, Philippe; Beasock, Mike; Schmidt, John
1998
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Untimely Response or Money Well Spent?
"On November 14, 1994, President Clinton declared a National Emergency citing an 'extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.' Strong words suggested the need for strong action from the Clinton administration. At risk was the nation's security in the face of a potential terrorist's use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices, also known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Three years later, in a February 1997 report to the President, the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group concluded that the U.S. Government was still ill-equipped to respond to a WMD event. The author contends that the U.S. Government's efforts to craft a comprehensive response plan have been painfully slow because of bureaucratic politics. The response efforts have to cut across local, state, and federal jurisdictions, and they will involve inter-agency partners at all levels of government. How will the government respond when terrorists employ chemical and biological weapons on U.S. shores? Understanding the dynamics of the players and the process begins with an examination of the threat and how the government plans to respond. The author attempts to answer three questions: Who has jurisdictional responsibility?; Who has fiscal responsibility; and Who is in charge? Effecting a timely and efficient WMD response is not an easy task. Jurisdictional division of responsibility between local, state, and federal governments makes this even more cumbersome. The complex nature of American bureaucracy and the inter-agency institutions that serve them further exacerbate the problem. On one hand, local and state authorities seek to remain autonomous, but they recognize the need for federal involvement. On the other hand, legal restrictions force federal agencies to abide by a strict set of statutory and regulatory guidelines in their response. The two must be carefully coordinated."
National War College (U.S.)
Aylward, Peter M.
1999
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Most Significant War Since World War II
Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the United States has been fighting a new type of war. "The first battle, of the first campaign of what President George Bush has warned could be a very long war, began on 07 October 2001 with strikes against the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan. What began nearly a month earlier with a high concept low technological asymmetric attack on the United States is being answered by what may be described as a reverse asymmetric war on terrorism. The United States is utilizing the full spectrum of its incredible military capability against low technology threats and an enemy that lacks formal armies, navies, and air forces. Finding the right capabilities and enough of them to produce desired military effects that accomplish military objectives in support of our political objectives is challenging at best. The character and conduct of war have dramatically changed in what the Bush administration aptly describes as a 'new kind of war.' The risks and challenges of this effort are enormous and we could find ourselves engaged in a whole range of conflicts from events that we cannot even anticipate today. […] This paper will attempt to identify and analyze the interplay between the United States' military objectives and political objectives under the backdrop of this evolving 'new kind of war.' If not properly strategized, the risks of competing political and military objectives may not serve to secure our vital national interests."
National War College (U.S.)
Brenton, Kevin R.
2002
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U.S.-Iranian Relations: Rebuilding the Pillar
"In 1970, Iran and Saudi Arabia were identified by U.S. President Richard Nixon as the two 'pillars' of U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. On February 1, 1979, the relationship between the governments of the United States and Iran experienced a complete reversal when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran. Subsequent relations between the two governments remained cold and distant throughout the 1980s. The second major war in 10 years is now raging in the Persian Gulf. What will the Persian Gulf look like in the aftermath of the war? Any discussion of this question must include the role to be played by the Government of Iran. The United States now has an opportunity to reverse its relationship with Iran and rebuild the pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf."
National War College (U.S.)
Studenka, John M.
1991-02-15
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U.S. National Security Structure: A New Model for the 21st Century
"This essay defines a set of key assumptions that are expected to permeate the U.S. national security environment through the year 2010, and draws a set of recommendations on how the national security community should be shaped to respond. Because the issue is so broad, however, this paper will focus its analysis and conclusions on the organizational structure of U.S. national security, recognizing that the important components of doctrine, military capabilities and tools, system processes (e.g. acquisition, logistics, planning, and budgeting), and training, to mention just a few others, are also critical factors that warrant attention....If the United States is to continue as the world's leading power, national security decision makers must look objectively at the future and make the adjustments necessary to remain ready, relevant, and capable. These decisions must be made now or we will face the early 2lst century ill-prepared -- and our continued preeminence eroded."
National War College (U.S.)
Washburn, Jeffrey S.
1998
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National Missile Defense: Responsible National Security Strategy or the Final Throes of Cold War Mentality?
"The national security interests of the United States would be better served by shifting the resources currently allocated for developing a National Missile Defense (NMD) system to more crucial programs. On the face of it, possessing the capability to defend the country from missile attack seems like a logical, responsible decision. However, as will be outlined below, NMD development fails to optimize the investment of time, money, and other resources because the system: (1) does not effectively counter the most likely and dangerous threats to the United States, (2) faces significant technological challenges, (3) is very expensive, and (4) creates significant anxiety among both allies and adversaries that could itself serve as a source of instability. While the horrific nature of the terrorist attacks led to bipartisan support for significant defense budget growth in FY 2002, we must expect that economic and political realities will quickly limit further increases. Therefore, the nation's civilian and military leadership must decide which capabilities are most feasible, effective, and appropriate for protecting our vital national interests."
National War College (U.S.)
Kardos, John A.
2002
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Deterrence and the New Nuclear Threats
"The emergence of new nuclear states, some of which are hostile to the US, has brought into question the future applicability of the nuclear deterrence concept. This paper addresses this fundamental question and its implications on future defense planning. It first discusses the dangers of the newly emerging nuclear states and the threats they pose to US interests. It then analyzes the declining utility of US nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the emerging threat. Finally, it recommends some options for dealing with the threat and enhancing overall deterrent capabilities."
National War College (U.S.)
Macelhaney, Mace
1994
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FLQ: A Canadian Insurgency
"The purpose of this paper is to examine the FLQ using the O'Neill framework for evaluating insurgencies. Questions to be addressed include what conditions allowed the FLQ to organize, how the government eventually defeated it, and why similar insurgencies have not sprung up to replace it given continued political instability in Quebec. A central premise of this paper is that for reasons of history, proximity and economic and political interdependence, the potential for violence in Quebec should be of central interest to U.S. policymakers. Indeed, the primary kidnapping targets of the FLQ in October 1970 were not Cross and Laporte, but U S diplomats resident in Montreal. Based on the evaluation of the FLQ experience, U.S. policy options regarding the possibility of separatist violence in Quebec will be discussed."
National War College (U.S.)
Kelly, Stephen R.
1995
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Sheep in Wolf's Clothing? The May 1997 National Security Strategy
"A public document such as the National Security Strategy, particularly during an interregnum, severely mutes controversial issues, structures content to appeal to the broadest possible audience, and chooses semantics based on "universal" values. The Strategy has left me with a vague disquiet which ultimately coalesces around two leitmotivs. One is the blurring of the distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy and the other is disguising a symmetrical approach behind a symmetrical rhetoric. As a result of the interaction of the two leitmotivs, I find the Strategy flawed in identifying transnational threats which are of vital or even major interest and in choosing appropriate instruments of statecraft."
National War College (U.S.)
McCarthy, Cheryl
1998
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Inevitability of U.S. Military Force
From the thesis abstract: "At the beginning of the 21st Century, the United States is the world's only remaining superpower, a position gained in the course of the last 50 years through international engagement, economic tenacity, and the efforts and lives of American soldiers. Our arsenal of strategic tools - political, economic, military - skillfully (or fortuitously) forged a successful conclusion of the Cold War, a period where military force was generally considered the instrument of last resort. However, in the last decade, military forces have been used earlier and earlier in American interventions not considered major theater war, often to the chagrin of the defense establishment. It can be argued that this outcome is a logical one for a nation that has funded the defense tool at roughly fifteen times more than its other instruments of statecraft. Moreover, after a decade of uncertainty and vacillation, the U.S. now has a strategic organizing principle - the war on terrorism - that promises to require significant new funds for defense for the foreseeable future. […] It is simply to recognize that if one instrument of statecraft is overwhelmingly resourced over other instruments - and therefore is highly proficient - the strategist is more likely to use it whether or not it is the right tool for the job because the alternatives are liable to be less capable or expedient. This choice in turn feeds a cycle of requirements to replace, rebuild, and recreate our military forces which not only raises the price of that tool, but also distracts the military from its primary mission of major theater war. Unfortunately, greater reliance on the military tool occurs right at the time when it can be argued that other instruments of national power - political, economic, informational, cultural -- might in fact be more effective against the threats that confront U.S. national security in the new century. This focus also threatens to alter the perception of what America stands for, from being respected for its values to being feared for its military prowess."
National War College (U.S.)
Kim-Mitchell, Elena
2002
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Iran: A Path to Greater Stability
This paper addresses the American approach to international difficulties with Iran. The author states that, "vital security and economic interests are tied to the region's vast oil reserves. Our approach in Iran will impact the overall legitimacy and effectiveness of our global antiterrorism and nuclear proliferation policies. Stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan, other vital interests, can be helped or hindered by Iran. Our treatment of Iran also will influence the Islamic world's view of the 'American World Order.' The new approach will help project the ideals of human rights, peaceful change and tolerance in the region." The topics discussed include altering U.S. goals in Iran to facilitate "regional stability," and the impact of American involvement in the Middle East, particularly with respect to Iran, Israel, and Palestine. Iranian and American viewpoints are discussed briefly, and policy recommendations for the United States government are provided. Louie proposes that, "American policy should blend clear signals on terrorism and nuclear weapons with offers of cooperation on Iraq and other issues. Integral to this strategy would be an assurance abjuring regime change provided Iran rejects terrorism and accepts Israel's existence."
National War College (U.S.)
Louie, Renata P.
2004
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Islamic Fundamentalism in Egypt: U.S. Policy Recommendations
"This paper will discuss Islamic Fundamentalism in Egypt; specifically, who and what the Islamic fundamentalists are, the policy and actions of the Egyptian Government in response to the threats of Islamic fundamentalists, and the United States reaction and current policy on Egypt. Recommendations for improvements to U.S. policy will also be provided." The author uses specific examples of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Egypt, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Group, and the al-Jihad, explaining their emergence, political and social goals, and leadership. To supplement the explanation of fundamentalist groups, Liberatore delves into the social and economic reasons for the attraction of fundamentalism in Egypt. Included in this discussion are Egyptian "unemployment, underemployment, and poverty" levels. In response to the population's discontent, the Egyptian government, led by President Mubarak, has instituted anti-terrorism policies consisting of public education and propaganda against fundamentalist groups, harsh anti-terrorism legislation, and economic reforms. Lastly, Liberatore explains U.S. and Egyptian relations.
National War College (U.S.)
Liberatore, Carla
1994
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Algeria: A Country in Crisis
This research paper examines Algeria's troubled history and chances for peace in the future. The author states that, "the country is on the brink of social collapse as militant Islamic fundamentalists challenge the oppressive measures of the current regime." A brief history of Algeria's political and violent conflicts is provided, as well as a discussion of the consequences of socialism and the exploitation of oil and natural gas resources on state revenues and social strife. To further her argument, Geiger clarifies the role population growth has had on agricultural problems. Also included in the document is a discussion of how "Islamists took the opportunity to focus and feed the discontent [in Algeria] and provided structure to the disaffected youth of the country." This discontent led to the creation of the Islamic Salvation Front, which politically opposed the ruling National Liberation Front. The author explains that, "if the fundamentalists succeed in Algeria, they will join Iran and the Sudan as focal points for other fundamentalist groups in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and other countries of the region."
National War College (U.S.)
Geiger, Donna V.
1994
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Adjusting U.S. Strategy Towards Iraq: Toward a Comprehensive Approach
"The terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. on September 11 reflected a level of brutality and ingenuity that horrified the entire world. Apart from those individuals who witnessed the destruction firsthand, many Americans continue to recall the harsh images flowing from millions of television sets that day and for weeks thereafter. These were ordinary Americans: falling out of buildings; burning to death; and running through narrow streets while being engulfed in smoke. President Bush's message soon after September 11 was understandably emotional, 'You're either with us . . . or with the terrorists.' This Presidential threat, coupled with the palpable anger of the American people, forced many nations to quickly digest the stakes of a 'global war on terrorism.' The purpose of this paper is not to argue that our nation's history requires that we "wait for threats to fully materialize, [increasing the risk that] we will have waited too long nor to downplay the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The objective is to review the nature of the threat posed by Iraq, the strategies and policy instruments presently employed and under consideration to address that threat, and, finally, to recommend adjustments where necessary. First, the Iraqi threat to the U.S and its allies has been grossly distorted and exaggerated. While exaggerating the nature and immediacy of the threat may regenerate homeland fears in such a way that sets in motion sympathy to oust Saddam, the actual commitment of American 'blood and treasure' will bear out the need for a far more convincing explanation of the 'why now?' issue. Second, the exhaustive failure to link Iraq directly to September 11 engendered an official yet public migration from preemption as the chief justification for an attack to an undefined strategic imperative to use force, causing international and domestic suspicion and confusion."
National War College (U.S.)
Kosak, Charles P.
2003
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Iraq: Preemption or Paralysis
"The United States must preemptively strike the Iraqi regime before the regime obtains enough Weapons of Mass Destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, to threaten U.S. security or to deter U.S. actions. Fundamental and vital U.S. national security interests, national safety and security, and undeterred access and influence in the Middle East demand a nuclear-free Iraq. An irrational Iraqi dictator armed with nuclear weapons not only could, but likely would, use these weapons against the United States to achieve his goals. The United States cannot live under the threat of massive destruction of its population by a madman. In addition, U.S. security is intimately tied to global economic security, which is threatened by Iraqi expansionist desires. An Iraq armed with nuclear weapons would be difficult and extremely costly to stop from re-occupying Kuwait and seizing vast oil reserves. In fact, if Iraq obtained enough nuclear weapons, potentially all U.S. intervention in the Middle East could be prevented or deterred by the threat of massive destruction inside the United States. Therefore, the U.S. must take action to prevent Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons and pursue an end-state of a nuclear-free, moderate Iraqi regime."
National War College (U.S.)
Johnson, Jeffrey
2003
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Threat Analysis - North Korean Nuclear Program
"Joel S. Wit, in his analysis of U.S. North Korean policy, stated that, 'For 50 years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been the poster child for rogue states.' Whether called a 'rogue state,' a 'state of concern,' or a 'failed state,' North Korea poses no shortage of military threats to the security of United States citizens and U.S. allies. An isolated, Stalinist regime, it possesses a large standing army and conventional weapons arsenal, a chemical and biological warfare capability, a developing a long-range missile program and a potential nuclear program. The North Korean nuclear program and the possible development of nuclear weapons endangers vital or core U.S. national interests. Analysis in this paper will focus on the U.S. strategy for dealing with the North Korean nuclear program at the end of William J. Clinton's eight years as president and the start of George W. Bush's presidency. The framework for this analysis will be 'A Design for National Security Strategy' contained in the National War College Course 5601, Fundamentals of Strategic Logic. This framework uses a five level approach to the design of a national security strategy. It begins with assumptions about the domestic and international environment. Level Two of the framework covers the National Interests and Threats. Levels Three through Five are focused on the Foreign Policy Objectives, Power and Resources, and Plans and Priorities, respectively. Finally, this paper will address recommendations for the strategy and means and methods to improve the policies for promoting stability in a vital region of the world."
National War College (U.S.)
Rowman, Peter J.
2002
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Strategy for Winning the 'War on Terrorism'
"Just as Al Qaeda employed western transportation and communications infrastructure for its assaults on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Congress, so it should employ western concepts of military strategy in carrying on its current struggle. Clausewitz & Associates, America's premiere strategic consultant, based at the prestigious National Defense University in Washington DC, is honored to have been chosen by Al Qaeda to develop a strategic framework on how Al Qaeda can win the 'War on Terrorism,' as it has been characterized by U.S. President George W. Bush. This paper will set forth a military strategy for Al Qaeda to follow, derived chiefly from principles explained by our firm's founder, Carl Von Clausewitz, in his famous book 'On War.' Included in this memo is a discussion of the definition of warfare for al-Qaeda and recommendations for al-Qaeda on what to do to succeed."
National War College (U.S.)
Margulies, Alexander H.
2002
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Killing in the Shadows, and Other Special Operations
This document addresses changes in U.S. national security policy due to a shift in the definition of "war." The author utilizes Clausewitz's theories on war, stating that "the first priority must be to understand the kind of war one is facing; it is one tailor made for Special Operations." The use of Special Operations Forces in warfare is discussed from several theoretical standpoints, with examples drawn from the hunt for Pablo Escobar, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. Also included is a literature review of books by Mark Bowden, Tom Clancy, General Carl Stiner (ret.), and Tony Holtz.
National War College (U.S.)
Johnson, Kevin M.
2003-04-24
