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Sadat: Modern Master of the Indirect Approach
From the student paper: "Egypt and the rest of the Arab world were caught in political limbo after the 1967 war with Israel. Israel had established strategic frontier defenses on the bordering Arab lands seized in the conflict. Over one million Arabs remained in occupied territories in the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights areas. The psychological impact on broken and defeated armies and the civilian population was telling. In a culture where honor and dignity were especially important, the humiliation and shame suffered as a result of being manhandled in the 'Six Day War' had to be redressed. President Assad of Syria stated that, 'the next battle would not be a fight against Zionism, imperialism or Jews, but a battle for honor and dignity.' The Arabs desired a political solution to regain their captured land, but the Israelis consolidated those areas following their victory and began to permanently settle on them. Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, increasingly was frustrated by the failure of diplomatic efforts to dislodge the Israelis from the occupied territory. From a position of weakness, the Arabs were unable to negotiate an acceptable settlement with Israel or gain the attention of the superpowers to broker a peaceful, equitable outcome to the ongoing conflict. Although he warned of an impending 'Battle of Destiny' every year from 1970 through 1973, Sadat's lack of follow up began to threaten his credibility. 'Everyone has fallen asleep over the Middle East crisis,' he said, 'the time has come for a shock!'"
National War College (U.S.)
Field, Robert C.; Delvecchio, Michael A
2001
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Chile: Defense and International Relations
From the student thesis: "Chile is a nation of extremes and opposites. Its geography includes the world's most arid desert in the north to Antarctica in the south. The Andes and the highest mountain in the Western Hemisphere (Mount Aconcagua 22,840 feet) mark one of the longest national borders in the world, while the immense coastline provides Chile with a commanding presence in the Pacific Ocean. Often described as an island, Chile's geographic extremes have been fundamental to the nation's history."
National War College (U.S.)
Hills, Thomas W.
2002
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Through a Glass Darkly: Viewing US Strategic Options on Iraq
This article provides in-depth analysis of four options for US policy--from a passive, laissez-faire approach to a bold strategy that seeks to assertively shape the region to reflect US values. It articulates the cost, benefit and risk associated with these options and poses the defining question for President Bush and his national security team--how do they view their policy's endstate? Do they envision an Iraq that is less threatening to the region? Or, do they want to look at Iraq "as through a glass darkly" and see a reflection of American society and values? The options presented here focus primarily on US policy toward Iraq. Whatever policy it eventually pursues, the new Administration must integrate it within a broader, revised US strategy toward the Mid-East, to include addressing Iranian, Israeli and the Palestinian issues. Each option presented here has a natural departure point that could allow and will require other initiatives to support overall US security interests throughout the region. Ultimately, the new Administration's policy will succeed if it accomplishes three key tasks. First, the Administration must articulate the nature of US interests with respect to Iraq. Are the interests vital, important, or humanitarian in nature? Second, no matter what option is pursued, it is imperative that the Bush team matches the resources commensurate with its objectives. Third, the resources available will be limited by the political capital that President Bush can and will commit to gain domestic and international support for his policy. This article portrays the trade-offs in each option, in terms of costs, risks and benefits.
National War College (U.S.)
Isherwood, Michael W.
2001-04-01
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Iran: From Khomeni to Martin Indyk
Special attention will be paid to the Iranian-US relations with a view toward exploring a possible shift in the strategies of both countries. The ultimate purpose is to examine the prospects for a new security model in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region with Iran performing a cooperative and constructive role. This paper is structured to address three basic themes. First, Iran's internal dynamics are significant factors in determining its future geopolitical functions in the Persian Gulf region, Central Asia, and the Southern Caucasus. To perform such functions the Iranian leadership has to clearly define Iran's strategic direction and national interests, Iran's internal forces must come to a consensus on future policies, and the Iranian sociopolitical system has to establish itself as a modern state rather than a revolutionary system. Second, despite the strategic location of Iran and its recent military buildup, it lacks a meaningful power projection capability and is not, therefore, in a position to pose a threat of a strategic nature either to the region or to the US interests in the Persian Gulf. Third, "Dual Containment Policy", designed by the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, represents a substantial departure from the authentic "Philosophy of Containment", pioneered by the dean of American diplomacy, George F. Kennan. The Iranian "half" of the Dual Containment is a politically-driven policy. It has no strategic grounds and is not consistent with US interests. Therefore, to advance US interests in the region, the Dual Containment Policy has to be reviewed.
National War College (U.S.)
Al-Allaf, Mohammed
2001-04-20
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All Bush's Horses and All Bush's Men: How Far Should The U.S. Go To Help Put Colombia Back Together Again?
The Bush administration's new National Security Strategy (NSS) singles out by name only eighteen of the world's 191 nations and of those only a handful merit more than a word. The NSS' focus on the potential threat from Iraq, relations with China, or potential conflict between nuclear adversaries Pakistan and India will surprise no one. Few Americans would consider Colombia as a nation in which they have significant national interests beyond, perhaps, a vague awareness of Colombia as source for their daily fixes of illegal drugs or coffee. But Colombia could soon loom large in the American mind: the NSS signals administration intention to link the U.S. battle against drugs flowing out of Colombia to its wider war against terrorism, a shift in policy that has implications for the expenditure of U.S. treasure, influence and, possibly, lives.
National War College (U.S.)
Alsace, Juan A.
2002
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North Korea and The United States: Learning how to Wage Peace in the Twenty First Century
While the relationship between the United States and North Korea has been effectively stalled for sixty years, this could be changing. Set adrift from the Soviet bloc, suffering from almost a decade of famine, North Korea is being forced to alter the way in which it interacts with the rest of the world, or face total collapse. There is potential for great improvement in the United States/North Korean relationship, but not without significant risk. The Kim Jong Il regime has developed and maintained a strong military, and one of its only significant exports is weaponry: ballistic missiles, missile technology, and the technology for building chemical, biological, and likely nuclear weapons. It is the potential for use and sale of weapons of mass destruction that makes North Korea of vital strategic interest to the United States. This essay will first examine the strategic interests represented by North Korea; secondly, the means currently employed by the United States to achieve the desired ends. Lastly, recommendations for a potential future course of action, and the possible outcomes, will be discussed. In the final analysis, the most likely outcome for the Korean peninsula is reunification. It remains to be seen if this can be accomplished without further violence.
National War College (U.S.)
Cornum, Rhonda
2002
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Biological Diversity: The Economy of Investing in Ecology for National Security
Terrorism, drug trafficking, human rights, refugee flows, and the control of weapons of mass destruction have been the focus of United States Government efforts to protect our national interests and preserve our national security. Certainly these are urgent concerns, but a comprehensive national security strategy must also address food and water resource needs, especially control and access to a diversity of biological resources. In the paper, I review the value of "biodiversity" and its importance to our national security, discuss the factors that make biodiversity issues difficult to resolve, and offer recommendations to strengthen our position what is likely to become a world ecological conflict.
National War College (U.S.)
Singer, Andrew
1995-08-09
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Clausewitz's Theory of the Paradoxical Trinity and the US Strategy in the Gulf War
Carl von Clausewitz's theory of the paradoxical trinity is a timeless theory relevant in modem conflicts and war as evidenced by this analysis of the U S strategy in the Gulf War In this paper, the author will analyze the U S strategy in the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) proving the timeless applicability of Clausewitz's theory of the paradoxical trinity. The author will define and discuss the three parts of the trinity, and then discuss the salient points of U S strategy and actions during the Persian Gulf War to support Clausewitz's ageless concept. This paper is a discussion of a 19th century theory as it was applied to a modern war, and is not a dissection of the Persian Gulf War political and military strategies, or military tactics.
National War College (U.S.)
Earle, Sheila Miller
1998
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Clausewitz at Armageddon: A 19th Century Perspective on Nuclear Risk Reduction
Colin Powell describes the writings of Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz as
"like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries." The hi-frequency with which modern commentators quote Von Clausewitz suggests that General Powell is not alone in his assessment. Two factors have helped Von Clausewitz's writings to withstand the test of time. First, he approached the study of war from a broad, theoretical perspective, giving emphasis to motivational factors and other fundamental themes that operate across the full spectrum of human conflict. Second, while the stunning rate of technological advance since the early 19th century has changed the shape and size of the battlefield, technological advances have, with possibly one significant exception, left the fundamental nature of war and human conflict unchanged. That exception, the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has for the first time given military and political leaders the capacity to bring about the annihilation of their enemy through execution of a single decision. This paper reexamines some of Von Clausewitz's observations about the nature of war and human conflict in light of the development of nuclear weapons and asks two questions: to what extent are Von Clausewitz's insights still valid, and, if they are still valid, how are they, or might they be, reflected in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war between two nuclear powers?
National War College (U.S.)
Bartlett, William M
1996
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Clausewitz: Validation of the Gulf War Air Campaign Plan
The date is 15 Jan 91. The location is the tank in the Pentagon. General Carl Von Clausewitz, brought out of retirement, is one of several prominent military thinkers invited by CJCS and CSAF to discuss coalition air campaign options anticipated to begin soon against Iraq. General Clausewitz has received briefings designed to bring him up to speed on air power history, capabilities, technology and doctrine. We now join General Clausewitz during the conclusion of the final briefing presented to him that laid out the air option plan for Desert Storm known as "Instant Thunder."
National War College (U.S.)
Lefforge, David R
1995
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Culture Counts: Cultural Bias in the National Security Strategy
The modern strategist plays down culture and mindset at significant risk. As a member of the author's committee noted in this critique of NATO's expansion, "The West simply cannot, overnight, undo Russian thinking that has existed for 50 years." Culture counts and not all ideals are universal. A measure of faith in the rightness of the American way of life and values is appropriate and may even be necessary in light of the American tradition demanding "morality" of its security policy. But "A National Security Strategy" is suffused with an unhealthy level of enthusiasm for American culture- an implicit assumption that our way of life is so universally attractive that all will hearken to it. Such an approach may draw in and engage many readers, but it may also conceal obstacles to attaining strategic goals. This brief essay will examine one apparent implicit assumption and discuss its implications for the overall feasibility of "A National Security Strategy".
National War College (U.S.)
Andrews, Timothy D.
1998
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Political Partisanship and the Professional Military Ethic: The Case of the Officer Corps' Affiliation with the Republican Party
"A recently published survey on civil-military relations revealed that a large majority of military officers claim an affiliation with the Republican Party. The finding suggests that officers have violated their professional ethic by abandoning the tradition of political neutrality. This paper first examines the reasons for the Republican bias, which include the conservatism of the GOP vis-à-vis the Democratic Party and institutional changes within the military. Second, it assesses the effect of the Republican bias on officer professionalism. I argue that the officer corps' voting preference does not constitute partisan activity and is not, by itself, harmful to professionalism and civil-military relations."
National War College (U.S.)
Betros, Lance A.
2000-05-04
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United States' Second Major Theater of War: A Bridge Too Far?
"The United States National Security Strategy (NSS), as set forth by President William Jefferson Clinton in 1998, articulated the 'Imperative for Engagement' abroad in order to remain secure at home in the aftermath of the 'Cold War.' Accordingly, in an era marked by globalization, transnational interests and threats, and ethnic and regional strife, '...the United States must be prepared to use all instruments of National Power, alone or in concert with allies and partners, to influence the actions of both state and non-state actors. It further states 'we must have the demonstrated will and capabilities to continue to exert global leadership and remain the security partner for the community of states that share our interests.' Implicit in our NSS is a commitment by the United States Government (USG) to dedicate the resources necessary to successfully execute this global engagement strategy. To that end, this paper will explore the National Military Strategy (NMS) intended to support an NSS of "'Engagement,' its three elements ('Shape, Respond, Prepare Now'), and the 'Core Military Requirement' of being able to 'deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably in conceit with regional allies.' The basic question is: Does the military possess the capability in the decade ahead to execute this essential requirement? I submit the United States Armed Forces are capable of being defeated in a Second Major Theatre of War by a determined an opportunistic foe!"
National War College (U.S.)
Christie, R.A.
2000
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Morphing War: Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism Doctrine in Colombia
Because of the Global War on Terror, US policy in Colombia recently abruptly changed from a strict focus on controlling the flow of drugs to the US to a broader policy of support for Colombia's battles with insurgent and paramilitary forces. Although we have expanded US counter-insurgency aid and training to the military, we have misunderstood the kind of war and the doctrine and tactics we need to use. The correct tactics are more antiterrorist and anti-bandit than anti-revolutionary. Civilian insecurity and lack of territorial control demand more assistance to the police, rather than more assistance to the military. This will be more effective in Colombia, and better for maintaining long term support from the US.
National War College (U.S.)
Becker, David C.
2004
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Posse Comitatus Act Post-9/11: Time for a Change?
"'We are today a Nation at risk to a new and changing threat.' With these opening remarks to the National Security Strategy for Homeland Security, President George W. Bush simplified the terrorism problem facing the United States (U.S.) today - - a problem that intensified after the 11 September 2001 attacks. The demand to find solutions to this problem, and make the U.S. more secure from terrorist attacks, may result in an increased domestic security role for the U.S. military. However, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) limits the domestic use of the military. In light of the recently activated U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, should the Posse Comitatus Act be repealed or amended? This paper will examine the debate concerning the PCA by explaining the founding origins of the PCA; the current PCA and its amendments focusing in particular on what the PCA specifically permits and prohibits; implementation problems for the U.S. military; the arguments for and against changing the PCA; examining the people and process involved in the debate concerning the PCA; and lastly providing a proposal for change."
National War College (U.S.)
Manley, Gerald J.
2003
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Dealing with the Threat Posed by Iraq
"In response to the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, the United States, in coordination with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), should take steps to impose a truly effective inspection regime to remove the threat. Should that effort fail, the United States should be prepared, again in conjunction with the UNSC and a willing coalition, to intervene militarily to achieve that goal. Such action will require extensive preparation for a long military occupation of Iraq and construction of a new polity that meets minimal norms of international respect for human rights. The danger posed by Iraq's possession and production of WMD has been raised repeatedly in recent months by U.S. government spokespersons. Even so, there are those who flatly deny that Iraq possesses WMD and who question U.S. motivations. The legitimacy of the UNSC's power to authorize the use of force in the face of a threat to international peace and security is universally accepted. Working through the U.N. presents the United States an opportunity to acquire the support of the international community in contemplating the use of force to strip Iraq of its WMD capacity. Conversely, failing to work through the U.N. would isolate the United States politically and would make it less likely that other states would commit military forces in Iraq. This paper discusses the following topics: whether the United States has the right to act preemptively to counter an Iraqi threat; support in the Middle East for regime change in Iraq; the nature of the threat from Iraq; the end-state sought in a military intervention; foreign policy objectives in Iraq; use of soft power, intelligence, diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic sanctions; use of deterrence, containment, and intervention; the risks of intervention; building a coalition; the center of gravity -- Saddam Hussein; the ground war; anticipating Iraqi strategies; employing Iraqi allies; psychological operations; and the occupation."
National War College (U.S.)
Moran, Roger
2002-10-28
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United States Merchant Marine: A Valuable Strategic Resource, Now and For the Future
"Alfred Thayer Mahan has been quoted as saying '[A] nation's maritime commerce strength in peacetime is the most telling indication of its overall endurance during war.' In today's modern context there still exists within our nation's defense planning, the understanding of the need for a maritime capability to support our projected wartime and emergency contingencies. In his February, 1993 Chairman's report, General Colin L. Powell highlighted the role of sealift capacity to meet our nation's strategic lift needs in addressing the new regional and flexible focus of our worldwide military missions. In his Annual Report to the President and the Congress in January 1994, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin discussed the essential role that mobility forces, including sealift, will play in our nation's effort at responding to regional dangers and opportunities. The question arises however whether Mahan's nexus still exists as it pertains to the role of our merchant marine in our wartime or national emergency sealift effort."
National War College (U.S.)
Richardson, Thomas W.
1994
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Homeland Security: Under Organized and Over Involved
This is a pre-9/11 paper about Homeland Defense. "Homeland Defense is the latest hot topic making the rounds within the Beltway. Articles are being written, committees formed, and think tanks are being engaged to express thoughts, commentary, and perhaps just to make noise about homeland defense. The buzz is all around town. The central thesis of this paper is that the federal government is not organized for success in homeland defense. The second and subordinate thesis is that the DoD is overly involved in domestic homeland defense, and has wandered deeply into the area of responsibility of civil authorities. This paper will seek to redefine homeland defense into a broader concept of homeland security, review key points of the current discussion, and make recommendations regarding next steps."
National War College (U.S.)
Wisniewski, Douglas J.
2001
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Homeland Defense: Use of the Military Instrument in Strategic Context
This is a pre-9/11 paper about the definition of Homeland Defense and the role the military should play in Homeland Defense.
National War College (U.S.)
Shattuck, Ronald A.
2001
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From Reconnaissance to Surveillance: Intelligence Transformation in the New Millennium
"Today's transnational terrorist groups pose a unique threat. They operate in the shadows like underground criminal organizations; yet have the potential to inflict an enormous number of casualties. Due to the terrorist's clandestine nature, the intelligence community cannot rely solely upon reconnaissance for collecting information against these groups. Today's collectors must incorporate the same techniques that law enforcement organizations used to dismantle mafia syndicates in New York and drug cartels in South America. Police forces use informants and reconnaissance to focus their search for potential criminals. But once suspects are identified, police forces routinely employ persistent surveillance to track and monitor their activities until an arrest can be made. Without persistent surveillance, the police would be searching for a needle in a haystack-not unlike the U.S. military's hunt for Mohammed Aideed in Somalia, Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq."
National War College (U.S.)
Dahlstrom, Eric L.
2003
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National Missile Defense: Opportunity or Threat?
"Prior to the election of 2000, presidential candidate George W. Bush campaigned with promises to bolster United States national security and strengthen the military. An essential element of his strategy for enhanced security was a National Missile Defense (NMD) system to protect the American 'homeland' from a ballistic missile attack. Bush felt that a combination of international and domestic factors had come together to give the country a unique opportunity to build and deploy such a system. Once in office, his administration moved aggressively to make this opportunity a reality. Critics of the NMD proposal, however, have been equally aggressive in their opposition and argue that the current initiative should be considered more of a 'threat' to national security than an 'opportunity.' The purpose of this paper is to first analyze the Bush administration's NMD proposal, then determine if it will serve as an effective component of the United States National Security Strategy. After a brief review of the NMD proposal, the paper will evaluate the initiative's strengths and weaknesses, and then conclude with recommendations on the future of NMD."
National War College (U.S.)
Howe, P. Gardner
2002
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Public Support for the War on Terrorism: America's Achilles' Heel
"On October 11, 2001, President George W. Bush held his first prime time news conference since assuming office to describe America's nascent War on Terrorism. In his opening statement and responses to questions he emphasized the nation's commitment to a 'sustained campaign to drive the terrorists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to justice.' He also described parallel campaigns to aggressively pursue 'agents of terror around the world' and strengthen 'our protections here at home.'...Unlike our own strategists who struggle to identify the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, Osama Bin Laden has long understood America's Achilles' heel. In a video first aired October 7th on the Al Jazeera network, Bin Laden applauded the September attacks and proclaimed that, 'The winds of change have come to eradicate oppression.' His message, although cloaked in religious metaphor, was as clear as that of President Bush, 'neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad.' Attempts to suppress airing of the Bin Laden statement reveal the administration's awareness of the potential persuasiveness of the Al Qaeda position. In what is in essence a psychological war-a war of ideas-in which progress will be largely immeasurable, success difficult to define, and public opinion acutely susceptible to manipulation, perception management will be a critical capability for all antagonists."
National War College (U.S.)
Richey, Ollen R.
2002
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To Transform into a More Capable Intelligence Community: A Paradigm Shift in the Analyst Selection
"Transnational security threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction bring out the challenging nature of intelligence analysis. We need people who can thrive in an analytical environment characterized by uncertainty, incompleteness and surprise. These are capabilities more innate than learned. Yet the entry process into the all-source analysis profession does not screen for people with these abilities. We need to improve our analytical work force. To do this, we need a systematic abilities-based pre-employment screening program for intelligence analysts. This paper provides a functional justification for a screening program. Such a proposal represents a paradigm shift from the conventional way of recruitment largely based on a resume and an interview. The form, content, costs or time to develop an actual program is beyond the scope of this paper. However, an implementation plan and strategy for measuring its effectiveness are proposed. The potential benefits of such a screening effort include a higher concentration of analytical focus on difficult intelligence problems, a greater chance for success in "connecting the dots," a model to be used by military and law enforcement analytical efforts, and, most importantly, a smaller, more powerful analytical work force."
National War College (U.S.)
Wolfberg, Adrian Z.
2003-04-21
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U.S. Military Readiness: Taming the Dragon of Change
"This paper looks at how ignoring the dragon [of change] is impacting readiness and what should be done to change today's system to prepare for tomorrow. Current defense policies are maintaining operational readiness at the expense of future readiness. The Cold War force structure and strategies are de-capitalizing the United States military and must be abandoned to re-capitalize the force for the future. In response to the current de-capitalization, policies, programs and systems must be changed to prepare the United States Military for the future. The readiness equation is broad in scope. Military readiness is more than a measure of training or equipping forces. In actuality, it closely parallels the Department of Defense definition of military capability. Readiness spans time and is quantifiable in current and future capabilities. Today's decisions on military strategy, force structure, resources, modernization, and readiness levels impact tomorrow's readiness. Readiness also requires direction and planning to be effective. The current readiness assessment program forces a myopic, near-sighted view of readiness and does not lend itself to objective long-range planning for readiness capability."
National War College (U.S.)
Rogers, Gary
1998
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Quadrennial Defense Review: Improving the Process to Improve the Product
"While many in Congress may have held out high hopes that the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and NDP [National Defense Panel] would produce meaningful recommendations for change to meet the nation's future security requirements, the results have been disappointing. This paper will seek to explain that the shortcomings in the products from the QDR and NDP were, perhaps predictably, largely a result of the bureaucratic structure of the process used to conduct these two much-publicized defense reviews. Furthermore, this paper will offer recommendations for an alternative structure for the next QDR to increase the freedom and independence of its operations. This will improve the chances that the next review will take a truly 'fresh look' at defense and yield a more relevant report."
National War College (U.S.)
Snodgrass, David E.
1998-12-14
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Analysis of U.S. Military Presence in North East Asia - Does Our New Strategy Fit the Circumstances
"Since World War II, the United States has invested heavily in the Pacific Region. This region is now our largest trading partner. We have active security arrangements with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. We also have non-treaty security relations with several other countries in the region. The possibility of a diminished Soviet threat, reductions in our defense budget and allies who have the ability to do more for their own defense, suggest that it is now desirable to reduce U.S. forces in the region."
National War College (U.S.)
Walters, Jimmy L.
1991
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U.S. National Security Strategy and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
"This paper proposes a new national security strategy. The recommendation is based on the synthesis of two arguments: (1) the Bush national security strategy is seriously flawed; and (2) proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous threat to U.S. national security. The broad elements of a new national security strategy are presented together with an analysis of strengths and a rebuttal of potential arguments against the proposal. A new national security strategy is needed, and its centerpiece should be twofold: first, the clear identification of U.S. vital interests; and second, the global neutralization of all nuclear threats. One would appropriately name the combination of these dual themes "Nuclear Containment." This strategy would employ the full spectrum of political, military, and economic power to achieve the following objectives: nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, a global ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and defense against all forms of nuclear attack."
National War College (U.S.)
Kalb, John F.
1993-01-25
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Fight Against Terrorism: Sun Tzu Revisited
This report applies the theories of war created by the Chinese General Sun Tzu 2,500 years ago to the "current war on terrorism." Tzu's work, "The Art of War," sets out principles on how to successfully conduct wars. The author takes Tzu's main concepts and relates them to the fight against al Qaeda after the attacks on 11 September 2001. Roberson discusses the concept of "know your enemy," particularly in relation to al Qaeda's ideology, goals, "political, economic, and military" situation, and capabilities. He then explores Tzu's principle of "attack the mind of the commander" by utilizing the psychology behind Bin Laden and al Qaeda's attacks on the West and the organization's attractiveness among Muslims. The last concept, using the "indirect approach," implies less reliance on "brute strength" and an increased use of "deception, the creation of false appearances to mystify and delude the enemy." Applying this to the war on terrorism, Roberson explains that an information campaign is necessary to combat extremist views.
National War College (U.S.)
Roberson, Darryl L.
2002
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Negating North Korea's Nukes: The Political Use of Military Power
The North Korean case demonstrates how diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power can be integrated in a political-military strategy designed to address a significant threat to US and international security. This experience also shows how important it is to balance military action and restraint in such a crisis. Specifically, this analysis suggests that the political use of military power was necessary to persuade North Korea to accept the concessions it made in the October 1994 Agreed Framework, thereby enabling the US to achieve its political objectives. In addition, certain quasi-military measures taken by the US may also have more directly helped turn the tide in North Korea's decision to accept a negotiated solution. Without detracting from the deterrent, such measures as withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the ROK, nuclear assurances to North Korea, and cancellation of Team Spirit provided carrots for good DPRK behavior and it cost the US very little politically or militarily. Indeed, all three US political objectives were achieved in the case of North Korea. First, North Korea will stay put in the NPT and be subject to IAEA inspections, eventually including special inspections and the dismantling of its existing graphite-based nuclear program, thus serving the objective of nonproliferation. Second, the muted use of military power, carefully balancing enhancements to our deterrent with abstaining from measures that might have provoked the unpredictable DPRK, avoided a military conflict. Finally, accomplishment of the first two objectives and the enhanced evidence of US commitment to their security provided clear assurances to the key allies in the region, the ROK and Japan, which in turn contributed to nonproliferation by reducing any perception on the part of these allies that they might need nuclear weapons.
National War College (U.S.)
Davis, M. Scott
1996-05-09
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Terrorism: Toward and Analytic Foundation
This essay sets out to evaluate just what questions need to be answered to take a cold, hard look at terrorism. It is first and foremost an examination of definitions. In the first section, a review of several incidents widely considered to be terrorist demonstrates the lack of definitional clarity in our current thinking about terrorism and how it differs from other uses of force. Insights offered by that review suggest which questions must be addressed by a more satisfactory definition. A second section proposes an alternate approach to terrorism, one based on the premise that terrorism fits at some point within a spectrum of all uses of force. This evaluation of terrorism--as a military maneuver, if you will--offers a rewarding set of criteria for determining which specific features distinguish terrorism from its neighbors on that spectrum. Finally, a concluding section examines this proposed definition of terrorism as maneuver within a broader context of politics, legitimacy, and state use of coercive force.
National War College (U.S.)
Perez, Karen L.
1997
