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All Bush's Horses and All Bush's Men: How Far Should The U.S. Go To Help Put Colombia Back Together Again?
The Bush administration's new National Security Strategy (NSS) singles out by name only eighteen of the world's 191 nations and of those only a handful merit more than a word. The NSS' focus on the potential threat from Iraq, relations with China, or potential conflict between nuclear adversaries Pakistan and India will surprise no one. Few Americans would consider Colombia as a nation in which they have significant national interests beyond, perhaps, a vague awareness of Colombia as source for their daily fixes of illegal drugs or coffee. But Colombia could soon loom large in the American mind: the NSS signals administration intention to link the U.S. battle against drugs flowing out of Colombia to its wider war against terrorism, a shift in policy that has implications for the expenditure of U.S. treasure, influence and, possibly, lives.
National War College (U.S.)
Alsace, Juan A.
2002
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Iraq - A Proposal for a Strategy of Compellence
Since the Carter Doctrine of the 1970s, US national interests in the Persian Gulf have been termed vital due to concerns about oil supplies, regional stability, Israeli survival, and an Arab-Israeli settlement. Thus, the US went to war in 1991 in response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. After defeat, Iraq accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 as the ceasefire ending the Gulf War. Since then, the US has practiced a strategy of containment to forestall Iraqi aggression. The Clinton Administration's 1997 A National Security Strategy for a New Century stated the US "would like to see Iraq's reintegration into the international community [but] Iraq must comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions [and] until that behavior changes, [the US] goal is containing [emphasis added] the threat Saddam Hussein poses to Iraq's neighbors, its people, the free flow of Gulf and broader US interests in the middle east." This paper contends that the containment policy is failing, the stated political goals are not being met, and an analysis of the situation indicates the need for a strategy of compellence. The analysis answers a number of questions that address the means that are being used to meet the US political goals and how they are failing, what means are available to support a compellence strategy, and the ability of military force to meet the political goals if non-military means fail.
National War College (U.S.)
Grosner, Brian
2002
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Responding to the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Threat: Rehabilitation or Smoking Hole?
The United States National Security Strategy has a stated objective to "...prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." As an adversary for the past 50 years, North Korea has consistently opposed our support of South Korea and Japan, and our presence in Northeast Asia. In the recent past, it has developed, tested and produced ballistic missiles. It has also fielded weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical and biological weapons. As troubling as those weapons are, that threat pales compared to the recent North Korean acknowledgement of a nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapons coupled with ballistic missile delivery systems present a new level of threat to the United States and its allies. This new North Korean potential can best be countered by a three-part strategy of aggressive diplomacy, conditional and unconditional engagement and a strong containment posture, all laced with a heavy dose of skepticism.
National War College (U.S.)
Cabot, Nelson, Jr.
2002
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Remove Threat for the World and Establish Peace for Iraq and the Region: A Strategy for Iraq
After the 1991 Gulf War Iraq has again developed into a threat to regional stability and into a risk to world peace. National and international studies delineate the capabilities and the risks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a dictatorial Iraq under Saddam Hussein. More than forty UN resolutions within the last eleven years have failed to persuade or coerce the Iraqi government into giving up WMD and into a more peaceful and democratic policy. Although containment has worked so far, the danger of supporting terrorists with WMD has increased after the UN weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) were barred from Iraq in December 1998. These WMD, in the hands of terrorists, could pose a direct threat to the U.S. national security, or they could be used to threaten countries in the region.
National War College (U.S.)
Schwald, Reiner
2002
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North Korea and The United States: Learning how to Wage Peace in the Twenty First Century
While the relationship between the United States and North Korea has been effectively stalled for sixty years, this could be changing. Set adrift from the Soviet bloc, suffering from almost a decade of famine, North Korea is being forced to alter the way in which it interacts with the rest of the world, or face total collapse. There is potential for great improvement in the United States/North Korean relationship, but not without significant risk. The Kim Jong Il regime has developed and maintained a strong military, and one of its only significant exports is weaponry: ballistic missiles, missile technology, and the technology for building chemical, biological, and likely nuclear weapons. It is the potential for use and sale of weapons of mass destruction that makes North Korea of vital strategic interest to the United States. This essay will first examine the strategic interests represented by North Korea; secondly, the means currently employed by the United States to achieve the desired ends. Lastly, recommendations for a potential future course of action, and the possible outcomes, will be discussed. In the final analysis, the most likely outcome for the Korean peninsula is reunification. It remains to be seen if this can be accomplished without further violence.
National War College (U.S.)
Cornum, Rhonda
2002
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Winning with Words: Strategic Communications and the War on Terrorism
This paper explores the process of incorporating all of the U.S. agencies' tools and talents into one focused, synergistic approach, resulting in an effective communications strategy to win the war on terrorism.
National War College (U.S.)
Haddock, Ellen K.
2002
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Confronting Iraq's WMD Threat: Coercive Inspections or Military Intervention
Liddell Hart's well-known observation highlights that wars are ultimately judged by their direct and indirect political consequences. Although coalition forces were able to achieve the limited political objectives of the Persian Gulf War, they were unable to eliminate the key factor that led to military intervention, the aggressive behavior of Saddam Hussein.2 Deterrence and containment have since become central to our post-war confrontation with Iraq. Unfortunately, containment is fracturing after a decade of use. Deterrence is problematic when matched against an increasingly robust Iraqi WMD program singularly controlled by an unpredictable and ruthless decision-maker in Saddam Hussein. New forms of compellence are required to force Saddam to disarm before Iraq has the capability to blackmail the rest of the world with an actual nuclear or advanced biological warfare capability. U.N.-led inspectors augmented by military force should serve as the focus of a coercive diplomacy regimen designed to discover, disarm, monitor and verify Iraq's WMD program. If inspections fail, pre-emptive military intervention can force regime change and compel Iraqi WMD disarmament.
National War College (U.S.)
Reed, Lawrence S.
2002
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Do we Still Need Ballistic Missiles?
Ballistic missiles have become synonymous with America's nuclear deterrent. Always ready at high reliability to provide widespread devastation to any attacker in less than an hour after launch, these weapons presented the ultimate deterrence against the nightmare scenario of the Cold War: a Soviet bolt-out-of-the-blue attack. Why would anyone question whether we should continue to maintain and operate ballistic missiles well into the future?
National War College (U.S.)
Pettis, Roy C.
2002
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North Korea: Carrots Now, Sticks Later?
Since the signing of the Armistice, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has flourished into a stable democratic country with a healthy and powerful economy. At the same time, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), under a communist totalitarian regime, has grown evermore isolated and teeters on the edge of collapse. However, the DPRK's military, coupled with its development and export of missile technology and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, threatens the stability of the entire region. The United States has declared this region an area of national interest and, therefore, must counter North Korea's actions to provide for stability in the region.This paper will examine the nature of the relationship between the United States and the countries of the region to identify national objectives and formulate a national security and military strategy to achieve them.
National War College (U.S.)
Romig, Christopher C.
2002
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North Korea: A Strategic Challenge
North Korea is still a threat to the interests of the U.S., and the United States' current strategy in dealing with the North has failed to eliminate this threat. The United States must therefore take action to prepare to use military force against North Korea to protect its interests. Which United States' interests are at such risk as to require the use of military force against North Korea? Clearly, national security is the most important interest at stake.
National War College (U.S.)
Webb, Steven G., 1958-
2002
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Iraq: A long-Term Project
Policy with regard to Iraq must take into account three levels of strategy: (1) Achieving policy objectives by means short of war;
(2) Advancing policy objectives through war; (3) Achieving objectives by various means incorporating the post-war policies.
These options cannot be considered in isolation for they are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlapping and complementary. The U.S. must be prepared to back up diplomacy with a credible threat of force. And after the war, one must have a strategy to manage the peace.
National War College (U.S.)
Genton, Thomas R.
2002-10-28
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National Missile Defense 2015: An Unintended Consequence
Two of the most enduring vital national interests are the protection of U.S. citizens and our territory. Driven by these interests, the United States began testing a limited national missile defense system intended to protect the country from missile attacks by "rogue" states. By the summer of 2000, missile testing for the national missile defense (NMD) proved inconclusive. This forced President Clinton to defer the deployment decision to the next administration. Given the wide political support for the defense system, however, the president authorized further missile tests.
National War College (U.S.)
Johnson, Keith
2002
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Ruminations of a North Korean General Concerning the United States' National Military Strategy
This paper will support my firm belief that the United States National Military Strategy is misdirected and unfocused. More importantly, their strategy fails to adequately understand the motivation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK) and increases the risk of conflict.
National War College (U.S.)
Hayden, Dave
2000
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Bunker-Busting Nuke: Essential Capability or Destabilizing Weapon?
Many potential adversaries possess deeply buried bunkers where weapons of mass destruction are manufactured and stored. Short of nuclear weapons, a considerable number of these facilities cannot be destroyed. Although some argue otherwise, America needs to develop and maintain a capability to defeat this target set should conflict arise.This thesis will become clear by first justifying the need to hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk, then refuting the arguments that precision low-yield nuclear weapons are destabilizing, and finally, making the case that America truly needs a bunker-busting nuclear warhead.
National War College (U.S.)
Morgan, Michael J.
2002
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Protection, Propaganda or Profit? An Analysis of Commercial Satellite Imaging in Wartime
In order to protect national security, the U.S. government includes a clause in every license that retains the ability to restrict operations of the satellite for reasons of national security. This is commonly known as "shutter control". The goal of this paper is to analyze the "shutter control" issue and the decision making process which led to the government purchase of IKONOS imagery. What were the competing interests with respect to commercial imagery regulation? Was the decision part of an interagency process? What are the government's objectives with respect to the purchases? And what are the precedents and implications these new de facto policies set forward?
National War College (U.S.)
Brunngraber, Michele
2002
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Decision Superiority: Transforming National Security Decision-Making
Despite the fact that an increasing amount of information is available, decisions to use force are often made without a process that relates quantitative and qualitative factors. Presidents have made serious decisions throughout history without innovative processes to assist them, but today's security environment is increasingly complex, dangerous, and quick moving. Today's decisions are executed quickly, in near-real-time, and impact at multiple levels. Senior decision-makers must make very costly decisions without a framework to assist them in understanding the full context and level of risk at that particular point in time.
National War College (U.S.)
Disbrow, Lisa S.
2002
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NPT and Iran: A Case of Domestic and Bureaucratic Politics
The nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, has been a major element in the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration. For this reason, the Administration placed considerable emphasis on obtaining the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the occasion of its 25-year review and extension in April-May 1995. For a range of foreign policy reasons, including nuclear nonproliferation, another clear and important goal of the Administration has been dual containment' of both Iran and Iraq. This paper will consider the process of implementing these two policies in the run-up to both NPT Review and Extension Conference and the announcement of a complete trade and investment embargo on Iran, two events that occurred at the same time. It will demonstrate how bureaucratic and domestic political factors helped lead the Administration to take action on one policy, containing Iran, that could have jeopardized success on the second, NPT extension, and seek to draw some lessons from that experience.
National War College (U.S.)
Davis, Scott
1996
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Rethinking U.S. Policy Towards Iraq: Keep Containment, Forget the Sanctions
In the wake of the Gulf War, struggling to deal with a still-recalcitrant and hostile Saddam, the Clinton administration fell back on a proven Cold War strategy- containment- as a means to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf. Dual containment uses sustained economic, diplomatic, and military pressure to isolate both Iran and Iraq, cut them off from the world trading system, and, (at least in the case of Iraq), encourage a change of regime. To date, this containment policy has arguably been quite successful. But it has also been subject to intense criticism as overzealous, unrealistic, and inhumane. Despite the points raised by such criticism, there are compelling reasons to "stay the course"- to maintain a firm policy of containing Iraq. However, it is also time to modify the economic sanctions, which in many ways have become counterproductive to the overall strategy of containment. To prove this outward paradox, that we should hold firm on containment while at the same time easing up on sanctions, this paper first argues that containing Saddam's Iraq is an appropriate and necessary strategy. It then explains why, within the context of containment, most economic sanctions on Iraq should be lifted.
National War College (U.S.)
King, Richard P.
1995
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How We Have Changed the Way We Think About Nuclear Weapons and Why It Matters
has become axiomatic to note that the world has changed with the demise of the Soviet Union. In the area of nuclear weapons, the shift has been particularly apparent. Although it is obvious that the world has been transformed, it is less apparent how the world has changed, that is, how the observed nuclear changes relate to the end of the cold war. This essay argues that an understanding of nuclear policy-making requires the inclusion of a less tangible factor- a psychological factor- which we will call the "nuclear conception". Such conceptions underlie most nuclear policies and have likely always played a major role in nuclear strategies. The key conclusion of this essay is that the changes currently apparent in the realm of nuclear policy are in part due to the fact that nuclear conceptions are in the process of fundamental change and these changes will have broader implications for US nuclear strategy. This change in conception, while largely sparked by US-Soviet rapprochement, is deeper than the simple suspension of superpower ideological competition.
National War College (U.S.)
Stern, Warren
1997
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Pandora's Box: The Key to Close It
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. policymakers viewed weapons of mass destruction (WMD)- nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons- in terms of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The "New World Order" that evolved in 1990 reflected a post-Cold War world which conceded that American power could lead a collective security arrangement to a more stable and secure international system. The U.S. and the world are on the verge of missing an opportunity to provide a coordinated political-military threat to put all forms of WMD back into Pandora's Box. The purpose of this paper is to propose a new national security strategy concerning the proliferation of WMD.
National War College (U.S.)
Childers, Al
1995
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Saddam Hussein's Decision to Invade Kuwait: Where Was Plan B?
The author believes that Saddam Hussein underestimated the international political reaction to the prospect of Iraq being in a position to assert control or influence over 40 per cent of the world's oil reserves. For the international community, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was viewed not solely as a threat to Kuwait, but as a threat to broader, international interests. One of Saddam's errors was his underestimation of how that threat to states beyond the region would inspire them to coalesce into unified action against Iraq. Saddam's other major error was in not devising a means of obtaining partial victory in his confrontation with Kuwait. Simple blackmail was a possibility here. Saddam could have obtained some economic redress and, in fact, Kuwait was ready to comply with some of Iraq's economic demands. Saddam, of course, wanted more than this, he wanted the Kuwait coast as a means of rectifying Iraq's limited access to the Gulf. But in pursuing his objectives without a possibility of compromise, he exposed both his rule and Iraqi state to inordinate risk when it became clear that an international coalition was prepared to take direct, decisive action against him.
National War College (U.S.)
Culpepper, Frances R. (Patty)
1997
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Infectious Disease in the Twenty-First Century: The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy
"National Security Strategy for a New Century" states that "The goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of out nation's fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions and territory intact, and promote the prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people". It is clear that infectious disease, whether naturally occurring or purposefully introduced, has the capability to complicate and frustrate efforts to achieve every facet of this goal. This paper will examine the different elements of the infectious disease threat and will identify potential opportunities arising from the unique nature of the threat. The Clinton Administration's expanded dual-track approach to strategy in this arena will be considered and potential problems will be identified. Finally, the paper proposes formulating a comprehensive infectious disease control strategy to better address this complex threat and makes some recommendations regarding its content.
National War College (U.S.)
Mason, Peter W.
1999-04-26
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Information Technology: A Difference in Scope or Kind
This paper began as an investigation of Real Time Information to the Cockpit (RTIC) which involves providing information from one sensor to one shooter. The author quickly found himself drawn into an investigation of something larger and, he believes, more fundamental. Are we at the verge of a "revolution" in warfare? This paper proposes that we in the military have yet to answer the fundamental questions surrounding information technology's impact on operations, organization, or doctrine. In typical fashion we have attacked the hardware problems and left the tougher issues of doctrine and implementation until later. "Later" has arrived and the quicker we come to grips with these most fundamental issues the better- for both our military and our nation. What type of organizational structure do we need in order to take advantage of information technology? What doctrinal modifications are needed to accommodate an information intensive future? Does information technology blur our traditional concepts of strategic, operational, and tactical warfare? This paper, while not offering a detailed analysis of each subject, does generate dome "food for thought". It will center on those information technologies that include real-time and near real-time capabilities in an ever expanding "battlespace". Do today's information technologies really represent a difference in kind or just a difference in scope?
National War College (U.S.)
Gibson, Marke F.
1996-04-24
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Negating North Korea's Nukes: The Political Use of Military Power
The North Korean case demonstrates how diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power can be integrated in a political-military strategy designed to address a significant threat to US and international security. This experience also shows how important it is to balance military action and restraint in such a crisis. Specifically, this analysis suggests that the political use of military power was necessary to persuade North Korea to accept the concessions it made in the October 1994 Agreed Framework, thereby enabling the US to achieve its political objectives. In addition, certain quasi-military measures taken by the US may also have more directly helped turn the tide in North Korea's decision to accept a negotiated solution. Without detracting from the deterrent, such measures as withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the ROK, nuclear assurances to North Korea, and cancellation of Team Spirit provided carrots for good DPRK behavior and it cost the US very little politically or militarily. Indeed, all three US political objectives were achieved in the case of North Korea. First, North Korea will stay put in the NPT and be subject to IAEA inspections, eventually including special inspections and the dismantling of its existing graphite-based nuclear program, thus serving the objective of nonproliferation. Second, the muted use of military power, carefully balancing enhancements to our deterrent with abstaining from measures that might have provoked the unpredictable DPRK, avoided a military conflict. Finally, accomplishment of the first two objectives and the enhanced evidence of US commitment to their security provided clear assurances to the key allies in the region, the ROK and Japan, which in turn contributed to nonproliferation by reducing any perception on the part of these allies that they might need nuclear weapons.
National War College (U.S.)
Davis, M. Scott
1996-05-09
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International Law and Terrorism: America Reprises the Lone Ranger in ReSponse to International Terrorism
The question presented in this essay is twofold. First, what, if any, international rules exist to deal with terrorists and other new and dangerous non-state actors on the world scene? Second, is the United States pursuing the most prudent policy to respond to the conundrum of terrorism and similar transnational threats? America may be relying too heavily on unilateral action to respond to terrorism. The author compares the United States to the Lone Ranger in seeking answers to these questions. The Lone Ranger represented the quintessential peace officer except that he operated outside the normal legal system to achieve his goals. He work a mask typical of banditry, he was not deputized as a law enforcement agent, and often used what is initially perceived as unlawful force and violence in achieving his ends. As a result, the Lone Ranger was always explaining his actions and that he was not the bad guy. By today's standards, he would be classified as a vigilante. He did, however, always turn the villains over to the proper authorities, which is his saving grace. The Lone Ranger mentality may be a part of the American psychology. Our attitude coupled with United States hegemony may lead us to reprising the role of the Lone Ranger in the war against terrorism without fully weighing the potential long-term consequences to the rule of law.
National War College (U.S.)
Finnie, Michael E.
1998-09
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International Organizations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy
More than a third of the international organizations (IOs) active on the world stage in 1992 were created by formal international agreements among countries. Most of the rest were created by existing international bodies. It is hard to imagine how world affairs would operate without international bodies such as the United Nations and its affiliates, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, or functional bodies such as the Universal Postal Union or the International Civil Aviation Organization. Nevertheless, the record shows that international organizations are not permanent fixture on the world scene, but that they are being created and dying all the time. Can international organizations be a viable tool of foreign policy? This paper explores the pros and cons, offering arguments from different viewpoints on this issue, including the moral issues involved.
National War College (U.S.)
Sanford, Jonathan E.
1999
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Through a Glass Darkly: Viewing US Strategic Options on Iraq
This article provides in-depth analysis of four options for US policy--from a passive, laissez-faire approach to a bold strategy that seeks to assertively shape the region to reflect US values. It articulates the cost, benefit and risk associated with these options and poses the defining question for President Bush and his national security team--how do they view their policy's endstate? Do they envision an Iraq that is less threatening to the region? Or, do they want to look at Iraq "as through a glass darkly" and see a reflection of American society and values? The options presented here focus primarily on US policy toward Iraq. Whatever policy it eventually pursues, the new Administration must integrate it within a broader, revised US strategy toward the Mid-East, to include addressing Iranian, Israeli and the Palestinian issues. Each option presented here has a natural departure point that could allow and will require other initiatives to support overall US security interests throughout the region. Ultimately, the new Administration's policy will succeed if it accomplishes three key tasks. First, the Administration must articulate the nature of US interests with respect to Iraq. Are the interests vital, important, or humanitarian in nature? Second, no matter what option is pursued, it is imperative that the Bush team matches the resources commensurate with its objectives. Third, the resources available will be limited by the political capital that President Bush can and will commit to gain domestic and international support for his policy. This article portrays the trade-offs in each option, in terms of costs, risks and benefits.
National War College (U.S.)
Isherwood, Michael W.
2001-04-01
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Iran: From Khomeni to Martin Indyk
Special attention will be paid to the Iranian-US relations with a view toward exploring a possible shift in the strategies of both countries. The ultimate purpose is to examine the prospects for a new security model in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region with Iran performing a cooperative and constructive role. This paper is structured to address three basic themes. First, Iran's internal dynamics are significant factors in determining its future geopolitical functions in the Persian Gulf region, Central Asia, and the Southern Caucasus. To perform such functions the Iranian leadership has to clearly define Iran's strategic direction and national interests, Iran's internal forces must come to a consensus on future policies, and the Iranian sociopolitical system has to establish itself as a modern state rather than a revolutionary system. Second, despite the strategic location of Iran and its recent military buildup, it lacks a meaningful power projection capability and is not, therefore, in a position to pose a threat of a strategic nature either to the region or to the US interests in the Persian Gulf. Third, "Dual Containment Policy", designed by the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, represents a substantial departure from the authentic "Philosophy of Containment", pioneered by the dean of American diplomacy, George F. Kennan. The Iranian "half" of the Dual Containment is a politically-driven policy. It has no strategic grounds and is not consistent with US interests. Therefore, to advance US interests in the region, the Dual Containment Policy has to be reviewed.
National War College (U.S.)
Al-Allaf, Mohammed
2001-04-20
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Cooperative Security: The Nuclear Strategy for an Uncertain World
Most leaders share the ultimate international interest to place greater emphasis on conventional military forces and dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, nuclear weapons. But this can only be achieved from a position of strength, not risk. While the Cold War strategies centered on building greater nuclear forces based on a confrontational standoff, the Cooperative Security strategy focuses on reducing nuclear forces found on multipolar cooperation. Their common denominator: Both rely on a position of nuclear deterrent strength. Cooperative Security is not the strategy that will close the nuclear era. It is a first step towards an evolving, comprehensive strategy that reconciles nuclear weapons with the new world realities and embraces, not ignores, the lessons of the nuclear debate. The world has an unprecedented opportunity to dramatically reduce the nuclear threat through cooperation. But to succeed, the US must create a comprehensive new Cooperative Security strategy for an uncertain world that builds upon the proven security of nuclear deterrence while nations cooperatively reduce, if not eliminate, the nuclear age.
National War College (U.S.)
Wilkinson, John L.
1996
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Clausewitz's Theory of the Paradoxical Trinity and the US Strategy in the Gulf War
Carl von Clausewitz's theory of the paradoxical trinity is a timeless theory relevant in modem conflicts and war as evidenced by this analysis of the U S strategy in the Gulf War In this paper, the author will analyze the U S strategy in the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) proving the timeless applicability of Clausewitz's theory of the paradoxical trinity. The author will define and discuss the three parts of the trinity, and then discuss the salient points of U S strategy and actions during the Persian Gulf War to support Clausewitz's ageless concept. This paper is a discussion of a 19th century theory as it was applied to a modern war, and is not a dissection of the Persian Gulf War political and military strategies, or military tactics.
National War College (U.S.)
Earle, Sheila Miller
1998
