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Maritime Access: Do Defenders Hold All the Cards?
National security strategy depends on sustaining access to world markets for American commerce in peacetime and for the Armed Forces to various parts of the globe in times of crisis or war. Potential nation-state adversaries understand the importance of this access and are devising strategies and investing in systems to delay, discredit, or deny U.S. entry to those regions of vital interest where they wish to become the dominant power. Most of these regions are adjacent to international waters where American naval forces freely operate today. Naval forces provide a valuable degree of sovereign and secure access in a strategic environment in which overseas land bases are becoming increasingly restricted politically and vulnerable militarily. The mobility and layered defensive capabilities of American warships, particularly those operating in carrier battle groups, make them the hardest of all tactical forces for an adversary to find, target, and effectively strike with anti-access systems, such as cruise or ballistic missiles. Mobility also keeps ships from being vulnerable to ballistic missiles and makes accurate, long-range targeting of anti-ship cruise missiles a great operational challenge. Moreover, the latest generation of weapon systems for defense against submarines and cruise missiles is extremely effective against the current and projected systems of potential adversaries. These defensive systems are fielded on many, but not all, U.S. ships because of budget constraints and past estimates that likely adversaries had minimal naval capabilities. As national strategy changes to one that accounts for more demanding anti-access threats, the technology and operational skill will become available to sustain assured access for American naval forces.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Barber, III, Arthur H.; Gilmore, Delwyn L.
2001-10
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Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy
A decade ago, the U.S. military and its allies had a close call with biological weapons (BW) in the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Iraqi BW could have inflicted horrific casualties on coalition forces, but the war stopped short of the contingency for which Iraq had prepared, predeployed, and preauthorized the use of such weapons: a march on Baghdad to remove the regime. But the close call of a decade ago, and the concern it generated among senior Gulf War military leaders, do not appear to have translated into substantial improvements to the operational capability of current U.S. military forces to project power and prevail against BW-armed adversaries.
Despite the efforts of many committed individuals, large vulnerabilities in the U.S. BW defense posture remain.
Operational concepts seem founded on the assumption that an adversary would not dare use these weapons or, if he did, that U.S. forces could simply operate around them, as if they were chemical weapons.
The present scare seems to have generated even broader high-level concern than did the potential exposure to Iraqi BW 10 years ago.
How can this concern be translated into an action agenda that will succeed at reducing present and future threats? How should we understand the risks of BW while the Al Qaeda leadership and anthrax mailer remain at large-and as the prospect of another war against Saddam Husayn looms on the horizon?
Our focus here is on the threat of biological weapons to military forces and operations; where appropriate, we sketch out some connections to the BW homeland security challenge.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Roberts, Brad; Moodie, Michael, 1948-
2002-07
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Organizing for National Security: Unification or Coordination?
"Experience gained from the 9/11 attacks, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, and the ongoing war on terror provides the basis for amending our anachronistic national security structures and practices. Many analysts and officials have called for a secondgeneration version of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to address the array of organizational and management challenges that we face. Some argue that the new security environment requires even more fundamental change, similar to what was enacted after World War II. The principal legislation that emerged from that era was the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols aimed to fix inter-Service problems by streamlining the chain of command and promoting 'jointness' but did not fundamentally alter the structure of the U.S. military. These earlier efforts attempted to strike a balance between those who wanted to unite bureaucracies to improve efficiency (primarily resource considerations) and produce more effective outcomes and those who opposed potentially dangerous concentrations of power and desired to preserve their heart-and-soul missions (as well as congressional support for their strategic view and related combat systems and force structures). Today, the debate rages anew with the security of this nation dependent on the outcome. This paper explores two options for reorganization: unification and coordination. We investigate each against the backdrop of the two previous attempts at reorganization in the context of the Madisonian political culture that constitutes part of who we are as a nation. Finally, each option is judged against its ability to contribute to the development and implementation of the kinds of strategies and operations needed to wage the new kind of war and peace in the emerging global security environment."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
2007-12
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Social Software and National Security: An Initial Net Assessment
"Social software connects people and information via online, informal Internet networks. It is appearing in increasingly diverse forms as part of a broad movement commonly called Web 2.0. Resulting social connections are typically serendipitous and can bring unexpected benefits. New social software technologies offer organizations increased agility, adaptiveness, interoperability, efficiency and effectiveness. Social software can be used by governments for content creation, external collaboration, community building, and other applications. The proliferation of social software has ramifications for U.S. national security, spanning future operating challenges of a traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive nature. Failure to adopt these tools may reduce an organization's relative capabilities over time. Globally, social software is being used effectively by businesses, individuals, activists, criminals, and terrorists. Governments that harness its potential power can interact better with citizens and anticipate emerging issues. Security, accountability, privacy, and other concerns often drive national security institutions to limit the use of open tools such as social software, whether on the open web or behind government information system firewalls. Information security concerns are very serious and must be addressed, but to the extent that our adversaries make effective use of such innovations, our restrictions may diminish our national security. We have approached this research paper as an initial net assessment of how social software interacts with government and security in the broadest sense."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Drapeau, Mark D.; Wells, Linton, 1946-
2009-04
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Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within
"This paper attempts to illustrate how difficult, if not impossible, it is to find root causes of domestic terrorism that are of general applicability. There may be similarities from one nation to another, but focusing on such similarities may well lead the analyst astray. The fact that each terrorist sought to cause fear in their fellow countrymen may well be the only common denominator. It is likely to be more important to focus on the unique cultural stamp of the individual nation to assess the reason for violence-prone disquietude among its citizens and residents. Unfortunately, many countries are now beginning to see similar threads of resentment that have begun to be expressed with violence at home. Here we briefly examine the experience of six countries with homegrown terrorism. Certainly, there are others that should be included in this survey; however, due to constraints of length we chose only six. In this paper, we eschew focus groups, such as animal and environmental rights groups, which are rightly described as terrorists when they use violence. We also leave aside the terrorist who acts to bring pressure on another nation--for example, the anti-Castro Cuban or the Sikh separatist who bombs a facility to express outrage at the conduct of another nation. Rather, we focus on the citizen and/or resident who seeks to cause harm to fellow citizens and residents, whether targeted for a single purpose, as with Theo Van Gogh, or murdered indiscriminately as in Spain and the United Kingdom."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Thachuk, Kimberley L., 1962-; Richardson, Courtney; Bowman,Marion E. "Spike"
2008-05
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Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Military Operations
"The abuse of prisoners by U.S. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib had broad strategic consequences, leading many people around the world to question the legitimacy of U.S. goals and activities in Iraq. This paper draws on extensive unclassified reports from multiple investigations that followed Abu Ghraib, and applies key psychological as well as social-situational perspectives to develop a better grasp of the causative factors. From a psychological standpoint, most young adults are powerfully inclined to behave in accord with the social conventions and pressures around them. Especially in ambiguous circumstances, then, it is important that standards of behavior be clear and explicit throughout all phases of an operation and that leaders at all levels represent and rein¬force those standards."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Bartone, Paul T.
2008-11
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Catastrophic Bioterrorism - What Is To Be Done?
Bioterrorism is one of the more muted terror concerns in the opinions of most Americans. Yet in most every possible way, bioterrorism could be the most ominous and damaging threats to national security. This paper discusses preparation demands of the increasing threat, analysis plans of bioterror cases, and ten capabilities that must improve in an effort to counter bioterrorism.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Danzig, Richard
2003-08
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From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and American National Security
"This paper examines how external challenges have prompted national investments in education to enhance American national security. Rather than focusing primarily on traditional professional military education, this analysis examines how education has been used as a tool of American power. Four major moments of transformation in the international system are surveyed to illustrate a link between strategic educational capacity, defined as the application of attained knowledge and skills, and national power. The study then assesses how education is used as a power asset in the contemporary security environment. Today, an important educational capacity is emerging in the new Minerva program in the Department of Defense and other transformational educational concepts with security applications. Education is gaining an increasing interest among American decision-makers as a strategic component of American power and an essential asset for successful military operations in the new global security environment."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Kay, Sean
2009-01
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Analysis of the Threat of Genetically Modified Organisms for Biological Warfare
"Evaluating the potential threats posed by advances in biotechnology, especially genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and synthetic biology remains a contentious issue. Some believe that, inevitably, these advances will lead to a catastrophic biological attack. Others believe that, despite these advances, the scientific and technical requirements, as well as the fundamental laws of natural selection will prevent such an attack. To better understand this issue, this study narrowed the scope of consideration in several dimensions. First, our analysis primarily focused on what we defined as a 'catastrophic biological attack', with a required level of damage more associated with biological warfare than bioterrorism. This damage would need to be direct in nature where the effect is more physical than psychological. Second, this biological attack would be restricted to the United States, not another nation or entity. In this sense, U.S. geography, climatology, infrastructure and medical systems play to counterbalance any potential biological attack. Even within a more narrow scope, there remains inherent complexity and uncertainty which, combined with the considerable rate of change for biotechnology, defies a simple, straightforward answer."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Warner, Jerry B.; Ramsbotham, James; Tunia, Ewelina
2011-05
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Bio-Inspired Materials and Devices for Chemical and Biological Defense
"Transformational advances in CBD [chemical and biological defense] are expected to depend heavily on biologically inspired technology. A leading vision in this direction is a conceptual platform known as the abiotic networked threat system (ANTS). ANTS is based on lessons learned from biology, incorporating abiotic homologues to biological recognition events and metabolic pathways to provide programmable capabilities to sense and respond to environmental threats. Further, it is a complete platform architecture with intelligent preprocessing and network capability and is envisioned to be embedded in all aspects of CBD including detection, communication, activation of response systems, and protection systems. The six major components in ANTS are: (1) Molecular recognition elements for xenobiotic threats; (2) Materials for synthetic matrices; (3) Signal transduction in biotic, hybrid and synthetic systems; (4) Power generation at the nanoscale; (5) Computational tools for design of abiotic units, devices and modules; (6) Combinatorial design and deployment of synthetic systems. On a very simplified level, the objective is a collection of self-sustaining micro- or mesoscale devices that mimic the xenobiotic (i.e., from outside the cell or tissue) threat recognition, response and adaptation of living cells. These units would operate as a decentralized network, communicating with one another, processing information, and triggering responses which may exhibit emergent properties. Recognition elements, power, signal transduction, and networking are generally recognized as essential and challenging areas for research in this concept. Less obvious are the challenges associated with the physical support matrix required to support and shelter the units. This report addresses area 2, materials for synthetic matrices."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Valdes, James J.; Valdes, Erica R.
2010-09
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Global Trade: America's Achilles' Heel
"Much has been written in the aftermath of September 11 on the porosity of America's borders and the failure of various agencies to share, fuse, analyze, and exploit available information to stop foreign threats before they enter the country. The resources and methods available to U.S. border control agencies appear to be no match for the myriad threats that could arrive from outside the country. Asymmetrical military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into America via the marine transportation system. In the uncertainty following the September attacks, the immediate response of security services around the country-the Coast Guard included-was to shut down the systems under their control until measures were taken to ensure that additional attacks were not already in progress. These system stoppages were generally short-lived because the economic impacts were intolerable, not only in dollar costs but also in potential loss of access to the essentials of daily American life. The United States is a trading nation, both domestically and globally, and relatively unimpeded movement of goods and people is necessary for its economy to function. Given the importance of international goods and materials to the American economy, closing our borders for more than a short period is infeasible. Furthermore, with our growing reliance on just-in-time delivery of foreign goods, even slowing the flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random selection of imports would be economically intolerable. This notion-exploiting available information to discern threats and concentrate resources to stop them-is at the heart of the maritime domain awareness (MDA) concept."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Ross, Robert G.; Loy, James M., 1942-
2002-02
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ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction
"The initial years of the 21st century have witnessed numerous large-scale crises, from the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake to longer-term, multi-faceted emergencies, such as those in Sudan. The United States has been involved as part of multinational coalitions in S&R missions in the Balkan states, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It has also provided humanitarian assistance in response to devastating natural disasters around the world. Increasingly, the scale and scope of such events involve both civilian and military components, as resources are stretched thin to support multiple ongoing crises. Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are key elements of the global response to crises, whether natural or man-made disasters or post-conflict S&R scenarios. ICTs are vital enablers of the coordination mechanisms that civilian and military organizations need to assist local populations and host governments. ICT capabilities and requirements need to be better understood, so that relief and reconstruction efforts can be better constructed and coordinated by all parties working in the interest of the affected population. This primer presents current knowledge and best practices in creating a collaborative, civil-military, information environment to support data collection, communications, collaboration, and information-sharing needs in disaster situations and complex emergencies. It consists of two parts. Part one defines and discusses the role of ICTs, the growing recognition of a need for improved collaboration, coordination, and information sharing, and the institutional and cultural characteristics of the various civilian and military participants in relief and reconstruction efforts. Part two draws real-world conclusions, provides best-practice recommendations, and offers practical checklists for maximizing use of communications and information management systems and processes."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Wentz, Larry K.
2006-07
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Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited
"Nuclear radiation, invisible and detectable only with special instruments, has the power to terrify-in part because of its association with nuclear weapons-and to become an instrument of terrorists. Radioactive isotopes can be spread widely with or without high explosives by a radiological dispersion device
(RDD) or so-called dirty bomb. This paper provides a general overview of the nature of RDDs and sources of material for them and estimates the effects of an assault, including casualties and economic consequences. Many experts believe that an RDD is an economic weapon capable of inflicting devastating damage on the United States. This paper is in full agreement with that assessment
and makes some quantitative estimates of the magnitude of economic disruption that can be produced by various levels of attack. It is also generally believed that even a very large RDD is unlikely to cause many human casualties, either immediately or over the long term. A careful examination of the consequences of
the tragic accident in Goiânia, Brazil, however, shows that some forms of radiological attack could kill tens or hundreds of people and sicken hundreds or thousands. Nevertheless, contrary to popular belief, RDDs are not weapons of mass destruction. The authors recommend several policies and actions to reduce the threat of RDD attack and increase the ability of the Federal Government to cope with the consequences of one. With improved public awareness and ability to respond, it should be possible to strip RDDs of their power to terrorize."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Zimmerman, Peter D.; Loeb, Cheryl
2004-01
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Biology and the Battlefield
"The military and the life sciences have been intertwined throughout history. Biology has often been a source of offensive weapons, ranging from the hurling of plague victims over the walls of Kaffa (which probably started the 14th-century Black Death) to the anthrax attacks of fall 2001. The military-biology relationship also has a humane side. Over the years, medical advances have saved countless soldiers and contributed to the overall well being of society. From the smallpox inoculation of Continental Army recruits in 1777- nearly 20 years before Edward Jenner's smallpox vaccination-to the development of modern vaccines, military physicians have a lengthy and impressive record of achievements. Biology has a new military role in the 21st century. Using the
tools of biotechnology, the emphasis is now on increasing warfighting capabilities by improving matériel and enhancing warrior performance. Potential new tools range from small electronic devices based on bacterial proteins to foods that contain vaccines. The possibilities range from warriors functioning without difficulty in extreme environments to unmanned aerial vehicles
flying in autonomous swarms. For the military to benefit fully from the advances of 21stcentury biology, a new organization is needed within the Department of Defense (DOD) that addresses the ethical, legal, and regulatory
implications of biotechnology. This entity also must ensure that DOD biotechnology spending is increased and that the majority of the funds are directed to warfighting issues rather than the longstanding biological concerns of medical and defensive measures."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Armstrong, Robert E.; Warner, Jerry B.
2003-03
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Cooperative Crisis Management and Avian Influenza: A Risk Assessment Guide for International Contagious Disease Prevention and Risk Mitigation
"This paper proposes a risk assessment and mitigation strategy designed to give both national authorities and international organizations the diagnostic tool needed to evaluate preparedness, identify country-level weaknesses, and prioritize scarce resources to combat avian influenza. This tool could help authorities and agencies at all levels of government identify risk factors and actions that may be taken to reduce vulnerabilities to communicable disease outbreaks; prevent animal-to-human disease transmission; improve the response to a communicable disease outbreak; and empower government authorities to communicate with local, national, and international partners. Without adequate prevention efforts, a communicable disease outbreak can rapidly spread and develop into an epidemic. Without an adequate response plan, an epidemic is more likely to become a pandemic. The prevention and response phases of crisis management are aimed at the most important element of cooperative crisis management: preventing loss of life. Senior decision makers who must make crisis management choices in the face of limited information often need practical experience to support this process. The risk assessment and mitigation strategy becomes an essential tool to which these decision makers may turn in a crisis."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Thompson, Donald F., Dr.
2006-03
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Information Assurance: Trends in Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Technologies
"One of the missions of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at National Defense University is to study the transformation of America's military and to explore the consequences of the information revolution. To further this mission, National Defense University, in collaboration with The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise of the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs, brought together leaders in the fields of military and commercial technology. The purpose of the meeting was to gain insight into the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in the use of information technology on the battlefield and in military systems. This volume presents the results of that workshop."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
2004
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Pre-Conflict Management Tools: Winning the Peace
"The Pre-Conflict Management Tools (PCMT) Program was developed to transform how intelligence analysts, policy analysts, operational planners, and decision makers interact when confronting highly complex strategic problems. The PCMT Program capitalizes on technologies and methods that help users collect, process, perform analyses with large quantities of data, and employ computational modeling and simulation methods to determine the probability and likelihood of state failure. The Program's computational decision aids and planning methodology help policymakers and military planners devise activities that can mitigate the consequences of civil war, or prevent state failure altogether. [...] The PCMT Program builds on social science research on state failure and conflict, by turning government users into consumers of social science models employed by academic researchers and validated through peer review processes and implementation by practitioners. By constructing an analytic suite out of existing models, the Program avoids the controversies of 1960's social science research programs, such as Project Camelot, by rejecting the notion of a single, government-sponsored theory of conflict or placing policymakers in the position of determining what is or is not valid social science."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Frank, Aaron B.
2005-02
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Container Security: A Proposal for a Comprehensive Code of Conduct
"Approximately 95 percent of the worlds trade moves by containers, primarily on large ships, but also on trains, trucks, and barges. The system is efficient and economical, but vulnerable. Until recently, theft and misuse have been as accepted as a cost of doing business. However, the rise of terrorism and the possibility that a container could be used to transport or actually be the delivery vehicle for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or high explosives have made it imperative that the security of the shipping container system be greatly improved. Aside from the direct effects of an attack, the economic, social, and political consequences of a significant disruption in the transport chain would be staggering. [...] This paper recommends, as a key step in this approach, the development and adoption of a comprehensive Code of Conduct that would be globally recognized and enforced for such an important component of global commerce. The implementation measures should provide incentives for the industry involved to comply with the obligations of the Code. The G8 and China, or the World Customs Organization, could take the lead in negotiating a global agreement on container security. A draft outline of such a Code is presented in the Annex to this Report."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Dahlman, Ola; Mackby, Jenifer; Sitt, Bernard
2005-01
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Role of Medical Diplomacy in Stabilizing Afghanistan
"Comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are not possible given the current fragmentation of responsibilities, narrow lines of authorities, and archaic funding mechanisms. Afghans are supportive of U.S. and international efforts, and there are occasional signs of progress, but the insurgent threat grows as U.S. military and civilian agencies and the international community struggle to bring stability to this volatile region. Integrated security, stabilization, and reconstruction activities must be implemented quickly and efficiently if failure is to be averted. Much more than a course correction is needed to provide tangible benefits to the population, develop effective leadership capacity in the government, and invest wisely in reconstruction that leads to sustainable economic growth. A proactive, comprehensive reconstruction and stabilization plan for Afghanistan is crucial to counter the regional terrorist insurgency, much as the Marshall Plan was necessary to combat the communist threat from the Soviet Union. This paper examines the health sector as a microcosm of the larger problems facing the United States and its allies in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Thompson, Donald F., Dr.
2008-05
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What Democracy for Afghanistan? An Analysis Utilizing Established Norms and Five Non-Western Case Studies
"Well into its eighth year, two assumptions about the conflict in Afghanistan have become accepted wisdom. First, the goals of Afghanistan and its international supporters cannot be achieved by military force alone; effective, civilian-directed elements of power are also needed in abundance. Second, both the political goal of establishing a viable democratic government and the military objective of defeating the Taliban and other insurgents may have to be more modest than heretofore declared. This study examines the stated goal of creating basic democratic or participatory governance in Kabul in light of internationally accepted measures of success and five possible models from the developing world. It concludes with findings and policy recommendations to help answer the important question being asked by leaders and policymakers: what type of government is possible in Afghanistan? A prominent goal of the international intervention in Afghanistan has been to see some level of representative government flourish as the system of choice for the Afghan people. The Bush administration linked a democratic Afghanistan to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] collective security interests. It has been suggested that the Obama Administration's March 2009 strategy for Afghanistan deemphasizes democracy in favor of security goals. However, the prominent place of the recent presidential and upcoming parliamentary elections in Obama's treatment of Afghanistan suggests that while expectations may have been lowered, putting in place at least the rudiments of participatory governance remains the end goal for Afghanistan's government. If international withdrawal from Afghanistan anticipates leaving such a democratic Afghanistan behind, what minimal political progress and achievements are required to constitute a democracy in Afghanistan, and how can the international community foster such progress with reasonable prospects for success?"
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Barry, Charles L., 1946-; Greene, Samuel R.
2009-09
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Primer on Alternative Transportation Fuels
"The Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that the United States presently imports 58% of its oil (petroleum) and that this will grow to about 68% by 2030.This fact, combined with the recent escalation in world oil prices, has led to renewed interest in alternative fuels that might reduce or eliminate the growing dependence on foreign oil sources. Of particular concern are the applications that power the U.S. transportation system. […] It can be seen from table 1 that about 65% (13.4 million barrels per day) of U.S. oil consumption relates to transportation fuels. This number is somewhat misleading in that the energy conversion efficiency of the typical transportation plant is about 18% (see figure A1 of appendix A). Thus, the energy that is actually needed for transportation propulsion is equivalent to about 2.4 million barrels of oil per day (BPD). The remaining 11 million BPD emerges mostly as waste heat due to the underlying efficiency of the energy conversion process. In this paper we will use 13.4 million BPD as the goal that alternative fuels must meet. However, it should be kept in mind that a radical improvement in the energy efficiency of propulsion power plants would markedly change the transportation fuels requirement. The Department of Defense (DOD) is especially dependent on petroleum."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Coffey, Timothy, 1941-
2010-09
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STAR-TIDES and Starfish Networks: Supporting Stressed Populations with Distributed Talent
"The Department of Defense increasingly is involved in postwar stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, capacity-building of partner nations at home and abroad, and other such complex operations. To provide sustainable support to stressed populations in these environments, an international, networked, knowledge-sharing research project called Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) encourages innovative approaches to public-private collaboration, whole-of-government solutions, and transnational engagement. It leverages a distributed network of people and organizations to conduct research, support real world contingencies, and bridge gaps among disparate communities. The three main goals of STAR-TIDES are to enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, government, and civil society) to operate in stressed environments, extend the military's ability to work with civilians in such situations, and economize by identifying cost-effective logistic solutions and rationalizing supply chains."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Wells, Linton, 1946-; Hardy, Walker; Gupta, Vinay
2009-12
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Defense Horizons: Strategic Fragility: Infrastructure Protection and National Security in the Information Age
This journal article from Defense Horizons a publication of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University discusses the vulnerability issues surrounding the interconnected critical infrastructures that span the globe. "Modern societies have reached unprecedented levels of prosperity, yet they remain vulnerable to a wide range of possible disruptions. One significant reason for this growing vulnerability is the developed world's reliance on an array of interlinked, interdependent critical infrastructures that span nations and even continents. The advent of these infrastructures over the past few decades has resulted in a tradeoff: the United States has gained greater productivity and prosperity at the risk of greater exposure to widespread systemic collapse. The trends that have led to this growing strategic fragility show no sign of slowing. As a result, the United States faces a new and different kind of threat to national security. This paper explores the factors that are creating the current situation. It examines the implications of strategic fragility for national security and the range of threats that could exploit this condition. Finally, it describes a variety of response strategies that could help address this issue. The challenges associated with strategic fragility are complex and not easily resolved. However, it is evident that policymakers will need to make difficult choices soon; delaying important decisions is itself a choice, and one that could produce disastrous results."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Lachow, Irving; Miller, Robert A.
2008-01
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Coping with an Attack: A Quick Guide to Dealing with Biological, Chemical and 'Dirty Bomb' Attacks
This guide provides information on how to prepare for Biological, Chemical and Dirty Bomb attacks. In the first section, pre- and post-attack preparation lists are given. In the second section, the various threats of a biological and chemical, as well as the general heading of dirty bomb threats, are laid out, followed by: immediate action required; symptoms of the attack; treatment if exposed; and whether or not the agents are contagious. Also provided are a frequently asked question and answer section.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Coomber, Patricia; Armstrong, Robert
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Who You Gonna Call? Responding to a Medical Emergency with the Strategic National Stockpile
"This paper reviews the history and current status of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), provides overview of its role in incident response, and reports on the testing of SNS deployment in recent terrorism exercises. The paper also explores some of the regulatory and legal issues that surround the use of the SNS and examines the dependence of the U.S. military on SNS supplies during crisis and consequence management support to civilians in the United States."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Prior, Stephen D.
2004-06
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Looking for Trouble: A Policymaker's Guide to Biosensing
"Protecting the population against the effects of a bioterrorism attacks is one of the most daunting tasks facing government officials. Some of the information required to make informed decisions is highly technical, and even the technical experts do no agree about many of the details or issues involved. This primer is written for the non-technical policymaker and is designed to assist him or her in reaching important decisions regarding how best to help provide early warning of a biological attack. The authors also present the results of an extensive statistical study that examined the utility of a system-of-systems approach to identifying a bioattack."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Prior, Stephen D.; Coomber, Patricia; Armstrong, Robert
2004-06
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Transforming the Reserve Component: Four Essays
"This volume contains four essays on various aspects of the Reserve Component. [...] The first essay calls for a fundamental restructuring of the Reserve Component in light of the largest mobilization since the Korean War, which has been fraught with problems in terms of combat readiness as well as pay, morale, and retention. Hans Binnendijk and Gina Cordero argue that a high-level national commission may be needed to design and gain support for that restructuring. In the second essay, Stephen M. Duncan calls for a complete re-thinking of U.S. security requirements and the related force structure, with an emphasis on the homeland security mission. In the new security environment, the American homeland needs to be considered as part of the battlespace. Duncan explores which conventional and homeland security missions should be assigned to Active Force Units and which to Reservists. Raymond F. Bell, Jr. argues in the third essay that one of the challenges facing Army transformation is the lack of a shared culture between the Active and Reserve Components. Bell examines how these separate cultures have negatively affected the Army's effectiveness as an organization and offers recommendations that move towards cultural change. Civil Affairs units are a central element to stabilization and reconstruction operations that require an integrated military and civilian response. The final essay by Michael J. Baranick, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz proposes several ways to improve the overall effectiveness of Civil Affairs units. Thanks are due to Neyla Arnas for editing the manuscripts."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Binnendijk, Hans; Bell, Raymond E., Jr.; Wentz, Larry
2005-02
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Senturion: A Predictive Political Simulation Model
"The expanding complexity of sub-national and cross-national threats to national security strains the analytical capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community, highlighting the need for methods and tools that can make this emergent complexity manageable. With an ever-increasing spectrum of threats, more objective analytic capabilities that draw on all-source intelligence and advances in computational methods are needed to help provide insight and aid in the understanding of individual and group behavior. This paper summarizes work utilizing the Senturion predictive analysis software at the National Defense University (NDU). The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at NDU has been testing the Senturion capability since 2002, and has begun to support the application of this new technology in DoD. Senturion is a simulation capability that analyzes the political dynamics within local, domestic, and international contexts and predicts how the policy positions of competing interests will evolve over time. The authors begin by describing the methodology underlying the software, and then provide an overview of three case studies that used the software: a predictive analysis of the stabilization and reconstruction phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the run-up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005, and the leadership transition in Palestine following the death of Yasser Arafat. Each of these projects tested the application of the software's modeling technology to unfolding events. Each analysis was performed and briefed to senior government decision makers well in advance of events; the forecasts from each project tracked well with reality, often providing counterintuitive results. The approach provides policy makers and analysts with a tool for anticipating the outcome of complex political events that can also provide a detailed explanation of why events may not unfold as expected with traditional means of analysis."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Baranick, Michael J.; Abdollahian, Mark; Efird, Brian . . .
2006-04
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New Military Framework for NATO
"Although Americans and Europeans do not always agree on political strategies in the Middle East, they have a compelling reason to reach an accord on the need to strengthen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces for future operations in that region and elsewhere. If adequate military capabilities are lacking, the Alliance will not be able to act even when its political leaders agree on the need to do so. But if it creates such capabilities, it will be able to act either ad hoc or across the board if a common political strategy eventually were to emerge. This article proposes a new and comprehensive military framework to help guide NATO improvements in the years ahead. This framework envisions a pyramid-like structure of future NATO forces and capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO Special Operations Force, the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, stabilization and reconstruction forces, and assets for defense sector development. The United States would provide one-third of the necessary forces, and Europe would be responsible for the other two-thirds. For the Europeans, creating these forces and capabilities is a viable proposition because they require commitment of only 10 percent of their active military manpower, plus investments in such affordable assets as information networks, smart munitions, commercial lift, logistics support, and other enablers."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Binnendijk, Hans; Gompert, David C.; Kugler, Richard L.
2005-05
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Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot of NATO's Readiness for CBRN Attacks
"The possibility of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members having to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident is not a hypothetical scenario reserved for training exercises. Indeed, a number of countries worldwide have considerable experience in dealing with a variety of naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate CBRN incidents. NATO itself, however, has no clear conceptual vision of its role in civil emergencies because preparedness of this sort remains a national responsibility. For many years, NATO's military forces have addressed CBRN issues as part of their military planning. But the question remains as to how NATO nations view the capability of their military forces and the contribution that these forces can make in dealing with the consequences of a domestic CBRN attack within one or several member countries. This paper provides insights into the current thinking of NATO members -- based on an informal survey of Alliance military attaches assigned to Washington, DC -- regarding the planning, assets, and training for such a contingency. The resulting snapshot of NATO CBRN capabilities suggests specific initiatives that should be considered within the Alliance to improve its collective response to a CBRN incident. Areas recommended for particular emphasis and further study include bolstering Alliance capabilities for biological and radiological contingencies; strengthening command and control and logistics capabilities; addressing the airlift shortfall; intensifying multilateral exercises; and creating an Alliance-wide mechanism for sharing lessons learned."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Moodie, Michael, 1948-; Armstrong, Robert; Merkeley, Tyler
2007-06
