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• Global Trade: America's Achilles' Heel

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  "Much has been written in the aftermath of September 11 on the porosity of America's borders and the failure of various agencies to share, fuse, analyze, and exploit available information to stop foreign threats before they enter the country. The resources and methods available to U.S. border control agencies appear to be no match for the myriad threats that could arrive from outside the country. Asymmetrical military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into America via the marine transportation system. In the uncertainty following the September attacks, the immediate response of security services around the country-the Coast Guard included-was to shut down the systems under their control until measures were taken to ensure that additional attacks were not already in progress. These system stoppages were generally short-lived because the economic impacts were intolerable, not only in dollar costs but also in potential loss of access to the essentials of daily American life. The United States is a trading nation, both domestically and globally, and relatively unimpeded movement of goods and people is necessary for its economy to function. Given the importance of international goods and materials to the American economy, closing our borders for more than a short period is infeasible. Furthermore, with our growing reliance on just-in-time delivery of foreign goods, even slowing the flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random selection of imports would be economically intolerable. This notion-exploiting available information to discern threats and concentrate resources to stop them-is at the heart of the maritime domain awareness (MDA) concept."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Ross, Robert G.; Loy, James M., 1942-

  2002-02
• Maritime Access: Do Defenders Hold All the Cards?

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  National security strategy depends on sustaining access to world markets for American commerce in peacetime and for the Armed Forces to various parts of the globe in times of crisis or war. Potential nation-state adversaries understand the importance of this access and are devising strategies and investing in systems to delay, discredit, or deny U.S. entry to those regions of vital interest where they wish to become the dominant power. Most of these regions are adjacent to international waters where American naval forces freely operate today. Naval forces provide a valuable degree of sovereign and secure access in a strategic environment in which overseas land bases are becoming increasingly restricted politically and vulnerable militarily. The mobility and layered defensive capabilities of American warships, particularly those operating in carrier battle groups, make them the hardest of all tactical forces for an adversary to find, target, and effectively strike with anti-access systems, such as cruise or ballistic missiles. Mobility also keeps ships from being vulnerable to ballistic missiles and makes accurate, long-range targeting of anti-ship cruise missiles a great operational challenge. Moreover, the latest generation of weapon systems for defense against submarines and cruise missiles is extremely effective against the current and projected systems of potential adversaries. These defensive systems are fielded on many, but not all, U.S. ships because of budget constraints and past estimates that likely adversaries had minimal naval capabilities. As national strategy changes to one that accounts for more demanding anti-access threats, the technology and operational skill will become available to sustain assured access for American naval forces.

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Barber, III, Arthur H.; Gilmore, Delwyn L.

  2001-10
• Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy

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  A decade ago, the U.S. military and its allies had a close call with biological weapons (BW) in the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Iraqi BW could have inflicted horrific casualties on coalition forces, but the war stopped short of the contingency for which Iraq had prepared, predeployed, and preauthorized the use of such weapons: a march on Baghdad to remove the regime. But the close call of a decade ago, and the concern it generated among senior Gulf War military leaders, do not appear to have translated into substantial improvements to the operational capability of current U.S. military forces to project power and prevail against BW-armed adversaries. Despite the efforts of many committed individuals, large vulnerabilities in the U.S. BW defense posture remain. Operational concepts seem founded on the assumption that an adversary would not dare use these weapons or, if he did, that U.S. forces could simply operate around them, as if they were chemical weapons. The present scare seems to have generated even broader high-level concern than did the potential exposure to Iraqi BW 10 years ago. How can this concern be translated into an action agenda that will succeed at reducing present and future threats? How should we understand the risks of BW while the Al Qaeda leadership and anthrax mailer remain at large-and as the prospect of another war against Saddam Husayn looms on the horizon? Our focus here is on the threat of biological weapons to military forces and operations; where appropriate, we sketch out some connections to the BW homeland security challenge.

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Roberts, Brad; Moodie, Michael, 1948-

  2002-07
• Assessing the Army Power and Energy Efforts for the Warfighter

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  "In this paper we review some of the landscape of research and development on power and energy as it pertains to the needs of the Army warfighter. We focus on the battlefield and consider questions related to vehicles, dismounted soldiers, and forward operating bases. The literature in the overall field of energy research is immense; we make no attempt to review all these reports but rather have looked at a few selected studies that focus on the military challenges. The context of the study is twofold: the National need to reduce the use of petroleum-based fuels and the Army's need to reduce the logistical burden and hazards of moving said fuels on the battlefield. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the danger inherent in transporting supplies over terrain that is difficult to render safe from terrorist raids and hidden explosives. The Army seeks to reduce this dependence by improving the fuel efficiency for uses that cannot now be entirely supplied by alternatives. These efforts will also provide the opportunity to save a great deal of money and reduce the number of personnel in the logistics chain. Needless to say, there will still be convoys carrying other supplies to forward bases. However, any reduction in the amount of supplies convoyed will be desirable."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Valdes, James J.; Chait, Richard, 1937-; Lyons, John W., 1930-

  2011-03
• Bio-Inspired Materials and Devices for Chemical and Biological Defense

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  "Transformational advances in CBD [chemical and biological defense] are expected to depend heavily on biologically inspired technology. A leading vision in this direction is a conceptual platform known as the abiotic networked threat system (ANTS). ANTS is based on lessons learned from biology, incorporating abiotic homologues to biological recognition events and metabolic pathways to provide programmable capabilities to sense and respond to environmental threats. Further, it is a complete platform architecture with intelligent preprocessing and network capability and is envisioned to be embedded in all aspects of CBD including detection, communication, activation of response systems, and protection systems. The six major components in ANTS are: (1) Molecular recognition elements for xenobiotic threats; (2) Materials for synthetic matrices; (3) Signal transduction in biotic, hybrid and synthetic systems; (4) Power generation at the nanoscale; (5) Computational tools for design of abiotic units, devices and modules; (6) Combinatorial design and deployment of synthetic systems. On a very simplified level, the objective is a collection of self-sustaining micro- or mesoscale devices that mimic the xenobiotic (i.e., from outside the cell or tissue) threat recognition, response and adaptation of living cells. These units would operate as a decentralized network, communicating with one another, processing information, and triggering responses which may exhibit emergent properties. Recognition elements, power, signal transduction, and networking are generally recognized as essential and challenging areas for research in this concept. Less obvious are the challenges associated with the physical support matrix required to support and shelter the units. This report addresses area 2, materials for synthetic matrices."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Valdes, James J.; Valdes, Erica R.

  2010-09
• Analysis of the Threat of Genetically Modified Organisms for Biological Warfare

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  "Evaluating the potential threats posed by advances in biotechnology, especially genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and synthetic biology remains a contentious issue. Some believe that, inevitably, these advances will lead to a catastrophic biological attack. Others believe that, despite these advances, the scientific and technical requirements, as well as the fundamental laws of natural selection will prevent such an attack. To better understand this issue, this study narrowed the scope of consideration in several dimensions. First, our analysis primarily focused on what we defined as a 'catastrophic biological attack', with a required level of damage more associated with biological warfare than bioterrorism. This damage would need to be direct in nature where the effect is more physical than psychological. Second, this biological attack would be restricted to the United States, not another nation or entity. In this sense, U.S. geography, climatology, infrastructure and medical systems play to counterbalance any potential biological attack. Even within a more narrow scope, there remains inherent complexity and uncertainty which, combined with the considerable rate of change for biotechnology, defies a simple, straightforward answer."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Warner, Jerry B.; Ramsbotham, James; Tunia, Ewelina

  2011-05
• Primer on Alternative Transportation Fuels

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  "The Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that the United States presently imports 58% of its oil (petroleum) and that this will grow to about 68% by 2030.This fact, combined with the recent escalation in world oil prices, has led to renewed interest in alternative fuels that might reduce or eliminate the growing dependence on foreign oil sources. Of particular concern are the applications that power the U.S. transportation system. […] It can be seen from table 1 that about 65% (13.4 million barrels per day) of U.S. oil consumption relates to transportation fuels. This number is somewhat misleading in that the energy conversion efficiency of the typical transportation plant is about 18% (see figure A1 of appendix A). Thus, the energy that is actually needed for transportation propulsion is equivalent to about 2.4 million barrels of oil per day (BPD). The remaining 11 million BPD emerges mostly as waste heat due to the underlying efficiency of the energy conversion process. In this paper we will use 13.4 million BPD as the goal that alternative fuels must meet. However, it should be kept in mind that a radical improvement in the energy efficiency of propulsion power plants would markedly change the transportation fuels requirement. The Department of Defense (DOD) is especially dependent on petroleum."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Coffey, Timothy, 1941-

  2010-09
• Organizing for National Security: Unification or Coordination?

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  "Experience gained from the 9/11 attacks, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, and the ongoing war on terror provides the basis for amending our anachronistic national security structures and practices. Many analysts and officials have called for a secondgeneration version of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to address the array of organizational and management challenges that we face. Some argue that the new security environment requires even more fundamental change, similar to what was enacted after World War II. The principal legislation that emerged from that era was the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols aimed to fix inter-Service problems by streamlining the chain of command and promoting 'jointness' but did not fundamentally alter the structure of the U.S. military. These earlier efforts attempted to strike a balance between those who wanted to unite bureaucracies to improve efficiency (primarily resource considerations) and produce more effective outcomes and those who opposed potentially dangerous concentrations of power and desired to preserve their heart-and-soul missions (as well as congressional support for their strategic view and related combat systems and force structures). Today, the debate rages anew with the security of this nation dependent on the outcome. This paper explores two options for reorganization: unification and coordination. We investigate each against the backdrop of the two previous attempts at reorganization in the context of the Madisonian political culture that constitutes part of who we are as a nation. Finally, each option is judged against its ability to contribute to the development and implementation of the kinds of strategies and operations needed to wage the new kind of war and peace in the emerging global security environment."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  2007-12
• STAR-TIDES and Starfish Networks: Supporting Stressed Populations with Distributed Talent

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  "The Department of Defense increasingly is involved in postwar stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, capacity-building of partner nations at home and abroad, and other such complex operations. To provide sustainable support to stressed populations in these environments, an international, networked, knowledge-sharing research project called Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) encourages innovative approaches to public-private collaboration, whole-of-government solutions, and transnational engagement. It leverages a distributed network of people and organizations to conduct research, support real world contingencies, and bridge gaps among disparate communities. The three main goals of STAR-TIDES are to enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, government, and civil society) to operate in stressed environments, extend the military's ability to work with civilians in such situations, and economize by identifying cost-effective logistic solutions and rationalizing supply chains."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Wells, Linton, 1946-; Hardy, Walker; Gupta, Vinay

  2009-12
• Directed Energy Weapons - Are We There Yet? The Future of DEW Systems and Barriers to Success

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  "The purpose of this paper is to examine the barriers to deployment […] and suggest a strategy for an initial deployment that addresses these issues. This strategy will focus on current high-priority threats against which DEW [directed energy weapons] would provide the best alternative for the military. The utility of Directed Energy systems for military applications depends on several key considerations. The DEW concept must demonstrate the capabilities of an operational weapon system. The DEW concept must not require a significant logistics tail, a dedicated infrastructure, or highly skilled operators and maintenance crews. Over the short-term, these prescriptions imply the development of lower-power tactical applications, such as defense against swarming threats, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), sensor and electronics destruction/denial, and less-than-lethal antipersonnel applications, for which DEW devices have already demonstrated a potential capability. This paper begins with a survey of DEW development and reviews how historical difficulties have prevented these systems from being deployed to the battlefield. The paper will then addresses current challenges and offers suggestions on a way ahead. The paper will not address the status of current programs, nor make suggestions for technology investment. These areas were well covered by the December 2007 DSB [Defense Science Board] report on DEW."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Zimet, Elihu; Mann, Christopher

  2009-05
• Center for Technology and National Security Policy [website]

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  "The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) is a US Department of Defense research center integrated into the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University focused on the intersection of technology and national security policy. As DOD senior leaders respond to a trend that has seen R&D shift from governments to the private sector, CTNSP is uniquely positioned to tap into the expertise of the military, academia, and global technology markets. Its dual role as a DOD organization and an academic institution provide access to restricted government information, as well as cutting edge research coming from both academia and the private sector. Situated at the National Defense University, CTNSP has immediate access to senior military leaders, in addition to the diverse student population, representing mid- and senior-level commanders with significant recent experience in military operations, helping ensure that CTNSP's research is grounded in operational insights and relevance. CTNSP conducts research and analysis on emerging trends in science and technology, strategic forecasting, and program assessment. In support of its mission, the Center delivers technical studies, program reviews, senior workshops, electronic data products, inter-agency exercises, expert consultation, and a variety of outreach activities."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
• Bio-Inspired Innovation and National Security

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  This book discusses biological warfare defenses. From the text: "Whereas the past 150 years or so might be termed the 'Age of Geology,' we may be moving toward an 'Age of Biology' in which bio-based sustainable practices are the norm. Things such as genetically modified foods are a start but are only the beginning of this trend, and there are vast implications of this for the military: If the raw material of diverse genes is more important to America than the raw material of petroleum, this may influence where and whom the military fights for resources, and will also pose new challenges to foreign policy, international stability, and law. Already there are controversies over who rightfully owns intellectual property rights to discoveries of drugs that stem from rare, indigenous organisms."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Loeb, Cheryl A.; Armstrong, Robert E., 1948-2008; Drapeau, Mark D. (Mark David)

  2010
• Social Software and National Security: An Initial Net Assessment

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  "Social software connects people and information via online, informal Internet networks. It is appearing in increasingly diverse forms as part of a broad movement commonly called Web 2.0. Resulting social connections are typically serendipitous and can bring unexpected benefits. New social software technologies offer organizations increased agility, adaptiveness, interoperability, efficiency and effectiveness. Social software can be used by governments for content creation, external collaboration, community building, and other applications. The proliferation of social software has ramifications for U.S. national security, spanning future operating challenges of a traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive nature. Failure to adopt these tools may reduce an organization's relative capabilities over time. Globally, social software is being used effectively by businesses, individuals, activists, criminals, and terrorists. Governments that harness its potential power can interact better with citizens and anticipate emerging issues. Security, accountability, privacy, and other concerns often drive national security institutions to limit the use of open tools such as social software, whether on the open web or behind government information system firewalls. Information security concerns are very serious and must be addressed, but to the extent that our adversaries make effective use of such innovations, our restrictions may diminish our national security. We have approached this research paper as an initial net assessment of how social software interacts with government and security in the broadest sense."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Drapeau, Mark D.; Wells, Linton, 1946-

  2009-04
• Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within

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  "This paper attempts to illustrate how difficult, if not impossible, it is to find root causes of domestic terrorism that are of general applicability. There may be similarities from one nation to another, but focusing on such similarities may well lead the analyst astray. The fact that each terrorist sought to cause fear in their fellow countrymen may well be the only common denominator. It is likely to be more important to focus on the unique cultural stamp of the individual nation to assess the reason for violence-prone disquietude among its citizens and residents. Unfortunately, many countries are now beginning to see similar threads of resentment that have begun to be expressed with violence at home. Here we briefly examine the experience of six countries with homegrown terrorism. Certainly, there are others that should be included in this survey; however, due to constraints of length we chose only six. In this paper, we eschew focus groups, such as animal and environmental rights groups, which are rightly described as terrorists when they use violence. We also leave aside the terrorist who acts to bring pressure on another nation--for example, the anti-Castro Cuban or the Sikh separatist who bombs a facility to express outrage at the conduct of another nation. Rather, we focus on the citizen and/or resident who seeks to cause harm to fellow citizens and residents, whether targeted for a single purpose, as with Theo Van Gogh, or murdered indiscriminately as in Spain and the United Kingdom."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Thachuk, Kimberley L., 1962-; Richardson, Courtney; Bowman,Marion E. "Spike"

  2008-05
• Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Military Operations

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  "The abuse of prisoners by U.S. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib had broad strategic consequences, leading many people around the world to question the legitimacy of U.S. goals and activities in Iraq. This paper draws on extensive unclassified reports from multiple investigations that followed Abu Ghraib, and applies key psychological as well as social-situational perspectives to develop a better grasp of the causative factors. From a psychological standpoint, most young adults are powerfully inclined to behave in accord with the social conventions and pressures around them. Especially in ambiguous circumstances, then, it is important that standards of behavior be clear and explicit throughout all phases of an operation and that leaders at all levels represent and rein¬force those standards."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Bartone, Paul T.

  2008-11
• Military Perspectives on Cyberpower

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  "During the course of nearly two years, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University (NDU), has conducted extensive research to identify and explore major cyber issues. These activities were performed in response to a request in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The result of that research is documented in a book entitled 'Cyberpower and National Security.' As part of that research, CTNSP convened several workshops to address challenges in cyberspace, cyberpower, cyberstrategy, and institutional factors. Several representatives from the military Services participated extensively in those workshops. During those workshops, a variety of cyber issues emerged about the roles of the Services in the areas of roles and missions and the creation of needed intellectual capital. As a consequence, we turned to each of the Services and asked if they could contribute to the public debate on these cyber issues. Subsequently, each of the Services identified volunteers who graciously generated white papers to illuminate the cyber debate. It must be emphasized that the individual white papers have not been reviewed by their Services. They constitute the individual opinions of the contributors who sought to identify and explore the key cyber challenges that the Services must address. In addition, to put those contributions in context, Dr. Elihu Zimet and Dr. Charles Barry from CTNSP have written an initial chapter that provides a framework for the Service chapters. In that chapter, they briefly summarize the major findings and recommendations from the individual authors. We are delighted to present these white papers in this volume. We trust they will help to identify and address many of the key cyber issues that the national security community must confront during the coming decade."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Wentz, Larry K.; Starr, Stuart H.; Barry, Charles L., 1946-

  2009-07
• Cyberspace and the 'First Battle' in 21st-century War

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  "The first battle in the 21st century, however, may well be in cyberspace. Coordinated cyber attacks designed to shape the larger battlespace and influence a wide range of forces and levers of power may become the key feature of the next war. Early forms of this may have already been seen in Estonia and Georgia. Control of cyberspace may thus be as decisive in the network-dependent early 21st century as control of the air was for most of the 20th century. In the future, cyber attacks may be combined with other means to inflict paralyzing damage to a nation's critical infrastructure as well as psychological operations designed to create fear, uncertainty, and doubt, a concept we refer to as infrastructure and information operations. The cyber sphere itself is, of course, a critical warfighting domain that hosts countless information infrastructures, but the rise of network-based control systems in areas as diverse as the power grid and logistics has widened the threat posed by network attacks on opposing infrastructures."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Kuehl, Dan; Miller, Robert A.

  2009-09
• Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism

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  "The most likely means of delivering a nuclear bomb on a major city is through a successful smuggling effort by a terrorist organization. The catastrophic damage it would cause demands cooperative action by all responsible governments. Several U.S. Government programs are in place to deal with this threat. These programs focus on the following: (1) Measures to prevent access by terrorist groups to fissile material, particularly enriched uranium and plutonium, the basic fuel for nuclear bombs; (2) Measures to strengthen international institutions to enable governments to deal more effectively with illicit trade in fissile materials and in equipment that can produce such materials; (3) Measures to enhance international cooperation in intelligence sharing and law enforcement; (4) Cooperative international defense activities designed to intercept illegal trafficking in fissile materials and equipment to produce these materials; and (5) Strengthening the capacity to monitor and detect illicit shipments of fissionable materials at entry points into the United States and, in cooperation with other countries, at key transportation nodes overseas. This report focuses on the last of these programs, and primarily on deployment of sensors overseas. This report provides an overview of the threat from nuclear terrorism; discusses the role of intelligence and risk assessments in countering this threat; provides a brief overview of nuclear detection technologies and issues; briefly summarizes key U.S. Government programs involved in nuclear detection; summarizes domestic legislation, which provides the impetus for increasing international collaboration; and discusses the need for a global approach to nuclear nonproliferation in which international institutions assume a leading and sustained leadership role."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Coffey, Timothy, 1941-; Goodby, James E.; Loeb, Cheryl

  2007-07
• Islamic Radicalization in the United States: New Trends and a Proposed Methodology for Disruption

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  "Over the past several years, the United States government and law enforcement agencies have become increasingly concerned with the spread and influence of Islamic radicalization amongst U.S. citizens and naturalized American individuals. Many such individuals are taking action intended to harm Americans and American interests domestically or abroad. Evidence points to a sophisticated and evolving indoctrination campaign that targets not just Americans of Muslim faith, but the larger population. It is becoming essential to view the spread of this radicalization as a technologically advanced phenomenon that should be addressed within the context of the evolving nature of the threat. This paper presents a study on practical and realistic assessments of Islamic radicalization in the United States and offers suggestions for its mitigation. In particular, the paper will address the emergence of the Internet as the battleground of ideas with the radical version of Islam, and will offer suggestions for addressing this problem for the government and law enforcement efforts."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Musa, Samuel; Bendett, Samuel

  2010-09
• Risk-Informed Decisionmaking for Science and Technology

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  "The goals of this study are: first, to apply leadership lessons learned from the Department of Defense laboratory management experience to the needs of DHS (Department of Homeland Security); second, to recommend best practices for leadership in the S&T Directorate; and third, to respond to DHS-requested areas of evaluation. This paper synthesizes the results of this study. Initially, the CTNSP team concentrated on the need for practical approaches that the DHS leadership could use to make critical risk-informed decisions and developed metrics for the selection of the most beneficial programs and projects."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Musa, Samuel; Berry, William E.; Chait, Richard, 1937-

  2010-09
• Good Bugs, Bad Bugs: A Modern Approach for Detecting Offensive Biological Weapons Research

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  "This report outlines a new framework to monitor countries in terms of their potential to engage in covert biological weapons research. This is an effort to develop an indirect approach to measuring a nation's capability to conduct offensive weapons research in both civilian and government or military settings. This report discusses eight possible indicators of illicit biological weapons activities. Through analyzing these indicators, one can indirectly identify areas of possible illicit BW activity. These indicators include: 1. Known chemical or nuclear programs, 2. Number and level of BSL 3-4 facilities in a country, 3. Sophistication of civilian domestic biotechnology capabilities, 4. Known manufacture of rare or unusual biological compounds, 5. Mismatch between number of trained scientists and positions available, 6. Level of business transparency, 7. Number of publications compared to number of scientists, and 8. Complexity of social networking among scientists (both domestically and with scientists from other countries). While not a panacea for monitoring all types of biological proliferation threats, the framework may serve as a guide for government and industry analysts for the type of information that needs to be collected and assessed to make more informed judgments about the likelihood that a particular state is engaging in illicit biological weapons research."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Moodie, Michael, 1948-; Loeb, Cheryl; Armstrong, Robert

  2008-12
• ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction

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  "The initial years of the 21st century have witnessed numerous large-scale crises, from the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake to longer-term, multi-faceted emergencies, such as those in Sudan. The United States has been involved as part of multinational coalitions in S&R missions in the Balkan states, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It has also provided humanitarian assistance in response to devastating natural disasters around the world. Increasingly, the scale and scope of such events involve both civilian and military components, as resources are stretched thin to support multiple ongoing crises. Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are key elements of the global response to crises, whether natural or man-made disasters or post-conflict S&R scenarios. ICTs are vital enablers of the coordination mechanisms that civilian and military organizations need to assist local populations and host governments. ICT capabilities and requirements need to be better understood, so that relief and reconstruction efforts can be better constructed and coordinated by all parties working in the interest of the affected population. This primer presents current knowledge and best practices in creating a collaborative, civil-military, information environment to support data collection, communications, collaboration, and information-sharing needs in disaster situations and complex emergencies. It consists of two parts. Part one defines and discusses the role of ICTs, the growing recognition of a need for improved collaboration, coordination, and information sharing, and the institutional and cultural characteristics of the various civilian and military participants in relief and reconstruction efforts. Part two draws real-world conclusions, provides best-practice recommendations, and offers practical checklists for maximizing use of communications and information management systems and processes."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Wentz, Larry K.

  2006-07
• Building the S&E workforce for 2040: Challenges Facing the Department of Defense

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  "Historically, the Nation has maintained within the Federal Government, and in quasi-government organizations, a highly competent cadre of scientists and engineers who would act as trusted advisors, and were of sufficient numbers and stature to adjudicate among the often conflicting advice and proposals from the larger community on emerging science and technology. Most of the internal government scientific and technical competence of DOD has resided in the military laboratories and the military research and development (R&D) centers. [...] This model worked well for many years and helped the United States to maintain an edge over adversaries by fielding technologically superior war-fighting systems. [...] However, the future viability of the model is in doubt. [...] A scientific and technical accountability gap has emerged. It appears that the government is not maintaining adequate/appropriate technical competence and/or is not making proper use of the competence that it has maintained. This paper examines some of the trends that have led to this situation. It focuses on the government component of the model. It is expected that many of the same considerations will apply to the quasigovernment component, also. [...] The government should remain properly sized and competent to exercise the stewardship with which it is entrusted. [...] To estimate future science and engineering (S&E) needs, this paper examines trends beginning in the late 1920s and continuing through the present time. [...] These trends have led to the emergence of a 'shadow workforce' in the private sector to compensate for the government workforce drawdown. The paper projects that the shadow workforce will soon dominate the government workforce, which raises questions about whether or not the government is in charge of its own program."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Coffey, Timothy, 1941-

  2008-07
• Policymaker's Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It

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  This paper addresses the threat of biological weapons. From the text: "This paper draws together several years of work in an attempt to suggest the outlines of this thinking about the risk that I regard as most pernicious: biological terrorism. It is written for those who desire a better understanding of this risk and its implications for policymakers. Section I delineates the problem that confronts us. It describes the character and magnitude of the risk of biological terrorism and identifies the factors that differentiate bioterrorism from other modes of terrorism. This section also comments on why biological terrorism has not yet emerged as an important instrument of terror and offers judgments about the likelihood of its manifestation over the next decade. Section II enumerates four factors that have confused, confounded, and constrained the U.S. response to this threat. Section III, the most operational part of this paper, offers my top 10 recommendations for moving ahead."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Danzig, Richard

  2009-12
• Nonlethal Capabilities: Realizing the Opportunities

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  "The use of lethal force has not always been appropriate to handle situations that the U.S. military has faced in the post-Cold War world. Nonlethal weapons offer a precision, accuracy, and effective duration that can help save military and civilian lives, break the cycle of violence by offering a more graduated response, and even prevent violence from occurring if the opportunity for early or preclusionary engagement arises. Fully exploiting nonlethal capabilities will require the refinement of existing technologies and the creation of new technologies. The effectiveness of the capabilities must be sufficiently reliable and predictable to give commanders confidence in their employment. Because nonlethal capabilities are a fairly new concept to domestic and international publics, military and civilian decisionmakers must be educated about them. As we step forward into the 21st century, we must look for new opportunities to leverage developing and emerging technologies that enable warfighting commanders to capitalize on the full spectrum of nonlethal capabilities. The value added will best be realized when we ensure that technology, operations, and policy are in balance, and the education of the American leadership, warfighters, and public is complete. These capabilities must become part of our daily lexicon."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  2009-03
• International Cyber Security Conference Final Report

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  The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) hosted the "Challenges in International Cyber Security" conference at the National Defense University (NDU) on April 29-30, 2009. Twelve key observations during the conference were: "There is, in essence, but one network in cyberspace and all stakeholders have to cooperate in securing that network for every user; Developing effective defenses requires improved mechanisms of indication and warning, increased situational awareness, and the employment of advanced technology; There is broad consensus that international dialogue on cyber governance, crime and security is imperative and overdue; The potential for warfare in the cyber domain will be determined by three factors - the development of laws, a deterrence construct, and operations; Cyber threats are by their very nature asymmetrical and credible deterrence requires at least the capability to respond in kind to cyber attacks; There are three general levels of 'bad' cyber activity - individual hackers, organized criminal activity, and nation state on nation state attacks; The first requirement when seeking to coalesce cyberspace governance is the recognition that spoken and written words form the foundation of our understanding of cyberspace and its governance; The U.S. and others have not fully established national governance over cyberspace matters; We have entered an age of global interdependency in terms of national security and financial stability; When assessing international prospects for future cyber security efforts, considerations of statute and law are essential first order tasks; The international community needs to federate monitoring efforts not just among governments but also across the public-private divide; Meshing commercial goals with national security goals will further incentivize close cooperation and security advances."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Barry, Chuck; Lee, Lauren; Rewers, Marek

  2009-06
• Towards a (Preliminary) Theory of Cyberpower

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  "In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, a request was made to have the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University (NDU) develop a theory of cyberpower. It was noted that there was a need to develop a holistic framework that would enable policy makers to address cyber issues in proper perspective. To satisfy that tasking, CTNSP convened five workshops, drawing on experts from government, industry, academia, and think tanks. Those workshops addressed a broad set of issues related to the evolution of cyberspace, cyberpower, cyberstrategy, and institutional factors that influence those factors (e.g., governance, legal issues). To develop the desired theory, this paper systematically addresses five key areas. First, the paper defines the key terms that are associated with cyberpower. Particular emphasis is placed on the terms cyberspace, cyberpower, and cyberstrategy. Second, the paper categorizes the elements, constituent parts, and factors that yield a framework for thinking about cyberpower. Third, the paper explains the major factors that are driving the evolution of cyberspace and cyberpower. To support that effort, the paper presents strawman principles that characterize major trends. Fourth, the paper connects the various elements of cyberstrategy so that a policy maker can place issues in proper context. Finally, the theory anticipates key changes in cyberspace that are likely to affect decision making. In view of the dramatic changes that are taking place in cyberspace, it is important to stress that this effort must be regarded as a preliminary effort. It is expected that the theory will continue to evolve as key technical, social, and informational trends begin to stabilize."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Starr, Stuart H.; Wentz, Larry K.; Kramer, Franklin D., 1945-

  2008-06
• Catastrophic Bioterrorism - What Is To Be Done?

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  Bioterrorism is one of the more muted terror concerns in the opinions of most Americans. Yet in most every possible way, bioterrorism could be the most ominous and damaging threats to national security. This paper discusses preparation demands of the increasing threat, analysis plans of bioterror cases, and ten capabilities that must improve in an effort to counter bioterrorism.

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Danzig, Richard

  2003-08
• From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and American National Security

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  "This paper examines how external challenges have prompted national investments in education to enhance American national security. Rather than focusing primarily on traditional professional military education, this analysis examines how education has been used as a tool of American power. Four major moments of transformation in the international system are surveyed to illustrate a link between strategic educational capacity, defined as the application of attained knowledge and skills, and national power. The study then assesses how education is used as a power asset in the contemporary security environment. Today, an important educational capacity is emerging in the new Minerva program in the Department of Defense and other transformational educational concepts with security applications. Education is gaining an increasing interest among American decision-makers as a strategic component of American power and an essential asset for successful military operations in the new global security environment."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Kay, Sean

  2009-01
• Senturion: A Predictive Political Simulation Model

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  "The expanding complexity of sub-national and cross-national threats to national security strains the analytical capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community, highlighting the need for methods and tools that can make this emergent complexity manageable. With an ever-increasing spectrum of threats, more objective analytic capabilities that draw on all-source intelligence and advances in computational methods are needed to help provide insight and aid in the understanding of individual and group behavior. This paper summarizes work utilizing the Senturion predictive analysis software at the National Defense University (NDU). The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at NDU has been testing the Senturion capability since 2002, and has begun to support the application of this new technology in DoD. Senturion is a simulation capability that analyzes the political dynamics within local, domestic, and international contexts and predicts how the policy positions of competing interests will evolve over time. The authors begin by describing the methodology underlying the software, and then provide an overview of three case studies that used the software: a predictive analysis of the stabilization and reconstruction phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the run-up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005, and the leadership transition in Palestine following the death of Yasser Arafat. Each of these projects tested the application of the software's modeling technology to unfolding events. Each analysis was performed and briefed to senior government decision makers well in advance of events; the forecasts from each project tracked well with reality, often providing counterintuitive results. The approach provides policy makers and analysts with a tool for anticipating the outcome of complex political events that can also provide a detailed explanation of why events may not unfold as expected with traditional means of analysis."

  National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy

  Baranick, Michael J.; Abdollahian, Mark; Efird, Brian . . .

  2006-04