Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "Michael, James B." in: author
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Proceedings of the Center for National Software Studies Workshop on Trustworthy Software
Achieving what is often termed "software trustworthiness" has been an elusive goal, in part because of the lack of a clear understanding of why we sometimes succeed but often fail to produce trustworthy software. In order to better understand the challenges the United States faces in achieving the goal of producing and acquiring trustworthy software systems and products, a workshop on the subject of trustworthy software was held April 8-9, 2004 in Monterey, California. The results of the workshop are documented in this report and intended to be used as input to a national research and development (R&D) agenda on software trustworthiness.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Michael, James B.; Linger, Richard C., 1941-; Voas, Jeffrey M.
2004-05-10
-
Phase II Report on Intelligent Software Decoys: Intelligent Software Decoy Tools for Cyber Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures
"One part of our research on the theory of deception (Rowe and Rothstein, 2004) looked at the classic deception methods of conventional warfare: concealment, camouflage, ruses, demonstrations, feints, false and planted information, lies, displays; and insight. Of the nine, concealment and camouflage of operations (as opposed to data) are difficult in cyberspace since so much of it is black and white: Either a file exists or not. Then domain name servers are quite willing to tell adversaries about what resources exist. Ruses are not helpful in cyberwarfare because identity theft is easy and lacks surprise. Demonstrations are hard to make convincing and likely counterproductive since shows of strength encourage attacks which cannot be defended. Feints are not helpful because it is so difficult to localize an enemy for a counterattack in cyberspace. False and planted information such as posting fake attack methods on hacker bulletin boards is certainly possible, but it may turn out to be easy to confirm most statements about cyberspace with sufficient time."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Michael, James B.; Rowe, Neil C.; Wingfield, Thomas C.
2004-04-28
-
Introduction to Legal Aspects of Operations in Cyberspace
"There are three legal paradigms through which to characterize computer intrusion. These paradigms overlap each other. In addition, an intrusion can fit into any two or all three of the paradigms. These are: law enforcement, intelligence collection, and military operations. The legal challenge in any computer intrusion is properly characterizing the intruders' categorical legal identity. This will determine whether one or more of the above paradigms are applicable. Each as has strengths, weaknesses, and limitations. Each also requires that an intrusion be dealt with according to its own precise standards."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Michael, James B.; Wingfield, Thomas C.
2004-04-28
-
Phase I Report on Intelligent Software Decoys: Technical Feasibility and Institutional Issues in the Context of Homeland Security
"The purpose of this project is to explore the technical feasibility and institutional issues associated with applying software-based deception techniques as part of Homeland defense. At present, we refer to the embodiment of software-based deception as intelligent software decoys, although this name may change in the next phase of our research.' The key idea that we are pursuing is that software-based deception can be used to harden software assets against attack. An important novel aspect of our research is that we introduce the concept of conducting counterintelligence and intelligently employing countermeasures in cyberspace via software-based deception. The owners of computing assets may have to deploy intelligent software decoys with such capabilities in order to counter attacks conducted by technology-savvy terrorists and criminals, in addition to information warriors from rogue2 or enemy nation-states; conventional countermeasures will likely be ineffective against the sophisticated arsenal of cyber weapons at the disposal of such attackers, and any countermeasure will be difficult to deploy without reliable counterintelligence, particularly if the users of countermeasures intend to avoid becoming cyber war criminals."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Michael, James B.; Rowe, Neil C.
2002-12-10
1
