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Japanese Nuclear Incident: Technical Aspects [April 5, 2011]
From the Document: "The Japanese earthquake and tsunami of March 2011 caused extensive damage to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). This damage has released some radioactive materials, and there are widespread fears about the health effects of current and possible future releases. These fears, and public concern about radiation in general, have attracted the world's attention. This report presents scientific and technical aspects of these issues in order to provide a basis for understanding the risks associated with this event. [...] While some radioactive material from the Japanese incident may reach the United States, it appears most unlikely that this material will result in harmful levels of radiation. In traveling thousands of miles between the two countries, some radioactive material will decay, rain will wash some out of the air, and its concentration will diminish as it disperses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2011-04-05
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'Dirty Bombs': Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress [June 24, 2011]
"Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven 'dirty bombs' are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress. Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health. […] To address these and related problems, this report provides background on RDDs and issues they raise; it does not track policy actions concerning RDDs in detail. It attempts to help understanding of these weapons in order to aid Congress in its oversight and funding of programs to counter them"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2011-06-24
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'Dirty Bombs': Background in Brief [June 24, 2011]
"Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven 'dirty bombs' are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress. Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health. Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use these weapons in an attempt to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. […] Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2011-06-24
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Japanese Nuclear Incident: Technical Aspects [March 29, 2011]
From the Document: "Japan's nuclear incident has engendered much public and congressional concern about the possible impact of radiation on the Japanese public, as well as possible fallout on U.S. citizens. This report provides information on technical aspects of the nuclear incident, with reference to human health. While some radioactive material from the Japanese incident may reach the United States, it appears most unlikely that this material will result in harmful levels of radiation. In traveling thousands of miles between the two countries, some radioactive material will decay, rain will wash some of it out of the air, and its concentration will diminish as it disperses. Many atoms are stable; they remain in their current form indefinitely. Other atoms are unstable, or radioactive. They 'decay' or 'disintegrate,' emitting energy through various forms of radiation. Each form has its own characteristics and potential for human health effects. Nuclear reactors use uranium or mixed oxides (uranium oxide and plutonium oxide, or MOX) for fuel. Uranium and plutonium atoms fission, or split, releasing neutrons that cause additional fissions in a chain reaction, and also releasing energy. A nuclear reactor's core consists of fuel rods made of uranium or MOX encased in zirconium, and neutron-absorbing control rods that are removed or inserted to start or stop the chain reaction. This assembly is placed underwater to carry off excess heat. The incident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant prevented water from circulating in the core of several reactors, causing water to evaporate and temperature to rise. High heat could melt the fuel rods and lead to a release of radioactive material into the air."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2011-03-29
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [November 16, 2010]
"A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit but do not ban such tests. In 1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, 'My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.' However, the Administration has focused its efforts in 2010 on securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). There have been no hearings on CTBT in the 111th Congress, and it appears unlikely to be brought up in the lame duck session. As of November 2010, 182 states had signed the CTBT and 153, including Russia, had ratified it. However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 35 had ratified. Five conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently in 2009. [...] Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. It considers the Stockpile Stewardship Program (listed as Weapons Activities), which seeks to maintain nuclear weapons without testing; the FY2010 appropriation is $6.384 billion, and the FY2011 request is $7.009 billion. Congress considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests. The FY2010 appropriation was $30.0 million; the FY2011 request is $43 million. This report will be updated occasionally. This version makes numerous updates throughout."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2010-11-16
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North Korea's 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications [November 24, 2010]
"On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second underground nuclear test. Unlike its first test, in 2006, there is no public record that the second one released radioactive materials indicative of a nuclear explosion. How could North Korea have contained these materials from the May 2009 event and what are the implications? As background, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. Entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, including the United States and North Korea. As of November 2010, 153 states, including 35 of the 44, had ratified. North Korea has not signed the CTBT. President Clinton signed it in 1996; in 1999, the Senate voted not to consent to its ratification. In 2009, President Obama pledged to press for its ratification. [...] Containment could be of value to North Korea. It could keep radioactive fallout from China, Japan, Russia, or South Korea, averting an irritant in relations with them. It could prevent intelligence services from gathering material that could reveal information about the weapon that was tested. It could permit North Korea to host nuclear tests by other nations, such as Iran; while such tests would be detected by seismic means, they could not be attributed to another nation using technical forensic means if effluents, especially particles, were contained. An issue for Congress is how containment could affect CTBT prospects. Supporters might argue that explosion-like seismic signals without detected radioactive material would lead to calls for an onsite inspection. Opponents might claim that only detection of radioactive material proves that a nuclear explosion occurred. Both would note inspections could not be required unless the treaty entered into force, supporters to point to a benefit of the treaty and opponents to note that North Korea could block inspections by not ratifying the treaty. Congress may wish to consider ways to improve monitoring capability, such as supporting further research on test signatures, improving monitoring system capability, and deploying more monitoring equipment. This update reflects developments in the North Korean uranium program and prospects for another nuclear test."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2010-11-24
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [December 7, 2010]
"A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit but do not ban such tests. In 1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, 'My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.' However, the Administration has focused its efforts in 2010 on securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). There have been no hearings on CTBT in the 111th Congress, and it appears unlikely to be brought up in the lame duck session. As of December 2010, 182 states had signed the CTBT and 153, including Russia, had ratified it. However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 35 had ratified. Five conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently in 2009. Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945. The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. (Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2010-12-07
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Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations [June 4, 2010]
"Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM, plutonium, and certain types of uranium) is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and to securing weapons and materials worldwide. Congress has funded a portfolio of detection R&D [Research and Development] and acquisition programs, and has mandated inspection at foreign ports of all U.S.-bound cargo containers using two types of detection equipment. Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces suspect signatures that can be detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons. SNM is dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph (a picture like a medical x-ray) when x-rays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden. Using lead or other shielding to attenuate gamma rays would make that image larger. Nuclear weapons produce detectable signatures, such as radiation or a noticeable image on a radiograph. Other detection techniques are also available. [...] This analysis leads to several observations for Congress. It is difficult to predict the schedule or capabilities of new detection technologies. It is easier and less costly to accelerate a program in R&D than in production. 'Concept of operations' is crucial to detection system effectiveness. Congress may wish to address gaps and synergisms in the technology portfolio. Congress need not depend solely on procedures developed by executive agencies to test detection technologies, but may specify tests an agency is to conduct. Ongoing improvement in detection capabilities produces uncertainties for terrorists that will increase over time, adding deterrence beyond that of the capabilities themselves."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2010-06-04
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North Korea's 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications [April 2, 2010]
"On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second underground nuclear test. Unlike its first test, in 2006, there is no public record that the second one released radioactive materials indicative of a nuclear explosion. How could North Korea have contained these materials from the May 2009 event and what are the implications? As background, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. [...] The treaty establishes a verification mechanism, including an International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear tests. Three IMS technologies detect waves that pass through the oceans (hydroacoustic), Earth (seismic), or atmosphere (infrasound); a fourth detects radioactive material from a nuclear test. Scientists concur that only the latter proves that an explosion was nuclear. Some believe that deep burial and other means can contain radioactive effluents. Another view is that containment is an art as much as a science. [...] An issue for Congress is how containment could affect CTBT prospects. Supporters might argue that explosion-like seismic signals without detected radioactive material would lead to calls for an onsite inspection. Opponents might claim that only detection of radioactive material proves that a nuclear explosion occurred. Both would note that inspections could not be required unless the treaty entered into force, supporters to point to a benefit of the treaty and opponents to note that North Korea could block inspections by not ratifying the treaty. Congress may also wish to consider options to improve monitoring capability, such as supporting further research on test signatures, improving the capability of monitoring systems, and deploying more monitoring equipment. This report may be updated, especially if North Korea conducts another test."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2010-04-02
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CRS Issue Statement on Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Posture and Programs and Arms Control [January 6, 2010]
This issue statement discusses counter-proliferation/nonproliferation in the United States. From the text: "President Obama outlined his Administration's priorities and goals for U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control policy in a speech in Prague, in April 2009. The President stated that 'the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War' and that America was committed to seeking 'the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.' He recognized that this goal would not be reached quickly, but he pledged that the United States would 'reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.' At the same time, he indicated that 'as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Medalia, Jonathan E.; Mangan, George
2010-01-06
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated 'Safeguards' and Net Assessments [June 3, 2009]
"In 1996, [the United States] signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. The Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999. [...] [One] aspect to past debates was 'Safeguards,' measures that this nation can take unilaterally within the treaty to protect its nuclear security. To compensate for 'disadvantages and risk' they saw in the treaty regime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their support for the 1963 treaty on four Safeguards: an aggressive nuclear test program, maintaining nuclear weapon laboratories, maintaining the ability to resume atmospheric tests promptly, and improving intelligence and nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities. Safeguards were key to securing Senate ratification of the 1963 treaty. Updated Safeguards have been part of subsequent treaty ratification efforts. In April 2009, President Obama pledged to pursue U.S. CTBT ratification 'immediately and aggressively.' [...] Safeguards could affect Senators' net assessment of the treaty [and] are amenable to legislative bargaining and compromise. As such, they may play a key role in a CTBT debate. To that end, Safeguards could be updated, such as by adding Safeguards for the nuclear weapon production plants and strategic forces, and could be augmented with implementation measures. While Safeguards may be part of a future CTBT debate, both supporters and opponents of the treaty could criticize them." This report examines potential arguments.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2009-06-03
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Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations [August 4, 2009]
"Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM, certain types of uranium and plutonium) is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and to securing weapons and materials worldwide. Congress has funded a portfolio of detection R&D and acquisition programs, and has mandated inspection at foreign ports of all U.S.-bound cargo containers using two types of detection equipment. Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces unique or suspect signatures that can be detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons. SNM is very dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph (a picture like a medical x-ray) when x-rays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden. Using lead or other shielding to attenuate gamma rays would make this image larger. Nuclear weapons produce detectable signatures, such as radiation generated by or a noticeable image on a radiograph. Other detection techniques are also available.[…]. This analysis leads to several observations for Congress. Some detection technology is advancing faster than many have expected. It is easier and less costly to accelerate a program in R&D than in production. 'Concept of operations' is crucial to detection system effectiveness. Congress may wish to address gaps and synergisms in the technology portfolio. Congress need not depend solely on procedures developed by executive agencies to test detection technologies, but may specify tests an agency is to conduct. Ongoing improvement in detection capabilities produces uncertainties for terrorists that will increase over time, adding deterrence beyond that of the capabilities themselves. This report will be updated occasionally."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2009-08-04
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Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations [January 25, 2010]
"Seven nations--China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States--possess nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006 and announced that it had conducted another such test in 2009, and Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant. In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. China's nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People's Liberation Army. France's nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry, under the supervision of other ministries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2010-01-25
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Nuclear Weapons: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program [May 24, 2005]
"Most current U.S. nuclear warheads were built in the 1980s, and are being retained longer than was planned. Yet warheads deteriorate with age, and must be maintained. The current approach monitors them for signs of aging. When problems are found, a Life Extension Program (LEP) rebuilds components. While some can be made to new specifications, a nuclear test moratorium bars that approach for critical components that would require a nuclear test. Instead, LEP rebuilds them as closely as possible to original specifications. Using this approach, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified stockpile safety and reliability for the past nine years without nuclear testing."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-05-24
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Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009 [Updated March 23, 2005]
"Earth penetrator weapons, often called 'bunker busters,' burrow into the ground some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities may be located, so the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). Some Members questioned whether there was a military need for it and stated that developing it would impair U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Others supported it; the House Armed Services Committee 'strongly reaffirm[ed]' its importance. The FY2005 defense authorization act contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. On May 20, the House rejected, 204-214, an amendment by Representative Tauscher to transfer funds from RNEP and the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI), another nuclear program, to Air Force conventional munitions. On June 15, the Senate rejected 42-55, an amendment by Senators Kennedy and Feinstein to delete funds for RNEP and ACI. P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, contained no funds for RNEP, and transferred the $9.0 million requested for ACI to a new Reliable Replacement Warhead program."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-03-23
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Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations [November 6, 2008]
This CRS Report for Congress "discusses the science of detecting nuclear weapons and materials, describes nine advanced U.S. technologies selected to illustrate the range of projects in the pipeline, and offers observations for Congress. The report does not compare technologies. The inclusion of the nine technologies should not be taken to mean that CRS judges them to be better than the hundreds of others not considered here. The report does not discuss the controversial Advanced Spectroscopic Portal because a detailed discussion of it could draw attention from the other technologies considered here. The scope of this report excludes the organization of the government for dealing with nuclear detection, the role of intelligence and law enforcement in detecting terrorist nuclear weapons, detection of radiological dispersal devices (such as 'dirty bombs'), the role of nuclear forensics in attributing an attack to its perpetrator, response to a nuclear attack, and the architecture of a national nuclear detection system. Nor does it discuss possible means by which terrorists might acquire a bomb, or whether they could make a bomb on their own. Much has been written on these topics. While many who are concerned with nuclear detection focus on thwarting nuclear terrorism, this report focuses on technology per se. It avoids extensive discussion of means to counter detection to avoid classified information."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2008-11-06
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [January 28, 2009]
"A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties currently bar all but underground tests with a maximum force equal to 150,000 tons of TNT. The Natural Resources Defense Council states the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006. [...]. The Obama Administration plans to seek Senate approval of the CTBT, followed by a diplomatic effort to secure ratification by the remaining states that must ratify for the treaty to enter into force. Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. It considers the Stockpile Stewardship Program (listed as Weapons Activities), which seeks to maintain nuclear weapons without testing; the FY2008 appropriation is $6.356 billion, and the FY2009 request is $6.618 billion.[...]. U.S. voting rights in the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission were suspended on January 1, 2009, for not paying enough dues. This report will be updated. For a detailed presentation of pros and cons, see CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan Medalia."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2009-01-28
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Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons [Updated January 27, 2003]
"The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review considered nuclear earth penetrator
weapons (EPWs), which would burrow tens of feet into the ground before detonating to improve their ability to destroy buried facilities. The FY2003 Department of Energy (DOE) budget request included $15 million to begin a study on a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The request led to congressional and public debate because EPWs involve such policy issues as circumstances under which the United States would use nuclear weapons, military value of EPWs, and nonproliferation. This report provides background, pros, and cons. It will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2003-01-27
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Terrorist 'Dirty Bombs': A Brief Primer [Updated April 1, 2004]
"Many fear a terrorist attack with a radiological dispersal device (RDD). RDDs may scatter radioactive material with an explosive (a 'dirty bomb') or other means. Radioactive atoms are unstable; as they decay, they emit electromagnetic radiation or subatomic particles that can damage cells. Many legitimate activities worldwide use such material. Dealing with RDDs involves controlling sources, detecting radiation, and preparing for and responding to an attack. This report discusses technical aspects of RDDs, including radiation, biological effects, sources of radioactive material, and effectiveness of such weapons. The report also addresses prevention and response, with regard to securing radioactive sources, detecting RDDs, and minimizing the effects of an RDD attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2004-04-01
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Nuclear Warhead 'Pit' Production: Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 29, 2004]
"A 'pit' is the fissile core of a nuclear warhead. In modern warheads, it creates a nuclear explosion that triggers a substantially larger thermonuclear explosion. All pits currently in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were made at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, CO, which opened in 1952. The Department of Energy (DOE) halted pit manufacturing operations there in 1989; the United States has been unable to make stockpile-quality pits- and therefore complete nuclear warheads- since then. This report is intended for those interested in the U.S. nuclear weapons program. It will track the pit budget request and program, and will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2004-03-29
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Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments [Updated July 27, 2009]
"Most current U.S. nuclear warheads were built in the 1970s and 1980s and are being retained longer than was planned. Yet they deteriorate and must be maintained. To correct problems, a Life Extension Program (LEP), part of a larger Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), replaces components. Modifying some components would require a nuclear test, but the United States has observed a test moratorium since 1992. Congress and the Administration prefer to avoid a return to testing, so LEP rebuilds these components as closely as possible to original specifications. With this approach, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified stockpile safety and reliability for the past 12 years without nuclear testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Department of Energy (DOE) component that operates the U.S. nuclear weapons program, would develop the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). [...] NNSA argues it will become harder to certify current warheads with LEP because small changes may undermine confidence in warheads, perhaps leading to nuclear testing, whereas new-design replacement warheads created by the RRW program will be easier to certify without testing. Critics believe LEP and SSP can maintain the stockpile indefinitely. They worry that untested RRWs may make testing more likely and question cost savings, given high investment cost. They note that there are no military requirements for new weapons. Others feel that neither LEP nor RRW can provide high confidence over the long term, and would resume testing. Another point of view is that either LEP or RRW will work without nuclear testing. This report provides background and tracks legislation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2009-07-27
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Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments [Updated July 23, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report is an update to a report of the same name that discusses the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program (RRW). "Most Recent Developments: In its May 7, 2008, mark of its portion of the FY2009 defense authorization bill, the House Armed Services Committee's Strategic Forces Subcommittee recommended eliminating the $10 million that the Department of Energy (DOE) requested for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and the $23 million that the Navy had requested for work related to this program. In its mark of the FY2009 defense authorization bill, released May 1, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended providing DOE's $10 million request but eliminating the Navy's $23 million request. In its FY2009 budget request, submitted to Congress February 4, DOE requested $10 million for RRW. Separately, the Navy requested $23 million for RRW-related work. In the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110- 161, signed into law December 26, 2007, Congress eliminated funds to develop RRW. Further, NNSA argues it will become harder to certify current warheads with LEP because small changes may undermine confidence in warheads, perhaps leading to nuclear testing, whereas new-design replacement warheads created by the RRW program will be easier to certify without testing. Critics believe LEP and SSP can maintain the stockpile indefinitely. They worry that untested RRWs may make testing more likely and question cost savings, given high investment cost. They note that there are no military requirements for new weapons. Others feel that neither LEP nor RRW can provide high confidence over the long term, and would resume testing. Another point of view is that either LEP or RRW will work without nuclear testing. Issues facing the 110th Congress include how best to maintain the nuclear stockpile, whether to continue RRW or cancel it in favor of LEP, and how RRW might link to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and nuclear nonproliferation. This report provides background and tracks legislation. It will be updated often. CRS Report RL33748, Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program, compares these two programs in detail."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2008-07-23
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments [Updated July 9, 2008]
"The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CTBT in 1996. As of July 9, 2008, 178 states had signed it; 144, including Russia, had ratified; and of the 44 that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, 41 had signed and 35 had ratified. Five conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently in 2007. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate. In October 1999, the Senate rejected it, 48 for, 51 against, 1 present. It is on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's calendar. It would require a two-thirds Senate vote to send the treaty back to the President for disposal or to give advice and consent for ratification. The Bush Administration opposes the CTBT, adheres to the test moratorium, has not ruled out resumed testing, and has no plans to test. It has reduced the time needed to conduct a nuclear test. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. Congress considers the Stockpile Stewardship Program (listed as Weapons Activities), which seeks to maintain nuclear weapons without testing. The FY2008 appropriation for it is $6.356 billion; the FY2009 request is $6.618 billion. Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor events that might violate the CTBT. The FY2008 appropriation was $23.8 million; the FY2009 request is $9.9 million. U.S. voting rights in the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission were suspended on January 1, 2008 for not paying enough dues. The United States paid $23.8 million on February 25, restoring its voting rights."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2008-07-09
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'Bunker Busters': Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006 [Updated June 23, 2005]
"Earth penetrator weapons, often called 'bunker busters,' burrow into the ground some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities may be located, so the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in 2003 that RNEP was a study, NNSA's FY2005 budget document showed a five-year total of $484.7 million if RNEP were to proceed beyond the study phase. NNSA stated that no decision had been made to proceed with RNEP and that out-year figures were shown to meet congressionally-mandated budgeting requirements and were not a request. RNEP requests are, of course, subject to congressional approval, rejection, or modification. The five-year figure sparked congressional debate. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. The House rejected an amendment by Representative Tauscher to transfer funds from RNEP and the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI), another nuclear program, to Air Force conventional munitions, and the Senate rejected an amendment by Senators Kennedy and Feinstein to delete funds for RNEP and ACI. P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, transferred the $9.0 million requested for ACI to a different program and contained no funds for RNEP. As a result, NNSA cannot work on RNEP in FY2005."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-06-23
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Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban: Chronology Starting September 1992 [Updated June 9, 2005]
"The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 'bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.' It was opened for signature in September 1996. In September 1997, President Clinton submitted it to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. The Bush Administration has not requested Senate consideration of the treaty. This report details actions on nuclear testing and the treaty starting with the most recent U.S. test in September 1992. It complements CRS Issue Brief IB92099, 'Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Testing,' which discusses earlier history, issues, and current developments, and CRS Report RS20351, 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con,' which presents arguments for and against the treaty. This report will be updated; see the issue brief for interim updates."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-06-09
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con [Updated June 28, 2005]
"The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions.
President Clinton signed it in 1996 and transmitted it to the Senate in 1997. The Senate rejected it in 1999. To enter into force, 44 named nations, including the United States, must ratify the treaty. The Bush Administration opposes ratification but has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing begun in 1992. This report presents pros and cons of key arguments: the treaty's implications for nuclear nonproliferation, for maintaining and developing nuclear weapons, for the value of nuclear weapons, and for maintaining U.S. nuclear advantage; monitoring issues; and potential consequences of resuming testing. This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Issue Brief IB92099, 'Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,' and CRS Report 97-1007 F, 'Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban: Chronology Starting September 1992."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-08-28
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Nuclear Weapons: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program [Updated July 20, 2005]
"With the end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapons complex, like the rest of the defense establishment, faced turmoil. Budgets and personnel were reduced, design of new weapons ended, and a test moratorium began. For a time, the chief concern of DOE's nuclear weapons management was survival of the nuclear weapons complex. To address this concern and set a course for the nuclear weapons enterprise, Congress, in the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160), Section 3138, directed the Secretary of Energy 'to establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification.' Since then, the Clinton and Bush Administrations have requested, and Congress has approved, tens of billions of dollars for this Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which is presented in NNSA's budget as 'Weapons Activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-07-20
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'Bunker Busters': Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006 [Updated July 6, 2005]
"Earth penetrator weapons, often called bunker busters, burrow into the ground
some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities may be located, so the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-07-06
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Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses [Updated February 10, 2005]
"It would be difficult for terrorists to mount a nuclear attack on a U.S. city, but such an attack is plausible and would have catastrophic consequences, in one scenario killing over a half-million people and causing damage of over $1 trillion. Terrorists or rogue states might acquire a nuclear weapon in several ways. The nations of greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan. Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, which tend to be lower in yield but more dispersed and apparently less secure than strategic weapons. It also has much highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security. Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium. The fear regarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon. Terrorists might also obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2005-02-10
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'Bunker Busters': Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005-FY2007 [Updated February 21, 2006]
"Earth penetrator weapons, often called 'bunker busters,' burrow into the ground some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities may be located, so the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in 2003 that RNEP was a study, NNSAs FY2005 budget document showed a five-year total of $484.7 million if RNEP were to proceed beyond the study phase. NNSA said no decision had been made to proceed, and out-year figures were shown to meet congressionally-mandated budgeting requirements and were not a request. RNEP requests are, of course, subject to congressional approval, rejection, or modification. The five-year figure sparked congressional debate. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. The House rejected an amendment by Representative Tauscher to transfer funds from RNEP and the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI), another nuclear program, to Air Force conventional munitions, and the Senate rejected an amendment by Senators Kennedy and Feinstein to delete funds for RNEP and ACI. P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, transferred the $9.0 million requested for ACI to a different program and contained no funds for RNEP. As a result, NNSA could not work on RNEP in FY2005."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Medalia, Jonathan E.
2006-02-21
