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International Trade: Rules of Origin [January 11, 2011]"Determining the country of origin of a product is important for properly assessing tariffs, enforcing trade remedies (such as antidumping and countervailing duties) or quantitative restrictions (tariff quotas), and statistical purposes. Other commercial trade policies are also linked with origin determinations, such as country of origin labeling and government procurement regulations. Rules of origin (ROO) can be very simple, noncontroversial tools of international trade as long as all of the parts of a product are manufactured and assembled primarily in one country. However, when a finished product's component parts originate in many countries--as is often the case in today's global trading environment--determining origin can be a very complex, sometimes subjective, and time-consuming process. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for determining country of origin using various ROO schemes. Non-preferential rules of origin are used to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Preferential rules are used to determine the eligibility of imported goods from certain U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners and certain developing country beneficiaries to receive duty-free or reduced tariff benefits under bilateral or regional FTAs and trade preference programs. Preferential rules of origin are generally specific to each FTA, or preference, meaning that they vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceJones, Vivian Catherine; Martin, Michael F.2011-01-11
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma [January 11, 2011]"Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and Presidential Executive Orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an examination of additional sanctions that have been considered, but not enacted, by Congress, or that could be imposed under existing law or executive orders. The report concludes with a discussion of options for Congress. The current U.S. sanctions on Burma are the result of a general, but uneven decline in U.S. relations with Burma and its military, the Tatmadaw, since World War II. For the most part, the decline is due to what the U.S. government sees as a general disregard by the Burmese military for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. In general, Congress has passed Burma-specific sanctions following instances of serious violation of human rights in Burma. These began following the Tatmadaw's violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions subject to differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements. The United States currently imposes sanctions specifically on Burma via five laws and four presidential Executive Orders (E.O.s). These sanctions can be generally divided into several broad categories, such as visa bans, restrictions on financial services, prohibitions of Burmese imported goods, a ban on new investments in Burma, and constraints on U.S. assistance to Burma."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2011-01-11
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Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress [October 6, 2010]From the Document: "Burma is to hold its first parliamentary elections in 20 years on November 7, 2010. The polls raise questions about U.S. policy towards the Burmese regime, coming in the context of two decades of largely isolationist U.S. policy towards Burma. Some argue that these elections, even if far from free and fair, offer a limited opportunity for political change, even if evolutionary. Others believe that the ruling junta's restrictions on electoral activity thus far demonstrate that it has little interest in democracy or in loosening its repressive policies. These considerations weigh deeply in policy debates over sanctions and engagement with the regime--debates in which Congress has had a strong voice over the past two decades. [...] The Obama Administration reportedly is considering the imposition of additional sanctions on Burma, in part because of the manner in which the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council] is conducting the election. The Administration is also backing calls for the creation of a U.N. Commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. Ten other nations have also backed the creation of the U.N. Commission. Under current federal law, President Obama has the authority to impose certain types of financial sanctions without seeking approval from Congress. However, he must inform Congress if and when he imposes new sanctions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2010-10-06
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U.S.-Vietnam Economic and Trade Relations: Issues for the 111th Congress [May 3, 2010]"After more than two decades of virtually no economic contact, the United States and Vietnam reestablished trade relations during the 1990s. Since then, Vietnam has rapidly risen to become a significant trading partner for the United States. Bilateral trade has risen from about $220 million in 1994 to $15.4 billion in 2009. Vietnam is the second-largest source of U.S. clothing imports, and a major source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery. Much of this rapid growth in bilateral trade can be attributed to U.S. extension of normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam. Another major contributing factor is over 20 years of rapid economic growth in Vietnam, ushered in by a 1986 shift to a more market-oriented economic system. [...] The growth in bilateral trade has not been without its accompanying issues and problems. Vietnam has applied for acceptance into the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program and is participating in negotiations of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. Both the Bush and the Obama Administrations have shown some hesitance in accepting Vietnam as a GSP beneficiary country and in concluding a BIT with Vietnam. Vietnam would like to have the United States officially recognize it as a market economy. [...] The 111th Congress may play an important role in one or more of these issues, as have past Congresses. The GSP program is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010, and if Congress should take up GSP renewal, it may also consider Vietnam's pending application. The 111th Congress may also weigh in on clothing and fish imports from Vietnam, or its designation as a market or non-market economy. Finally, if current growth trends continue, Congress may be asked to act on the rising amount of footwear, furniture, and/or electrical machinery being imported from Vietnam. This report will be updated as circumstances require."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2010-05-03
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Burma's 2010 Elections: Implications of the New Constitution and Election Laws [May 10, 2010]"On an undisclosed date in 2010, Burma plans to hold its first parliamentary elections in 20 years. The elections are to be held under a new constitution, supposedly approved in a national referendum held in 2008 in the immediate aftermath of the widespread destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis. The official results of the constitutional referendum are widely seen as fraudulent, but despite significant domestic and international opposition, Burma's ruling military junta--the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)--has insisted on conducting the polls as part of what it calls a path to 'disciplined democracy.' [...] There are signs of concern among Members of Congress about the dearth of progress in Burma towards democracy and greater respect for human rights. Nine Senators sent a letter to President Obama on March 26, 2010, urging the imposition of additional economic sanctions on the SPDC in light of 'a set of profoundly troubling election laws.' However, another Senator perceives 'several substantive gestures' on the part of the SPDC, and suggests it is time to increase engagement with the Burmese government. The 111th Congress has already taken action with respect to Burma, such as renewing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. If it were to determine that additional actions should be taken, there are several alternatives available. Among those alternatives are holding hearings or seminars on the political situation in Burma, pushing the Obama Administration to implement existing sanctions on Burma more vigorously, and adding or removing existing sanctions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2010-05-10
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International Trade: Rules of Origin [May 14, 2010]"U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for determining country of origin using various ROO schemes. Non-preferential rules of origin are used to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Preferential rules are used to determine the eligibility of imported goods from certain U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners and certain developing country beneficiaries to receive duty-free or reduced tariff benefits under bilateral or regional FTAs and trade preference programs. Preferential rules of origin are generally specific to each FTA, or preference, meaning that they vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference. CBP has periodically proposed implementing a more uniform system of ROO as an alternative to the 'substantial transformation' rule that is currently in place. On July 25, 2008, CBP's latest proposal suggested that a system known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules system 'has proven to be more objective and transparent and provide greater predictability in determining the country of origin of imported merchandise than the system of case-by-case adjudication they would replace.' [...] This report deals with ROO in three parts. First, we describe in more detail the reasons that country of origin rules are important and briefly describe U.S. laws and methods that provide direction in making these determinations. Second, we discuss briefly some of the more controversial issues involving rules of origin, including the apparently subjective nature of some CBP origin determinations, and the effects of the global manufacturing process on ROO. Third, we conclude with some alternatives and options that Congress could consider that might assist in simplifying the process."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceJones, Vivian Catherine; Martin, Michael F.2010-05-14
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Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange and U.S.-Vietnam Relations [May 28, 2009]"This report examines various estimates of the effects of Agent Orange on Vietnam's people and environment, the history of U.S. policy on the issue, the current clean up efforts in Vietnam, the various forms of assistance--including U.S. assistance--provided to people with medical conditions associated with dioxin exposure, and the implications for bilateral relations. It concludes with a brief discussion of possible congressional responses to the issue."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2009-05-28
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Pakistan's Capital Crisis: Implications for U.S. Policy [November 7, 2008]This CRS report assesses how Pakistan's capital crisis directly affects U.S. security interests. "Pakistan -- a key U.S. ally in global efforts to combat Islamist militancy -- is in urgent need of an estimated $4 billion in capital to avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt. The elected government of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani is seeking short-term financial assistance from a number of sources, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China, and an informal group of nations (including the United States) known as the 'Friends of Pakistan.' The Pakistani government reportedly has reservations about conditions on the assistance, expressing concerns that the conditions may create political and economic problems. The current crisis has placed some strain on U.S.-Pakistan relations. […] A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghanistan's stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development in the region. Progress in this latter area has been severely threatened in 2008 by a sharp decline in Pakistan's economic stability, culminating in an immediate need for capital assistance. U.S. officials and independent analysts are increasingly concerned that a failing Pakistani economy could undermine multilateral efforts to stabilize South Asia and curtail the incidence of Islamist radicalism."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.; Kronstadt, K. Alan2008-11-07
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International Trade: Rules of Origin [Updated August 22, 2008]This Congressional Research Service report analyzes proposed Customs and Border Protection changes to the rules of origin in order to make them more uniform. This, and other aspects of the impact of rules of origin are discussed. From the text: "Determining the country of origin of a product is important for properly assessing tariffs, enforcing trade remedies (such as antidumping and countervailing duties) or quantitative restrictions (tariff quotas), and statistical purposes. Other commercial trade policies are also linked with origin determinations, such as country of origin labeling and government procurement regulations. Rules of origin (ROO) can be very simple, noncontroversial tools of international trade as long as all of the parts of a product are manufactured and assembled primarily in one country. However, when a finished product's component parts originate in many countries -- as is often the case in today's global trading environment -- determining origin can be a very complex, sometimes subjective, and time-consuming process. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for determining country of origin using various ROO schemes. Non-preferential rules of origin are used to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Preferential rules are used to determine the eligibility of imported goods from certain U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners and certain developing country beneficiaries to receive duty-free or reduced tariff benefits under bilateral or regional FTAs and trade preference programs. Preferential rules of origin are generally specific to each FTA, or preference, meaning that they vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceJones, Vivian Catherine; Martin, Michael F.2008-08-22
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma [July 16, 2010]"This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an examination of additional sanctions that have been considered, but not enacted, by Congress, or that could be imposed under existing law or executive orders. The report concludes with a discussion of options for Congress. The current U.S. sanctions on Burma are the result of a general, but uneven decline in U.S. relations with Burma and its military, the Tatmadaw, since World War II. For the most part, the decline is due to what the U.S. government sees as a general disregard by the Burmese military for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. In general, Congress has passed Burma-specific sanctions following instances of serious violation of human rights in Burma. These began following the Tatmadaw's violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions subject to differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements. The United States currently imposes sanctions specifically on Burma via five laws and four presidential Executive Orders (E.O.s). These sanctions can be generally divided into several broad categories, such as visa bans, restrictions on financial services, prohibitions of Burmese imported goods, a ban on new investments in Burma, and constraints on U.S. assistance to Burma."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2010-07-16
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Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange and U.S.-Vietnam Relations [July 25, 2011]"Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, there has been a gradual warming of bilateral relations between the United States and Vietnam, culminating in the appointment of the first U.S. ambassador to Vietnam in 1996 and the granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to Vietnam in 2007. Over the last three decades, many--but not all--of the major issues causing tension between the two nations have been resolved. One major legacy of the Vietnam War that remains unresolved is the damage that Agent Orange, and its accompanying dioxin, have done to the people and the environment of Vietnam. For the last 35 years, this issue has generally been pushed to the background of bilateral discussions by other issues considered more important by the United States and/or Vietnam. With most of those issues presently resolved, the issue of Agent Orange/dioxin has emerged as a regular topic in bilateral discussions. […] Since 2007, Congress has appropriated $43.4 million for dioxin removal and related health care activities in Da Nang. However, the Vietnamese government and people would like to see the United States do more to provide help for victims of Agent Orange. This report examines various estimates of the effects of Agent Orange on Vietnam's people and environment, the history of U.S. policy on the issue, the current cleanup efforts in Vietnam, the various forms of assistance--including U.S. assistance--provided to people with medical conditions associated with dioxin exposure, and the implications for bilateral relations. It concludes with a brief discussion of possible congressional responses to the issue. This report will be updated as conditions warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2011-07-25
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How Large is China's Economy? Does it Matter? [February 13, 2008]"China's rapid economic growth since 1979 has transformed it into a major economic power. Over the past few years, many analysts have contended that China could soon overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy, based on estimates of China's economy on a 'purchasing power parity' (PPP) basis, which attempts to factor in price differences across countries when estimating the size of a foreign economy in U.S. dollars. However, in December 2007, the World Bank issued a study that lowered its previous 2005 PPP estimate of the size of China's economy by 40%. If these new estimates are accurate, it will likely be many years before China's economy reaches U.S. levels. The new PPP data could also have an impact on U.S. and international perceptions over other aspects of China's economy, including its living standards, poverty levels, and government expenditures, such as on the military. This report will not be updated."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMorrison, Wayne M.; Martin, Michael F.2008-02-13
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma [May 21, 2012]"Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an examination of additional sanctions that have been considered, but not enacted, by Congress, or that could be imposed under existing law or executive orders. It also discusses waiver provisions under which they could be removed. The report concludes with a discussion of options for Congress. The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. The actions of the new quasi-civilian government in Burma have initiated a discussion on when and how to possibly remove some of the existing sanctions. Since Secretary Hillary Clinton's visit in December 2011, the Obama Administration has announced the partial relaxing of some of the existing sanctions in an effort to promote further reforms in Burma and to support pro-reform officials in the Burmese government. The easing of U.S. sanctions has been generally timed to correspond with a significant political development in Burma."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-05-21
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Burma's Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions [April 24, 2012]From the Document: "The installation of the Union Government in 2011 and the undertaking of initial reforms have raised the prospects for the resumption of a democratically elected civilian government in Burma after five decades of military rule. The release of Burma's political prisoners has a central role in U.S. policy and Burma's political future. Many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma were implemented after Burma's ruling military junta suppressed protests and detained many political prisoners. In addition, the removal of many of the existing U.S. sanctions requires the release of all political prisoners in Burma. Similarly, hopes for a democratic government in Burma--as well as national reconciliation-- would depend on the release of prisoners associated with the country's ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their members are released from custody. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnic-based militias will probably require the release of their members currently in detention. [...] The status of Burma's political prisoners is likely to figure prominently in any congressional consideration of U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may choose to examine the political prisoner issue in Burma either separately or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy towards Burma."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-04-24
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings in Vladivostok, Russia: A Preview [August 16, 2012]"Russia will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of seniorlevel meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The main event for the week will be the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting to be held September 8-9, 2012. President Barack Obama will not attend the event; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will lead the U.S. delegation. As host for the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Russia has set the main agenda items as: advancing trade and investment liberalization and regional economic integration; strengthening food security; establishing reliable supply chains; and promoting cooperation to foster innovative growth. The United States hopes to complete priorities established at last year's Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu and support Russia's agenda in cases where the two nations share a common objective. […] Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues--implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. On occasion, the trade liberalization measures proposed to APEC by the United States have required changes in U.S. trade laws. As an APEC member, the United States must contribute to the annual budget of APEC. The Congressional Budget Justification for FY2013 includes a request for $1.028 million for APEC support."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-08-16
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Potential Trade Effects of Adding Vietnam to the Generalized System of Preferences Program [August 14, 2012]"In May 2008, Vietnam formally requested to be added to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program as a 'developing country.' On June 20, 2008, the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced that it was initiating a formal review of Vietnam's eligibility for GSP benefits and would accept public comments on the application until August 4, 2008. Vietnam has already been accepted into several other developed-country GSP programs around the world, including Canada, the European Union (EU), and Japan. The GSP statute provides the President with the authority to designate any country a beneficiary developing country, provided the country complies with various trade and investment policies and labor conditions. Congress does not need to act to approve GSP status for Vietnam. The President is, however, required to notify Congress of his intention. The inclusion of Vietnam into the GSP program is generally viewed as another step in the development of closer bilateral relations."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceJones, Vivian Catherine; Martin, Michael F.2012-08-14
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Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange and U.S.-Vietnam Relations [August 29, 2012]"Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, there has been a gradual warming of bilateral relations between the United States and Vietnam, culminating in the appointment of the first U.S. ambassador to Vietnam in 1996 and the granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to Vietnam in 2007. Over the last three decades, many--but not all--of the major issues causing tension between the two nations have been resolved. One major legacy of the Vietnam War that remains unresolved is the damage that Agent Orange, and its accompanying dioxin, have done to the people and the environment of Vietnam. For the last 35 years, this issue has generally been pushed to the background of bilateral discussions by other issues considered more important by the United States and/or Vietnam. With most of those issues presently resolved, the issue of Agent Orange/dioxin has emerged as a regular topic in bilateral discussions. […] This report examines various estimates of the effects of Agent Orange on Vietnam's people and environment, the history of U.S. policy on the issue, the current cleanup efforts in Vietnam, the various forms of assistance--including U.S. assistance--provided to people with medical conditions associated with dioxin exposure, and the implications for bilateral relations. It concludes with a brief discussion of possible congressional responses to the issue. This report will be updated as conditions warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-08-29
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma [August 8, 2011]"Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an examination of additional sanctions that have been considered, but not enacted, by Congress, or that could be imposed under existing law or executive orders. The report concludes with a discussion of options for Congress. The current U.S. sanctions on Burma are, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government sees as a general disregard by Burma's ruling military junta for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. […] In November 2010, Burma's ruling military junta held parliamentary elections and released prominent opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. In January 2011, Burma's new Union Parliament met for the first time, and on March 30, 2011, the ruling military junta formally dissolved itself and transferred power to the new Union Government. However, various aspects of these changes in Burma--including the selection of senior junta members for many of the more powerful positions in the new Union Government--have raised questions about the extent to which there has been significant political change in Burma. The 112th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of some of the existing sanctions, depending on the conduct of Burma's new Union Government and other developments in Burma. This report will be updated as conditions warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2011-08-08
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U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress [August 8, 2011]"A robust discussion has arisen around U.S. policy towards Burma. Some Members of Congress, senior officials in the Obama Administration, noted Burma scholars, and representatives of various interest groups have weighed in on this discussion, offering their views on the merits of current U.S. policy towards Burma and what policy changes ought to be made. Among the commentators, there is general agreement that more than 20 years of political and economic sanctions, and nearly two years of 'pragmatic engagement,' have not led to the achievement of the stated goals of U.S. policy towards Burma--the release of all political prisoners from detention and the transfer power to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. […] The installation of a new government in Burma and the appointment of Derek J. Mitchell to serve as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma are viewed as creating a 'honeymoon period' in which Congress and the Obama Administration can review and, if desired, adjust U.S. policy towards Burma. The genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma was largely driven by Congress passing legislation after particularly egregious actions by Burma's ruling military junta. The 112th Congress is currently considering legislation (H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res. 17) that would renew certain import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. If the history of the development of U.S. policy towards Burma is indicative, any dramatic new development in Burma--either good or bad--could prompt Congress into action."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.; Mix, Derek E.2011-08-08
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India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations [September 1, 2011]"South Asia emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region's dominant actor with more than 1 billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent great power and 'indispensable partner' of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China's growing clout. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a 'strategic partnership' based on shared values and apparently convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative--first launched in 2005 and codified in U.S. law in 2008--reversed three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, but has not been implemented to date. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement to expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major U.S. arms sales to India are underway. […] Its left-leaning Congress Party-led ruling national coalition has been in power for more than seven years under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an Oxford-trained economist. New Delhi's engagement with regional and other states is extensive and reflects its rising geopolitical status. The national economy has been growing rapidly-- India's is projected to be the world's third-largest economy in the foreseeable future--yet poor infrastructure, booming energy demand, and restrictive trade and investment practices are seen to hamper full economic potential. Despite the growth of a large urban middle-class, India's remains a largely rural and agriculture-based society, and is home to some 500-600 million people living in poverty. This report will be updated periodically."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKronstadt, K. Alan; Kerr, Paul K.; Martin, Michael F.2011-09-01
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma [October 19, 2012]"Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an examination of additional sanctions that have been considered, but not enacted, by Congress, or that could be imposed under existing law or executive orders. It also discusses recent easing of some of those sanctions and provisions under which additional sanctions could be waived or removed. The report concludes with a discussion of options for Congress. The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. The actions of the new quasi-civilian government in Burma have led the Obama Administration to waive some of the existing sanctions in an effort to promote further reforms and to support perceived pro-reform Burmese government officials. The easing of U.S. sanctions has been generally timed to correspond with a significant political development in Burma-U.S. relations. […] The 112th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of some of the existing sanctions, depending on the conduct of Burma's new Union Government and other developments in Burma. This report will be updated as conditions warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-10-19
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Burma's Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions [October 19, 2012]"The installation of the Union Government in 2011 and the undertaking of initial reforms have raised the prospects for the resumption of a democratically elected civilian government in Burma after five decades of military rule. The release of Burma's political prisoners has a central role in U.S. policy and Burma's political future. Many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma were implemented after Burma's ruling military junta suppressed protests and detained many political prisoners. In addition, the removal of many of the existing U.S. sanctions requires the release of all political prisoners in Burma. Similarly, hopes for a democratic government in Burma--as well as national reconciliation-- would depend on the release of prisoners associated with the country's ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their members are released from custody. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnic-based militias may require the release of their members currently in detention. Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary greatly. In November 2011, President Thein Sein stated that there are no political prisoners in Burma because everyone in detention had committed a crime. Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Ko Ko told the press in January 2012 that 128 dissidents remain in detention. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a non-profit organization dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, the Burmese government may have as many as 914 political prisoners in its 42 prisons and 109 labor camps scattered across the country."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-10-19
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress [January 11, 2013]"Since December 2011, the Obama Administration has waived many of the existing sanctions specifically imposed on Burma in an effort to promote greater political and economic reform in the country. Having waived most of the sanctions for which he had the authority to do so, President Obama may approach the 113th Congress about the selective repeal or removal of one or more of the current sanctions on Burma. In addition, the 113th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of some of the existing sanctions on Burma, depending on the conduct of the Burmese government and other developments in the country. […] The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. Burma-specific sanctions began following the Burmese military's violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions with differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements. […] On March 30, 2011, the SPDC formally dissolved itself and transferred power to a nominally civilian government known as the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein, ex-general and former prime minister for the SPDC. President Thein Sein, with the support of Burma's Union Parliament, has implemented a number of political and economic reforms, to which the Obama Administration has responded by waiving or easing sanctions. However, the continuation of serious human rights abuses has raised questions about the extent to which there has been significant political change in Burma, and if the easing of sanctions has been warranted."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2013-01-11
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Free Trade, and the 2008 Meetings in Lima, Peru [March 31, 2009]"Congress and the Executive Branch have historically identified the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as an important organization to help promote the U.S. goal of liberalizing international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world. APEC's commitment to the goal of trade and investment liberalization is embodied in its Bogor Goals, in which APEC members pledged to free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing economies. However, several alternative avenues for the promotion of trade integration in Asia have emerged, challenging the past U.S. focus on APEC. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is promoting the creation of various forms of an all-Asian free trade association that would exclude the United States. In addition, during its last few months, the Bush Administration indicated its intention to enter into negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP), an existing free trade agreement between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. In November 2008, APEC held its annual Leaders' Meeting in Lima, Peru. Although the official theme for the meeting was 'A New Commitment to Asia-Pacific Development,' global economic events overshadowed the event, focusing discussion on resisting protectionist pressures and expediting economic recovery. In their joint meeting statement, the APEC leaders stated that they thought their economies would recover within 18 months. They also expressed their support for the G20 commitment to refrain from erecting new trade barriers for at least 12 months."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2009-03-31
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China's Sovereign Wealth Fund [February 24, 2009]"China established its major sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) on September 29, 2007--six months after it first announced its intention to create such a fund. Financed with $200 billion in initial capital, the CIC is one of the largest sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the world. The creation of CIC was somewhat controversial in China. Both the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) reportedly wanted the CIC under their authority. In the end, the CIC reports directly to China's ruling State Council. However, as part of the interagency struggle, it was decided that the CIC would have to make significant purchases in several state-owned banks, as well as purchase the Central Huijin Investment Corporation (CHIC) from the PBOC. […] There have been calls for greater oversight and regulation of the activities of SWFs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in consultation with many of the leading SWFs, has developed a set of voluntary 'Generally Accepted Principles and Practices' (GAPP) for the operation of SWFs. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has drafted policy guidelines for countries that are recipients of SWF investments. Some international financial experts have suggested elements to be included in such guidelines, including standards for transparency, governance, and reciprocity. Other experts have suggested that the United States should review its current laws and regulations governing foreign investments in the United States, and possibly implement special procedures or restrictions on proposed investments by SWFs. These include financial reporting requirements, limits on SWF ownership of U.S. companies, restrictions on the types of equity investments SWFs can make in U.S. companies, and special tax provisions for SWFs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2009-02-24
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings in Vladivostok, Russia: Postscript [November 19, 2012]"Russia hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, the main event for the week, was held September 8-9, 2012. It was the first time that Russia had hosted the APEC meetings, as well as the first APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting at which all the members were also members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S. expectations for the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting were relatively low for a number of reasons. First, several of the members' leaders either did not attend (e.g., President Obama), were effectively lame ducks (e.g., President Hu Jintao of China), or were facing political uncertainty at home (e.g., Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan), making it difficult for the members to consider major commitments. Second, in the eyes of U.S. officials involved in the preparations for the meetings, Russia's lack of experience and past lack of commitment to APEC weakened the pre-meeting preparations for the Leaders' Meeting. Third, by holding the Leaders' Meeting in September (rather than in November, as in previous years), Russia foreshortened the time to work on various initiatives. Fourth, recent events and initiatives, including the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement negotiations, have raised questions within the Obama Administration about APEC's role on the promotion of greater economic integration in the Asia- Pacific region."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-11-19
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Understanding China's Political System [January 31, 2013]"This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political system of China, the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies. China's Communist Party dominates state and society in China, is committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power, and is intolerant of those who question its right to rule. Nonetheless, analysts consider China's political system to be neither monolithic nor rigidly hierarchical. Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing different sets of interests is common at every level of the system. The report opens with a brief overview of China's leading political institutions. They include the Communist Party and its military, the People's Liberation Army; the State, led by the State Council, to which the Party delegates day-to-day administration of the country; and the National People's Congress (NPC), China's unicameral legislature. […] The second half of the report is devoted to detailed discussion of China's formal political structures--the Party, the military, the State, the National People's Congress, a consultative body known as the China People's Political Consultative Conference, and China's eight minor political parties, all of which are loyal to the Communist Party. Also discussed are other political actors who play a role in influencing policy debates, including the media, big business, research institutes, university academics, associations, and grassroots non-governmental organizations. The report concludes with a discussion of prospects for political reform, noting that while China's new Communist Party chief has called for everyone to be bound by the constitution and law, Party policy is to reject vigorously the notion of a multi-party system, separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, or a federal system, on the grounds that all are unsuited to China's conditions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceLawrence, Susan V.; Martin, Michael F.2013-01-31
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China's Banking System: Issues for Congress [February 20, 2012]"China's banking system has been gradually transformed from a centralized, government-owned and government-controlled provider of loans into an increasingly competitive market in which different types of banks, including several U.S. banks, strive to provide a variety of financial services. Only three banks in China remain fully government-owned; most banks have been transformed into mixed ownership entities in which the central or local government may or may not be a major equity holder in the bank. The main goal of China's financial reforms has been to make its banks more commercially driven in their operations. However, China's central government continues to wield significant influence over the operations of many Chinese banks, primarily through the activities of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In addition, local government officials often attempt to influence the operations of Chinese banks. […] China's banking system raises two key issues that may be of interest to Congress. First, Congress may choose to examine allegations of inappropriate bank subsidies to major Chinese companies, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Second, under its WTO [World Trade Organization] accession agreement, China was to open its domestic financial markets to foreign banks. Congress may consider reviewing China's compliance with the WTO agreement and press the Obama Administration to raise the issue with the Chinese government. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-02-20
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Burma's Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions [July 5, 2012]"The installation of the Union Government in 2011 and the undertaking of initial reforms have raised the prospects for the resumption of a democratically elected civilian government in Burma after five decades of military rule. The release of Burma's political prisoners has a central role in U.S. policy and Burma's political future. Many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma were implemented after Burma's ruling military junta suppressed protests and detained many political prisoners. In addition, the removal of many of the existing U.S. sanctions requires the release of all political prisoners in Burma. Similarly, hopes for a democratic government in Burma--as well as national reconciliation-- would depend on the release of prisoners associated with the country's ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their members are released from custody. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnic-based militias will probably require the release of their members currently in detention. […] The status of Burma's political prisoners is likely to figure prominently in any congressional consideration of U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may choose to examine the political prisoner issue in Burma either separately or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy towards Burma. Congress may also consider taking up legislation--on its own or in response to a request from the Obama Administration--to amend, modify, or remove some of the existing sanctions on Burma. This report will be updated as circumstances require."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMartin, Michael F.2012-07-05
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Understanding China's Political System [March 20, 2013]"This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political system of China, the world's second-largest economic power, one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies. By introducing some of the distinct features and governance challenges of China's political culture, the report aims to help Congress understand the ways in which political actors in China interact, or in some cases, fail to interact, with implications for China's relationship with its neighbors and the world. By introducing some of the leading political institutions and political actors in China, the report aims to help Congress understand where Chinese interlocutors sit within the Chinese political system, gauge their relative influence, and judge the authoritativeness of their statements with respect to official policy. Where appropriate, the report also seeks to highlight ways in which China's political culture affects official Chinese interactions with the U.S. government."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceLawrence, Susan V.; Martin, Michael F.2013-03-20