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U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2010: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy [February 4, 2011]
"After communist North Vietnam's victory over U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975, the United States and Vietnam had minimal relations until the mid-1990s. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1995, overlapping security and economic interests have led the two sides to begin to form a strategic partnership of sorts. In 2010, the Obama Administration indicated its intent to take relations to 'the next level,' and cooperated with Vietnam to coordinate a multicountry diplomatic push back against perceived Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. In the United States, voices favoring improved relations have included those reflecting U.S. business interests in Vietnam's reforming economy and U.S. strategic interests in expanding cooperation with a populous country--Vietnam has 88 million people--that has an ambivalent relationship with China and that is asserting itself on the regional stage. Others argue that improvements in bilateral relations should be conditioned upon Vietnam's authoritarian government improving its record on human rights. The population of more than 1 million Vietnamese Americans, as well as legacies of the Vietnam War, also drive continued U.S. interest. Vietnamese leaders have sought to upgrade relations with the United States in part due to the desire for continued access to the U.S. market and to worries about China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia. That said, Sino-Vietnam relations are Vietnam's most important bilateral relationship and Vietnamese leaders must tiptoe carefully along the tightrope between Washington and Beijing, such that improved relations with one capital not be perceived as a threat to the other."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.
2011-02-04
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [June 8, 2011]
"The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance facilitates the forward deployment of about 36,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy in the region. For Japan, the alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provide maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors, particularly China and North Korea. […] However, the economic problems in Japan and the United States associated with the credit crisis and the related economic recession, together with the impact of the March 11 disasters, will likely dominate the bilateral economic agenda for the foreseeable future. Japan has been hit particularly hard by the financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn. Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) declined 1.2% in 2008 and 5.3% in 2009 but grew 4.0% in 2010. It is expected to increase only 1.0% in 2011 as a result of the March 11 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident. The value of the yen has appreciated and has hit 15-year highs in terms of the U.S. dollar, which could adversely affect Japanese exports to the United States and other countries, contributing to the downturn in Japanese economic growth."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki; Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma . . .
2011-06-08
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Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex [March 17, 2011]
"This purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and examine U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and legislation. The KIC is a six-year old industrial park located in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) just across the demilitarized zone from South Korea. As of the end of 2010, over 120 medium-sized South Korean companies were employing over 47,000 North Korean workers to manufacture products in Kaesong. The facility, which in 2010 produced $323 million in output, has the land and infrastructure to house two to three times as many firms and workers. Products vary widely, and include clothing and textiles (71 firms), kitchen utensils (4 firms), auto parts (4 firms), semiconductor parts (2 firms), and toner cartridges (1 firm). Despite a rise in tensions between North and South Korea since early 2008, the complex has continued to operate and expand. The KIC was not shut down in 2010 despite two violent incidents between the two Koreas that year: the March sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, which was found to be caused by a North Korean torpedo, and North Korea's artillery attack on a South Korean island in November. Indeed, the complex has become virtually the last vestige of inter-Korean cooperation. After the Cheonan sinking, South Korea announced it would cut off all inter-Korean economic relations except the Kaesong complex. It also has reduced the number of South Korean workers--primarily government officials and business managers--at the complex because of worries about them being taken hostage by North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki
2011-03-17
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Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications [March 1, 2011]
"On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement with the European Union (EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventhlargest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea's third-largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Jurenas, Remy; Manyin, Mark E.; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2011-03-01
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [March 24, 2011]
"The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance facilitates the forward deployment of about 36,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy in the region. For Japan, the alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provide maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors, particularly China and North Korea. U.S.-Japan relations have been adjusting to the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) landslide victory in the August 30, 2009, elections for the Lower House of Japan's legislature. The DPJ's victory appears to mark the end of an era in Japan; it was the first time Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was voted out of office. The LDP had ruled Japan virtually uninterrupted since 1955. Since the resignation of the DPJ's first prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, in June 2010, bilateral relations have been smoother under the leadership of Naoto Kan. Although in the past some members of the DPJ have questioned and/or voted against several features of the alliance, the party appears to have shifted its strategic thinking after a series of provocations from North Korea and indications of growing assertiveness from the Chinese military in disputed waters in 2010."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2011-03-24
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Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in North Korea [March 25, 2011]
"A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)--non-profit, charitable institutions--have been active in North Korea since the mid-1990s. Although their work is relatively limited in scope, it is of interest to U.S. policy-makers because of the deep isolation of the regime in Pyongyang. Several American and international NGOs have provided assistance to North Korea in humanitarian relief, development, health, informal diplomacy, science, communication and education. A relatively recent trend is that a growing number of NGOs, particularly in South Korea, are run by or have North Korean defectors on staff. Non-governmental organizations' activities in North Korea have stirred some controversy. Some observers believe that NGOs' projects represent one of the few ways to improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans, and that their work provides first-hand accounts about social conditions in North Korea. Some NGOs have a comparative advantage in dealing with North Korea, with over a decade's experience working with North Korean officials and institutions. However, others argue that NGOs' programs aid North Korea's regime, and that given the lack of transparency and tight restrictions imposed on them by the regime, their funds are vulnerable to diversion by North Korean officials."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Taylor, Mi Ae
2011-03-25
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Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex [April 18, 2011]
"This purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and examine U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and legislation. The KIC is a six-year-old industrial park located in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) just across the demilitarized zone from South Korea. As of the end of 2010, over 120 medium-sized South Korean companies were employing over 47,000 North Korean workers to manufacture products in Kaesong. The facility, which in 2010 produced $323 million in output, has the land and infrastructure to house two to three times as many firms and workers. Products vary widely, and include clothing and textiles (71 firms), kitchen utensils (4 firms), auto parts (4 firms), semiconductor parts (2 firms), and toner cartridges (1 firm). Despite a rise in tensions between North and South Korea since early 2008, the complex has continued to operate and expand. The KIC was not shut down in 2010 despite two violent incidents between the two Koreas that year: the March sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, which was found to be caused by a North Korean torpedo, and North Korea's artillery attack on a South Korean island in November. Indeed, the complex has become virtually the last vestige of inter-Korean cooperation. After the Cheonan sinking, South Korea announced it would cut off all inter-Korean economic relations except the Kaesong complex. It also has reduced the number of South Korean workers--primarily government officials and business managers--at the complex because of worries about them being taken hostage by North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki; Manyin, Mark E.
2011-04-18
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Proposed U.S.-South-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications [December 15, 2010]
"On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement with the European Union (EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea's third-largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). [...] A broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the KORUS FTA. With the modifications in the agreement reached in December, this group also includes the three Detroit-based auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. It still faces opposition from some labor unions and other groups, including Public Citizen. Many U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough to break down South Korean trade barriers or that the agreement will encourage U.S. companies to move their production offshore at the expense of U.S. workers. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy, particularly in light of an FTA signed in October 2010 by South Korea and the EU."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Jurenas, Remy; Manyin, Mark E.; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2010-12-15
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China-North Korea Relations [December 28, 2010]
"The People's Republic of China (PRC) plays a key role in U.S. policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The PRC is North Korea's closest ally, largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery, and arguably the country most able to wield influence in Pyongyang. China also is the host of the Six-Party Talks (involving the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) over North Korea's nuclear program. The close PRC-DPRK relationship is of interest to U.S. policymakers because China plays a pivotal role in the success of U.S. efforts to halt the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to enforce economic sanctions, and to ensure that North Korean refugees that cross into China receive humane treatment. Since late 2008, China has been not just the largest, but also the dominant, provider of aid and partner in trade with North Korea. This report provides a brief survey of China-North Korea relations, assesses PRC objectives and actions, and raises policy issues for the United States. While Beijing still maintains its military alliance and continues its substantial economic assistance to Pyongyang, in recent years many PRC and North Korean interests and goals appear to have grown increasingly incompatible. Increasingly, many Chinese officials and scholars appear to regard North Korea as more of a burden than a benefit. However, Beijing's shared interest with Pyongyang in preserving North Korean stability generally has trumped these other considerations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki; Manyin, Mark E.
2010-12-28
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U.S.-South Korea Relations [December 8, 2010]
"Since late 2008, relations between the United States and South Korea (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) have been arguably at their best state in decades. By the middle of 2010, in the view of many in the Obama Administration, South Korea had emerged as the United States' closest ally in East Asia. Of all the issues on the bilateral agenda, Congress has the most direct role to play in the proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Congressional approval is necessary for the agreement to go into effect. In early December 2010, the two sides announced they had agreed on modifications to the original agreement, which was signed in 2007. South Korea accepted a range of U.S. demands designed to help the U.S. auto industry and received some concessions in return. In the United States, the supplementary deal appears to have changed the minds of many groups and members of Congress who previously had opposed the FTA, which is now expected to be presented to the 112th Congress in 2011. If Congress approves the agreement, it would be the United States' second largest FTA, after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S.-South Korean coordination over policy towards North Korea has been particularly close. The Obama and Lee Administrations have adopted a medium-to-longer-term policy of 'strategic patience' that involves three main elements: refusing to return to the Six-Party Talks without an assurance from North Korea that it would take 'irreversible steps' to denuclearize; gradually attempting to alter China's strategic assessment of North Korea; and using Pyongyang's provocations as opportunities to tighten sanctions against North Korean entities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Taylor, Mi Ae; Manyin, Mark E.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2010-12-08
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [January 13, 2011]
"The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance facilitates the forward deployment of about 36,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy in the region. For Japan, the alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provide maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors, particularly China and North Korea. U.S.-Japan relations have been adjusting to the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) landslide victory in the August 30, 2009, elections for the Lower House of Japan's legislature. The DPJ's victory appears to mark the end of an era in Japan; it was the first time Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was voted out of office. The LDP had ruled Japan virtually uninterrupted since 1955. Since the resignation of the DPJ's first prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, in June 2010, bilateral relations have been smoother under the leadership of Naoto Kan. Although in the past some members of the DPJ have questioned and/or voted against several features of the alliance, the party appears to have shifted its strategic thinking after a series of provocations from North Korea and indications of growing assertiveness from the Chinese military in disputed waters in 2010."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2011-01-13
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [October 6, 2010]
"U.S.-Japan relations have been adjusting to the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) landslide victory in the August 30, 2009, elections for the Lower House of Japan's legislature. With the resignation of the DPJ's first prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, the United States must now adjust to the leadership of Naoto Kan, the new premier. [...] Japan is one of the United States' most important economic partners. Outside of North America, it is the United States' second-largest export market and second-largest source of imports. Japanese firms are the United States' second-largest source of foreign direct investment, and Japanese investors are the second-largest foreign holders of U.S. treasuries, helping to finance the U.S. deficit and reduce upward pressure on U.S. interest rates. Bilateral trade friction has decreased in recent years, partly because U.S. concern about the trade deficit with Japan has been replaced by concern about a much larger deficit with China. One exception was U.S. criticism over Japan's decision in 2003 to ban imports of U.S. beef, which have since resumed, but on a limited basis. However, the economic problems in Japan and the United States associated with the credit crisis and the related economic recession will likely dominate the bilateral economic agenda for the foreseeable future. Japan has been hit particularly hard by the financial crisis and subsequent recession. Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) declined 1.2% in 2008 and 5.3% in 2009 and is forecast to grow 3.0% in 2010. At the same time, the United States is showing signs of recovery. The value of the yen has appreciated and has hit 15-year highs in terms of the U.S. dollar, which could adversely affect Japanese exports to the United States and other countries, contributing to the downturn in Japanese economic growth."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2010-10-06
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea [March 12, 2010]
"Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, of which about 60% has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. As of early March 2010, the United States is not providing any aid to North Korea, except for a small medical assistance program. The Obama Administration, along with the South Korean government, have said that they would be willing to provide large-scale aid if North Korea takes steps to irreversibly dismantle its nuclear program. The main vehicle for persuading Pyongyang to denuclearize is the Six-Party Talks, involving North Korea, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The Talks have not met since late 2008. U.S. energy and food aid to North Korea fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in 2006. The Bush Administration resumed energy aid in the fall of 2007 after progress was made in the Six-Party Talks -- involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia -- over North Korea's nuclear program. The United States and other countries began providing heavy fuel oil (HFO) in return for Pyongyang freezing and disabling its plutonium-based nuclear facilities. However, no additional energy assistance has been provided through the Six-Party process since North Korea withdrew from the talks in 2009, following condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North Korea's April 2009 launch of a suspected longrange missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear device."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Manyin, Mark E.
2010-03-12
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North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List? [June 29, 2010]
"Whether North Korea should be included on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries has been a major issue in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy since 2000, particularly in connection with negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea demanded that the Clinton and Bush Administrations remove it from the terrorism support list. On October 11, 2008, the Bush Administration removed North Korea from the terrorism list. [...] This report describes the rationales for including North Korea on the terrorism list from 1987-2008, for North Korea's delisting in 2008, and the debate in 2010 over whether to re-list North Korea. The major impact of a decision to return North Korea to the list would likely be symbolic, because removing North Korea from the list does not appear to have provided Pyongyang with direct, tangible benefits."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.
2010-06-29
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [September 17, 2009]
"The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. […]. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Japan made its first-ever military deployments in non-combat support of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. In 2004 Tokyo sent non-combat troops to Iraq, despite considerable domestic opposition. In 2005 the United States and Japan announced a sweeping new agreement to strengthen military cooperation. The plan calls for U.S. forces to be realigned and Japan to take on a more active (non-combat) role in maintaining regional and global security. Since mid-2007, political turmoil and divided government in Tokyo slowed or stalled some of this progress in security relations. […]. Bilateral trade friction has decreased in recent years, partly because U.S. concern about the trade deficit with Japan has been replaced by concern about a much larger deficit with China. The exception was U.S. criticism over Japan's decision in 2003 to ban imports of U.S. beef, which have since resumed. However, the economic problems in Japan and United States associated with the credit crisis and the related economic recession and how the two countries deal with those problems will likely dominate their bilateral economic agenda for the foreseeable future. Japan has been hit particularly hard by the financial crisis and subsequent recession. Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) declined 0.7% in 2008 and is projected to decline by 6.2% by the end of 2009 with a modest rebound expected in 2010."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2009-09-17
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [September 2, 2009]
This CRS report discusses recent developments in Japan- U.S. relations, the North Korean Nuclear Test and Missile Launches, the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Downturn, and Political Paralysis in Tokyo, in addition to the following topics: major diplomatic and security issues, regional and historical issues, military issues, economic issues, and Japanese politics. "The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance, with its access to bases in Japan, where about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed, facilitates the forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy. For Japan, the alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provide maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors, particularly China and North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2009-09-02
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea [September 9, 2009]
"Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, about 60% of which has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. U.S. aid fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in 2006. The Bush Administration resumed energy aid in the fall of 2007, after progress was made in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program. [...]. Some have speculated that a desire for increased food donations led Pyongyang to moderate its behavior toward the United States and South Korea in the summer of 2009. If so, the Obama Administration must make a number of decisions, including: whether to resume food aid; if so, whether to condition all or part of its assistance on expansive levels of access and monitoring; and whether to pressure South Korea and China to impose similar conditions on their food aid. [...]. This report will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid to North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Manyin, Mark E.
2009-09-09
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United States Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) [November 16, 2009]
"The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. Established in 1967, it has grown into one of the world's largest regional fora, representing a strategically important group of 10 nations that spans critical sea lanes and accounts for 5% of U.S. trade. This report discusses U.S. diplomatic, security, trade, and aid ties with ASEAN, analyzes major issues affecting Southeast Asian countries and U.S.-ASEAN relations, and examines ASEAN's relations with other regional powers. Much U.S. engagement with the region occurs at the bilateral level, but this report focuses on multilateral diplomacy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lum, Thomas G. (Thomas Gong), 1961-; Manyin, Mark E.; Dolven, Ben
2009-11-16
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South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Outlook [September 30, 2009]
This report discusses recent development in South Korea's domestic politics and its foreign policy outlook. More specific topics include President Lee's political standing, his handling of the South Korean Economy and challenges from the left; U.S.-ROK relations, issues in the U.S.-ROK military alliance, U.S. force deployment and base relocation plans, Wartime Operational Control (OPCON), and the KORUS FTA and economic issues; regional diplomacy including Inter-Korean relations, ROK-Japan relations, ROK-China relations, and ROK-Russia Relations; and options and implications for the United States.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Konishi, Weston S.
2009-09-30
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U.S. Accesion to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) [May 5, 2009]
"In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced that the Obama Administration would launch its formal interagency process to pursue accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), one of the ten-nation organization's core documents. It is expected that this process could be concluded within the year. If the Administration chooses to send a signal (such as signing the agreement) before then, it could do so at the next likely milestone, the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministerial meeting in late July 2009. This report will analyze the legal and diplomatic issues involved with the possible accession to the TAC. […]. Some U.S. and Southeast Asian officials and analysts say that expanding U.S. engagement with ASEAN will help boost Southeast Asia's political stature, particularly as China seeks to continue expanding its influence in the region. The major concern with accession is whether the TAC's emphasis on non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs would constrain U.S. freedom of action, particularly its ability to maintain or expand sanctions on Burma. […]. Other objections have included arguments that acceding would accord greater legitimacy to the ruling Burmese junta; a view that ASEAN is insufficiently 'action-oriented'; and a belief that the TAC is an untested, arguably meaningless agreement. One issue that might arise for U.S. policymakers is whether accession to the TAC should take the form of a treaty, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or whether the President already has sufficient authority to enter the TAC without further legislative action being necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Morrison, Wayne M.; Manyin, Mark E.; Garcia, Michael John
2009-05-05
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Assistance to North Korea [May 20, 2009]
"Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, about 60% of which has paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. U.S. aid fell significantly in the mid-2000s, bottoming out at zero in 2006. The Bush Administration resumed energy aid in the fall of 2007, after progress was made in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program. […]. North Korea's failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks, would restart its nuclear facilities and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. The United States had been providing technical assistance to North Korea to help in the nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took legislative steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. In its FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations budget request, the Obama Administration has asked for over $150 million for North Korea-related energy and denuclearization assistance. This money would supplement existing resources in the event of a breakthrough with North Korea. In separate committee actions, House and Senate appropriators denied these requests. However, they did approve monies for the State Department's general emergency non-proliferation fund that the Administration could use in North Korea. […]. This report will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid to North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Manyin, Mark E.
2009-05-20
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [June 3, 2009]
This CRS report discusses recent developments in Japan- U.S. relations, the North Korean Nuclear Test and Missile Launches, the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Downturn, and Political Paralysis in Tokyo, in addition to the following topics: major diplomatic and security issues, regional and historical issues, military issues, economic issues, and Japanese politics.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2009-06-03
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U.S. Accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) [Updated July 13, 2009]
"In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced that the Obama Administration would launch its formal interagency process to pursue accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), one of the ten-nation organization's core documents. The Administration reportedly hopes to announce its accession at the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministerial meeting July 22-23, 2009. This report analyzes the legal and diplomatic issues involved with accession to the TAC."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Morrison, Wayne M.; Manyin, Mark E.; Garcia, Michael John
2009-07-13
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North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 [July 1, 2009]
"The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea's second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctions on North Korea's arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. [...] This report summarizes and analyzes Res. 1874. On the surface, financial sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea) and its prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary effect... unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being 'tainted' by handling any DPRK transaction. A ban on luxury goods will only be effective if China begins to deny North Korea lucrative trade credits. Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented... While procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous and optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki; Manyin, Mark E. . . .
2009-07-01
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress [February 24, 2010]
"The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance facilitates the forward deployment of about 36,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy in the region. For Japan, the alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provides maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors, particularly China and North Korea. U.S.-Japan relations have been adjusting to the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) landslide victory in the August 30, 2009 elections for the Lower House of Japan's legislature. The victory gave the DPJ, under party president Yukio Hatoyama, control of the government. While most members of the left-of-center DPJ are broadly supportive of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the general thrust of Japanese foreign policy, in the past the party has questioned and/or voted against several features of the alliance, including base realignment and Japan's financial payments for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The Party has put forward a foreign policy vision that envisions greater 'equality' in Japan's relations with the United States, in part through deeper engagement with Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy. The DPJ's victory appears to mark the end of an era in Japan; it was the first time Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was voted out of office. The LDP had ruled Japan virtually uninterrupted since 1955."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Cooper, William H., 1949-
2010-02-24
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U.S. Assistance to Vietnam [Updated February 11, 2005]
"In recent years, many members of Congress have become interested in linking U.S. aid to the human rights situation in Vietnam. One initiative in the 108th Congress, H.R. 1587, proposed capping existing non-humanitarian U.S. assistance programs to the Vietnamese government at FY2004 levels if the President did not certify that Vietnam is making 'substantial progress' in human rights, including religious freedom. In the near term, the substantive impact of H.R. 1587 on U.S. aid would likely have been negligible because at present, no U.S. non-humanitarian assistance is given directly to the government of Vietnam. Thus, if it had been enacted, the bill's principal impact would likely have been symbolic. Proponents of the measure argued that it would pressure the Vietnamese government to improve the country's human rights situation. Critics argued that the bill could chill the warming of bilateral political and security ties that has been taking place slowly over the past several months. On July 19, 2004, the House passed H.R. 1587. Attempts to include stripped-down versions of the measure in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (H.R. 4818) did not succeed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.
2005-02-11
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea [Updated May 26, 2005]
"Since 1995, the U.S. has provided over $1 billion in foreign assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea), about 60% of which has taken the form of food aid, and about 40% in the form of energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Additionally, the Bush Administration has proposed offering North Korea broad economic development assistance in exchange for Pyongyang verifiably dismantling its nuclear program and cooperating on other security-related issues. Although the President has considerable flexibility to offer some forms of short term development assistance, longer term aid would likely require congressional action."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.
2005-05-26
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U.S. Assistance to North Korea [Updated April 26, 2005]
"Since 1995, the U.S. has provided over $1 billion in foreign assistance to the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea), about 60% of which has taken the form of food aid, and about 40% in the form of energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Additionally, the Bush Administration has proposed offering North Korea broad economic development assistance in exchange for Pyongyang verifiably dismantling its nuclear program and cooperating on other security-related issues. U.S. aid to North Korea has been controversial since its inception, and the controversy has been intimately linked to the larger debate over the most effective strategy for dealing with the DPRK. The North Korean Human Rights Act, (passed by the 108th Congress as H.R. 4011, P.L. 108-333) for instance, which includes hortatory language calling for significant increases above current levels of U.S. support for humanitarian assistance to be conditioned upon substantial improvements in transparency, monitoring, and access. Pyongyang has the Act as evidence of the United States hostile policy toward North Korea, and has used it as justification to suspend its participation in the six party talks to resolve the nuclear crisis."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.
2005-04-26
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Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues [November 26, 2003]
From the Document: "Japan and North Korea have not established official relations since the Korean Peninsula, which the Japanese Empire annexed in 1910, was liberated from Japanese rule and divided into two separate states following Japan's defeat in World War II. Attempts to establish normal relations in the early 1990s and again in 2000 ended in failure, due to seemingly unresolvable obstacles. In September 2002, a one-day summit was held in Pyongyang between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the first ever between the leaders of the two countries. Koizumi and Kim momentarily appeared to break longstanding stalemates on several issues and agreed to restart bilateral normalization talks, but the talks subsequently stalled, due to two developments: North Korea's apparent admission to U.S. officials in October 2002 that it had a secret nuclear weapons program based on the process of uranium enrichment; and popular outrage in Japan at Kim Jong-il's admission that North Korea kidnapped 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980 and brought them to North Korea to live. Subsequently, according to the North Korean government, eight of whom died."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.
2003-11-26
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Terrorism in Southeast Asia [Updated April 7, 2004]
"Since September 2001, U.S. has been concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore that are known to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. To combat the threat, the Bush Administration has pressed countries in the region to arrest suspected terrorist individuals and organizations, deployed over 1,000 troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group, increased intelligence sharing operations, restarted military-military relations with Indonesia (including restoring International Military Education and Training [IMET]), provided or requested from Congress over $1.1 billion in aid to Indonesia and the Philippines, and has signed a multilateral counterterrorism agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Niksch, Larry A.; Cronin, Richard P.; Manyin, Mark E.
2004-04-07