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Bug Stops Here: Force Protection and Emerging Infectious Diseases
"Force health protection is an urgent priority for the Department of Defense (DOD), as increasing threats of natural outbreaks of infectious disease could seriously undermine mission readiness and success. U.S. national security might be impacted by military operations in regions with endemic and epidemic occurrences of infectious disease, where disease activity may prevent the successful completion of a mission or operation or may even result in infected soldiers carrying a contagious disease back to the United States. Changing military doctrine and tactics call for a fresh approach to force protection. Rapid deployment of military forces, revised distribution of medical resources in theater, improved body armor, and modern combat casualty care efforts are leading to different illnesses and injuries from those seen in previous conflicts. Emerging infectious diseases in the context of urban warfare, low-intensity conflict, and the rapid movement of service members and civilians, have made a new approach to military medical support imperative. Despite improvements in combat-injury protection and wound management, disturbing trends are developing in infectious diseases in military forces. The purpose of this paper is to review important lessons that have been learned in the past, and to revisit the older but proven principles of force protection that are in danger of being forgotten in today's technology-focused military environment."
National Defense University
Loeb, Cheryl; Thompson, Donald F., Dr.; Swerdlow, Joel L.
2005-11
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Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited
"Nuclear radiation, invisible and detectable only with special instruments, has the power to terrify-in part because of its association with nuclear weapons-and to become an instrument of terrorists. Radioactive isotopes can be spread widely with or without high explosives by a radiological dispersion device
(RDD) or so-called dirty bomb. This paper provides a general overview of the nature of RDDs and sources of material for them and estimates the effects of an assault, including casualties and economic consequences. Many experts believe that an RDD is an economic weapon capable of inflicting devastating damage on the United States. This paper is in full agreement with that assessment
and makes some quantitative estimates of the magnitude of economic disruption that can be produced by various levels of attack. It is also generally believed that even a very large RDD is unlikely to cause many human casualties, either immediately or over the long term. A careful examination of the consequences of
the tragic accident in Goiânia, Brazil, however, shows that some forms of radiological attack could kill tens or hundreds of people and sicken hundreds or thousands. Nevertheless, contrary to popular belief, RDDs are not weapons of mass destruction. The authors recommend several policies and actions to reduce the threat of RDD attack and increase the ability of the Federal Government to cope with the consequences of one. With improved public awareness and ability to respond, it should be possible to strip RDDs of their power to terrorize."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Zimmerman, Peter D.; Loeb, Cheryl
2004-01
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Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era
"The Nunn-Lugar CTR program can rightly be called the Marshall Plan of nuclear nonproliferation. The purpose of this study is to review the techniques developed and used by the Nunn-Lugar program to date, including some closely related activities, and to recommend specific ways in which these techniques could be applied on a global basis to eliminate the various types of nuclear threats faced by the United States. Five categories of nuclear threat reduction will be discussed in this article: 1. Residual nuclear-related security problems in Russia. 2. Nuclear weapons programs in de facto nuclear weapons states. 3. Applying CTR techniques in the cases of former noncooperative states. 4. Nuclear weapons programs in noncooperative states. 5. Insecure storage of fissionable materials in countries around the world."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Goodby, James E.; Loeb, Cheryl; Burghart, Daniel L.
2004-09
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Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
"The most likely means of delivering a nuclear bomb on a major city is through a successful smuggling effort by a terrorist organization. The catastrophic damage it would cause demands cooperative action by all responsible governments. Several U.S. Government programs are in place to deal with this threat. These programs focus on the following: (1) Measures to prevent access by terrorist groups to fissile material, particularly enriched uranium and plutonium, the basic fuel for nuclear bombs; (2) Measures to strengthen international institutions to enable governments to deal more effectively with illicit trade in fissile materials and in equipment that can produce such materials; (3) Measures to enhance international cooperation in intelligence sharing and law enforcement; (4) Cooperative international defense activities designed to intercept illegal trafficking in fissile materials and equipment to produce these materials; and (5) Strengthening the capacity to monitor and detect illicit shipments of fissionable materials at entry points into the United States and, in cooperation with other countries, at key transportation nodes overseas. This report focuses on the last of these programs, and primarily on deployment of sensors overseas. This report provides an overview of the threat from nuclear terrorism; discusses the role of intelligence and risk assessments in countering this threat; provides a brief overview of nuclear detection technologies and issues; briefly summarizes key U.S. Government programs involved in nuclear detection; summarizes domestic legislation, which provides the impetus for increasing international collaboration; and discusses the need for a global approach to nuclear nonproliferation in which international institutions assume a leading and sustained leadership role."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Coffey, Timothy, 1941-; Goodby, James E.; Loeb, Cheryl
2007-07
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Bio-Inspired Innovation and National Security
This book discusses biological warfare defenses. From the text: "Whereas the past 150 years or so might be termed the 'Age of Geology,' we may be moving toward an 'Age of Biology' in which bio-based sustainable practices are the norm. Things such as genetically modified foods are a start but are only the beginning of this trend, and there are vast implications of this for the military: If the raw material of diverse genes is more important to America than the raw material of petroleum, this may influence where and whom the military fights for resources, and will also pose new challenges to foreign policy, international stability, and law. Already there are controversies over who rightfully owns intellectual property rights to discoveries of drugs that stem from rare, indigenous organisms."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Loeb, Cheryl A.; Armstrong, Robert E., 1948-2008; Drapeau, Mark D. (Mark David)
2010
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Reform of the National Security Science and Technology Enterprise
From the Introduction: "A strong science and technology (S&T) program has been vitally important to American national security since World War II and has to date given the United States a strategic advantage over competitors. During World War II and throughout the Cold War, highly specific and large-scale technology needs led to the concentration of national security S&T (NSST) programs in a few agencies, with little cross-agency coordination. Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances have changed greatly. Meeting new and emerging threats to national security--from global climate change to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism--requires an effective mechanism for direction, funding, and integration of the highly fragmented and very wide range of Federally-supported S&T."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Berry, William E.; Coffey, Timothy, 1941-; DeYoung, Don J. . . .
2008-10
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Good Bugs, Bad Bugs: A Modern Approach for Detecting Offensive Biological Weapons Research
"This report outlines a new framework to monitor countries in terms of their potential to engage in covert biological weapons research. This is an effort to develop an indirect approach to measuring a nation's capability to conduct offensive weapons research in both civilian and government or military settings. This report discusses eight possible indicators of illicit biological weapons activities. Through analyzing these indicators, one can indirectly identify areas of possible illicit BW activity. These indicators include: 1. Known chemical or nuclear programs, 2. Number and level of BSL 3-4 facilities in a country, 3. Sophistication of civilian domestic biotechnology capabilities, 4. Known manufacture of rare or unusual biological compounds, 5. Mismatch between number of trained scientists and positions available, 6. Level of business transparency, 7. Number of publications compared to number of scientists, and 8. Complexity of social networking among scientists (both domestically and with scientists from other countries). While not a panacea for monitoring all types of biological proliferation threats, the framework may serve as a guide for government and industry analysts for the type of information that needs to be collected and assessed to make more informed judgments about the likelihood that a particular state is engaging in illicit biological weapons research."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Moodie, Michael, 1948-; Loeb, Cheryl; Armstrong, Robert
2008-12
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