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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [April 27, 2017]
"Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2017-04-27
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Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement [October 31, 2017]
"In an October 13, 2017, announcement of a new U.S. strategy on Iran, President Donald Trump asserted that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran, or permanently ensure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. Trump asserted that, by supporting terrorist groups in the Middle East region and furthering its ballistic missile program, 'Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.' The President also announced that he would not certify to Congress under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17) that continued U.S. sanctions relief to Iran under the JCPOA is 'appropriate and proportionate' to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program. [...] This report analyzes some the options the Administration and Congress might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or INARA, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some potential implications of these options are analyzed as well."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Heitshusen, Valerie
2017-10-31
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [November 25, 2009]
"Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran 'halted its nuclear weapons program,' defined as 'Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work,' in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is 'keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons' and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is 'inherently reversible.' Intelligence community officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA. Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran's action's have not been sufficient to alleviate all of the IAEA's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-11-25
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [January 14, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. [...] However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-01-14
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [August 1, 2016]
From the Summary: "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-08-01
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [June 14, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-06-14
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons [February 12, 2016]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called 'full spectrum deterrence' have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-02-12
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [December 27, 2016]
"In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-12-27
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [February 26, 2016]
"This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2016-02-26
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [July 15, 2013]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.- Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Through these efforts, the United States allocates more than $1 billion each year to threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. However, these programs may slow or stall in the next few years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2013-07-15
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Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [July 9, 2013]
"Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but has instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less by 2018. There are two major international initiatives to address cluster munitions: the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and negotiations under the U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Obama Administration has reiterated U.S. opposition to the CCM, which entered into force August 1, 2010, but participated in negotiations regarding cluster munitions under the CCW."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-07-09
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Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [July 30, 2013]
"Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but has instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. There are two major international initiatives to address cluster munitions: the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and negotiations under the U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Obama Administration has reiterated U.S. opposition to the CCM, which entered into force August 1, 2010, but participated in negotiations regarding cluster munitions under the CCW."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-07-30
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Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [April 29, 2014]
"Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but has instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. There are two major international initiatives to address cluster munitions: the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and negotiations under the U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Obama Administration has reiterated U.S. opposition to the CCM, which entered into force August 1, 2010, but participated in negotiations regarding cluster munitions under the CCW."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Feickert, Andrew
2014-04-29
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [April 28, 2014]
"The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.- Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Through these efforts, the United States allocates more than $1 billion each year to threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. However, these programs may slow or stall in the next few years. [...] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. [...] The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-04-28
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [June 25, 2015]
"The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2015-06-25
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 11, 2015]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. […] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-05-11
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [October 19, 2015]
"The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2015-10-19
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Iran Nuclear Agreement [July 30, 2015]
"On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA) that attempts to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes, in exchange for a broad suspension of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations sanctions. The text of the JCPOA appears to reflect largely what was agreed in an April 2, 2015, framework for a comprehensive agreement. Some issues that were left open in the framework accord were clarified and specified in the JCPOA. The agreement, if it enters into force following review by the U.S. Congress and Iran's political system, will replace a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim nuclear accord agreed to in November 2013 and in operation since January 2014. The Administration and the other P5+1 governments assert that the JCPOA represents the most effective of several alternatives to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon--one of which could conceivably be military action against Iran's nuclear facilities. The Administration also argues that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon remain available even after the JCPOA expires. The Administration further asserts that the JCPOA contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran is found not in compliance with its requirements, although the Administration and many experts acknowledge it is difficult to predict the degree to which international governments might reimpose their sanctions in the event U.N. sanctions are reimposed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.
2015-07-30
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Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress [August 6, 2015]
"The nuclear agreement between Iran and six negotiating powers ('P5+1:' United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and China), finalized on July 14, 2015, raises a wide variety of issues as Congress undertakes a formal review under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17). The Administration submitted the 150+ page text (including annexes) of the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,' (JCPOA) to Congress on July 19, 2015, and the period for congressional review under the act is to conclude on September 17. Should the agreement stand after review processes in Congress and in Iran's legislatures, the JCPOA would enter into force 90 days from July 20, 2015--the date of the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA and called on U.N. member states to assist in its implementation. Broadly, the accord represents an exchange of limitations on Iran's nuclear program for the lifting or suspension of U.S., U.N., and European Union (EU) sanctions. The text contains relatively complicated provisions for inspections of undeclared Iranian nuclear facilities, processes for adjudicating complaints by any of the parties for nonperformance of commitments, 'snap-back' provisions for U.N. sanctions, finite durations for many of Iran's nuclear commitments, and broad U.N., E.U., and U.S. commitments to suspend or lift most of the numerous sanctions imposed on Iran since 2010. Many of the agreement's provisions have raised questions about the degree to which the accord can accomplish the P5+1 objectives that were stated when P5+1-Iran negotiations began in 2006."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.
2015-08-06
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [September 10, 2015]
"The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant. "
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2015-09-10
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Iran Nuclear Agreement [September 9, 2015]
"On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA) that attempts to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes, in exchange for a broad suspension of U.S. sanctions and a lifting of those sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations. The JCPOA largely reflects what was agreed in an April 2, 2015, framework for the accord, and those issues that were left open in the framework agreement were clarified and specified in the JCPOA. The agreement, if it enters into force following review by the U.S. Congress and Iran's political system, will replace a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim nuclear accord in operation since January 2014. The Administration and the other P5+1 governments assert that the JCPOA represents the most effective means to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, and that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon remain available even after the key nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA expire. The Administration further asserts that the JCPOA contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran is found not in compliance with its requirements, although the Administration and many experts acknowledge it is difficult to predict the degree to which international governments might reimpose their sanctions in the event U.N. sanctions are reimposed. Critics of the agreement, including some U.S. allies in the Middle East, express concerns that the accord requires the United States to give up its main source of leverage on Iran, which is the extensive international sanctions regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.
2015-09-09
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Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord [November 26, 2014]
"On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the 'P5+1') finalized an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) requiring Iran to freeze many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from some international sanctions. The period of the interim deal was to be six months, during which time Iran and the P5+1 would attempt to reach a comprehensive deal on the long-term status of Iran's nuclear program. […] Throughout 2014, the attention of the international community increasingly turned to the potential outcome of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear accord. […] In July, the two sides announced that progress--and Iran's compliance with the JPA provisions--justified extending the JPA until November 24, 2014. Intensive negotiations attempted to finalize a deal by that deadline, but the two sides again announced that more time was needed to close still significant gaps in their positions. […] On November 24, Iran and the P5+1 announced that they were extending the talks--and all provisions of the JPA--with the intent of finalizing a detailed agreement by June 30, 2015. […] Some U.S. allies, as well as some in Congress, assert a concern that the P5+1 might accept an accord that does not ensure that Iran could not utilize its nuclear infrastructure to develop a nuclear weapon. Some countries in the region, including the Persian Gulf monarchies, express concern that a final accord would prompt a broader U.S.-Iran rapprochement that could cause the United States to retreat from the Middle East."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-11-26
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Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Tlaks on a Comprehensive Accord [February 2, 2015]
"On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the 'P5+1') finalized an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) requiring Iran to freeze many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from some international sanctions. The period of the interim deal was to be six months, during which time Iran and the P5+1 would attempt to reach a comprehensive deal on the long-term status of Iran's nuclear program. The main elements of the JPA are requirements that Iran freeze, in effect, its production of enriched uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235--the form of enriched uranium in Iran's stockpile that has caused the most concern; dilute and convert the 20% enriched uranium and 5% enriched uranium stocks to other forms that would take time to reverse; halt key elements of its heavy-water reactor program that could lead to a plutonium bomb; and provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with additional information about its nuclear program, as well as access to some nuclear-related facilities which are not covered by Iran's IAEA safeguards agreement. […] The main outstanding issues reportedly center on the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program; the duration of the comprehensive accord; and the extent and sequencing of the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. On November 24, Iran and the P5+1 announced that they were extending the talks--and all provisions of the JPA--with the intent of finalizing a detailed agreement by June 30, 2015. The parties have stated they would first attempt to reach an overarching framework for the agreement by March 24, 2015."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2015-02-02
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Iran Nuclear Agreement [December 15, 2015]
"On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is intended to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes, in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran. The JCPOA largely reflects what was agreed in an April 2, 2015, framework for the accord. The agreement replaces a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim nuclear accord in operation since January 2014. […] A resolution of disapproval of the JCPOA was not enacted by Congress by the deadline of September 17, 2015, set by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17). Iran's legislature approved the agreement and the JCPOA formally took effect on "Adoption Day" (October 18, 2015), the date stipulated by the JCPOA as 90 days after passage of Resolution 2231. On that day, the Administration issued provisional waivers for U.S. sanctions laws, which will take effect once Iran's compliance with initial required nuclear tasks is certified ("Implementation Day"). The Administration has appointed a State Department "coordinator" for implementation of the agreement. Some legislation has been introduced with the stated purpose of redressing asserted weaknesses of the deal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.
2015-12-15
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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [January 7, 2016]
"This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the re-transfer to third party states of such military items."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2016-01-07
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [April 7, 2016]
"Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2016-04-07
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [May 31, 2016]
"Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's 'final assessment on the resolution' of the outstanding issues. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2016-05-31
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [June 13, 2016]
"[…] Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran 'halted its nuclear weapons program' in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is 'keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons' and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is 'inherently reversible.' U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that '[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.' […] Iran and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's 'final assessment on the resolution' of these outstanding issues."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2016-06-13
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [April 13, 2016]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-04-13
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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [April 19, 2016]
"This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the re-transfer to third party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. [...] In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the AECA, is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. Under current law Congress must overcome two fundamental obstacles to block or modify a presidential sale of military equipment: it must pass legislation expressing its will on the sale, and it must be capable of overriding a presumptive presidential veto of such legislation. Congress, however, is free to pass legislation to block or modify an arms sale 'at any time' up to the point of delivery of the items involved. This report will be updated, if notable changes in these review procedures or applicable law occur."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2016-04-19
