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• Iran Nuclear Agreement [May 2, 2018]

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  "On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany-- collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA required constraints that seek to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran. [...] Officials from both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump Administrations have certified that Iran is abiding by its JCPOA commitments. [...] Top Trump Administration officials have argued that the JCPOA does not address Iran's 'malign' activities in the region and any other activities that the Administration considers provocative or destabilizing, such as the continued development of ballistic missiles. Administration officials have also said that these weaknesses in the agreement might lead the Administration to conclude that the JCPOA is not adequately serving U.S. interests. Yet, P5+1 and other U.S. allies argue that the agreement contributes to regional stability and that the United States should continue to implement it. [...]In the 114th and 115th Congresses, legislation has been introduced with the stated purpose of redressing asserted weaknesses of the deal or preventing any U.S. sanctions relief beyond that explicitly promised in the JCPOA.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Katzman, Kenneth

  2018-05-02
• Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit [July 20, 2018]

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  "Multilateral negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program date back to 2003 after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on the existence of clandestine nuclear facilities at Natanz. In October of that year, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom under which Iran temporarily suspended aspects of its nuclear program, including enrichment of uranium, and signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, but also asserted its right to develop nuclear technology. In January 2006, Tehran announced that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. After that time, Iran held multiple rounds of talks with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5 + 1)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.

  2018-07-20
• Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles [May 4, 2020]

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  From the Document: "The U.S. government has in law a number of mechanisms by which it can alter or end the sales of U.S.-origin defense articles when foreign countries misuse such items."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Rosen, Liana W.

  2020-05-04
• U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes [Updated May 7, 2020]

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  From the Introduction: "In March 2018, the United States submitted a proposal to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners that would relax the regime's export guidelines for certain Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S. counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to maintain the MTCR's standards, which are widely regarded as effective."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-05-07
• Iran's Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition [June 19, 2020]

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  From the Document: "U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, implements the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and contains other provisions concerning Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's development of missiles, and arms transfers to and from Iran. The United States has threatened to invoke the resolution's 'snapback' mechanism, which requires the Security Council to reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted pursuant to Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA. The JCPOA, finalized in July 2015 by Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1), requires Iran to implement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Tehran's compliance with the agreement. [...] In May 2018, President Donald Trump issued a memorandum stating that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement. Arguing that subsequent efforts by the remaining JCPOA participants, known as the 'P4+1,' were inadequate to sustain the agreement's benefits for Iran, the government has undertaken some nuclear activities that exceed JCPOAmandated limits. Iranian officials continue to assert that Tehran will resume implementing all of its JCPOA commitments if the P4+1 does so."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-06-19
• Iran's Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition [Updated September 18, 2020]

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  From the Document: "U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, implements the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and contains other provisions concerning Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's development of missiles, and arms transfers to and from Iran. The United States has threatened to invoke the resolution's 'snapback' mechanism, which requires the Security Council to reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted pursuant to Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA. The JCPOA, finalized in July 2015 by Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1), requires Iran to implement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Tehran's compliance with the agreement. Prior to the JCPOA, these programs caused international concern because they could both have produced fissile material for use in nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-09-18
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated November 20, 2020]

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  From the Introduction: "Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-11-20
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated December 10, 2020]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-12-10
• Iran's Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition [Updated October 29, 2020]

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  From the Document: "U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, implements the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and contains other provisions concerning Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's development of missiles, and arms transfers to and from Iran. The United States has threatened to invoke the resolution's 'snapback' mechanism, which requires the Security Council to reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted pursuant to Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA. The JCPOA, finalized in July 2015 by Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1), requires Iran to implement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Tehran's compliance with the agreement. Prior to the JCPOA, these programs caused international concern because they could both have produced fissile material for use in nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-10-29
• Iran's Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition [Updated August 17, 2020]

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  From the Document: "U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, implements the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and contains other provisions concerning Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's development of missiles, and arms transfers to and from Iran. The United States has threatened to invoke the resolution's 'snapback' mechanism, which requires the Security Council to reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted pursuant to Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-08-17
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 8, 2018]

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  "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration has offered some support for existing agreements, but has argued that the United States lacks a 'willing partner' in Russia and, therefore, will not pursue further agreements as long as Russia remains in violation of existing arms control treaties."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2018-05-08
• U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement [May 9, 2018]

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  "On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that his Administration would cease implementing U.S. commitments under the 2015 multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and reimpose all U.S. sanctions that were in place prior to the JCPOA. His announcement made reference to his previous statements on the issue, including an October 13, 2017,announcement of U.S. strategy on Iran and a January 12, 2018, statement pledging to leave the agreement unless Congress and U.S. allies acted to address the full range of U.S. concerns on Iran. In his May 8 and earlier statements, President Trump asserted that the agreement does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran, or permanently ensure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. President Trump also again asserted that the JCPOA provided Iran with additional financial resources with which to pursue its ballistic missile program and support its regional 'malign activities.' In his May 8 statement, President Trump indicated that reimposed U.S. sanctions would succeed in pressuring Iran to renegotiate the JCPOA to accommodate Administration demands. [..] This report analyzes the U.S. pullout from the JCPOA and its potential implications."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Heitshusen, Valerie

  2018-05-09
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [June 22, 2017]

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  "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the re-transfer to third party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. […] In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the AECA, is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. Under current law Congress faces two fundamental obstacles to block or modify a presidential sale of military equipment: it must pass legislation expressing its will on the sale, and it must be capable of overriding a presumptive presidential veto of such legislation. Congress, however, is free to pass legislation to block or modify an arms sale 'at any time' up to the point of delivery of the items involved."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2017-06-22
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [July 25, 2017]

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  "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (Section 36(c) AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration is authorized to proceed with a given sale. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2017-07-25
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [November 19, 2015]

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  "The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2015-11-19
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [May 12, 2015]

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  "The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2015-05-12
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [September 26, 2016]

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  "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's 'final assessment on the resolution' of the outstanding issues. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2016-09-26
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [March 3, 2016]

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  "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's 'final assessment on the resolution' of the outstanding issues. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2016-03-03
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [February 8, 2016]

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  "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's 'final assessment on the resolution' of the outstanding issues. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2016-02-08
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [January 14, 2016]

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  "The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2016-01-14
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [December 7, 2015]

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  "The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2015-12-07
• Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress [December 8, 2014]

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  "U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements ('123' agreements), which are bilateral agreements with other governments or multilateral organizations, have several important goals, including promoting the U.S. nuclear industry, which is increasingly dependent on foreign customers and suppliers, and preventing nuclear proliferation. Increased international interest in nuclear power has generated concern that additional countries may obtain fuel-making technology that could also be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Ensuring the peaceful use of transferred nuclear technology has long been a major U.S. objective, and Congress has played a key role. […] In recent years, some observers and Members of Congress have advocated that the United States adopt new conditions for civil nuclear cooperation. These would include requiring potential recipients of U.S. civil nuclear technology to forgo fuel-making enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. Such protocols augment the IAEA's legal authority to inspect nuclear facilities."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Holt, Mark

  2014-12-08
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [April 4, 2017]

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  "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's "final assessment on the resolution" of the outstanding issues. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2017-04-04
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [April 28, 2014]

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  "In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. [...] The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs' progress since the government began implementing a November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions' to Iran's nuclear programme."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2014-04-28
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [December 20, 2013]

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  "In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. […] The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions' to Iran's nuclear programme. The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2013-12-20
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [July 31, 2013]

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  "In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions' to Iran's nuclear programme. The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2013-07-31
• Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement [April 5, 2018]

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  "In an October 13, 2017, announcement of a new U.S. strategy on Iran, President Donald Trump asserted that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran, or permanently ensure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. Trump asserted that, by supporting terrorist groups in the Middle East region and furthering its ballistic missile program, 'Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.' The President also announced that he would not certify to Congress under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17) that continued U.S. sanctions relief to Iran under the JCPOA is 'appropriate and proportionate' to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Heitshusen, Valerie

  2018-04-05
• Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement [October 11, 2017]

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  "Trump Administration statements, including President Trump's speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, 2017, assert that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration seeks to renegotiate the JCPOA, or negotiate a separate accord, to address the full range of U.S. concerns on Iran. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran--Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany--assert that the JCPOA is succeeding in its core objectives and that its implementation should not be jeopardized. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some potential implications of Administration decisions on the JCPOA are analyzed as well."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Heitshusen, Valerie

  2017-10-11
• Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement [October 5, 2017]

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  "Trump Administration statements, including President Trump's speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, 2017, indicate that the Administration does not believe that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addresses the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration is considering ending or altering U.S. implementation of the JCPOA - a decision that is opposed by the other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran: Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some potential implications of Administration decisions on the JCPOA are analyzed as well."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Heitshusen, Valerie

  2017-10-05
• Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement [September 07, 2017]

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  "Trump Administration statements indicate that the Administration does not believe that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addresses the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration is considering ending or altering U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This report does not analyze the advantages and disadvantages of any specific option, or examine in detail the implications of any particular course of action."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Heitshusen, Valerie

  2017-09-07