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Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [October 5, 2011]
"Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but has instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less by 2018. There are two major international initiatives to address cluster munitions: the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and negotiations under the U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Obama Administration has reiterated U.S. opposition to the CCM, which entered into force August 1, 2010, but is participating in negotiations regarding cluster munitions under the CCW."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-10-05
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [Updated February 12, 2008]
"On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader, global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. […] The Senate approved the conference report by unanimous consent early on December 9, and President Bush signed the bill into law (P.L. 109-401) on December 18, 2006. The law requires that the following, among other things, must occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed: submission of a finalized text of a cooperation agreement to Congress, approval of an IAEA safeguards agreement by the IAEA Board of Governors, consensus agreement within the NSG to make an exception for India, and passage of a joint resolution of approval of the agreement by the Congress. India and the United States reached agreement in July 2007 on the text of a nuclear cooperation agreement, and New Delhi has been conducting discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency since this past November."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-02-12
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [Updated May 20, 2008]
This CRS report discusses the cooperation between the United States and India in the development of a civil nuclear energy program. The report begins by discussing recent developments in the U.S.-Indo nuclear cooperation. In December 2006, President Bush "signed the bill into law (P.L. 109-401)," however, there are certain actions that must be met before "nuclear cooperation can proceed." After this, the report goes into providing background information into U.S.-Indo cooperation in the nuclear sphere. U.S. involvement began during the mid-1950's when it helped India build a nuclear reactor. The report also looks into certain "issues for consideration" that arise due to this nuclear deal. One of these issues is the impact on other nations (especially members of the Nonproliferation Regime) as well as the impact on U.S. Nonproliferation policies. The report concludes by discussing potential issues for the U.S. Congress to consider as a result of this nuclear deal. The report also weighs the potential costs and benefits of the deal- "nonproliferation experts have argued that the potential costs of nuclear cooperation with India to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy may far exceed the benefits. At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a NSG exception. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. Some believe the proposed agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. Others contend that allowing India access to the international uranium market will free up its domestic uranium sources to make more nuclear weapons."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-05-20
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [Updated April 23, 2008]
"On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader, global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the potential costs of nuclear cooperation with India to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy may far exceed the benefits. At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a NSG exception. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. Some believe the proposed agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. Others contend that allowing India access to the international uranium market will free up its domestic uranium sources to make more nuclear weapons."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-04-23
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [June 26, 2012]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. […] The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States 'intends to support India's full membership' in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2012-06-26
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [January 11, 2013]
"The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-01-11
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [February 16, 2012]
"The 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology-items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is
conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Fergusson, Ian F.
2012-02-16
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [July 14, 2011]
"The 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). […] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--the end result of the President's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present EAA or writing new legislation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-07-14
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [May 18, 2012]
"The 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. [...] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--the end result of the President's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present EAA or writing new legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the delicate balance between the maintenance of economic competitiveness and the preservation of national security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Fergusson, Ian F.
2012-05-18
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [May 7, 2012]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. [...] The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States 'intends to support India's full membership' in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2012-05-07
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [December 15, 2011]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2011-12-15
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [August 11, 2011]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2011-08-11
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [July 21, 2011]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. […] However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention. The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States 'intends to support India's full membership' in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2011-07-21
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2010]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) 'that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.' In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-09-30
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [July 17, 2009]
"This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-07-17
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [June 11, 2009]
This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-06-11
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [October 28, 2010]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) 'that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.' In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-10-28
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [Updated November 3, 2008]
This CRS report explores the issues for Congress that come along with nuclear cooperation with India. "On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader, global partnership with India. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. […] P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed bill into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). […] On September 10, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements discussed above have been met. […] In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State has also submitted a report required by P.L. 109-401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approves the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, but it has not yet entered into force."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-11-03
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [Updated October 17, 2008]
This CRS report discusses U.S.- India nuclear cooperation. "On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader, global partnership with India. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-10-17
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [April 1, 2009]
This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management. "
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-04-01
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [October 28, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. [...]. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. According to the Office of the Parliamentarian of the House of Representatives, the 90 days of continuous session for the proposed U.S.-UAE agreement expired October 17, 2009. The UAE cabinet approved the agreement October 26. The two governments need to exchange diplomatic notes in order for the agreement to enter into force. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. [...]. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-28
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [September 15, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. […]. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. […]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. […]. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-15
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [February 24, 2010]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. [...] On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi's IAEA safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India's declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency 'is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule' described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India's safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. The President submitted the required certifications to Congress February 3."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-24
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [February 4, 2010]
"U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). [...] On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi's IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India's declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency 'is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule' described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India's safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA. The President submitted the required certifications to Congress February 3. Furthermore, U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. India also is reportedly insisting that New Delhi and Washington conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi signs contracts with U.S. nuclear firms."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-04
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [February 14, 2011]
"India, which has not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. [...] The NSG, at the behest of the Bush administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention. The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States 'intends to support India's full membership' in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2011-02-14
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [April 19, 2013]
"The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. […] Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system. In April 2010, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new system based on four singularities: [1] a single export control licensing agency for both dual-use and munitions exports, [2] a unified control list, [3] a single enforcement coordination agency, and [4] a single integrated information technology (IT) system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-04-19
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [December 20, 2010]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. The 111th Congress approved a U.S.-UAE bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE January 15, 2009. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg signed a new version of the agreement May 21, 2009; the Obama Administration submitted the proposed agreement to Congress the same day. […] This report provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-12-20
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [May 14, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. […] This report provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-05-14
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [April 8, 2010]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. [...] U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India. New Delhi had reportedly insisted that India and the United States conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi would sign contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. However, the countries announced March 29 that they had concluded the agreement. The Administration must submit the subsequent arrangement to Congress, but has not yet done so. The proposed arrangement shall not take effect if Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval. It is worth noting that U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-04-08
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [June 2, 2011]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India.[…] The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States 'intends to support India's full membership' in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2011-06-02
