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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [July 23, 2012]
"In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. […] Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but then-IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2012-07-23
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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated May 24, 2021]
From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. [Public Law] 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction. The AECA also contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, under which the U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a government-to-government basis. In addition, the law specifies criteria for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of U.S.-government licensed defense articles and services directly from U.S. firms to eligible foreign governments and international organizations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2021-05-24
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [December 4, 2008]
"In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the agency ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The agency has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a September 2008 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. [...]. A September 2008 report from ElBaradei stated that the IAEA 'has not been able to make progress' on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-12-04
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [Updated November 20, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service report about the Iranian Nuclear Program provides and update on the current status of its nuclear activities. "Although Iran claims that its nuclear programs are exclusively for peaceful purposes, they have generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions, most recently in March 2008, which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues at its Natanz centrifuge facility to enrich uranium, expand the number of operating centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran 'halted its nuclear weapons program,' defined as 'Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work,' in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is 'keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons' and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is 'inherently reversible.' Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the agency's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report will be updated as necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-11-20
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Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [Updated May 17, 2021]
From the Document: "The U.S. government has continued to express concerns about China's record concerning the proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to other countries, with more recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear technology. (See CRS [Congressional Research Service] In Focus IF11050, 'New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China', by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.) Official U.S. government reports indicate that the Chinese government has apparently ended its direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but Chinese-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns about entities operating in China that provide other forms of support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit finance and money laundering."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2021-05-17
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India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations [September 1, 2011]
"South Asia emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region's dominant actor with more than 1 billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent great power and 'indispensable partner' of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China's growing clout. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a 'strategic partnership' based on shared values and apparently convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative--first launched in 2005 and codified in U.S. law in 2008--reversed three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, but has not been implemented to date. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement to expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major U.S. arms sales to India are underway. […] Its left-leaning Congress Party-led ruling national coalition has been in power for more than seven years under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an Oxford-trained economist. New Delhi's engagement with regional and other states is extensive and reflects its rising geopolitical status. The national economy has been growing rapidly-- India's is projected to be the world's third-largest economy in the foreseeable future--yet poor infrastructure, booming energy demand, and restrictive trade and investment practices are seen to hamper full economic potential. Despite the growth of a large urban middle-class, India's remains a largely rural and agriculture-based society, and is home to some 500-600 million people living in poverty. This report will be updated periodically."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kronstadt, K. Alan; Kerr, Paul K.; Martin, Michael F.
2011-09-01
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [October 1,2009]
From the Summary: "In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. [...]. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, an August 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-01
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [September 17, 2009]
From the Summary: "In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September 2008. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.[...]Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-17
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [July 30, 2008]
From the Summary: "On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader, global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the potential costs of nuclear cooperation with India to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy may far exceed the benefits. At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a NSG exception. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. Some believe the proposed agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. Others contend that allowing India access to the international uranium market will free up its domestic uranium sources to make more nuclear weapons."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2008-07-30
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 [June 7, 2021]
From the Summary: "Balancing U.S. national security and export competitiveness in U.S. export control policy has been a complex and challenging issue for Congress and the executive branch for a number of decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Reform Act (ECRA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of certain goods, including defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. Additionally, the United States participates in several multilateral export control regimes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Casey, Christopher A.
2021-06-07
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated June 1, 2021]
From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions' provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2021-06-01
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Illicit Fentanyl and Weapons of Mass Destruction: International Controls and Policy Options [March 28, 2022]
From the Document: "As synthetic opioid overdose deaths in the United States reach historic [hyperlink] levels, some policy stakeholders have sought U.S. action in designating [hyperlink] fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Such calls [hyperlink] have also prompted congressional interest [hyperlink]. Although a statutory designation of fentanyl as a WMD does not appear necessary for additional executive branch action to address fentanyl as an illicit drug or chemical weapon, Congress may consider developing legislation to improve upon perceived shortcomings in the U.S. government's approach to addressing fentanyl. [...] Various observers draw rhetorical comparisons between fentanyl abuse and WMDs. For example, the congressionally mandated [hyperlink] Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking assessed [hyperlink] in February 2022 that '[i]n terms of loss of life and damage to the economy, illicit synthetic opioids have the effect of a slow-motion weapon of mass destruction.' Others, including some Members of Congress [hyperlink], note the possible use of fentanyl as a weapon; in media reports [hyperlink], observers [hyperlink] have speculated that fentanyl's increasing availability may prompt U.S. adversaries and nonstate actors to weaponize the drug. Governments have also recently committed to restricting the use of central nervous system-acting (CNS) chemicals, including fentanyl, in law enforcement and other security operations. (In 2002, the Russian military reportedly [hyperlink] deployed an aerosolized form of fentanyl to incapacitate terrorists holding hostages in a Moscow theater; the gas also killed [hyperlink] more than 120 of the hostages.)"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Rosen, Liana W.
2022-03-28
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AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation [Updated March 11, 2022]
From the Document: "On December 1, 2021, President Joseph Biden submitted to Congress an 'Agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information.' This In Focus explains the agreement's substance, as well as provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83- 703; 42 U.S.C. [United States Code]
§§2153 et seq.), concerning the content and congressional review of such agreements. An accompanying message to Congress explains that the agreement would permit the three governments to 'communicate and exchange Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information and would provide authorization to share certain Restricted Data as may be needed during trilateral discussions' concerning a project to develop Australian nuclear-powered submarines. This project is part of an 'enhanced trilateral security partnership' named AUKUS [Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States], which the three governments announced on September 15, 2021. The United States has a similar nuclear naval propulsion arrangement only with the United Kingdom pursuant to the bilateral 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. The partnership's first initiative, according to a September 15 Joint Statement, is an 18-month study 'to seek an optimal pathway to deliver' this submarine capability to Australia. This study is to include 'building on' the U.S. and UK nuclear-powered submarine programs 'to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.' The study is 'in the early stages,' according to a November 2021 non-paper from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which adds that '[m]any of the program specifics have yet to be determined.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2022-03-11
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Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 9, 2022]
From the Summary: "Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions (a major contributor to civilian casualties) to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, DOD issued a new DOD policy that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD 'will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.
2022-03-09
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U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions [Updated January 13, 2020]
From the Document: "The January 2, 2020, U.S. killing in Iraq of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani, generally regarded as one of the most powerful and important officials in Iran, has potentially dramatic implications for the United States. For Congress, it raises possible questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East, broader U.S. global strategy, U.S. relations with partners and allies, the authorization and legality of U.S. military action abroad, U.S. measures to protect its servicemembers and diplomatic personnel, and congressional oversight of these and related issues."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Thomas, Clayton (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs); Katzman, Kenneth; Blanchard, Christopher M. . . .
2020-01-13
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U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions [January 8, 2020]
From the Document: "The January 2, 2020, U.S. killing in Iraq of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani, generally regarded as one of the most powerful and important officials in Iran, has potentially dramatic implications for the United States. For Congress, it raises possible questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East, broader U.S. global strategy, U.S. relations with partners and allies, the authorization and legality of U.S. military action abroad, U.S. measures to protect its service members and diplomatic personnel, and congressional oversight of these and related issues. This report provides background information in response to some frequently asked questions related to the strike and its aftermath."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Thomas, Clayton (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs); Katzman, Kenneth; Blanchard, Christopher M. . . .
2020-01-08
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated April 25, 2022]
From the Summary: "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that the United States has occasionally used to implement its national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many others see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. After the end of the Cold War, the pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the INF Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. It did not support the full five-year extension of the New START Treaty but did seek to negotiate a short-term extension during the latter half of 2020. These talks failed to produce an agreement. It also advocated discussions on a future treaty that would limit all types of U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear weapons, but most arms control analysts doubt that China would participate in this process. The Biden Administration supported the full five-year extension of New START and reached an agreement with Russia that took effect on February 3, 2021."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2022-04-25
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Current and Potential Programs [April 13, 2022]
From the Summary: "Since the dawn of military aviation, the U.S. military has been interested in remotely piloted aircraft. Present-day unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) typically consist of an unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) paired with a ground control station. UAS have become ubiquitous in U.S. military operations since the 1990s with the introduction of the MQ-1 Predator. The U.S. military currently employs several different large UAS, including [1] the Army's MQ-1C Gray Eagle, [2] the Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper, [3] the Navy's MQ-25 Stingray, [4] the Air Force's RQ-4 Global Hawk, [5] the Navy's MQ-4C Triton, and [6] the Air Force's RQ-170 Sentinel. In addition, several other reported programs are either in development or currently undergoing experimentation. These programs include the Air Force's B-21 Raider and the Air Force's RQ-180. As Congress performs its oversight and authorization functions, it may consider several potential issues associated with UAS programs, including [1] the cost of manned versus unmanned aircraft, [2] a lack of acknowledged follow-on programs of record, [3] the management of UAS acquisitions across the Department of Defense, [4] the interoperation of UAS with existing force structure, and [5] export controls of UAS abroad."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hoehn, John R.; Kerr, Paul K.
2022-04-13
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Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production [May 13, 2022]
From the Background: "Iran's nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, Tehran has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but has halted its nuclear weapons program and has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. [...] Since the early 2000s, Tehran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium235 (u-235) isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Tehran asserts that its enrichment program is meant to produce fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) requires Iran to implement various restrictions on its nuclear program, as well as to accept specific monitoring and reporting requirements."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2022-05-13
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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [June 10, 2022]
From the Summary: "This report reviews the process and procedures that apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such items. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the President must formally notify Congress 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally notify Congress 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the transaction. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to these destinations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2022-06-10
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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated May 3, 2022]
From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction. The AECA also contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, under which the U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a government-to-government basis. In addition, the law specifies criteria for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of U.S.-government licensed defense articles and services directly from U.S. firms to eligible foreign governments and international organizations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Grimmett, Richard F.
2022-05-03
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes [Updated May 10, 2022]
From the Introduction: "Beginning in 2017, the United States has submitted a series of proposals to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners that would relax the regime's export guidelines for certain Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S. counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to maintain the MTCR's standards, which are widely regarded as effective. [...] The MTCR, according to its website, 'seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of' nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC weapons) 'by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.' Established in 1987 by the United States and six other countries, the MTCR, which holds several meetings per year and currently consists of 35 partner countries, is an informal voluntary arrangement whose partners agree to apply common export policy guidelines to an annex containing two categories of controlled items. Partner countries implement these guidelines pursuant to national legislation and regularly exchange information on relevant export licensing issues, including denials of technology transfers. The MTCR guidelines apply to both armed and unarmed UAS."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2022-05-10
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated May 20, 2022]
From the Introduction: "Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2022-05-20
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated May 24, 2022]
From the Introduction: "Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2022-05-24