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• Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production [May 13, 2022]

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  From the Background: "Iran's nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, Tehran has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but has halted its nuclear weapons program and has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. [...] Since the early 2000s, Tehran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium235 (u-235) isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Tehran asserts that its enrichment program is meant to produce fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) requires Iran to implement various restrictions on its nuclear program, as well as to accept specific monitoring and reporting requirements."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2022-05-13
• U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes [Updated May 10, 2022]

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  From the Introduction: "Beginning in 2017, the United States has submitted a series of proposals to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners that would relax the regime's export guidelines for certain Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S. counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to maintain the MTCR's standards, which are widely regarded as effective. [...] The MTCR, according to its website, 'seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of' nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC weapons) 'by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.' Established in 1987 by the United States and six other countries, the MTCR, which holds several meetings per year and currently consists of 35 partner countries, is an informal voluntary arrangement whose partners agree to apply common export policy guidelines to an annex containing two categories of controlled items. Partner countries implement these guidelines pursuant to national legislation and regularly exchange information on relevant export licensing issues, including denials of technology transfers. The MTCR guidelines apply to both armed and unarmed UAS."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2022-05-10
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated May 3, 2022]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction. The AECA also contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, under which the U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a government-to-government basis. In addition, the law specifies criteria for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of U.S.-government licensed defense articles and services directly from U.S. firms to eligible foreign governments and international organizations."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Grimmett, Richard F.

  2022-05-03
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated April 25, 2022]

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  From the Summary: "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that the United States has occasionally used to implement its national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many others see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. After the end of the Cold War, the pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the INF Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. It did not support the full five-year extension of the New START Treaty but did seek to negotiate a short-term extension during the latter half of 2020. These talks failed to produce an agreement. It also advocated discussions on a future treaty that would limit all types of U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear weapons, but most arms control analysts doubt that China would participate in this process. The Biden Administration supported the full five-year extension of New START and reached an agreement with Russia that took effect on February 3, 2021."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2022-04-25
• Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Current and Potential Programs [April 13, 2022]

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  From the Summary: "Since the dawn of military aviation, the U.S. military has been interested in remotely piloted aircraft. Present-day unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) typically consist of an unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) paired with a ground control station. UAS have become ubiquitous in U.S. military operations since the 1990s with the introduction of the MQ-1 Predator. The U.S. military currently employs several different large UAS, including [1] the Army's MQ-1C Gray Eagle, [2] the Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper, [3] the Navy's MQ-25 Stingray, [4] the Air Force's RQ-4 Global Hawk, [5] the Navy's MQ-4C Triton, and [6] the Air Force's RQ-170 Sentinel. In addition, several other reported programs are either in development or currently undergoing experimentation. These programs include the Air Force's B-21 Raider and the Air Force's RQ-180. As Congress performs its oversight and authorization functions, it may consider several potential issues associated with UAS programs, including [1] the cost of manned versus unmanned aircraft, [2] a lack of acknowledged follow-on programs of record, [3] the management of UAS acquisitions across the Department of Defense, [4] the interoperation of UAS with existing force structure, and [5] export controls of UAS abroad."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Hoehn, John R.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2022-04-13
• Illicit Fentanyl and Weapons of Mass Destruction: International Controls and Policy Options [March 28, 2022]

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  From the Document: "As synthetic opioid overdose deaths in the United States reach historic [hyperlink] levels, some policy stakeholders have sought U.S. action in designating [hyperlink] fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Such calls [hyperlink] have also prompted congressional interest [hyperlink]. Although a statutory designation of fentanyl as a WMD does not appear necessary for additional executive branch action to address fentanyl as an illicit drug or chemical weapon, Congress may consider developing legislation to improve upon perceived shortcomings in the U.S. government's approach to addressing fentanyl. [...] Various observers draw rhetorical comparisons between fentanyl abuse and WMDs. For example, the congressionally mandated [hyperlink] Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking assessed [hyperlink] in February 2022 that '[i]n terms of loss of life and damage to the economy, illicit synthetic opioids have the effect of a slow-motion weapon of mass destruction.' Others, including some Members of Congress [hyperlink], note the possible use of fentanyl as a weapon; in media reports [hyperlink], observers [hyperlink] have speculated that fentanyl's increasing availability may prompt U.S. adversaries and nonstate actors to weaponize the drug. Governments have also recently committed to restricting the use of central nervous system-acting (CNS) chemicals, including fentanyl, in law enforcement and other security operations. (In 2002, the Russian military reportedly [hyperlink] deployed an aerosolized form of fentanyl to incapacitate terrorists holding hostages in a Moscow theater; the gas also killed [hyperlink] more than 120 of the hostages.)"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Rosen, Liana W.

  2022-03-28
• AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation [Updated March 11, 2022]

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  From the Document: "On December 1, 2021, President Joseph Biden submitted to Congress an 'Agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information.' This In Focus explains the agreement's substance, as well as provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83- 703; 42 U.S.C. [United States Code] §§2153 et seq.), concerning the content and congressional review of such agreements. An accompanying message to Congress explains that the agreement would permit the three governments to 'communicate and exchange Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information and would provide authorization to share certain Restricted Data as may be needed during trilateral discussions' concerning a project to develop Australian nuclear-powered submarines. This project is part of an 'enhanced trilateral security partnership' named AUKUS [Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States], which the three governments announced on September 15, 2021. The United States has a similar nuclear naval propulsion arrangement only with the United Kingdom pursuant to the bilateral 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. The partnership's first initiative, according to a September 15 Joint Statement, is an 18-month study 'to seek an optimal pathway to deliver' this submarine capability to Australia. This study is to include 'building on' the U.S. and UK nuclear-powered submarine programs 'to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.' The study is 'in the early stages,' according to a November 2021 non-paper from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which adds that '[m]any of the program specifics have yet to be determined.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2022-03-11
• Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 9, 2022]

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  From the Summary: "Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions (a major contributor to civilian casualties) to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, DOD issued a new DOD policy that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD 'will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.

  2022-03-09
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated February 17, 2022]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction. The AECA also contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, under which the U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a government-to-government basis. In addition, the law specifies criteria for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of U.S.-government licensed defense articles and services directly from U.S. firms to eligible foreign governments and international organizations."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Grimmett, Richard F.

  2022-02-17
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [December 21, 2021]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions' provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, the government's nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-12-21
• AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation [December 10, 2021]

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  From the Document: "On December 1, 2021, President Joseph Biden submitted to Congress an 'Agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information.' This In Focus explains the agreement's substance, as well as provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. [Public Law] 83- 703; 42 U.S.C. [United States Code] §§2153 et seq.), concerning the content and congressional review of such agreements. An accompanying message to Congress explains that the agreement would permit the three governments to 'communicate and exchange Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information and would provide authorization to share certain Restricted Data as may be needed during trilateral discussions' concerning a project to develop Australian nuclear-powered submarines. This project is part of an 'enhanced trilateral security partnership' named AUKUS, which the three governments announced on September 15, 2021. The United States has a similar nuclear naval propulsion arrangement only with the United Kingdom pursuant to the bilateral 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2021-12-10
• Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [Updated December 8, 2021]

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  From the Document: "In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2021-12-08
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated October 20, 2021]

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  From the Summary: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to thirdparty states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (Section 36(c) AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration is authorized to proceed with a given sale. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-10-20
• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW):budget and U.S. Contributions [August 25, 2021]

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  From the Document: "The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, Netherlands, is the international organization responsible for overseeing implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, or Convention). The parties to the CWC have agreed to destroy and prevent the development and use of chemical weapons, as well as to restrict the use of dual-use chemicals while promoting technical cooperation. Assessed use of chemical weapons by Syria, North Korea, and Russia since 2013 has drawn renewed U.S. and international attention to chemical weapons issues and placed additional demands on the OPCW."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Blanchfield, Luisa

  2021-08-25
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated August 18, 2021]

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  From the Introduction: "Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-08-18
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated June 21, 2021]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions' provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, the government's nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-06-21
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 [June 7, 2021]

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  From the Summary: "Balancing U.S. national security and export competitiveness in U.S. export control policy has been a complex and challenging issue for Congress and the executive branch for a number of decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Reform Act (ECRA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of certain goods, including defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. Additionally, the United States participates in several multilateral export control regimes."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Casey, Christopher A.

  2021-06-07
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated June 1, 2021]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions' provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-06-01
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated May 24, 2021]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. [Public Law] 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction. The AECA also contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, under which the U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a government-to-government basis. In addition, the law specifies criteria for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of U.S.-government licensed defense articles and services directly from U.S. firms to eligible foreign governments and international organizations."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-05-24
• Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [Updated May 17, 2021]

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  From the Document: "The U.S. government has continued to express concerns about China's record concerning the proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to other countries, with more recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear technology. (See CRS [Congressional Research Service] In Focus IF11050, 'New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China', by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.) Official U.S. government reports indicate that the Chinese government has apparently ended its direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but Chinese-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns about entities operating in China that provide other forms of support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit finance and money laundering."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-05-17
• U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions [Updated April 30, 2021]

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  From the Document: "U.S. law establishes the conditions under which the U.S. government and U.S. commercial entities may sell defense articles to foreign countries. This In Focus provides an overview of the main laws and policies that may limit such sales on the basis of human rights concerns."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Rosen, Liana W.

  2021-04-30
• U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy [Updated April 8, 2021]

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  From the Document: "On January 31, 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced a new policy on the use of antipersonnel landmines (APLs). According to a January 31, 2020, DOD memorandum, President Trump 'decided to cancel Presidential Policy Directive-37 (PPD-37),' which was issued by the Obama Administration in January 2016. The Administration adopted the new policy following an internal DOD review ordered by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis that was completed in 2018."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-04-08
• IAEA Budget and U.S. Contributions: In Brief [Updated April 2, 2021]

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  From the Introduction and Background: "The United States has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the agency's 1957 founding. The IAEA Statute was approved on October 23, 1956, by the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was held at United Nations (U.N.) headquarters. Article II of the Statute, which came into force on July 29, 1957, describes the agency's purpose: The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. The IAEA, an autonomous intergovernmental organization that has a relationship agreement with the U.N., has 172 member states, including the United States. The agency's missions include promoting nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear technology for medical and agricultural purposes, as well as implementing safeguards agreements in more than 180 countries. Countries that are not members of the IAEA may still be subject to agency inspections or receive IAEA technical assistance."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Blanchfield, Luisa

  2021-04-02
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated March 11, 2021]

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  From the Introduction: "This report provides an overview of many of the key arms control and nonproliferation agreements and endeavors of the past 40 years. It is divided into three sections. The first describes arms control efforts between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union, covering both formal, bilateral treaties, and the cooperative threat reduction process. The second section describes multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts, covering both formal treaties and less formal accommodations that have been initiated in recent years. The final section reviews treaties and agreements that address chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. The report concludes with several appendices. These provide a list of treaties and agreements that the United States is a party to, a description of the treaty ratification process, and a list of the bilateral and international organizations tasked with implementation of arms control efforts."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2021-03-11
• Iran's Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition [Updated March 1, 2021]

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  From the Document: "U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, implements the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and contains other provisions concerning Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's development of missiles, and arms transfers to and from Iran. In August 2020, the United States has invoked the resolution's 'snapback' mechanism, which requires the Security Council to reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted pursuant to Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA. The JCPOA, finalized in July 2015 by Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1), requires Iran to implement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Tehran's compliance with the agreement. Prior to the JCPOA, these programs caused international concern because they could both have produced fissile material for use in nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-03-01
• U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes [Updated February 1, 2021]

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  From the Introduction: "Beginning in 2017, the United States has submitted a series of proposals to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners that would relax the regime's export guidelines for certain Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S. counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to maintain the MTCR's standards, which are widely regarded as effective. [...] The MTCR, according to its website, 'seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of' nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC weapons) 'by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.' [...] The MTCR guidelines apply to both armed and unarmed UAS. According to the MTCR, Category I items are the most sensitive and include complete UAS 'capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, their major complete subsystems … and related software and technology,' as well as 'specially designed' production facilities for these UAS and subsystems. Partner governments should have 'a strong presumption to deny' such transfers, regardless of their purpose, but may transfer such items on 'rare occasions.' [...] Regime partners have greater flexibility with respect to authorizing exports of Category II items, which include less sensitive and dual-use missile related components."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-02-01
• Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions [January 29, 2021]

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  From the Document: "President Joseph Biden and members of his Administration have expressed an intention to reverse various Trump Administration policies toward Iran, particularly the Trump Administration's decision to end its participation in the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement known as the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). This report provides background and analysis on the agreement, the conditions under which the United States might re-enter it, and potential legal, congressional, and regional implications. The JCPOA, which was finalized on July 14, 2015, by Iran and the United States and five other powers (Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), exchanged relief from international sanctions for restrictions on Iran's nuclear program."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.; Elsea, Jennifer . . .

  2021-01-29
• Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [January 22, 2021]

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  From the Document: "The U.S. government has continued to express concerns about China's record concerning the proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to other countries, with more recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear technology. [...] Official U.S. government reports indicate that the Chinese government has apparently ended its direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but Chinese-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns about entities operating in China that provide other forms of support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit finance and money laundering."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2021-01-22
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated December 10, 2020]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-12-10
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated November 20, 2020]

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  From the Introduction: "Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-11-20