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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated March 18, 2019]
From the Document: "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms."
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2019-03-18
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [February 15, 2011]
"In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a November 2010 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2011-02-15
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [May 2, 2011]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. [...] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report will be updated annually, or as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-05-02
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [January 13, 2011]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 60-90 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-01-13
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Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability [December 9, 2010]
"In September 2010, media reports emerged about a new form of cyber attack that appeared to target Iran, although the actual target, if any, is unknown. Through the use of thumb drives in computers that were not connected to the Internet, a malicious software program known as Stuxnet infected computer systems that were used to control the functioning of a nuclear power plant. Once inside the system, Stuxnet had the ability to degrade or destroy the software on which it operated. Although early reports focused on the impact on facilities in Iran, researchers discovered that the program had spread throughout multiple countries worldwide. From the perspective of many national security and technology observers, the emergence of the Stuxnet worm is the type of risk that threatens to cause harm to many activities deemed critical to the basic functioning of modern society. The Stuxnet worm covertly attempts to identify and exploit equipment that controls a nation's critical infrastructure. A successful attack by a software application such as the Stuxnet worm could result in manipulation of control system code to the point of inoperability or long-term damage. Should such an incident occur, recovery from the damage to the computer systems programmed to monitor and manage a facility and the physical equipment producing goods or services could be significantly delayed. Depending on the severity of the attack, the interconnected nature of the affected critical infrastructure facilities, and government preparation and response plans, entities and individuals relying on these facilities could be without life sustaining or comforting services for a long period of time."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Theohary, Catherine A.; Kerr, Paul K.; Rollins, John
2010-12-09
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2010]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) 'that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.' In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-09-30
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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status [October 18, 2010]
"Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in considering the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferationspecific legislation in the 111th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on the regimes. The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006 and 2009, Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in non-compliance with its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including greater restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT with nuclear weapons, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain in the treaty regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2010-10-18
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [October 7, 2010]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-10-07
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CRS Issue Statement on WMD and Missile Proliferation [January 8, 2010]
From the Document: "The possible proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (known collectively as Weapons of Mass Destruction--WMD) and their delivery systems to additional nations or subnational groups poses significant challenges for U.S. national security policy. The complex challenges presented by the threat of WMD proliferation have diplomatic, technological, and economic aspects. The United States is a signatory to several international agreements, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention, that seek to contain the spread of these weapons to other nations. Washington also pursues policies that seek to slow or prevent the proliferation of weapons or materials from specific countries, such as Russia, Pakistan, and China, and to dissuade or prevent the acquisition of these weapons and related technologies by specific countries, such as Iran and North Korea, and subnational or terrorist groups."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-01-08
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [November 12, 2009]
"Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install and operate additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. [...] Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the IAEA's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report expands and replaces CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni, and will be updated as necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-11-12
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [November 17, 2009]
"This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant. [...] The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a November 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-11-17
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [September 17, 2009]
"In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September 2008. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.[...]Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-17
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [November 5, 2009]
"India and the United States announced July 27, 2007, that they had reached agreement on the text of a nuclear cooperation agreement. P.L. 109-401, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, which President Bush signed into law December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive such an agreement with India from several requirements of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. President Bush submitted the text of the proposed agreement to Congress September 10, 2008. Additionally, the President submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) 'that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.' In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS), which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report, which is required by section 104 of P.L. 109-401, on various aspects of the agreement."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-11-05
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [September 15, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. […]. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. […]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. […]. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-15
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [September 29, 2009]
"Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. […] Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran 'halted its nuclear weapons program,' defined as 'Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work,' in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is 'keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons' and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is 'inherently reversible.' Intelligence community officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA. Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the IAEA's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report expands and replaces CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni, and will be updated as necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-29
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [October 1,2009]
"In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. [...]. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, an August 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding 'possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.' The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-01
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [Updated April 1, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "U.S. military commanders continue to be concerned about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons in a destabilized Pakistan. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified March 31, 2009, that 'Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.' […] Pakistani efforts to improve the security of the country's nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-04-01
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [May 15, 2009]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. Pakistan does not have a stated nuclear policy, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is thought to be primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan's top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan's international proliferation network. Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-05-15
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated August 12, 2009]
"This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.[…] In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September 2008."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-08-12
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [June 11, 2009]
This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-06-11
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [Updated June 12, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-06-12
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [July 17, 2009]
"This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-07-17
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [July 30, 2009]
This report addresses the instability in Pakistan as an issue of the security of the country's nuclear weapons. "Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-07-30
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [February 2, 2010]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.- Russian relationship."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-02
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues [February 23, 2010]
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 'minimum credible deterrent' is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan's security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-23
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress [February 24, 2010]
"India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would 'work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India' and would 'also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,' in the context of a broader partnership with India. [...] On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi's IAEA safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India's declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency 'is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule' described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India's safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. The President submitted the required certifications to Congress February 3."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2010-02-24
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [April 1, 2009]
This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management. "
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-04-01
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [February 10, 2009]
"This report provides an overview of many of the key arms control and nonproliferation agreements and endeavors of the past 40 years. It is divided into three sections. The first describes arms control efforts between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union, covering both formal, bilateral treaties, and the cooperative threat reduction process. The second section describes multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts, covering both formal treaties and less formal accommodations that have been initiated in recent years. The final section reviews treaties and agreements that address chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. The report concludes with several appendices. These provide a list of treaties and agreements that the United States is a party to, a description of the treaty ratification process, and a list of the bilateral and international organizations tasked with implementation of arms control efforts. Additionally, The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report replaces CRS Report RL30033. It will be updated annually, or as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-02-10
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [October 21, 2009]
"Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install and operate additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran 'halted its nuclear weapons program,' defined as 'Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work,' in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is 'keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons' and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is 'inherently reversible.' Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the IAEA's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-21
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [October 28, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. [...]. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. According to the Office of the Parliamentarian of the House of Representatives, the 90 days of continuous session for the proposed U.S.-UAE agreement expired October 17, 2009. The UAE cabinet approved the agreement October 26. The two governments need to exchange diplomatic notes in order for the agreement to enter into force. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. [...]. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-28