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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [October 28, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. [...]. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. According to the Office of the Parliamentarian of the House of Representatives, the 90 days of continuous session for the proposed U.S.-UAE agreement expired October 17, 2009. The UAE cabinet approved the agreement October 26. The two governments need to exchange diplomatic notes in order for the agreement to enter into force. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. [...]. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-10-28
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [September 15, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. […]. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. […]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. […]. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-09-15
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [April 1, 2009]
This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management. "
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-04-01
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [June 11, 2009]
This CRS report "provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options." From the summary: "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. The Obama Administration has not submitted the proposed agreement to Congress for the required review period. [...]. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE's 'civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation' and, 'the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed' in the UAE. The agreement also states that future cooperation may encompass training, scientific exchanges, and technical assistance, including in the areas of nuclear security, infrastructure protection, and nuclear fuel and waste management."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-06-11
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [January 30, 2018]
"In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--a chief goal of President Obama's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the EAA [The Export Administration Act] or enacting replacement legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present nonproliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the balance between maintaining economic competitiveness and preserving national security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2018-01-30
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [October 18, 2012]
"Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. […] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--the end result of the President's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present EAA or writing new legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the delicate balance between the maintenance of economic competitiveness and the preservation of national security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2012-10-18
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [December 20, 2010]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. The 111th Congress approved a U.S.-UAE bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE January 15, 2009. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg signed a new version of the agreement May 21, 2009; the Obama Administration submitted the proposed agreement to Congress the same day. […] This report provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2010-12-20
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United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation [May 14, 2009]
"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. […] This report provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2009-05-14
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [April 19, 2013]
"The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. […] Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system. In April 2010, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new system based on four singularities: [1] a single export control licensing agency for both dual-use and munitions exports, [2] a unified control list, [3] a single enforcement coordination agency, and [4] a single integrated information technology (IT) system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-04-19
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [January 13, 2014]
"The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology -- items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. […] Administrative enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies, while criminal enforcement is carried out by the Department of Commerce, units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2014-01-13
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [July 14, 2011]
"The 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). […] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--the end result of the President's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present EAA or writing new legislation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2011-07-14
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [February 16, 2012]
"The 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology-items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is
conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Fergusson, Ian F.
2012-02-16
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [September 20, 2013]
"The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. […] Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system. In April 2010, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new system based on four singularities: (1) a single export control licensing agency for dual-use, munitions exports, and Treasury-administered embargoes. (2) a unified control list, (3) a single primary enforcement coordination agency, and (4) a single integrated information technology (IT) system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-09-20
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U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [January 11, 2013]
"The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2013-01-11
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [May 22, 2018]
"Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The Export Administration Act (EAA) legislated dual-use controls, but it has expired and such controls are presently maintained under IEEPA authorities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2018-05-22
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [October 30, 2018]
"Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2018-10-30
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [August 9, 2018]
"Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The Export Administration Act (EAA) legislated dual-use controls, but it has expired and such controls are presently maintained under IEEPA authorities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2018-08-09
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Nuclear Cooperation: Part 810 Authorizations [April 18, 2019]
From the Document: "Secretary of Energy Rick Perry told Congress in late March that he had approved Part 810 authorizations for Saudi Arabia. Under U.S. law, nuclear-related exports require an export license or other authorization. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et seq.), requires a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (known as a '123' agreement after the relevant section of the AEA) for the export of commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) export licensing authority (10 C.F.R. 110). These include nuclear reactors and U.S.-origin special nuclear material, which the regulation defines as plutonium, uranium-233, or enriched uranium. The AEA also requires a 123 agreement for exports involving 'restricted data,' defined as 'all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2019-04-18
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U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions [Updated May 6, 2019]
From the Document: "U.S. law establishes the conditions under which the U.S. government and U.S. commercial entities may sell defense articles to foreign countries. This In Focus provides an overview of the main laws and policies that may limit such sales on the basis of human rights concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Rosen, Liana W.
2019-05-06
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Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation [Updated April 9, 2019]
From the Document: "U.S. companies have provided proposals to Saudi authorities in relation to a planned tender for nuclear reactor construction in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with the kingdom's nascent nuclear energy program. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has entered into agreements concerning possible civil nuclear cooperation with several countries (Table 1, right). In July 2017 the Saudi cabinet approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity production and desalination amid a larger effort to diversify the Saudi economy and expand the use of renewable energy. Saudi authorities expressed hopes of signing contracts for reactor construction in 2018, but did not do so. Depending on its nature and extent, future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require executive branch authorizations and/or congressional approval of bilateral agreements. Saudi plans also are fueling debate in Congress over regional nuclear proliferation and security dynamics."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.
2019-04-09
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [January 8, 2018]
"Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The Export Administration Act (EAA) legislated dual-use controls, but it has expired and such controls are presently maintained under IEEPA authorities. [...] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--a chief goal of President Obama's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the EAA or enacting replacement legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the balance between maintaining economic competitiveness and preserving national security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2018-01-08
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated June 6, 2019]
From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2019-06-06
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [Updated April 5, 2019]
From the Document: "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Fergusson, Ian F.
2019-04-05
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [Updated April 1, 2019]
From the Document: "Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2019-04-01
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated April 1, 2019]
From the Document: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2019-04-01
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated March 18, 2019]
From the Document: "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms."
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2019-03-18
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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated April 1, 2019]
From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.
2019-04-01
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U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [Updated March 5, 2019]
From the Document: "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.
2019-03-05
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [July 21, 2014]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-07-21
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Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2013]
"Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. […] A major policy concern of the United States has been the use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria, which could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. […] On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with 'military action against Syrian regime targets' in response to the August 21 attack and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons 'on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2013-09-30
