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• States' Obligations Under Additional Protocols to IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements [October 23, 2017]

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  "Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) treaty, which entered into force in 1970, requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), which are of indefinite duration, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These agreements are based on a model described in Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153), which states that such agreements 'should provide for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied' to all nuclear material of potential proliferation concern 'in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' The scope of a CSA agreement is not limited to nuclear material declared by a state, but includes all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within that country. This was a change from the pre-NPT version of IAEA safeguards, described in Information Circular 66 (INFCIRC/66), which depended on verifying declared material at specific facilities. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the IAEA's ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to a CSA is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government. After a CSA enters into force, the government is required to provide the IAEA with lists of all nuclear material in the country and nuclear facilities, along with associated design information. The agency subsequently verifies the correctness and completeness of those declarations using various verification methods."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2017-10-23
• Iran Nuclear Agreement [September 15, 2017]

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  "Multilateral negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program date back to 2003 after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on the existence of clandestine nuclear facilities at Natanz. In October of that year, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom under which Iran temporarily suspended aspects of its nuclear program, including enrichment of uranium, and signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, but also asserted its right to develop nuclear technology. In January 2006, Tehran announced that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. After that time, Iran held multiple rounds of talks with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.

  2017-09-15
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [September 19, 2017]

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  "Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2017-09-19
• U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes [January 10, 2019]

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  "In March 2018, the United States submitted a proposal to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners that would relax the regime's export guidelines for certain Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S. counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to maintain the MTCR's standards, which are widely regarded as effective. [...] Congress has frequently expressed interest in issues concerning UAS development and use, as well as missile proliferation, and also conducts oversight of U.S. UAS exports."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-01-10
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [Updated May 10, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-05-10
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated August 14, 2019]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such military items."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Grimmett, Richard F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-08-14
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated June 6, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-06-06
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [Updated December 20, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-12-20
• Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation [Updated February 12, 2020]

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  From the Overview: "U.S. companies have provided proposals to Saudi authorities in relation to a planned tender for nuclear reactor construction in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom's nuclear energy program remains nascent, and, in recent years, the Saudi government has entered into agreements concerning possible civil nuclear cooperation with several countries (Table 1). In July 2017 the Saudi cabinet approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity production and desalination amid a larger effort to diversify the Saudi economy and expand the use of renewable energy. Saudi authorities expressed hopes of signing contracts for reactor construction in 2018, but did not do so. Depending on its nature and extent, future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require executive branch authorizations and/or congressional approval of bilateral agreements. Saudi plans also are fueling debate in Congress over regional nuclear proliferation and security dynamics."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-02-12
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated January 30, 2020]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such military items."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Grimmett, Richard F.

  2020-01-30
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Status [Updated October 9, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-10-09
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated October 17, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-10-17
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated November 19, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-11-19
• Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer [Updated March 4, 2020]

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  From the Summary: "In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2020-03-04
• New U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy [February 28, 2020]

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  From the Document: "On January 31, 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced a new policy regarding the use of antipersonnel landmines (APL). According to a January 31, 2020, DOD memorandum, President Trump 'decided to cancel Presidential Policy Directive-37 (PPD-37),' which was issued by the Obama Administration in January 2016. The Administration adopted the new policy following an internal DOD review ordered by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis that was completed in 2018."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-02-28
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated March 12, 2020]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions' provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-03-12
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [Updated March 3, 2020]

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  From the Document: "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress '30' calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (Section 36(c) AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified '15' calendar days before the Administration is authorized to proceed with a given sale. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2020-03-03
• Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations [Updated December 9, 2019]

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  From the Summary: "Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions' provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. [...] This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-12-09
• U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions [January 8, 2020]

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  From the Document: "The January 2, 2020, U.S. killing in Iraq of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani, generally regarded as one of the most powerful and important officials in Iran, has potentially dramatic implications for the United States. For Congress, it raises possible questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East, broader U.S. global strategy, U.S. relations with partners and allies, the authorization and legality of U.S. military action abroad, U.S. measures to protect its service members and diplomatic personnel, and congressional oversight of these and related issues. This report provides background information in response to some frequently asked questions related to the strike and its aftermath."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Thomas, Clayton (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs); Katzman, Kenneth; Blanchard, Christopher M. . . .

  2020-01-08
• U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions [Updated January 13, 2020]

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  From the Document: "The January 2, 2020, U.S. killing in Iraq of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani, generally regarded as one of the most powerful and important officials in Iran, has potentially dramatic implications for the United States. For Congress, it raises possible questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East, broader U.S. global strategy, U.S. relations with partners and allies, the authorization and legality of U.S. military action abroad, U.S. measures to protect its servicemembers and diplomatic personnel, and congressional oversight of these and related issues."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Thomas, Clayton (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs); Katzman, Kenneth; Blanchard, Christopher M. . . .

  2020-01-13
• Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [July 14, 2016]

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  From the Summary: "Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments over the past two decades. These assessments indicate that [1] there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and [2] Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2016-07-14
• IAEA Budget and U.S. Contributions: In Brief [Updated February 3, 2020]

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  From the Document: "The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], an autonomous intergovernmental organization related to the United Nations, has 171 member states, including the United States. Its missions include promoting nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear technology for medical and agricultural purposes, as well as implementing safeguards in more than 180 countries. A country does not have to be a member in order to have inspections or receive IAEA technical assistance. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to forego developing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons. To ensure compliance with this requirement, the treaty also requires these states to conclude comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements. Such agreements are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material. [...] The United States is the largest contributor to the IAEA, providing an estimated $200 million annually in assessed and voluntary contributions. The share of U.S. contributions is typically about 25% of the regular IAEA budget, as is the case for FY2020, but can fluctuate slightly from year to year, depending on such factors as the total budget and number of members that are assessed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham

  2020-02-03
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [Updated January 28, 2020]

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  From the Document: "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Fergusson, Ian F.

  2020-01-28
• U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative [October 18, 2012]

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  "Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called 'dual-use' goods and technology--items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. […] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--the end result of the President's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present EAA or writing new legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the delicate balance between the maintenance of economic competitiveness and the preservation of national security."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2012-10-18
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [Updated April 5, 2019]

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  From the Document: "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.; Fergusson, Ian F.

  2019-04-05
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [Updated March 5, 2019]

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  From the Document: "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2019-03-05
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [January 8, 2018]

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  "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The Export Administration Act (EAA) legislated dual-use controls, but it has expired and such controls are presently maintained under IEEPA authorities. [...] In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--a chief goal of President Obama's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the EAA or enacting replacement legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the balance between maintaining economic competitiveness and preserving national security."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2018-01-08
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [January 30, 2018]

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  "In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system--a chief goal of President Obama's proposal--or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the EAA [The Export Administration Act] or enacting replacement legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present nonproliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the balance between maintaining economic competitiveness and preserving national security."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2018-01-30
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [October 30, 2018]

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  "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2018-10-30
• U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative [August 9, 2018]

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  "Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The Export Administration Act (EAA) legislated dual-use controls, but it has expired and such controls are presently maintained under IEEPA authorities."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Kerr, Paul K.

  2018-08-09